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FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF LIFE

AN ESSAY ON CITIZENSHIP AS PURSUIT OF VALUES

BY

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TO

H. M. M.

Praesidium et dulce decus meum

PREFACE

THE arrangement of this volume may seem to call for some explanation. It was begun as a short treatise on Citizenship, with special reference to the problem of World Citizenship; but it was soon found impossible to deal with the subject at all satisfactorily without some discussion of the values that are aimed at in human life. I tried at first to deal with these in the course of the discussion of the problems of citizenship; but this proved to be somewhat confusing. Hence I have been led to consider the general significance of value before entering upon the treatment of citizenship. I have become convinced, as some others have been, that the consideration of values is the fundamental problem of philosophy, as distinguished from the work of the special sciences. Bosanquet was the writer who, in his later years, most definitely emphasized this view. On some points I have ventured to express a certain degree of divergence from his views; but it is possible that the divergence is not much more than verbal. His chief work bearing upon the fundamental problems of citizenship—*The Philosophical Theory of the State*—was written a good many years ago, before he had formulated his final views about value; and he did not emphasize this conception as much as he might have done at a later stage in his brilliant career. He dwelt upon the conception of the General Will, rather than upon that of the Common Good; but I think it is comparatively easy to translate what he says in terms of ultimate value. In the later editions of his book he modified his earlier statements to a considerable extent; and it is probable that, in view of many misunderstandings, as well as of some changes in his own outlook, he might have made further modifications in them.

The fact that the writing of this book has occupied me for a number of years, and that my views of its scope and plan have undergone changes in the interval, has perhaps resulted in a certain lack of unity and sometimes in unnecessary repetition. But repetition may perhaps occasionally be better than too

frequent reference from one part to another. Possibly I may have quoted too much from other writers. When something that I wanted to say has been better said by others than I could hope to say it myself, I have thought it right to give readers the benefit of the best, as well as to support myself by their authority. The subject is one of so much general interest and importance that I have sought to avoid unnecessary technicalities in the treatment of it.

Those who are acquainted with Professor Muirhead's work as Editor of the Library of Philosophy will hardly need to be informed that I have derived much help from his exceedingly friendly criticisms and suggestions, for which I am very grateful. The book owes a great deal to him; but he must not be held responsible for any of my errors or shortcomings. I am also much indebted to Dr. J. E. Turner for very valuable assistance in reading the proofs and preparing the Index.

The substance of some parts of the book has already been published in the *Hibbert Journal* and the *Journal of Philosophical Studies*; and I have to thank the Editors of those journals for permission to reproduce the material with some modifications.

J. S. MACKENZIE

LONDON,
July 1928

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INTRODUCTION

PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE

ACCORDING to Pope, 'the proper study of mankind is man'; and, in a similar way, Goethe has put into the mouth of Wilhelm Meister the saying that man is the only being who is interesting to man. Neither of these statements can be accepted without great qualifications. Certainly Goethe did not confine his interests to human affairs; and, if Pope did, it probably tended to limit his outlook on human life itself. It is surely clear that the proper study of mankind is everything in the heavens above and on the earth beneath, and even some things that can hardly be properly said to be contained in either—such as mathematical and other general concepts (including the concept of value). At any rate, in dealing with human life, we are necessarily led to pay some attention to all the things that human beings deal with—*quicquid agunt homines*; and it would not be easy to set limits to these. It remains true, however, that human life concerns us more nearly than any other distinguishable aspect of the Universe in which we live. It is true also that, in some respects, we can study human life in ways in which it is hardly possible for us to study anything else. It may not be altogether right to say that no created spirit can penetrate into the inner secrets of nature; many of its secrets have been discovered; but, at least, the secrets of the human heart are more directly accessible to us. Its bitterness, as well as its sweetness, is apprehended in our own experience; and we can interpret, with some degree of confidence, the expressions that are given to them by others. We can hardly be quite as sure of the ways in which other animal beings feel; and it needs a very elaborate study to discover some of the ways in which more purely physical processes take place and influence one another. We know, in particular, from our own conscious experience, that our activities are directed towards the realization of more or less definitely

conceived ends. We do not know, with any comparable degree of directness, how far the activities of more purely animal beings are guided by similar purposes. It is at least improbable that plants are so guided; and we have considerable grounds for believing that more purely physical processes do not imply any conscious pursuit of ends. This is not, however, necessarily to be taken as implying that these physical processes are in no way directed towards the realization of ends. Clocks and other human contrivances are so directed; and it may be that the processes of nature have somehow been similarly contrived, though in a much more recondite fashion. But about this we cannot at present do much more than speculate.

When the Greeks began to form speculative views about the processes of nature, they tended (probably under the influence of ideas that were derived, to some extent, from foreign sources[1]) to think that everything might be made intelligible by reference to certain simple elements, such as fire, air, water, and earth; but this method of interpretation was soon felt to be unsatisfactory, even as applied to purely physical processes; and conceptions derived from reflection on human life —such as those of Love and Strife—began to be introduced. It was gradually realized, however, that in human life at least forces of this kind do not operate in a purely mechanical fashion, but are to some extent guided by the idea of ends. It would seem to have been Socrates who first definitely called attention to this—taking his cue, to some extent, from Anaxagoras's emphasis on *Mind*. Plato, in a memorable and well-known passage in the *Phaedo*, represents him as blaming the earlier philosophers for their neglect of the idea of purpose, and as urging that his own activities at least could not be interpreted without reference to certain ends and guiding principles that were definitely present to his mind. And he suggested that it was probably incorrect to regard even the apparently blind processes of nature as being wholly without such guidance. He urged that even the place of the earth and its relations to other bodies could probably not be rightly understood without some attempt to show that its place and relations were the *best*. Few would now be prepared to maintain

[1] Burnet's *Early Greek Philosophy* may be referred to on this subject.

that it could be at all directly shown that such relations are the best. It is generally recognized that it is only to living things and their direct products that such teleological interpretations can be immediately applied, and that it is only in human life that the presence of definite purposes can be with any confidence known to be present. This recognition has led to the distinction between what are sometimes called the positive sciences, which are directed to the study of certain comprehensive aspects of the actual happenings in nature and in human life, and the normative sciences—chiefly Logic, Metaphysics, Ethics and Aesthetics[1]—which are concerned with the great ends of Truth, Goodness and Beauty, by which human life is more or less consciously guided. The consideration of these ends constitutes a main part of what is now understood by philosophy, as distinguished from the more purely physical sciences and even from the definitely psychological study of the processes that go on in the minds of men and that appear to go on, in a somewhat different way, in the minds of animals.[2] It is difficult—perhaps impossible—to make a quite

[1] Perhaps the mathematical sciences should be regarded as occupying an intermediate position between the two groups. On the meaning of 'normative,' reference may be made to Mr. W. E. Johnson's *Logic*, vol. i. pp. xx–i, and 225–6.

[2] See Bosanquet's essay on *Science and Philosophy* (in the volume of essays collected by our Editor-in-Chief, Professor Muirhead), where it is urged that the study of values is the essential task of philosophy, as distinguished from the special sciences. I believe this to be the best way of making the distinction; and I think it was in the development of Greek philosophy that the distinction was most clearly brought out. By the definite recognition of Value as the central problem of philosophy, Bosanquet succeeded more fully than any other recent writer in giving a complete account of its main problems in all their most essential aspects. Hence, in what follows, I have made more use of his work than of that of any other writer. Of course, like everyone else, he is open to some criticism in detail —especially, I think, in his references to the most ultimate metaphysical issues. In a good deal of modern philosophy these issues have tended to be somewhat obscured, chiefly owing to the predominance of the physical sciences which are only very gradually being brought into relation to philosophical conceptions. It has certainly become much more possible in recent years than it was in previous generations to make this relation clear, and we are thus tending to return to the Platonic (or perhaps Socratic) conception of the idea of Good as the ultimate interpretative principle. But we are only indirectly concerned with its larger implications in the present study. For further light on it, readers may be referred to Professor Muirhead's book on *Philosophy and Life* and to his very admirable Introduction to the second series of *Contemporary British Philosophy*.

rigid division between these different studies. The results of any one, at least, have to be used in others; but, in our present study, we are almost exclusively concerned with human ends. The consideration of the most important and fundamental of these ends is what we understand by the study of Values; and the present essay is an attempt to examine their place and relations in human thought and life, with special reference to their bearing on social problems. The first part is concerned with the most general problems; the second is an attempt to deal, in a somewhat more detailed way, with those problems that are definitely social. The details of those that belong to the special provinces of Logic, Ethics and Aesthetics, as well as those that concern Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Religion, though not entirely ignored, are more slightly referred to.

PART I

THE PROBLEM OF VALUE

CHAPTER I

THE GENERAL CONCEPTION OF VALUE

We have already noted that Socrates was one of the first, if not the very first, who emphasized the idea of Value by urging that we can only properly understand human life, and perhaps even the Universe within which that life is carried on, by asking what is *best*. This question, however, is not an altogether easy one to answer, even with reference to human life, and still more with reference to the Universe in general. We have, on the whole, to be content with giving some account of *how* things happen, rather than of *why* they happen as they do. Hume[1] and others have been somewhat sceptical as to the possibility of explaining, at all fully, even how physical events take place. We know, for instance, that if we throw an elastic ball against a smooth surface at a particular angle, it will rebound in a particular direction; but it is not at once apparent how it comes to move in that special way. Still less can it be said to be obvious that that is the best way in which it might move. Modern science, however, has gone a long way to explain the general conditions that lead it to behave as it does. Similarly, we know that if an apple becomes detached from the tree on which it grows, it falls to the ground. If we had not noticed this and a number of similar occurrences, we might have supposed that it was just as likely to fly upwards. Newton went a considerable way to account for its actual motion by connecting it with the general idea of gravitation, which helps to explain the motion of the planets and of the earth itself as well as the fall of apples; but it still left us in the dark as to why that tendency should be found in nature at all, and indeed even as to how it operated. The more recent theories that are specially associated with the name of Einstein have carried Newton's explanation a great deal farther; and have enabled us to connect the particular instance of gravitation with the

[1] Especially in his *Enquiry*.

more general way in which events occur in the spatio-temporal order;[1] but even this does not enable us to see why there should be this particular spatio-temporal order at all. It does not enable us to see that it is the *best* way in which events might be supposed to occur. In human life, however, it does seem possible to see that certain modes of behaviour are better than others, especially when we take account, not merely of individual activities, but of the social groups within which these activities occur. We thus get a good deal nearer to the Why. This is the subject with which we are to be mainly concerned in what follows. In the meantime it may suffice to note that, even in the simplest individual actions, it is nearly always apparent that there is some quite definite purpose. Human beings have nearly always some discoverable end in view in their activities, though it may not always be quite clearly apparent even to themselves, and though it may not always be apparent to others either that the end is the best that they might pursue or that the means that they adopt are the best to secure it. Even if the activity in question is only of the nature of play, the player at least aims at winning the particular game in which he is engaged; or, if he does not, there is some discoverable ground for the absence of this desire. He may think it better that someone else should win it; and in that case the winning of it by someone else is the good that he seeks. Sometimes, no doubt, the precise ground for such desires may not be readily discoverable. There may be a prize to be secured by winning the game; or there may be some glory in winning it or some satisfaction in the exhibition of skill. Or again, the winning of the game may only be an end that is temporarily adopted in order to give definiteness to the activities. The real object may be to secure exercise or relaxation; and these may be sought for the sake of health or pleasure. Reflections of this kind have led many to think that the only ultimate ends are pleasure and the enhancement of vitality (the latter being perhaps only for the sake of the former).

[1] This is all that Mr. Russell, for instance, claims for it. 'It puts the law of gravitation in a recognizable place among physical principles, instead of leaving it, as heretofore, an isolated and unrelated law' (*The Analysis of Matter*, p. 80).

If such a conclusion could be taken as valid, we should be led to the view that pleasure is the only thing that has intrinsic value in human life. This is a view to which some consideration will have to be given at a later stage, although the full discussion of it belongs properly to Ethics. On the face of it, it is not a wholly satisfactory answer as applied to the entire field of human activities. Still less could it be used to throw any direct light on the movements of the planets and other cosmic occurrences.

The difficulties involved in applying the conception of Ends or Values to the problems of human life, and still more to those of the Universe in general, have sometimes led to a certain depreciation of the study of them or, as it has often been called, the study of Final Causes. Bacon said that 'the research into final causes, like a virgin dedicated to God, is barren and produces nothing.' It does not appear, however, from his own investigations, that he intended altogether to condemn the inquiry into such causes. To be 'dedicated to God' may be the highest honour; and it is pretty clear that Bacon did not mean to deny this.[1] But we know that all excellent things are apt to be difficult; and it is certainly not easy to assure ourselves that we have reached a conception of Value that can be taken as final and complete; and the recognition of this difficulty has given rise to a tendency to deal mainly with values that clearly cannot be regarded as quite final or intrinsic. In our own country, in particular, the general study of Value was, until comparatively recent years, mainly confined to the investigation of the conditions that determine the values that are attached to economic goods and services. The interest that has been more recently aroused in the wider aspects of the subject is largely due to the influence of the great Austrian philosopher, Alexius Meinong, and his immediate followers. Even before he wrote, however, something had been done in our own country to extend the scope of the inquiry; and, as I am not attempting to write a systematic treatise on the whole subject of Value, it may be well to begin here with some reference to that.

[1] About this reference may be made to Dr. Broad's essay on *The Philosophy of Francis Bacon*, pp. 14–15.

Ruskin, in his two books called *Unto this Last* and *Munera Pulveris*, rendered an important service by directing attention to the somewhat narrow sense in which the conception of Value was commonly employed in the treatment of economic problems. Further reference will have to be made to this at a later stage. In the meantime, a very short statement must suffice. When we speak of values in connection with things that can be bought and sold, we are apt to think primarily of what is called their Exchange Value, *i.e.* the price that we might get or that we might be required to give for them. In this sense, it has been commonly said that 'the value of a thing is just as much as it will bring.' But many things are 'priceless'; and, even when things have a price, the price may give very little indication of what the things are really worth to those who buy or sell; and still less of what they may be expected to contribute permanently to human well-being. The price of things depends more on the labour and difficulty involved in procuring them than on the contribution that they make to human welfare. But Wealth has been commonly interpreted as meaning the possession of things, including control over the services of persons, that are highly priced, or the possession of the means of procuring such things or services. In opposition to this interpretation, Ruskin declared emphatically that 'the only Wealth is Life'; and that Value should properly be taken to mean what 'avails' for the support or furtherance of Life. No doubt, this is partly a verbal question. What was meant might be otherwise expressed by saying that, in considering real values, what we have to estimate is the degree in which *Welfare* is promoted, rather than the degree in which *Wealth* is produced. Recent writers on Economics—notably Professor Pigou—have adopted the term Welfare as best expressing what is aimed at in the practical applications of economic theory.[1]

[1] Reference may also be made to the book on *Industry and Civilization* by Mr. C. Delisle Burns and to several other recent writings, especially those of Mr. J. A. Hobson. It can hardly be said, however, that either Mill or Marshall ignored the consideration of Welfare—certainly not the latter; but it is extremely difficult to determine in detail what constitutes welfare. Some considerations bearing upon it will be found in Part II, especially Chapter VII; but it is not possible in such a book as this to do more than touch on the fringes of the subject.

No doubt, it may be urged that this also is a term that is not self-explanatory; nor is it self-evident what we are to understand by the promotion of Life. Herbert Spencer, Mr. Lloyd Morgan and others have discussed this a good deal, both from the biological and from the more purely human point of view; but into the results of such discussions we cannot enter at the present stage or indeed, with any completeness, at any stage in this study. It is sufficiently evident that human beings are higher in the biological scale than plants or what we refer to as the lower animals; but it is not so easy to say how the superiority of one human being or one stage of human civilization over another is properly to be estimated. Ruskin sought to give a clue to this by pointing to the connection of the term Value with the idea of *availing*, and by noting that there are other terms from the same root, especially Validity and Valour. What is valid may be said to avail in the pursuit of knowledge; and valour at least tends to avail in certain modes of action. Reflection on this suggests that there are different modes of Value, more or less definitely connected with what psychologists commonly distinguish as the three main aspects of our conscious life—the knowing aspect, the feeling aspect, and the active or conative aspect. We value knowledge; we value what yields direct enjoyment; and we value efficient action. Hence it has been commonly said that there are three great values in human life—Truth, Beauty and Goodness. Other things —such as Health, Wealth and particular forms of social organization—are then regarded as only instrumental to the achievement of those supreme ends. How far this can be accepted as a final account of the most purely intrinsic values is a question that we are not yet in a position to consider.[1] We must first inquire what these terms are to be taken

[1] The subject is discussed in Chapter VII of this Part. For the general philosophical theory of value, reference may be made to the book by Professor W. M. Urban, *Valuation, its Nature and Laws*. The more recent work by Professor Perry may also be consulted with advantage, together with Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures and Ward's *Realm of Ends*. It is also very ably discussed, though with a more specific reference, in Professor Sorley's book on *Moral Values and the Idea of God* and more fully in Professor G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica*.

to mean and how their meanings are related to one another. But at least they may serve to give us a starting-point for more detailed investigation, especially into the chief values that are pursued by human beings in their communal life.

CHAPTER II

THE VALUE OF TRUTH

THAT a certain value is attached to Truth, is shown by the interest that is taken in pure science and philosophy, and indeed also in the details of human history. Truth, as Professor Alexander has urged,[1] always involves at least a certain *appreciation*. The value that is attached to it, however, is not always intrinsic. The interest that is taken in pure science is partly—sometimes even mainly—with a view to its practical applications; and even that which is taken in history and philosophy is partly created by the light that they throw on the fundamental problems of practical life. Philosophy is generally regarded as including the theory of the State and the education of the citizen for his place in it. It is only necessary to remember the prominent place that such discussions have in the Dialogues of Plato and in the writings of Rousseau, Fichte, Hegel, Comte, Mill, Spencer, Green, Bosanquet, and many others. Hence it is not quite clear that many people attach a supreme value to Truth, purely for its own sake.[2] It has even been said that 'where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise'; and more than one of the most eager votaries of knowledge have declared that, if they held truth in their hands, they would let it go again for the pleasure of pursuing it. Wordsworth went even farther, characterizing the results of scientific study as 'barren leaves,' and contrasting them unfavourably with the simple enjoyment of childhood. It is well to remember, however, that he accompanied this attitude with the attribution of a finer and deeper insight to the mind of the child, whom he addresses as 'mighty prophet, seer blest!' And, when it is said

[1] *Space, Time and Deity*, vol. ii. p. 237.

[2] Professor Laird has definitely denied that Truth should be regarded as one of the intrinsic values (see *A Study in Realism*, p. 125), and he seems to think this too obvious to call for discussion. It will be seen, however, as we proceed, that there is a sense in which I am disposed to agree with him. The subject is more fully dealt with below, in Chapter VII.

that ignorance may be bliss, it is perhaps forgotten that even madness or drunkenness may be bliss; yet few sane or sensible people would be willing to gain bliss at such a cost. Those who think of the pursuit of Truth, rather than the attaining of it, as that which possesses supreme value, are regarding it as a game; and it is true that some of those who have been most eager in the search—such as the late Dr. Bosanquet—have been rather fond of referring to their strenuous activities as a game that they played. Even in a game, there is generally some hope of winning; but it seems to be true that, if it could be won without playing, the interest in it would be largely gone. To admit that this is the case with regard to Truth itself, is not necessarily to deny that it has intrinsic value: it is at most only to deny that it is the only or complete value; just as, if Beauty is a supreme value, there may also be a value in the act of creating it. It must be admitted, I think, that those who seek for Truth generally have in their minds an anticipation of some purposes that it will serve; but those who fix their minds too exclusively upon these are apt to lose some of the ardour of pursuit. According to Bacon's metaphor, they are like Atalanta running after the golden apples and neglecting to pursue the race. Their curiosity is quenched when they are not able to see any direct uses to which the discovery can be put. They forget—to use another homely illustration—that a baby cannot be put to any immediate use. Happily babies have a way of forcing themselves on people's attention; but some other things of great importance lack this power. When there is not any such extraneous interest, it is doubtful whether many people can be said to care much for knowledge for its own sake. Even when Truth is valued in a quite disinterested way, it is generally correct to say that what is valued is not particular parts or aspects of knowledge, but rather the insight into the general structure of reality that these particular fragments of knowledge yield. So long as it can properly be said that 'knowledge comes, but wisdom lingers,' the value that is attached to the knowledge is, in general, instrumental rather than intrinsic. Now, when knowledge becomes insight, it is not merely an apprehension of particular truths, but rather the partial apprehension of a

complete and well co-ordinated system of reality. The value that is attached to such a system lies, at least to a large extent, in the appreciation of the beauty of such a harmonious totality. Apart from this, particular parts of knowledge may very well present themselves to us as 'odious truths,' or at least as truths that have no particular value in themselves. It may be true, for instance, that most of us know very little; and the apprehension of that truth has a certain instrumental value. It helps to keep us humble and anxious to know more; but it is not in itself beautiful, and it has no intrinsic value. Hence it may be thought that it is the beauty of certain ultimate truths that we value, rather than truth simply as such. In order, however, to be clear about this, it is necessary to inquire somewhat carefully into the meaning of Truth, about which several different theories have been held. There are three main theories, which are briefly characterized as the theory of Correspondence, the theory of working Hypotheses, and the theory of Coherence. Each of them contains a certain degree of truth; but I believe the third may be taken as combining what has value in the other two doctrines.

The clearest statement of the theory of Correspondence is, I think, that which has been given by Mr. Russell.[1] The application of the theory is best seen in simple matters of fact, such as the circumstances of human history. In a true history or accurate dramatic representation, the occurrences that are set before us correspond exactly to the events that have occurred in the past. This is seldom the case in dramatic performances and perhaps not even very often the case in the more sober records of history. Shakespeare's historical plays or Mr. Shaw's *Saint Joan*, or the romances of Sir Walter Scott, cannot be accepted as showing us exactly what happened in the past. Shakespeare certainly took very great liberties

[1] See especially the elaborate discussions in his *Philosophical Essays*. In order to maintain the theory of Correspondence, he finds it necessary to introduce many subtle distinctions which could not be properly discussed in such a sketch as the present. The chief instance that he uses is the fact that Charles I died on the scaffold. It would be generally admitted that this is true; but it is difficult to see how it could be held to have intrinsic value, in the sense in which beautiful music or a noble action may be held to have such value; nor, of course, does Mr. Russell contend that it has.

even with English history. Perhaps some of Mr. Drinkwater's plays may be accepted as more exact representations. Some historians, on the other hand, are very reliable. Carlyle, although an imaginative writer, took great pains to find out what the real facts were; and probably there may be one or two other historians who are even more reliable. In such cases there may be said to be an exact correspondence between the records and the actual occurrences in the past. A similar correspondence may be found in the accurate accounts that are given of scientific experiments or of astronomical and other observations. Thus there is a very large field over which the theory of correspondence can be applied; and the ascertainment of truth in this sense has evidently great value; though often its value is instrumental rather than intrinsic. Knowledge of the facts of history yields important lessons; but it is doubtful whether the knowledge of every trivial detail would have much value. It would at least be too overwhelming for our limited minds. For most of us a judicious selection of the most important facts has more value; and it is not certain even that the occasional perversion of the facts that is usually to be found in stories or dramatic representations has not a greater value for us than an exact record of every detail would have. In general, it is not mere 'facts' that we value, but rather facts that have a certain place and significance in an interesting process of development. What we want in such studies is insight, rather than simple knowledge. This is, I believe, the meaning of Aristotle's saying that Drama is more philosophical and more serious than History. It brings out the significance of great events without unimportant details; and it is only significant truths that have much value.

But there are also some truths that do not directly relate to matters of fact. The truths of mathematics, for instance, are of this character. Even so simple a truth as that $2 + 2 = 4$ has been called in question on the ground that, in putting things together, some change is nearly always brought about. England and Wales, for instance, are two countries; and Scotland and Ireland are other two. But when they are made into a United Kingdom, they do not remain just as they were in isolation. Some of them tend to coalesce and others to split

up. The same is even more apparent in the case of chemical combinations. Hence some have been led to deny the truth of the statement that $2 + 2 = 4$. But, of course, it is true in pure mathematics. Two and two do not always *make* four; but they always *are* four, so long as they remain two and two. Again, mathematicians are in the habit of using some expressions, such as $\sqrt{-1}$ and infinity; and, so far as I am aware, no objects can be pointed to that correspond directly to these expressions. Yet the results that are arrived at by the use of these conceptions appear to be true. Some of them at least can be tested by correspondence, though the conceptions themselves cannot be tested in that way. Hence some have been led to put forward a different theory of Truth, which brings out more definitely the way in which it may be said to have value. The Pragmatists (such as William James, Professor Dewey and Dr. Schiller) maintain that the right conception of Truth is not to be found in correspondence, but in working. And 'working' seems to mean *leading to valuable results*. From this point of view, both the mathematicians and the dramatists may be justified. We cannot point to anything that can be seen to be infinitely great or infinitely little; and it may be—I think it is the case[1]—that there are no such things; and yet it may be true that these conceptions are useful for the discovery of important truths; and it may be said that, for this reason, they may be regarded as themselves containing truth. Similarly, it may be said that Shakespeare's plays of *Henry IV* or Mr. Shaw's *Saint Joan*, though containing a good deal that does not exactly correspond to the historical occurrences, are nevertheless true in the sense that they enable us to see the significance of the historical occurrences in a way that more accurate details would not. It may be urged also that there are some cases in which truth depends on antecedent beliefs. There is a well-known phrase in Vergil's *Aeneid*, '*possunt quia posse videntur*,' 'They can because they think they can.' A confident belief that something can be done often enables us to do what, without such a belief, would hardly

[1] Hegel's conception of infinity as that which is complete in itself seems to be the only one that is capable of concrete realization. But this is a difficult subject that cannot be properly discussed here.

have been possible; and, similarly, the belief that something is impossible makes it impossible for us. Hence a belief that works, in the sense of helping us to pursue what has value, has itself great instrumental value. But it is doubtful whether it is right to say that such a belief is true. For instance, particular religious beliefs are a great help to many people; and it may be right not to disturb them in such beliefs. But it does not follow that other people should be urged to adopt them. It is an argument for toleration, but not for proselytism. And we generally mean by truth what is valid for every one.[1] It may be well to conceal some truths from those who are not ripe to receive them; perhaps it may even be right to encourage people, especially children, to believe some things that are not strictly accurate; but it is a practice that often leads to trouble at a later stage.[2]

Thus, although it may be recognized that there is an element of value, at least of instrumental value, in each of these theories of Truth, it does not appear that either of them is wholly satisfactory. Hence a third view has been put forward, most clearly and cogently by F. H. Bradley, which is commonly referred to as the theory of Coherence. What this means, as I understand it, is that the truth about things constitutes an orderly system, and that all particular truths have a place within that system. In other words, what is maintained is that the Universe is a Cosmos, a system of orders; and that, in finding any particular truths, we are discovering their place within that coherent whole. This theory itself, of course, claims to be a truth. It is regarded as a comprehensive truth within which all other truths have a place. It is a great Postulate or Hypothesis, upon which the pursuit of all particular truths depends; and we have to ask how far it is capable of verification. I think the answer is that it can only be gradually verified by the application of the other two views. It is verified in so far

[1] Hence Professor Alexander notes that, for an absolutely solitary individual, the pragmatic test would be the only one available (*Space, Time and Deity*, vol. ii. p. 266).

[2] For further criticisms of the pragmatic view of Truth, I may refer to the very lucid essay on the subject in Professor G. E. Moore's *Philosophical Studies*. The discussion of it in Mr. Russell's *Philosophical Essays* may also be consulted with advantage.

as it is found to correspond and to work. Hence I am disposed to regard all the three leading theories of Truth as having a place in the actual quest for Truth. But the coherence theory is the most comprehensive of the three, and may be said to include the other two. We can only find correspondences within a coherent system; and nothing can finally work except in so far as it fits into its place in such a system. It may be noted that, if the Correspondence theory were to be accepted as completely true, its truth would have to be taken to mean that it corresponds to something else; and it is not easy to see what it would correspond to. Similarly, if the pragmatic theory is true, it could only be accepted as a working hypothesis; whereas it seems to claim to be more than this. The coherence theory, though difficult to apply with any completeness, coheres both with itself and with the other two.

Now we have to ask in what sense it is to be held that Truth is one of the supreme Values. That it has instrumental value is pretty obvious. To know correspondences, to know what works, and to know in what respects the world in which we live forms a coherent system, is evidently of great value in the conduct of life. But we have still to ask whether it has an absolute and supreme value in itself. It is possible to doubt this. Milton, in referring to the story about the tree of Knowledge in the Garden of Eden, says that knowledge of good was 'bought dear by knowing ill.' But evidently it is well to know what is evil as well as what is good, in order that we may avoid the one and pursue the other. But that only amounts to saying that such knowledge has a great instrumental value. Whether it has intrinsic value depends on the conclusion to which it points. The saying of Keats is often quoted, 'Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty'; and Browning has said, even more emphatically:—

> O world, as God has made it, all is Beauty;
> And knowing this is Love, and Love is Duty.

Against this must be set such a view as that which was so brilliantly stated by Mr. Bertrand Russell in his essay on *The Free Man's Worship*.[1] According to that view the world

[1] Published in his books *Mysticism and Logic* and *Philosophical Essays*.

as a whole is not in the end adapted for the realization of the ultimate values at which men aim; but nevertheless we are justified in pursuing them. We have, of course, not yet reached a point at which this could be profitably discussed. We have only opened up the problem. It certainly seems, on the face of it, as if there were many things in the world, as we know it, that it would be better not to know, except in so far as the knowing of them helps us to avoid them or to cure them. It may be, however, that the avoiding of them or the curing of them is itself an important element in the Ultimate Good. It seems at least that, if all were good from the start, there would not be much purpose in human life. Or again, it may be that what we call evil is only Appearance, and that the reality behind Appearance is wholly good. That is a distinction that we must now proceed to consider briefly.

CHAPTER III

APPEARANCE AND REALITY

TRUTH, as we have seen, appears to be best interpreted as meaning the apprehension of something that coheres with the whole of reality as a systematic order or Cosmos. But truth in this sense is not readily discoverable. We have usually to be content with something that falls short of reality, something that only corresponds to what can be somehow apprehended, or that proves serviceable as a working hypothesis. Yet what we discover in this way may have a good deal of value for us, both instrumental and intrinsic. Reality, in the fullest sense of the word, may be inaccessible to us. We seem to catch glimpses of it here and there; but we are continually discovering that the glimpses that we have got are very partial and unsatisfying; and sometimes we find that they have even been extremely misleading. We have to be continually reminding ourselves that things are not always what they seem. There are, of course, some rather extreme instances of this. Dr. Broad, for instance,[1] has taken as an example the 'pink rats' that are sometimes seen by people in a state of intoxication. Any vivid dream carries with it a similar illusion; and, even in our ordinary waking life, we are often subject to temporary misconceptions of what we apprehend. In such cases the objects that we apprehend are really seen. They really appear; but they are not really what they appear to be. The pink rats are not actual rodents. Their bite would be harmless. They are, in technical phraseology, epistemological objects, but not ontological. The full discussion of this distinction would carry us too far away from our present subject; but its general significance has some importance from the point of view of value. In pursuing ultimate values, it would seem—at least, *primâ facie*—that we have to include Truth among these values; and it appears best to regard Truth as involving the

[1] See *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, pp. 140–2.

recognition of Reality as a coherent system, that corresponds to our apprehension when fully developed, and in accordance with which it is possible to 'work,' *i.e.* to carry on the essential activities of our lives. The complete apprehension of it, or perhaps even of any part of it, would, however, only be possible for omniscience; and from that we are certainly as yet far removed. But the apprehension of appearances gives us at least a partial glimpse of reality, which we may hope to make more and more complete. What appears must be in some degree real, and we have to try to find out gradually to what extent it can be so regarded. This has been strikingly brought out by F. H. Bradley in his great work on *Appearance and Reality*, in which he even urges that 'Reality lives in its Appearances.' This, no doubt, sounds somewhat paradoxical; but I think it may be made a little less perplexing if we use the term 'expression' rather than 'appearance.' Reality, it would seem, cannot be thought of as purely statical. It has at least a time aspect. Indeed, we have recently been taught to believe[1] that what exists in the Universe as we know it is always an 'event.' This does not necessarily mean that there is no aspect of persistence in the Universe; but it does mean that what we apprehend is always a passing aspect or temporal expression. When we see a flower, for example, we certainly see something that is not altogether unreal; but it is something that grows and fades; and what we apprehend at any time is one of its passing phases. We catch at any moment one of its appearances or expressions. We may know very little about it, in comparison with what is known by an expert botanist; and it may convey very little meaning to us, in comparison with what it might yield to a reflective poet like Wordsworth. It may even be true, as Tennyson said, that if we could understand what it is, 'root and all and all in all,' we should 'know what God and Man is.' At any rate, we should know a great deal more about it than what we directly see. What we see is only its temporary appearance or expression. To some it expresses much more than it does to others—much more to Wordsworth or to a botanist than to Peter Bell. What we

[1] Professor A. N. Whitehead has explained this very convincingly in his book on *Science and the Modern World*.

directly see, however, is not nothing. Even the pink rat that the drunkard sees is not nothing. It is an appearance or expression; and so is a dream. Now, it is not altogether easy to get beyond appearances. Even Wordsworth and the botanist may not succeed in getting very far beyond them. To know what the flower really is would involve, on the one hand, a knowledge of the evolutionary process by which vegetable life is generated, and, on the other hand, a knowledge of the process by which the colour that it displays is produced; and of the former at least no one appears as yet to know very much. It might also raise the question of what it means for us in the way of suggestion, and how it comes to have such a meaning. Even the comparatively simple question of colour raises many problems for the physicist and the psychologist; and for the philosopher it may raise even more. Even Professor Alexander, who is reckoned to be among the realists, says[1] that colour is a spirit. At any rate, its immediate appearance is far from being all that there is to say about it. It is in this sense that we have to understand what Bradley has emphasized about 'Degrees of Truth and Reality.' Most of the truths that we apprehend are only true within their limited province. The whole truth even about comparatively simple objects is never apprehended by us; but what we apprehend may be true so far as it goes.

Now, it may be asked whether we can ever hope to get beyond appearances. It may be said that, in getting behind one appearance, we are only penetrating to another. Kant asked whether we can ever know the 'thing in itself'; and he answered in the negative. Similarly, it is very commonly thought in the East that the world of our ordinary knowledge is Mâya or illusion, and that Reality is something utterly different. But it may be asked further whether we have any right to postulate the existence of a 'thing in itself'; whether Bradley, for instance, may not be right in maintaining that 'Reality lives in its Appearances.' This is a question that we can hardly hope to answer with any completeness in such a sketch as the present, which is primarily concerned with values. It seems

[1] *Space, Time and Deity*, vol. ii. pp. 59–60. He quotes Meredith, Pater and Bosanquet. By a spirit, however, he means an apparition, not a self-conscious being.

clear that we attach a certain value to the apprehension of reality, certainly an instrumental value and probably even an intrinsic one; and it is mainly from that point of view that we have to consider the subject. Some have sought to remove the difficulty by contending that all reality is essentially mental —a view that was called by Henry Sidgwick 'mentalism.' Berkeley, at least in some of his earlier writings, maintained this very emphatically; and it has sometimes been supposed that all those who are called idealists are of this opinion.[1] Even Berkeley's view was somewhat qualified by the recognition of what he described as a Divine language, as well as by some other modifications in his later statements. Even the recognition of a language seems to carry us a little beyond individual minds. For a language is a medium of intercourse between minds, and can hardly be regarded as simply existing within any one mind. The precise nature of what we call the external world, or the spatio-temporal system, is very difficult to determine. It used to be thought of as made up of a vast collection of solid atoms. The atoms previously thought of as indivisible have been resolved into smaller constituents; and these are now thought of rather as centres of influence than as material particles. The material universe is now generally regarded as a system of electro-magnetic activities; and the view of it, as thus conceived, is not very far removed from what is meant in the East by Mâya, which does not appear to be necessarily understood as meaning mere illusion, but only as indicating that there are different degrees of Truth in our apprehension of Reality. It is now generally recognized that few things are just what they appear to be on a superficial view, or even what they appear to be after a good deal of careful observation and analysis. We are constantly finding that things are much more complex and that their explanations have to be much more subtle than was at first supposed. But it is certainly quite wrong to represent the reality that we apprehend as existing within our minds. It may, however,

[1] Dr. J. E. Turner, in his *Theory of Direct Realism*, has explicitly urged that Idealism, rightly understood, does not exclude Realism. I think this is true, and it has been more or less definitely recognized by many idealistic writers; but it is too large a subject to be properly discussed here.

be an expression of mind, comparable to a language. This appears to involve the view that mind is essentially creative, capable of expressing itself through a medium that is distinguished from itself. Hegel urged, by a somewhat elaborate argument, that the universe can only be interpreted by the conception of creative Spirit. To discuss this here would carry us far beyond our present scope.[1] But what it is important for us to notice at the present stage is that this involves that the world that we apprehend is not to be supposed to be, in any proper sense, *in* our minds. It may be a projection of mental activity; but it has at least become distinct from particular minds, and it is not from our individual minds that it can be supposed to emanate. For us at least it is an external spatio-temporal system that we apprehend. Of course, the way in which we apprehend it is limited by the structure of our senses and by the interpretative powers of our individual intelligences. In that sense it is true that we live, to a large extent, in a world of our own construction. But the way in which we apprehend it does not vary very greatly from one mind to another, except in so far as their surroundings and their inherited aptitudes differ. That there may be a creative Intelligence from which it emanates is a hypothesis for which there may or may not be sufficient grounds. But they are highly speculative grounds, which cannot, in any direct way, be verified. The recognition of this, which is now almost universal, has given rise to those views that are commonly referred to as realistic. Many of the supporters of this—very notably Mr. Bertrand Russell—are specially interested in mathematics; and this forms a convenient bridge between what is mental and what is physical. Numbers and mathematical conceptions in general are not physical. They are 'ideal constructions' that we build up for the interpretation of physical facts and processes; and they can also be applied to some mental processes. They can be applied to everything that exists in the spatio-temporal system; and mental processes are at least temporal, and have also important spatial connections. Modern interpretations of the physical universe tend to become more and more mathematical. The analysis of matter has already carried

[1] But see below, Chapter IX.

us far beyond the old view of solid atoms placed in a rigid spatial system. What is now thought of is a system of events occurring within a limited spatio-temporal whole, in which our individual minds have also a definite place, at least in so far as most of their activities are concerned.[1] The exact relation of our minds to our bodies is a problem that is still involved in a good deal of uncertainty.[2]

Modern realism, it is important to remember, cannot properly be called materialism. It is rather energism; and this conception can be, to some extent at least, applied to mental processes as well as to those that are more purely physical. We are thus led to a species of Monism, which is neither to be called Mentalism nor Materialism. But the distinction between mental and physical processes continues to exist, and the question of the exact relations between them is a very difficult problem. The Mind has very definite physical connections; and, on the other hand, it is at least not certain that physical processes can be fully interpreted without some reference to mind. It is here that the question of Value begins to enter in. In most of our mental activities we are pursuing values; and this aspect of mental life becomes more and more prominent as our minds develop. Language, for instance, owes its development to value. It arises and has been developed as a means of communication between minds. In certain simple forms it is so used by animals; and without its use it does not appear that their lives could be carried on at all. Cries of various kinds—sounds that can be produced and heard—serve as means for the expression of feelings and purposes; and in human life they become definite words of a more and more complex kind by which a great variety of meanings can be expressed. Most of these meanings involve something of the nature of purposes and choices, approvals and disapprovals, and all sorts of valuations. Eventually they involve definite determinations of Why as well as How particular activities are carried on. Such valuations do not simply exist in individual

[1] Reference may be made on this subject to Mr. Russell's *Analysis of Matter*. But the analysis is still proceeding.

[2] For an account of the various ways in which this relation may be conceived, reference may be made to Dr. Broad's luminous work on *The Mind and its Place in Nature*.

minds. They involve, in their more developed form, the use of words and other signs—things that can be seen or heard—as means of intercourse between minds. We are learning more and more to make use of the various forces of nature for the communication of thoughts, feelings and purposes. Sound and light have long been used in this way. Electricity is now largely used for the same purpose; and perhaps we ought now to add hypnotic influence and telepathic vision—however these are to be explained. And, having thus learned to express our valuations through physical signs, we begin also to attach values to physical objects themselves. We learn the uses of plants and animals and of the various physical forces, and we apprehend beauty in the world around us. The light of the sun and stars, the moaning of the sea, the howling of the winds, the shapes of hills and valleys, the colours of living and lifeless things, affect us in many different ways. We fall into what Ruskin called the 'pathetic fallacy.' We apply our own valuations to many things that, so far as we know, have no apprehension of any values at all. And, in particular, we seek to know the truth about all these things; not merely because 'knowledge is power,' not merely because it has instrumental value, but because we are beings whose nature it is to know, and who can only realize ourselves through knowing, and perhaps also because we have an ineradicable conviction that the universe in which we live, in spite of its many difficulties and apparent evils, is worth knowing. But, to bring this out more fully, we must give further consideration to the antithesis between Nature and Spirit.

CHAPTER IV

NATURE AND SPIRIT

It must be very evident, from what has already been stated, that it is necessary to clear up our ideas with regard to what is to be understood by Mind and Matter, Spirit and Nature. On a first view, very superficial ideas tend to prevail. At first the two things seem very sharply distinguishable; but we have learned to recognize that there is a gradual transition from the one to the other. Active and quick-witted peoples, like the ancient Greeks, with an eager outlook on the world in which they live, are very apt to start as materialists. They are impressed by the things they see around them, such as fire, air, earth and water, and the varieties and complications of these; and they are prone to think that everything might be accounted for by their modifications and transformations; and the developments of modern science have led many people in our own time and country to incline to a similar view. Meditative peoples, on the other hand, like most of the Indians, are comparatively little impressed by the phenomena of nature, and are more apt to be absorbed by the processes of their own minds. They are apt to think of nature as mere Mâya, *i.e.* at least very largely illusory. This attitude also has had its representatives among ourselves; and it is clear that we must try to arrive at some balance between the two ways of interpreting the Cosmos. A more comprehensive outlook, such as ultimately prevailed in Greece and to a somewhat less extent in India, leads to some sort of dualism or to a complicated scheme, such as we find in Aristotle's conception of Matter and Form or in the Cartesian opposition between Space and Thought. In the modern world the opposition has tended to become one between Science and Philosophy; and we are only beginning to see our way to a reconciliation between them. It is now our business to try to find a more thorough harmony between them.

On the one hand, we have to recognize that minds or spirits are not altogether self-contained, and cannot be properly

understood without reference to their social relations as well as to the material system with which they are connected throughout the whole course of their development. On the other hand, it has to be recognized that the material system is a complex, formed out of elements that cannot themselves be characterized as material.

According to the newer conceptions of physical science, matter is capable of being analysed into modes of energy, concentrated at certain points within a spatio-temporal system, but extending its influence throughout the whole of that system. Minds, on the other hand, have also to be regarded as complex, and as acting and reacting in relation to the material system with which they are connected. Some part of these activities can be accounted for by what is now called Behaviourism; but there is an inner core of consciousness which does not seem to be capable of any purely mechanical interpretation. Some, indeed—notably Mr. Bertrand Russell—are inclined to believe that the two aspects—the material and the mental—may be supposed to have a common basis and to be present in varying degrees throughout the whole. In any case, it seems clear that they are distinguishable, even if and when they are present on both sides. Now, what are we to say about this distinction between two aspects in the world that we apprehend? Are we simply to accept it as an ultimate fact in the universe, or can we suppose that one of the aspects may be accounted for by means of the other?

Can we suppose that our conscious experiences may be fully accounted for by bodily movements? Some philosophers have at least come pretty near to this doctrine. Those who are called behaviourists hold that all our movements, including those that are expressive—our speech and other modes of communication—are simply complex nervous and muscular processes. The mental process that accompanies them is only an epiphenomenon. This is, on the face of it, highly paradoxical; but it is surprising how many distinguished thinkers have at least formed the habit of saying that they believe it.[1] Even the followers of Descartes, who laid so much stress on

[1] Some discussion of it will be found in Mr. Russell's *Analysis of Mind*, pp. 157, *etc.*

thought, regarded the lower animals as automata. Certainly some animal expressions do not seem to imply much in the way of conscious process. The words that are used by parrots do not seem to imply any understanding of the meaning that we usually suppose words have for us; and it is true that much human expression is also based on habits that do not involve much reflection. Lord Kelvin had a famous parrot that often said things that appeared to be very apposite—such as 'Late again!' when its master came in somewhat tardily to dinner. It is pretty certain that this was merely a habit. But Lord Kelvin himself had certain habits of thought that it would not be easy to justify, and that might be said not to involve any real conscious process. It has been noted of him, in particular, that he refused to accept any methods of physical explanation that could not be represented by a mechanical model. It may be urged that this was merely a habit into which he had got—a more complicated habit than that of his parrot, but not implying much more in the way of reflection. And if once we admit this, it is an easy extension of the same principle to say that all expressions of thought are habitual reactions that might go on quite independently of any conscious process. Professor Alexander, for instance, seemed at one time to be disposed to accept this view.[1] But, besides being highly paradoxical, it appears to be open to physiological objections.[2] At the other extreme are those who are inclined to ascribe conscious preferences, not only to men and animals, but also to plants and perhaps even to modes of existence still lower in the scale. Wordsworth said that he believed that flowers enjoyed the air they breathed; and quite recently Sir J. C. Bose has ascribed sympathies and antipathies to trees.[3] These are matters on which it is not

[1] I understand that he has now been led to reject it. Reference may be made to the Preface to the new edition of *Space, Time and Deity*.

[2] This has been urged by Mr. Bartlett in a review in *Mind* (Oct. 1927).

[3] Reference may be made to the account of his life by Professor Patrick Geddes. It has been shown that there is a high degree of sensitivity in plants, but it is doubtful whether it can be said to have been shown that that sensitivity is accompanied by consciousness. The Cartesians doubted whether there is such consciousness even in the lower animals. It is possible at least that their degree of consciousness is slighter than it is in human life, even when the purely organic sensitiveness is equally great.

within my present province—nor indeed is it within my competence—to pronounce an opinion. But the mere fact that there can be different opinions suffices to show that there is a recognized distinction between movements that involve consciousness and those that do not. The extreme view, on one side, is that all movements do involve it: the extreme view, on the other side, is that it is not necessarily involved in any movements, even in articulate speech and the other movements that we commonly describe as purposive. The latter view may be said to involve the denial of valuation as having any effective place in the life of the world. We do not really, according to this view, perform any actions because we value the ends to which they are directed, but merely because we have acquired the habit of responding in certain ways to certain stimulations. It is not, of course, denied that we have feelings and thoughts in connection with these movements; but it is denied that the feelings and thoughts play an effective part in their determination. Now, the fact that so many competent thinkers have more or less definitely committed themselves to such a view shows that there is some degree of plausibility in it. Yet it is certainly paradoxical; and it does not appear to me that it can be reasonably maintained. Can it be supposed, for instance, that Shakespeare in writing his plays and sonnets and Plato in writing his dialogues and letters, and Napoleon in planning his campaigns, were merely carrying on certain habits that they had acquired, and were not really influenced by their aesthetic, intellectual and practical valuations in the work that they carried on? That habit played a large part in their activities may be freely admitted. Without more or less definitely acquired habits we should all be lost. But surely thought, feeling and choice are not merely habits that have been acquired by our organisms. The feeling aspect is the one that might most readily be admitted to be so. The way in which we feel in any given situation is certainly to a large extent a matter of habit. We cannot, as a rule, determine how we are to feel in any given situation; and some of our responses to such feelings occur without any choice on our part, often even contrary to our choice. Most people know how difficult it is to control their feelings, especially in sudden emergencies. It is true also

that many of our decisions depend on our acquired habits. And, when we resist the feelings or the tendencies to form particular decisions, it is true that our resistance to them is largely due to habits that we have acquired. Our thoughts also tend to run in particular channels, due largely to our education and the experiences of our lives; and it may be supposed that all these tendencies have become embodied in our physical constitution. Some of them also are hereditary. People can often trace their ways of thinking, feeling and acting to their immediate or more remote ancestors. Even so original a genius as Goethe thought that he could definitely trace his physical and mental characteristics to his father and mother; and that there was nothing at all in him that could properly be said to be his own. These are large concessions that have to be made; and it is noteworthy that many of those who doubt the adequacy of such explanations seek to supplement them by the supposition of a certain continuity with previous incarnations.[1] When such concessions are made, it may well seem that there is nothing that can be definitely ascribed to our own individual choice, and that we are simply, in Huxley's phrase, 'the cunningest of nature's clocks.' On this view the distinction between nature and spirit would seem to disappear. Yet it does not altogether disappear. Huxley's phrase, 'the cunningest of nature's clocks' is a somewhat unfortunate one; for nature, so far as we know, has no clocks and no cunning, *i.e.* no constructions or activities that can be regarded as being definitely brought about by conscious choice. Even if we admit to the fullest extent that all is habit, and even that all our habits are expressions of physical adaptations, it still remains true that there are higher and lower levels in the universe, and that it is only spiritual beings who are capable of realizing this distinction, and of pursuing the higher in preference to the lower. In other words, there are real values in life, however true it may be that our pursuit of them is dependent on our

[1] This is a view that is commonly held among primitive peoples; and it is very generally believed in India. Among ourselves it has been powerfully, though perhaps hardly convincingly, defended by the late Dr. McTaggart, in his book on *Some Dogmas of Religion*. Dr. Broad has also recognized it as a possible view (in his book on *The Mind and its Place in Nature*).

inherited nature and our acquired nurture; and that these are embodied in our physical constitution.

There is, however, one further consideration of which it is important to take account. We, as conscious beings or spirits, are not only in the most intimate connection with our physical organisms, their inherited constitution and inborn tendencies, but also with the social organism. However true it may be that Goethe owed his characteristic powers and dispositions to those of his father and mother, it is also quite obviously true that the way in which he made use of those powers and dispositions was due to the fact that he was born in Germany at a time of great intellectual and artistic development and of keen interest in the similar developments in other countries. In accounting for his achievements, we must have due regard for these influences as well as those that were more purely innate. I say 'more purely innate,' because it is evident that what he derived from his father and mother was partly a matter of nurture as well as of inherited dispositions.

When full account is taken of all these elements in the building up of a human personality, it may well seem that there is nothing of any real importance that has to be considered as purely spiritual in the explanation of it; that it may be completely accounted for by external influences; and that, in the end, there is nothing in spirit that may not be traced back to nature. We thus appear to be led to a purely materialistic interpretation of the Universe; and I wish it to be distinctly understood that, so far, such an interpretation appears to me to be perfectly reasonable. Is there anything to be set against it?

What has to be set against it, so far as I can see, is a consideration that arises only when we seek to interpret the Universe as a whole. It may be that, when we seek to do this, the last has to be put first and the first last. Granting that spirit has been evolved from nature and is throughout determined by the natural conditions of its origin, it may yet be that these natural conditions themselves are in need of further explanation, and that that explanation is to be found in the end to which they point. Goethe—to continue the illustration that I have adopted—did in the end become a creative artist, whatever may have been the special circumstances upon

which his development depended. A certain creativeness belongs to spirit, and does not appear to be found in anything else. This calls, however, for some further explanation.

Recent scientific discoveries have thrown a great deal of fresh light upon the structure of our Universe. They have enabled us, as no previous theories did, to regard the spatio-temporal system as a coherent whole, limited in extent, but internally consistent and intelligible. But its origin remains unexplained. It may be said that we have no right to look for any explanation. It has simply to be accepted as it stands—or rather as it moves. Electrons and protons and their complex interactions have built up an elaborate system of suns and planets on some of which—on one at least—life and thought have become developed. We can to some extent trace the steps by which this development has been brought about; but how there ever came to be such a system at all remains unexplained. Nature does not account for itself. Can spirit help, in any way, to account for it? This is a question to which I hope we may be able to return a more or less satisfactory answer as we proceed; but, in the meantime, some preliminary observations may be made.

Returning to the case of Goethe, we have noted that, in the end, he became a creative artist—one of the greatest whom the world has ever known. In this creative activity he surely added something to what he inherited or imbibed. He himself urged the need of this addition very strongly in his famous declaration[1]:—

> Was du ererbt von deinen Vätern hast,
> Erwirb es um es zu besitzen.

Of course, his creativeness was of a somewhat limited kind. He used the experiences of his own individual life and the material that was provided by previous thinkers and artists; and, by means of these, he produced a result that was essentially novel. He was able to do this because the human mind, whatever its origin and history may have been, becomes constructive in a sense in which nothing else that is known to

[1] 'What you have inherited from your fathers, earn in order that you may possess it.'

us can be said to be so. In this sense it is true, as Goethe himself said, that 'man alone can perform the impossible'; and this fact at least suggests the possibility that what is last in the order of evolution may be first in explanatory power. Granting to the fullest extent that mind, as we know it, is a result of material circumstances and remains throughout conditioned by these circumstances, we may yet be justified in believing, or at least in conjecturing, that it may contain the explanation of the processes out of which it has grown. The scientific thinker is undoubtedly a product of the material and social conditions out of which he has grown; but he is capable of understanding those conditions and even, within certain limits, of controlling them by means of his understanding. May it not be the case, then, that the explanation of the whole is to be found in the end rather than in the beginning, in valuations rather than in electro-magnetic activities, in spirit rather than in nature? This seems at least to be a possible speculation; and I hope that its significance may become more apparent as we proceed.

So far, I have been acknowledging the strength of the case against the recognition of valuation as an effective influence below the human level. But it should now be added that the tendency among recent biologists is rather towards the acknowledgment that even in the lower forms of life valuation is not wholly absent. It is generally recognized that all forms of life have been developed by a process of evolution; and this has sometimes been thought of as taking place simply as a result of a struggle for existence between different forms of life that happen to have come into being. Charles Darwin, in particular, laid the emphasis mainly, though not exclusively, on this. Even this, it may be noted, implies a slight element of valuation, *viz.* the valuation of existence.[1] Lamarck, Spencer and others admitted a rather more definite pursuit of values; and recent writers on biology have been tending to recognize this even more explicitly. The term 'emergence' has been used in this connection by Professor Lloyd Morgan and others; but it must be admitted that, in itself, this is a somewhat vague term

[1] Professor Alexander has laid stress on this element of value (*Space, Time and Deity*, vol. ii. p. 309); but it appears to be only instrumental value that is involved in it—the value that consists in efficiency.

which calls for a good deal of interpretation. What it seems to suggest is, as Professor Alexander once noted, a process like that of Neptune rising out of the sea in the manner described by Vergil. Such a comparison is not particularly enlightening; for Neptune presumably existed in the sea before he emerged from it, whereas there is a certain novelty in the emergence of living forms. It might be better to compare the process that takes place with the efforts of a bird or a butterfly to escape from a cage in which it is enclosed. It beats against the sides of its enclosure until it finds an opening through which it can emerge. Perhaps it does not know what it is seeking, but it is at least aware of a certain negative value in its imprisonment. According to Blake, 'a robin redbreast in a cage Puts all heaven in a rage.' At any rate, the robin may be supposed to feel somewhat unhappy when it first discovers the impossibility of escape. Now, it may be true that in all forms of conscious life there is some degree of discontent with the limitations of their conditions, and that it is this discontent that leads to progress. It is, no doubt, somewhat difficult to suppose that this can be true in the case of plants. But even there, as we have noticed, there seems to be some degree of sensitiveness which may tend to give rise to an upward urge. This upward urge, it would seem, is what is to be understood by Emergence—or Epigenesis, as it is sometimes called. The way of escape may evidently be in several different directions. If it is true, for instance, that apes and men have a common origin, it seems clear that they have found an escape from their limitations by different outlets—the former by the development of physical powers and dexterities, the latter by an erect and balanced posture and by concentration of mind. However this may be, it probably remains true that it is only in human life that the upward tendency involves a definite consciousness of positive values that are to be pursued. On this it is not necessary to dogmatize.[1] J. H. Fabre has taught us to admire

[1] The biological theory of emergence has been expounded by Professors Lloyd Morgan, Arthur Thomson and others. It has been applied by Professor Alexander as the basis for a general interpretation of the evolution of the Cosmos. Some valuable references and discussions on the subject will be found in the 'Proceedings of the International Congress of Philosophy' held at Chicago in 1927. The first session of that Congress was devoted to this subject.

the elaborate instincts of many of the lowliest creatures; but he has also taught us to recognize that they are incapable of modifying their instincts to suit changing conditions. What may be taken as certain is that in human life we do find, not merely an effort to escape from conditions that are felt to be unsatisfactory, but a positive endeavour to create better conditions. When this endeavour is well directed, and especially when it is directed towards the higher values that may be realized by a social group, it is what we specially mean by Goodness; and, if this is not in itself to be called Value, it is at least the pursuit of Value; and it may be that this pursuit may be regarded as having value in itself. This is the problem that we have next to consider. What I have been urging so far, is that this aspect of active endeavour, which is characteristic of the life of spirit, may be regarded as growing out of nature, and perhaps as implied in it from the outset.

CHAPTER V

THE VALUE OF GOODNESS

THE term 'good' is used in several different senses.[1] In a general sense, it may be understood as equivalent to 'value.' When Plato spoke of 'the Form of Good,' he seems to have meant the idea of a certain ultimate value at the realization of which the Universe might be supposed to aim.[2] Similarly, when we speak of 'goods,' we generally mean any commodities to which an economic value is attached, though the reference tends to be confined to things that can be readily moved from place to place. When, however, we speak of a 'good man,' we mean a man who seeks to promote what is good in the more general sense; and we generally think rather of the values that he seeks to promote than of those that he actually achieves. It relates to 'valour' in the wide sense in which that term was used by Ruskin. Kant thought that it was best to say that goodness, in this sense, has Dignity or Worth rather than Value (*Würde* rather than *Werth*). Certainly we value it in a sense that is different from that in which we value Truth or marketable commodities and even different from that in which we value landscapes or works of art. We value a good man both for what he is and for what he does. In appreciating the latter we are to some extent regarding it as instrumental;

[1] The book by Mr. G. L. Dickinson on *The Meaning of Good* may be referred to with advantage in this connection.

[2] Aristotle, at the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, gave his approval to the definition of Good as that at which all things aim. Professor G. E. Moore has urged, in his *Principia Ethica*, that Good, in this wide sense, cannot be defined. As it is a *summum genus*, it seems clear that it cannot be formally defined. We can only say that it is the ultimate object of desire. But it is important to distinguish this wide sense of the term from the more limited sense in which we speak of moral goodness. Some interesting discussions about this will be found in Professor H. J. Paton's book on *The Good Will*. Good, in the widest sense, includes intrinsic and instrumental goods; and moral goodness is one of those that are intrinsic. In this sense, I think it is capable of definition, though perhaps not of a purely formal definition. It is not clear to me that Dr. Moore has taken sufficient account of this ambiguity.

whereas, when we are thinking of the man himself, the value or worth that we ascribe to him appears to be intrinsic. Yet it is hardly possible to make any sharp distinction between what a man is and what he does. Goodness, in this sense, is essentially active. One can hardly be good without doing good; though the doing may take many forms, some of them not immediately apparent. Sometimes even to refrain from a particular mode of action may be a good act. 'They also serve who only stand and wait.' Hence patience is generally recognized as one of the virtues; and quietness is often regarded as a form of goodness, especially in the case of children who are only learning to act. It is felt—perhaps sometimes wrongly felt—that the less they do the better, except under guidance. Just at present there are some tendencies in the opposite direction, which may also not be wholly wise. But, at least, goodness is active; and this was what Ruskin sought to bring out by the use of the term 'Valour.'

When it is said that man differs from other living beings through his possession of the knowledge of Good and Evil, it is mainly in this ethical sense that the term 'Good' is being used. In a sense it is a 'Fall.' Knowledge of good is bought dear by knowing ill. Moral judgments are largely condemnations. We have done the things that we ought not. But it is a gradual fall, and we fall to rise. Most animals distinguish between what is good for food and shelter and what is not serviceable for any such purpose, and have also some other modes of liking and disliking; they quarrel and they are capable of love; but it is doubtful whether they have any clear apprehension of the distinction between what is right and what is wrong. In human life this distinction becomes more and more clearly apparent, though there remain many cases in which we are uncertain. The one thing about which there is no doubt is that what is right is to be chosen and what is wrong is to be avoided. There is here what Kant called a categorical imperative. An absolute command appears to be laid upon us to do what we see to be right and to avoid what we see to be wrong. This is not felt, in quite the same direct way, with reference to other modes of value. Though we value Truth and Beauty, we are not always, in any direct way,

consciously pursuing them. Scientific and philosophic thinkers devote a large part of their time to the pursuit of truth; and poets and painters and other artists are busily engaged in the creation of beauty; and, in a small way, we may all do something for the advancement of both. It is right that we should all pursue truth and beauty as far as we can. Sometimes the best that we can achieve in these directions is so little that we are forced to leave it to others. But we are all bound to do the best that we can in those departments for which our abilities fit us. That may be said, in Kant's language, to be the only categorical imperative. But, when we have selected our particular department, we have then to observe the special requirements of that department. In science and philosophy we have to observe the conditions of truth; in art, the conditions of beauty; in more mechanical work, the conditions of the material that we use; in politics and the more ordinary occupations of life, the conditions and special circumstances of human life.[1] Carlyle said once of a careless workman that he broke all the Ten Commandments with every stroke of his hammer. He meant, I suppose, that the man violated the general law of duty by not paying proper attention to the material with which he was working. In this sense, the law of duty may be said to be the only supreme law. But there are also special conditions that have to be observed in special departments; and, in particular, there are the conditions of Truth and Beauty, which, in their own way, have a similar supremacy to that which belongs to Goodness.[2]

There is another consideration to which I think it well to refer at this point. There is a famous saying of Socrates, that 'no man is willingly deprived of the good,' or, as it is sometimes put, rather more paradoxically, that 'no man is willingly wicked.' This seems contrary to ordinary experience. Shakespeare (or perhaps Marlowe[3]) represents Richard the Third

[1] On this reference may profitably be made to Professor Laird's *Study in Moral Theory*, chap. iii.

[2] I think Professor Laird has not sufficiently recognized this, though his statement is, in general, very good.

[3] It is now commonly recognized that the play of *Richard III* was not written by Shakespeare. It was one of the plays that R. L. Stevenson confessed he could not read.

as saying, 'I am determined to prove a villain.' One may doubt whether he ever said or thought this. Shylock thought that the wrongs that he had suffered justified him in seeking revenge. King Lear thought that the disobedience of Cordelia justified him in casting her off. Iago thought that the grievances that he had against Othello justified him in looking out for some redress. Richard the Third himself may have felt that he had a grievance against nature and the world at large. Yet it may be doubted whether any of these was wholly unaware that his action was open to some criticism. They may not have been altogether willingly deprived of the Good; but it may at least be suspected that they were somewhat willingly deprived of the Best. Evil is in some degree negative. It is seldom directly chosen: it is taken at most as the second best. Milton represents Satan as saying 'Evil, be thou my good'; but that is when he has lost all hope of reaching the real good. Perhaps we have all to be content with something that falls short of the highest that we might imagine. Yet it remains true that 'we needs must love the highest when we see it'; that is, when we *really* see it, and see it as something that, in Aristotle's phrase, 'can be done and achieved by man,' or rather, by *this particular man*. Certainly men do not always do the best they can. Perhaps they never do. But perhaps it is not untrue to say that they do the best they think they can at the moment, with their particular powers and in their particular circumstances. On reflection, they may see that they might have done better, or at least that a better man would have acted differently. Milton represents even Satan as being 'abashed' in the presence of an Angel, and feeling 'how awful goodness is.' But he knew that such goodness was not for him. It is not easy to be good, in any really effective sense. Ruskin was quite right in characterizing moral virtue as Valour. When anyone tries to do what is strictly the best that he knows, there are nearly always lions in the path. Even Christ is represented as shrinking from the bitter cup and lamenting that He was forsaken by God. That is an extreme case; but the path of strict duty is seldom a primrose path. Those who do the best that they feel they can are generally aware that they might have done better. The human Will, as Kant said, is not a 'Holy Will': it is not a Will that is

See p. 142

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inevitably directed towards the Best, or even towards the best that we know. The confession that we have done the things that we ought not to have done, and left undone those that we ought to have done, is one that nearly everyone may make—everyone, I should suppose. When Nelson, on a memorable occasion, exclaimed, 'Thank God, I have done my duty!' he must have been well aware that he had not always done it. A pretty good case could be made out for the view that all our shortcomings are due to lack of courage—the courage either to meet pain or to 'take pains.' We cannot face the cost, whatever form the cost may take. But it is also true to say that we do not always realize that it is worth the cost. Hence, when it is said that no one is willingly deprived of the good, it would seem that there are two explanations of the failure to attain it—(1) that we do not realize, with sufficient clearness, what the good is; (2) that we have not the courage to pursue it strenuously. A present or anticipated evil influences us more than an unimagined good or a good that is not imagined in a sufficiently clear and vivid form. But this is due largely to the fact that the evil directly affects ourselves, whereas the good is often one that is only directly enjoyed by others. In order to bring this out more definitely, it is necessary to consider carefully what the good that we seek is, both as it affects ourselves and as it affects others. In this connection it may be well to notice what is meant by Conscience.

It is customary to speak of the 'voice of conscience.' This is a comparatively modern way of speaking; but even in ancient times we find some anticipations of it. When the Hebrew prophets said that they were urged by God to say or do certain things, they probably meant substantially the same as what we mean by the voice of conscience [1]; except that they were generally urged by it to do certain things, whereas we are rather more apt to think of conscience as urging us to refrain from doing certain things. Socrates came nearer to this. He professed to hear an inner voice that checked him when he was about to say or do something; but the things that he was thus prevented from doing were not things that he regarded

[1] At first they were inclined to hear it expressed in the thunder, but afterwards in the 'still, small voice.'

as morally wrong, but rather things that would, for some reason, not be, as we say, 'tactful'; and apparently he did not definitely know why they would not be tactful. He only had a feeling that it would be better to refrain. In more modern times, when we say that anyone is conscientious we mean rather that he reflects very carefully on what is involved in his actions, and decides on general principles whether they are right or wrong. The most conspicuous instance of this in our own time has been seen in the attitude of those who had a conscientious objection to War. The general basis of this was the principle that it is always wrong to take part in any action that directly involves the destruction of human life. Some would go farther and include the lives of animals. In India there are some who regard even the destruction of dangerous or noxious creatures, such as snakes or mosquitoes, as wrong. Those who hold such views seldom regard the endangering of one's own life in quite the same way. Nietzsche, who is not always easy to interpret,[1] on account of his highly metaphorical and deliberately paradoxical way of writing, is sometimes supposed to have approved of War. But he appears to have been to a large extent a pacifist. When he spoke of fighting, he meant mainly 'fighting the good fight'; and he encouraged individuals to 'live dangerously,' *i.e.* he commended Valour.[2] Many lives—some of great value to mankind—have been lost by Alpine climbing; but few would regard this as morally blameworthy. It is evident, however, that we can hardly determine the rightness or wrongness of such actions merely by reference to an 'inner voice.' We have to reflect upon our actions in order to determine whether it is right to act or to refrain. There is such a thing as 'the conscience of an ass.' It has also been noted[3] that 'conscience is in most men an anticipation of the opinion of others.' Bishop Butler regarded conscience as a reflective principle, not simply as an inner voice; and Kant sought to give a more definite interpretation of the principle that is involved. His general view was that it

[1] His general views have been well expounded in W. M. Salter's book on *Nietzsche the Thinker*.

[2] Reference may be made on this to the book on *Christianity and the Present Moral Unrest*, edited by Dr. A. D. Lindsay.

[3] Sir H. Taylor, *The Statesman*, p. 63.

Kant

is right to act in such a way as to promote our own perfection and the happiness of others. But happiness and perfection are so intimately bound up with one another that it is hardly possible to make such a distinction. It would seem that what is good for us must also be good for others. Hence we have to look for some more satisfactory interpretation of goodness, both with reference to individuals and with reference to society. In other words, we have to try to define more precisely what determines the value of human action. It would seem at least that goodness can hardly be supposed to lie merely in the preservation of life, but must consist rather in the effort to advance it; and we have still to inquire what its advancement means. It has often been said that Happiness is 'our being's end and aim'; but it has gradually become pretty clear that this is not an altogether satisfactory view. For one thing, the meaning of Happiness is not by itself much clearer than the meaning of Good. For another thing, Happiness by itself is a purely individual good, whereas it seems clear that the good that is sought by human beings is a social one. Some have attempted to meet this difficulty by representing a human society as simply a collection of individuals. This is unsatisfactory, as we shall see later; but it may be worth while to consider how, on this supposition, the Good is to be conceived. The Utilitarian theory is not yet wholly dead, and it still calls for criticism.

According to this view, the end is Happiness, and Happiness means simply a sum of pleasures, pains being counted as negative, and every person being counted as one, and nobody as more than one. In order to deal with this theory satisfactorily, it is necessary to consider somewhat carefully what is meant by Pleasure and Pain. They are modes of what is now commonly called Feeling or Feeling-tone; but Pain at least is often understood in a somewhat different sense, which tends to give rise to a good deal of confusion. When we speak of Pain, we are apt to have primarily in mind such experiences as toothache, headache, the experience of a bruise or burning, or weariness or general physical depression. These are organic sensations which generally imply some bodily injury or weakness. That these are evils can hardly be denied. They are

impediments that have to be struggled against. They involve physical injury or deterioration and this reacts upon our mental and spiritual growth. It implies some loss of power and efficiency, and so far impedes us in the realization of what is good, however Good may be conceived. Valour, to be efficient, involves some degree of bodily vigour; and anything that lowers our vitality lessens our ability to realize the Good, whatever that Good may be. Pains, in this sense, can be pretty definitely graded and measured. But Pain is also understood in a somewhat different sense. Physical pain is felt only by the person who has suffered some bodily injury; but we may also be pained by witnessing the sufferings of another person or those of an animal, or by seeing someone performing an action of which we disapprove. A scholar may be pained by hearing a false quantity or an inaccurate quotation. In such cases there is no bodily injury. There is only a disagreeable feeling or feeling-tone. Now, while it is on the whole pretty obvious that physical injury or lowering of vitality is an evil, it is not equally apparent that a negative feeling-tone is always evil, and still less that it is the only thing that is evil. Pleasure has not quite the same degree of ambiguity as pain; for there are comparatively few cases in which there are any very definite bodily pleasures corresponding to bodily pains. Bodily health does not make itself very clearly felt. When we are thoroughly well, we take but little notice of our bodily condition. There is no pleasure of the teeth that bears any comparison with the pain of toothache; and the same is true of most bodily experiences. There is, no doubt, some pleasure in eating and drinking, in certain colours, sounds and smells; and there is sometimes a general consciousness of physical exhilaration; but, broadly speaking, there is but little bodily pleasure to correspond to bodily pain. Hence, if we mean by pleasure and pain such organic experiences, the pursuit of the Good would consist mainly in the attempt to remove or mitigate pain; and it can hardly be denied that Goodness does consist very largely in this. It is the kind of Goodness that was displayed by the good Samaritan, by Florence Nightingale and by many famous philanthropists. It cannot be denied that pain is a great evil, and that some of

the finest forms of goodness are shown in the attempt to remove it either in men or in animals.[1] The promotion of pleasure seems also to be good, though, in general, it appears to be relatively unimportant. But when it is said that Happiness is our being's end and aim, it is not merely bodily sensations that are referred to. It is rather what is called hedonic-tone; and it is not so obvious that it is always a good thing to have a pleasant hedonic tone and a bad thing to have an unpleasant one. The hero may feel some exhilaration in the performance of noble deeds; but it is not always certain that those who experience such an elevation of feeling are to be preferred to those who go forth with tears or with doubts and anxieties. Hence, if Pleasure is to be taken as the standard, it is not the pleasure of the good man himself that is to be considered, but rather the pleasure that he promotes in others. But the question remains whether Pleasure, or even Happiness, is quite the right word for what he seeks to promote either in himself or in others. This is a question that can only be very briefly dealt with here.

It is generally recognized that the work done by such writers as Bentham and J. S. Mill on the Utilitarian basis was of great value; and a great deal of it would retain its value even if we were to decide that Pleasure is not the best word to use for the Good that is to be promoted. The most obvious objection to Pleasure is that the word is commonly used mainly for modes of enjoyment that are of a comparatively trivial and fleeting kind; and Bentham at least did not hesitate to refer to such trivial enjoyments as being quite as good as any other if they brought as much pleasure. 'Quantity of pleasure being equal,' he said, 'pushpin is as good as poetry.' The term Happiness is somewhat less open to objection; but even that is most commonly used for a kind of enjoyment that some of the best men have to forgo and even to learn to despise. Carlyle, as is well known, said that we could do without happiness and find blessedness instead. But that term, again, suggests something that few can reach. Madness or drunken-

[1] It has been said that, instead of speaking of the Greatest Happiness of the greatest number, it would be better to aim at the Least Pain of the smallest number (Goldscheid, *Zur Ethik der Gesamtheit*, p. 383).

ness may produce it.[1] Perhaps Joy might have been a better term than any of these. J. S. Mill sought to meet the difficulty by recognizing that there are different qualities in pleasures, and that there should be a preference for the higher qualities. But this would make it very difficult to have any quantitative estimate; and yet without that it is hard to see how we could decide to what extent the higher qualities are to be preferred. If we are to calculate the value of different qualities, it would be necessary to find some way of reducing qualities to quantities. If we use the term Joy instead of Pleasure, it may be maintained that all modes of Joy are the same in quality, and that a good deal that is called Pleasure yields very little lasting Joy. Enjoyment is qualitative rather than quantitative, and qualities cannot be calculated.

Without entering into any minute consideration of the difficulties that are thus suggested, it seems best to state simply that reflection on them has now led most people to think that it is best not to say that the end that we seek is any form of enjoyment, but rather the development of the highest type of Life, which does normally involve a certain joy. But, of course, this still leaves us with the problem, how the highest type is to be determined, and also how the lower types are to be treated. It could hardly be right to kill out the lower types of human life or even of animal life; nor could it be right to torture them. The general principle seems clear enough, though it is probably unwise to endeavour to express it in the form of a definite calculation or even of definite rules or injunctions. Some modes of existence are pretty obviously higher than others in the scale of being. They are higher in so far as they approximate more closely to the mental or spiritual type; and, in general, it would seem that goodness consists mainly in the effort to promote and conserve the higher forms of life, but, as far as possible, without injury to the lower. Injury shows itself most conspicuously in the

[1] 'Kings may be blest, but Tam was glorious,
O'er a' the ills of life victorious.'

William James said that 'if merely "feeling good" could decide, drunkenness would be the supremely valid human experience' (*Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 16).

form of physical pain; and it seems pretty safe to say that this should never be inflicted except in defence of some higher form of being. Life is to some extent a struggle, and pain cannot always be avoided. There are some cases in which it appears to be necessary for the defence of the higher forms of life; but it is at least a good general principle, 'When in doubt, avoid giving pain.' It has sometimes been said[1] that it is the best definition of a Gentleman, that he is one who never willingly gives pain. It would be somewhat more questionable to say that he is one who always seeks to give pleasure; nor, of course, can the avoidance of the infliction of pain be held to imply that it can never be justified, *e.g.* in surgery or in war. The case of the vivisectionist is more difficult. Professor Laird is very emphatic in his denunciation of it in his *Study in Moral Theory*; but it has to be remembered that its ultimate object, at least, is to mitigate pain and to preserve life. Browning's suggestion that what the vivisectionist seeks is to 'save his toe from shoots' is not quite fair. It is not his own toe that he seeks to save; nor is it only such trivial pains that he seeks to mitigate. Pains that are necessary for the preservation or advancement of life must be regarded as inevitable; but I think it is clear that it is always our duty to make them as small as possible, and to have as comprehensive a view of them as possible. The infliction of pain can, in general, only be justified by its mitigation on a larger scale. It has been noted, in this connection, that 'it sometimes happens that he who would not hurt a fly will hurt a nation.'[2]

There is one further consideration that it may be well to emphasize here. When we say that it is right to do anything, we imply that it is possible. It can never be right to undertake anything that obviously cannot be done. When we say that anyone ought to do something, we imply that we believe

[1] I believe it was Cardinal Manning who first gave this definition. For a somewhat more positive account, reference may be made to Bosanquet's essay on 'Ladies and Gentlemen.' See *Science and Philosophy*, pp. 239 *sqq.*

[2] Sir H. Taylor, *The Statesman*, p. 65. The best general defence of the Utilitarian view is, I think, that contained in Rashdall's *Theory of Good and Evil*; but it is not convincing, and indeed Rashdall did not regard pleasure or even happiness as the *complete* Good. Most writers now prefer to speak of 'happiness in the creative sense.'

that he can. Thus there is a very real sense in which Goodness may be said to involve Power. Valour is futile without some degree of strength and skill. Hence it may be said that right action always presupposes some degree of Might. This has sometimes been inverted, and taken to mean that Might is Right. Carlyle, for instance, has been accused by some of maintaining this; and it may be true that he did not always guard himself sufficiently against this interpretation; and perhaps there are some others who can be more justly charged with it. But it is surely obvious enough that no one is entitled to undertake anything that is clearly not within his power. One who has no knowledge of plants should not undertake to act as a gardener; and one who has but little knowledge of men should not undertake to teach or to rule them. Nor can it be right to enter upon any enterprise without counting the cost and assuring ourselves, as far as possible, that we have the means of meeting it. It is not always right to do what we believe we can do; but it is always wrong to attempt what we know that we cannot do. This was, I believe, all that Carlyle meant when he said that we have to inquire into our Might before we decide what is our Right. It could be put in a less misleading but more commonplace way by saying that we have to ascertain our qualifications before we decide upon our task. Power of some sort has thus to be recognized as an aspect of goodness; and hence it has sometimes been maintained that Power should be regarded as one of the intrinsic values. Obviously it has instrumental value. Shelley lamented that

> The good lack power, but to shed idle tears;
> The powerful goodness lack—worse need for them.

Shelley himself was characterized by Matthew Arnold as a 'beautiful but ineffectual angel.' This is, of course, an exaggeration.[1] He had his faults, but he was effectual enough in his own peculiar way; and it might even be maintained that, in so far as he was ineffectual, he was not either beautiful or

[1] See the very interesting book by Mrs. Ward Campbell on *Shelley and the Unromantics*, where the practical significance of his work is triumphantly brought out.

angelic. Carlyle was apt to maintain that the genuine Hero has every kind of capability; but that also seems to be an exaggeration. Carlyle himself was as ineffectual in some respects as Shelley was in others. Everyone has to contend with external obstructions as well as those that are due to his own lack of energy and insight; but, without some energy, there can hardly be goodness in any intelligible sense. 'If our virtues did not go forth of us, 'Twere all alike as if we had them not.' Benevolence and the appropriate use of Power (Power both intellectual and imaginative) may thus be said to be the two aspects of effective Goodness. Its essence is well summed up in the familiar phrase 'kindness in another's trouble, courage in your own.' Thus Goodness consists essentially in Power directed towards Welfare, *i.e.* to the enhancement of Life; and, thus directed, it tends to produce Beauty and Joy. Hence we may now proceed to the consideration of what is to be understood by Beauty; reserving what has to be said about the more definitely social or co-operative aspects of Goodness to be considered later.

CHAPTER VI

THE VALUE OF BEAUTY

We have now completed the consideration of Truth and Goodness, regarded as modes of value; though we have still to consider how these modes are involved in religion and in the social life of mankind. But the consideration of Goodness has led us to notice its relation to Beauty; and we have now to try to see more definitely what is involved in this. We noted that Goodness does not seem to be properly conceived as aiming at the realization of a sum of pleasures, including, as far as possible, the elimination of pains. But it does appear to aim at the realization, through strenuous effort, of a certain harmony and perfection that yield joy; and this leads us directly to the conception of Beauty, which appears to be the form in which pure Value (as distinct from Validity and Valour) becomes most definitely apparent. In Truth we reach what has a certain validity; and in Goodness we see a mode of effort which may (with a slight straining of the meaning of terms) be characterized as valour; but in neither case do we seem to achieve any finality. Beauty presents itself as a more definite realization of what has intrinsic value. It is 'its own excuse for being,' and does not appear to aim at anything beyond itself. At the same time, it can hardly be regarded as altogether independent of truth and goodness. The saying of Keats that 'beauty is truth, truth beauty,' has carried conviction to many; and it can hardly be denied that there is a close connection between these two elements of value. What is untrue lacks a certain element of harmony; and what is inharmonious can hardly be supposed to be completely true. Similarly, the saying of Browning that the apprehension of beauty is love and that love is duty appeals to us as a means of connecting Beauty with Goodness. It does not appear, however, that either of these identifications can be taken as exact scientific statements. That the complete apprehension

of truth would mean the knowledge of the universe as a perfectly coherent system, may be an article of philosophic faith, but hardly of certain knowledge; and, short of this, much of what appears to be true is a source of anxious thought, and may sometimes almost drive us to despair. Again, though it may be said that duty rests on love, yet the love on which it rests is active benevolence, not satisfaction with what appears to exist. Probably neither Keats nor Browning intended their statements to be taken as scientific propositions, but rather as expressions of faith in a certain ultimate harmony. Such a faith is properly religious; and the essentially religious attitude will have to be considered at a later stage. It is, at any rate, pretty clear that there is a close connection between beauty and the other two ends to which, in a general sense, we attach the highest value. We have now to try to understand what beauty essentially is and how it is related to truth and goodness.

It is well to recognize at the outset that the term may be used in a wider and in a narrower sense. In the narrower sense it is applied primarily to objects that are sensuously apprehended, and especially to those that are apprehended by sight and sound;[1] but in a wider sense it is applied also to actions, characters, and even to more purely intellectual processes such as mathematical or philosophical demonstrations. The wider sense was somewhat more readily applied by the ancient Greeks than it is by us. Aristotle, for instance, stated

[1] When reference is made to objects of sense, the senses that are chiefly concerned are those of sight and hearing. Smell plays a more subordinate part (though it sometimes enters, to a considerable extent, into the apprehension of the charm of certain flowers). Taste and organic sensations have but little place in the apprehension of beauty. It is true that we commonly speak of 'good taste' in referring to the appreciation of beauty; but this appears to be due, not to the fact that we apprehend beauty by taste, but rather that it is largely by taste that we distinguish between what is wholesome or unwholesome for food or drink. It is this discriminative element in the sense of taste that causes it to be specially associated with critical discernment. Professor Patrick Geddes has suggested (in one of his lectures) that the fact that Ruskin's father was a wine-merchant may have had something to do with the development of his artistic taste. This seems a little far-fetched; but it may serve to indicate the sense in which taste connects with the apprehension of value. Ruskin certainly emphasized the view that 'good taste' lies at the basis of all moral excellence, in the sense that what we enjoy is the ultimate test of what we are.

that it is the characteristic feature of all moral action that it is done for the sake of beauty—τοῦ κάλου ἕνεκα—*i.e.* because it is felt to be called for to produce harmony and joy. Καλοκαγαθία—the goodness which is also beauty—was taken by the Greeks as the expression for the supreme aim in human life. The greater emphasis that has been laid in modern times on the inner purpose, as distinguished from its outer expression, has tended to make a somewhat sharper distinction between the good and the beautiful. We are rather apt to think of goodness as being shown chiefly in the somewhat painful effort to achieve what is felt to be right in opposition to the forces that make for evil; and such efforts often appear to have no beauty that we should desire them. Apart from the simple beauty of flowers and other natural objects, we are apt to think of beauty as being shown chiefly in what are called the fine arts, poetry, music, pictorial representation, the drama, dancing, and some other modes of expression. The study of these belongs to the science of aesthetics; and it is not a subject that can be at all definitely discussed in such a general survey as the present.[1]

The general truth about Beauty seems to be that in all its forms it presents us with objects that have a certain harmonious completeness that yields a lasting joy. 'A thing of beauty is a joy for ever.' The object that is depicted may be slight and fleeting; but art gives, as it has been said, 'to one brief moment caught from fleeting time, The appropriate calm of blest eternity.' It is in art that we give, in Goethe's phrase, 'to the moment endurance.' But there are some difficulties about this. The objects that are set before us in art are not always in themselves either harmonious or joyful. It has even been said that 'our sweetest songs are those that tell of saddest thought.' Tragedies are reckoned among the highest, if not quite the highest, forms of art.[2] The grotesque also has a

[1] Reference may be made to Bosanquet's *History of Aesthetic* for the consideration of the main theories that have been held. In the main, he accepts the views of Hegel. The same applies to the very admirable book on *The Theory of Beauty* by Mr. E. F. Carritt. Reference may also be made with advantage to Mr. A. C. Bradley's *Oxford Lectures on Poetry*, to Professor Lascelles Abercrombie's *Theory of Art*, and to many others.

[2] This has been very specially emphasized by Bosanquet. See *Science and Philosophy*, especially p. 88.

considerable place in artistic representation; and some pictures that are highly admired represent objects that seem comparatively trivial and uninteresting—a tailor at work, cocks fighting, a woman threading a needle, or such scenes as those that are represented in 'The Jolly Beggars.' Many recent writers on aesthetics have sought to meet these difficulties by urging that the primary object of Art is not Beauty, but Expression. Croce is the philosopher who has emphasized this most definitely. Of course, this does not mean that fine Art is not beautiful; but the beauty of it may lie in the perfection of the expression, rather than in the nature of what is expressed. Professor Lascelles Abercrombie says[1] that 'a work of art is not created in order to be beautiful; beauty is the sign that it has succeeded in being a work of art.' Perhaps this is not quite true. I think the artist does aim at beauty; but the beauty at which he aims is the beauty of expression. The great Belgian poet Verhaeren said[2] that 'the immediate end of the poet is to express himself; the mediate end is to attain the beautiful.' Another quotation from Professor Abercrombie[3] may help to bring out what is meant. 'When a poet chooses a subject—or, I had better say, when a subject chooses a poet—there is no necessity for beauty to have any say in the business; but there is absolute necessity for every subject which poetry successfully communicates to us, to have thereby become invested with beauty.' Similarly, Mr. Roger Fry has defined beauty in art[4] as 'that harmony which always results from the expression of intense and disinterested emotion.' The recognition of this helps to some extent to remove the difficulty, but not, I think, altogether. Even in natural objects we seem sometimes to find a certain beauty in what can hardly be described as complete or harmonious. Renan said that the somewhat baleful activities of such men as Nero or Cesar Borgia are 'beautiful as a tempest or an abyss.' But why should a tempest or an abyss be regarded as beautiful? Some would, no doubt, say that they are sublime

[1] *Towards a Theory of Art*, pp. 65–6. All his writings on this subject are extremely interesting.

[2] See *Emile Verhaeren*, by P. Marsell Jones, p. 228.

[3] *The Theory of Poetry*, p. 44.

[4] In *The Great State*, p. 253.

rather than beautiful. But the sublime does at least appear to yield a certain joy somewhat similar in kind to that which is given by what we characterize more simply as beautiful. This points, I think, to an essential difference between our moral and our aesthetic valuations. Goodness implies some degree of power directed towards a beneficent end; but it is on the benevolence, rather than on the power, that our moral valuation rests. Goodness may be made perfect in weakness—not, however, if the weakness means weakness of will. It is the effort that counts. It would seem that, in aesthetic valuation, the reverse is true. There is no beauty where there is no achievement; and we may recognize a certain beauty, or at least a certain sublimity, in the perfection of power, even when it is not beneficent. It does its work magnificently, even if its work is baneful. A man who is morally wicked may, in his activities, be aesthetically sublime, if there is a certain harmony and completeness in his activities. We cannot refuse a certain aesthetic admiration for Milton's Satan, at least in the earlier stages of his career, before his final degradation; however much we may disapprove of his attitude in taking evil as his good. The same appears to be true of Goethe's Mephistopheles; and I suppose Nero was not wholly wrong when he claimed to be an artist. There are *fleurs de mal*.[1] It is well to remember also the emphatic declaration of Browning, even if it is a little overstrained:—

> The sin I impute to each frustrate ghost
> Is the unlit lamp and the ungirt loin,
> Though the end in view were a vice.

Even the horrors of war, as Vergil noticed, may give us joy in the retrospect.

But this consideration does not wholly meet our difficulty. It may serve to explain why it is that we may derive an

[1] Swinburne was fond of emphasizing the distinction between what is morally good and what is aesthetically to be commended. See especially his book on *William Blake*, p. 108. 'To art,' he says, 'that is best which is most beautiful; to science that is best which is most accurate; to morality that is best which is most virtuous.' But he might have added that *philosophy* cannot quite accept these sharp antitheses. But it is possible to exaggerate the antitheses. Satan, for instance, had at least the virtue of courage.

aesthetic satisfaction from the contemplation of maleficent power as well as of that which is benevolent; but it does not fully explain the predominant part that what we cannot but regard as evil plays in certain forms of art. Tragedy is generally rated higher as a form of dramatic art than Comedy. *Hamlet*, *Othello*, *King Lear* and *Macbeth* are counted the greatest of Shakespeare's plays; and I suppose *Saint Joan* is at least among the most highly appreciated of Mr. Shaw's. Some may find more satisfaction in *As You Like It*; but Mr. Shaw at least conceives that Shakespeare had an ironical intent in the title given to that play—meaning 'as *you* like it,' not 'as *I* like it.' Even in *As You Like It* there are a good many sad reflections. It is by no means purely joyous. The Second Part of Goethe's *Faust* may be said to have a happy ending which is also a sublime one; but most people regard the First Part as a more satisfying work of art. Dante's *Heaven* may be a finer achievement than his *Hell*; but at least the former would probably seem somewhat insipid without the latter. In general, there appears to be a tragic element in almost all the greatest poetry. And even in other forms of art what gives an immediate joy is apt to be thought feeble or trivial. Bacon remarked that there is no excellent beauty that has not some strangeness in the proportion. What is beautiful is always, in a sense, a unique creation. One star differs from another star in glory. Each is a little universe in itself, having a certain completeness and perfection of its own; but it is a selected completeness; and such a selected completeness may be comparatively limited and unsatisfying. It may have only the sort of beauty that we express by such terms as pretty or lovely. In what we call sublime we pass beyond this limited form of beauty and approximate to religion. In such poems as the *Divine Comedy* and the Second Part of *Faust*, this transition is definitely made; but, just for that reason, they pass almost beyond the limits of art; but in all great Tragedy there is an approximation to this. Greek Tragedy was regarded as religious; and this was more possible in Greek religion than in most others. Its gods were immortal men; and its men could be regarded as mortal gods. The tragedy lay in the recognition that, though they contained the image of the

divine, they were yet mortal. All the greatest art seems to contain some traces of this antithesis; and it thus becomes sublime, and not merely beautiful.

We might put this in a somewhat different way. Beauty seems to be the final form of pure Value. But, being the final form, it must include those other aspects that seem to be necessary for complete value. It must have some degree of Truth and Reality and some degree of Power and Benevolence. But, in so far as it is concerned with what is finite, these are necessarily displayed in imperfect forms. A dramatic representation must be true to human nature; and it can hardly even be wholly dissociated from historical and geographical truth. It represents something that can at least be supposed to have happened at some particular place and time. It must represent, in Wordsworth's phrase, 'some natural sorrow, loss or pain, That has been and may be again.' It must also contain some power and benevolence. Its leading characters must be in some degree heroic. They must contain the element of Valour; and their failures must result from some conflict between good and evil purposes. Otherwise it can hardly be great art. Hegel thought that it must represent a conflict between two purposes that are both good in themselves, but that lead to opposition. I think there is some exaggeration in this. The greatest of Shakespeare's plays represent characters that are powerful, but not always aiming at ends that can be approved. Their purposes need not be benevolent or just; but they must be natural and in some degree strenuously pursued.

In this connection it may be well to refer to Aristotle's conception of the *κάθαρσις* or purification[1] that is involved in tragedy. What he meant by this is not altogether clear. It has sometimes been thought of simply on the analogy of medicine, as if the function of tragedy were to 'cleanse the stuffed bosom of the perilous stuff that weighs upon the heart.' But it is probably better to connect it with that other Aristotelian

[1] Aristotle's doctrine of *κάθαρσις* is not very easy to interpret; but the interpretation here given seems to be the one that is most in accordance with his general view of Tragedy. Reference may be made to Bosanquet's *History of Aesthetic*, pp. 64–5.

expression that was previously referred to (p. 28), that tragedy is 'more philosophical and more serious than history.' When we study history in a purely matter-of-fact way, we get an imaginative representation of a number of occurrences, some noble and beautiful, some horrible and depressing; and we are affected by them in approximately the same way as we are affected by the events that are occurring here and now. In a tragedy, on the other hand, we are presented with a number of occurrences that may or may not be similar to those that are happening here and now, but that are set before us in such a way as to make their significance apparent. If they involve pity and terror or other emotional elements, they do not come to us in the way in which pity or terror may be provoked by occurrences in the world around us, and they do not call for any active intervention on our part. We apprehend them as belonging inevitably to certain modes of action. Hence the pity or terror which they evoke is an idealized emotion. The scenes that we apprehend are seen as inevitable aspects of certain modes of action. They are not accidental occurrences that we may deplore, but rather aspects of the essential nature of existence; and in that sense they may be said to express the true nature of reality in a sense in which purely historical events may not appear to do so. The emotion that they evoke is thus different in kind from that which we may experience in connection with occurrences that present themselves to us as accidental and for which we may feel some personal resentment or some call for action.

The real reason for the superiority of Tragedy over Comedy, as well as over History, seems to be that it contains a deeper truth. Every human life is a Tragedy; and the 'happy ending' that a Comedy supplies, even if it is a great Comedy, is not an ending at all. Even the Greeks recognized that no man can be called happy until he is dead. It is only then that we can pass judgment upon his life as a whole. Shakespeare himself could hardly have been counted happy when he was trying to sign his will; but we may count him happy when we view his whole career. Southey said of the death of Nelson that, if he had been provided with a chariot and horses of fire, he could not have passed in a brighter blaze of glory. There is thus a

certain completeness in Tragedy. It shows us a result that is seen to be the inevitable working out of the imperfect aims of human beings in a more or less adverse environment; and it at least suggests that there may be a deeper view of the meaning of human life. The struggle is ended; and, if it has left us sadder, it has also left us wiser. Great lessons have been impressed upon us, and we have gained a deeper insight. But the full significance of this deeper view can only be supplied by religion; or at least it can only be supplied by the more definite recognition of those elements of Reality and Goodness that are involved in the highest value. It may be noted that it seems possible to enhance even the beauty of a natural object by ascribing to it a sort of moral purpose. Browning, after referring to the perfect beauty of a cultivated flower, contrasts it with that of a wild flower[1]:—

> The wilding now,
> Ruffled outside at pleasure of the blast,
> That still lifts up, with something of a smile,
> Its poor attempt at bloom!

He thus gives it a certain superiority by ascribing to it a sort of moral effort. Of course, there is a certain 'pathetic fallacy' in this. This may help us to see that the perfection of Beauty involves, directly or indirectly, the other elements of Value. But it involves them in a more perfect balance.

It has sometimes been said that music is the form of art in which beauty is shown in its purest essence. Certainly it seems to come nearer than any other to the realization of perfect harmony, and hence has been commonly thought of as the mode in which the perfect bliss that is thought of as constituting the supreme realization of heaven can be best conceived. But it is a form that tends to become almost purely emotional, omitting both the more intellectual and the more practical content. It is almost purely of the nature of an 'embodied joy,' even when it may be the expression of 'saddest thought.' It enables even the bitterest experiences to find a place in a harmonious setting in which they seem to be but aspects of a perfect unity. All art appears to aim at this; but in other forms

[1] *Ferishtah's Fancies*, Mihrab Shah.

the particular content interferes to some extent with the harmonious impression. On the other hand, the lack of concrete embodiment must be regarded as a limitation in purely musical expression. Probably the most perfect beauty is found in dramatic representations of life expressed at least partly in rhythmic form, as on the Greek and Elizabethan stage.

On the whole, I feel it to be more difficult to state what is meant by beauty than what is meant by any of the other values that are recognized as intrinsic. Perhaps this is due to the fact that it is the element that underlies them all. I should be disposed to sum up by saying that a beautiful object is an object that is apprehended as being exactly what it ought to be. If it is a truth, it is a truth that is felt to be completely true. If it is an action, it is exactly fitted to realize the end in view. If it is an expression, it expresses exactly what it is meant to convey. And there is nothing in it that is irrelevant. It thus yields a pure joy, even if it may contain much that is in itself sad; and indeed the joy is all the greater when we are enabled to realize that even what is in itself evil has a fitting place in the order of the universe.[1]

What has now been stated may enable us to see more clearly what is the real significance of the saying of Keats that 'beauty is truth, truth beauty,' a saying that seems to me to be sometimes quoted without much understanding of what it means. It is not to be interpreted, I think, in a sense that gives support to what is commonly known as Realism in art. It does not mean literal truth; but it implies a selection of what is relevant; and this may often be opposed to what is literally true with reference to fact or even to appearance. The statements in Shelley's *Skylark* or in Keats's *Ode to the Nightingale* —such as 'bird thou never wert' or 'The Queen-Moon is on her throne, Cluster'd around by all her starry fays'— are not literally true; but they correctly express what is felt by a mind that adequately appreciates the beauty of the objects that are referred to. In that sense, the statements are both true and beautiful. They are true, not about the skylark and the moon, but about an attitude of mind in the contempla-

[1] The poetry of Francis Thompson may be specially referred to in this connection.

tion of them. In that sense, they are truly beautiful and beautifully true. The nightingale is not an 'immortal bird'; but the significance of its song, as expressed by Keats, may be said to be immortal. In that sense his statement is true. It is also true that $2 + 2 = 4$, but it is not particularly beautiful. The Taj Mahal is beautiful; but it is not easy to see in what sense it can be said to be true. To say that it is beautiful, however, is to say what is true. Similarly, the moon is not a 'full orbed maiden' nor a 'queen,' nor does it even appear to be either the one or the other. But it is a true instinct in human nature to personify objects that attract our interest. It is natural to feel a kinship with them; and it may be truer to think of them in that way than to think of them as a collection of inert particles. The skylark that Shelley addresses is not the bird, but the source of its significant music. It is the song of the lark that has significance; and, in appreciating that, we are not thinking of the bird. Even a much more realistic poet than Shelley or Keats, such as Burns, selects significant phases of life. He does not seek to give 'the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.' What he expresses is true in the sense of indicating certain abiding and significant aspects of reality. Shakespeare, on a larger scale, gives a similar selection of significant moments in the lives that he depicts. Art, it would seem, is real and unreal. It 'is reality as the artist perceives, feels, experiences it, but that is very different from reality seen as in a mirror by the eyes of you or me.'[1] It is reality transformed by a deeper vision. It is true to life, but selects aspects of life that have a special significance. It has pity and terror in it; but it is a pity and terror with which we have no personal concern. The joy that it yields is also not a joy in anything that directly concerns our individual lives. One of the greatest triumphs of Shakespeare's art is found in the creation of Falstaff.[2] Almost everyone is led to love him; but no one wants to be like him. Our enjoyment of him is thus

Falstaff

[1] L. A. Reid, *Knowledge and Truth*, p. 232.

[2] The best treatment of this is that given in Mr. A. C. Bradley's *Oxford Lectures on Poetry*. The remarks of Professor W. E. Hocking are also worth adding here. 'It is in the world of art, of letters, of fairly distant history—in brief, it is in the world of imagination . . . that Falstaff, the Jolly Friars, Lucretia Borgia, Tam o' Shanter, Don Juan, and all the other

quite disinterested. What is wholly unreal is unconvincing because, though it may be harmonious in itself, it is not in harmony with the rest of our experience. 'News from Nowhere' is not very gratifying news, so far as it is really from nowhere. On the other hand, the clear vision of actual conditions, even if they are very unsatisfactory conditions, has beauty when they are seen as conditions in which the working of laws that are essentially beneficent may be observed. But the recognition of this does not prevent the artist from creating Ariels and Calibans, immortal nightingales and skylarks that were never birds, and enabling us to enjoy a 'light that never was on sea or land'—though the apprehension of that light may have its chief value in helping us to appreciate more adequately the light that is there. We come back to reality with new eyes. It remains true, I think, that the poetic artist 'looks at all things as they are, but through a kind of glory.' The 'glory' lies in the apprehension of their intrinsic value.

It is well to remember that the saying of Keats occurs in an ode in which he is referring to a picture that represented, not facts, but rather eager aspirations. As Bosanquet has said,[1] it is 'the glory of art that in it alone the body of man and of nature rushes to meet the soul in a splendour which springs from both, and every particle of which is charged with significance.' I think 'significance' is the right word. We prefer to forget what is trivial. Prince Henry was ashamed to remember the number of Poins's silk stockings. But we are glad to remember what has great significance, even if it is in itself disagreeable.

There is a type of general optimism that seems to be specially characteristic of American writers. The saying of Margaret Fuller, 'I accept the Universe,' is perhaps its most

heroes and heroines of the morally unstrenuous life have their rightful sphere. They are the glorified fringes of our too sharp-cut and self-righteous ideals' (*Human Nature and its Remaking*, p. 109).

[1] *Croce's Aesthetic*, p. 19. With this might be compared also the statement of A. Coomaraswamy (*The Dance of Shiva*, p. 36): 'As love is reality experienced by the lover, and truth is reality experienced by the philosopher, so beauty is reality as experienced by the artist, and these are three phases of the absolute.' Such statements, I think, help us at least to understand what is meant. The saying of Ruskin should also be remembered: 'You never will love Art well till you love what she mirrors better' (*Eagle's Nest*, § 39).

terse expression; but we find the same idea more voluminously set forth in the writings of Emerson and, still more, in those of Walt Whitman. But I think they always mean that they accept things, not simply as they stand, but as they contain 'the promise and potency' of what is better. When Whitman 'loafs,' he 'invites his soul,' and it is the soul of a fighter for what is better. Keats also contrasts the immortal beauty that is expressed in the nightingale's song with 'the fever and the sweat' of the 'hungry generations' of humanity. The vision of the poet is always the vision of things as they might be and only very partially are. A faith of this kind lay at the heart even of the apparent pessimism of Francis Thompson. On the other hand, the joy that Shelley ascribes to the skylark is based on an understanding of the significance of pain and evil:—

> Thou of death must deem
> Things more true and deep
> Than we mortals dream,
> Or how could thy notes flow in such a crystal stream?

Of course, there is a touch of the 'pathetic fallacy' in this, as well as in Browning's reference to the wild flower. It is we, and not the lark, who may deem something deeper about death; and it is Shelley's notes, much more than the lark's, that flow in a crystal stream. It is well to remember Turner's answer to someone who said that he could not see in nature what was depicted in his paintings—'Don't you wish you could?' The artist creates; he does not merely copy; but he creates a perfection that nature may be said to be striving after or reveals a significance which in nature is only partly shown. Hence art has been defined[1] as 'the completion of the possession of the beautiful.' It gives immortality to something that is felt to have an eternal significance. 'When we enter into art,' as Professor Abercrombie says,[2] 'we recollect the ideal towards which we must for ever strive; we perfectly know what it is at which our lives are aimed; and we forget that our hopes must be, except in artistic consciousness of them, eternally frustrated.' Perhaps not eternally.

[1] By Professor Hocking, *Human Nature and its Remaking*, p. 320.
[2] *Towards a Theory of Art*, p. 115.

CHAPTER VII

INTRINSIC AND INSTRUMENTAL VALUES

We have now reached a stage at which it is possible to consider more definitely the distinction between those values that may be regarded as intrinsic or ultimate and those that should be characterized as more purely instrumental. In discussing intrinsic values, we are endeavouring to answer the old question, 'What is man's chief end?' But we have also to ask, What are the chief instrumentalities by the help of which that end may be, as far as possible, achieved? It is not easy to make the distinction quite a sharp one. We have seen that Truth and its correlate, Reality, can hardly be regarded as having complete value except in so far as they may be described as absolute. If Reality means the Universe regarded as a completely coherent system, and if Truth means such a system as consciously apprehended, it may be maintained that this apprehension would yield complete satisfaction to the purely intellectual aspect of our consciousness; but, in that case, it seems clear that it would also be apprehended as beautiful; and it may be urged that it is this fact that enables it to be described as having intrinsic value. In so far as it falls short of this, its value may be described as relative or instrumental. It supplies the means of advancing to a more perfect apprehension. Goodness, in like manner, appears to mean the summoning of our powers in the service of Benevolence; and Benevolence means the conscious effort to promote harmony in the collective life of humanity. Such harmony would be the realization of a high form of Beauty, and would yield Joy. It appears from this that Beauty and its correlative, Joy, are the central elements in Value. Regarded in separation from these ends, Truth has only that kind of value that has been called Validity; and Goodness has the higher kind that may be called Valour or Worth. But it seems to be true also that perfect beauty must contain these aspects. We cannot conceive

any complete beauty or any perfect joy that would not involve truth and reality, and that would not be a living whole containing process. Hence it seems necessary to regard intrinsic value as including all these aspects. It seems clear also that each aspect contains the distinguishable features that may be characterized as subjective and objective respectively. The appreciation of beauty yields joy; the apprehension of reality is truth; and the right direction of power is active benevolence. These evidently correspond to the three main aspects of our conscious life, and cannot be conceived as existing apart.

But, it may be asked, is it not possible to think of some values as existing in themselves without any direct reference to the conscious apprehension of them? Are we to say that flowers that 'waste their sweetness on the desert air' have no value? The answer would seem to be that anything that exists in this purely external way can only be regarded as having a potential value. It is a mode of existence which, if it were consciously apprehended, would acquire value. Perhaps, however, this is little more than a verbal question. It may be right to say that value can subsist without any conscious valuation. Certainly it would be somewhat paradoxical to say that houses lose their value when they are uninhabited; but it is true to say that they owe their value to the fact that they are suitable for human habitation. In a similar sense values may be held to subsist without conscious valuation. There might be reality without any true apprehension of it; there might be power without the benevolent application of it; and there might be beauty without the joy that comes with its appreciation. In a similarly anticipatory sense we may even ascribe valuation to the subhuman world. The subhuman world may be supposed to be—perhaps it must be supposed to be—the best that could exist in its particular place; and so it may be regarded as at least containing the potentiality of what, at a higher stage of development, is recognized as value. But such value must at least be regarded as an imperfect mode of value. We call it value only so far as we recognize that it is an essential stage in the realization of those values that are consciously apprehended. Hence it may be said to be instrumental, rather than intrinsic. It has ultimate value only

by anticipation. No doubt, this is in some degree true even of those values that we rightly regard as being, on the whole, ultimate or intrinsic. Truth, as we know it, is never the whole truth. As Bradley has said,[1] 'abstraction, inconsistency, and one-sidedness, belong necessarily to the path of knowledge.' Yet there is a growing value in the gradual attainment of it; and we may believe that it would have the highest value if it could be fully achieved. Goodness is, by its very nature, a pursuit rather than an attainment. Even beauty and joy, as we apprehend them, are never perfect; and a large part of their value lies in their leading us on to the pursuit of truth and goodness. Hence we cannot properly say that any one of them contains by itself the complete and perfect value; and we have to recognize that even the most complete and perfect values that we know are in part instrumental. 'The harmonious removal of every discord is still for us something which can neither anywhere, as such, be perceived nor in detail understood. It contains inconsistencies which, refusing to be theoretically solved, are made good only by faith.'[2] Perhaps, on the other hand, it may be true also that even those values that appear to be only instrumental are essential elements in the perfect whole. Indeed, if we are entitled to believe that the whole of reality has perfect value, we must recognize that every part of that whole shares somehow in its perfection. Thus we should have to agree with the Platonic Socrates in thinking that the recognition of Mind or Spirit as the interpretative principle in the whole involves the view that everything that exists is the best. But we must also acknowledge that we can never expect to see, in detail, that it is so. In any case, the further consideration of this must be reserved for a separate chapter. For the present, I must be content to sum up the general results that appear, so far, to have been reached.

The most purely intrinsic of all values is Joy—'Joy in widest commonalty spread.' In this the Utilitarians were right, though their use of the term Pleasure was misleading, and they appear to have been mistaken in thinking that Joys,

[1] *Principles of Logic*, second edition, vol. ii. p. 722.
[2] Bradley, *ibid.*, p. 725.

which are intensive magnitudes, could, in any definite way, be summed. It is better to speak of 'happiness in the creative sense,' as some recent writers[1] have done; though that also is somewhat vague. In any case, it is important to remember that Joy is directed to some object that, in a wide sense, has a certain beauty. 'When we apprehend some joy, we comprehend some bringer of that joy'; and what directly yields joy is beauty. Beauty is, to a large extent, created by human agency; and its conscious creation implies benevolence and power. When beauty appears in the universe that we apprehend, it constitutes an orderly and coherent system of reality; and, so far as we succeed in apprehending such a system, we attain to truth. Thus it would seem that there are six main aspects of intrinsic value—Truth, Reality, Benevolence, Power, Beauty and Joy. All the others may be called instrumental with reference to the joy that they yield; but they are so inseparably bound up with that joy that they may be said to be involved in its intrinsic nature. In thus regarding the aspect of Beauty as that which most definitely contains value, in the narrower sense of that term, it must not be supposed that we are ascribing to it a higher dignity than that which belongs to Goodness and Truth. It may be right to say, as Kant did, that Goodness should be regarded as having worth (*Würde*) rather than value (*Werth*); and, if so, it seems clear that worth represents a higher dignity than value. The creator is greater than his work. We rightly ascribe to Shakespeare a higher dignity than that which is ascribed to his plays; but the dignity that we ascribe to him is due to the intrinsic value of his plays. 'If our virtues did not go forth of us, 'Twere all alike as if we had them not'; nevertheless, it is the virtues that have supreme worth. But they 'go forth of us' in the generation of beauty and joy. Again, Beauty has value only in so far as it is realized; and thus Reality is an essential element in the supreme values. 'News from Nowhere,' as already noted, is not very gratifying news if it really is from Nowhere. On the other hand, the clear vision of actual conditions, even if they are very unsatisfactory conditions, has beauty in so far as

[1] Especially Professor Hobhouse, in his books on *The Rational Good* and *The Elements of Social Justice*.

they are seen as conditions in which the working of laws that are essentially beneficent may be, in some degree, observed or felt. Even 'carnage' may be felt to have a certain beauty when we can think of it as 'God's daughter,' *i.e.* as a means, in particular circumstances, of accomplishing a beneficent object. The destruction of evil is good. Hence it does not seem possible to isolate the intrinsic values from one another, or to affirm that any one of them has, by itself, an importance that is superior to that of the others. It is in their unity that the supreme value must be taken to lie. Everything is, in some degree, beautiful, when it is viewed in its true place in reality as an inevitable element in the orderly structure of things. There is, however, certainly a sense in which goodness as the supreme worth, the benevolent power by which beauty is created and sustained, may be said to be the highest of all the values. In this sense, we may agree with the emphatic utterance of Sir Henry Jones,[1] that 'in the last resort nothing, or nothing of consequence, takes place except that men are slowly learning goodness.' But, in learning it, they are learning also to pursue the other intrinsic values. Goodness, in the strictly moral sense, means the strenuous effort to promote Good in the wider sense. The pursuit of truth is an endless and difficult quest; and the creation of beauty, in any supreme sense, calls for a special genius. In the case of goodness, zealously to seek is, in some degree, to find. From these supreme aspects of intrinsic value we may distinguish those existences or characteristic features that are definitely instrumental to them. Health, for instance, is in some degree a necessary condition of the well-being that yields joy, and of the power which, guided by benevolence, produces those individual and social conditions without which beauty can hardly be achieved. All these things must have a place in reality; and, to be fully effective, they must be truly apprehended. All these circumstances, though they may be regarded as instrumental to the production and diffusion of joy, are yet so directly involved in that achievement that they can hardly be separated from it, and may therefore be described as intrinsic. Bodily conditions also, especially some tolerable

[1] *A Faith that Enquires*, p. 201.

degree of health, are very intimately bound up with the realization of the beauty and joy of life; and a suitable organization of society is also an essential condition. Thus all these characteristics may properly be treated as being rather more than instruments. It is only when we pass to objects of a more specific kind, which are more or less 'fungible'—*i.e.* capable of being substituted for one another—that we come to those that are most properly described as instrumental. For the maintenance of a suitable social environment, it may be necessary to have an army and navy, a police force, laws and forms of government for the due organization of the social system, houses and clothes for the maintenance of life and health, education for the development of the bodily and mental powers, cultivation of the soil, industry, trade, and so forth. Some of these things may have a certain beauty in themselves, and may yield an immediate joy; but, in the main, they may not unfairly be classed as instrumental. For the proper establishment and organization of some of them, special studies may have to be developed. Political and economic theories are needed for the due consideration of the complicated conditions of social life. All these may be said to be, in their various ways, instrumental, though some of them are so essential for the realization of the supreme ends of life that they may almost be regarded as intrinsic. This is especially true of education, in the most comprehensive acceptation of that term, since it is necessary for the full development of conscious life itself, on which the apprehension of values depends. Most other things are more purely instrumental. The question then comes to be mainly one with regard to the relative importance of these subsidiary values. They are liable, to some extent, to conflict with one another. In the pursuit of health and physical well-being we may sacrifice some ends that are more important *et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas*. The organization of a social and political system may involve us in conflicts of classes and nationalities that are destructive of health and life and of the balance and sanity of mind on which the beauty and joy of life depend. And, in the pursuit of food and clothing, we may miss the Kingdom of Heaven.

Nevertheless, a large part of human life is necessarily devoted to the pursuit of ends that have only a subsidiary value. This is especially true of those ends with which the study of economics is concerned. The greater part of most men's mature life is absorbed in occupations that are to a considerable extent—often almost exclusively—pursued for the sake of the maintenance of life itself. This is secured by the production of what, in a wide sense, are called 'goods,' a term that is generally taken to mean things that are recognized as having a certain instrumental value. Sometimes it has been found convenient to describe these as 'utilities,' which may almost be taken as synonymous with instrumental values. Some of these are necessary for the support, the prolongation or the enjoyment of physical and mental well-being. Others are of a more doubtful utility; but, according to the common phrase, they are 'in demand.' Some people, for a variety of reasons, like to have them. Some of them, though of very little use in themselves, help to promote social intercourse or to satisfy casual desires created by artificial conditions of life. Money has been invented to serve as a measure of the relative values that are attached to such 'goods' and of balancing their values against the difficulties (or disutilities) that are involved in procuring and distributing them. These difficulties are conveniently regarded as having a negative value, though sometimes they may have a positive value in contributing to the development and exercise of important human faculties that help to realize the intrinsic ends of life. The consideration of the somewhat complicated problems that arise in the treatment of these subsidiary values is the task of the very difficult and important science of economics. With that we are not at present concerned; but some further reference to it will come up in the course of Part II. In the meantime, having completed the general consideration of the three main aspects of intrinsic value, we pass to a brief study of the place of Religion, which appears to be intimately concerned with the apprehension of the supreme values.

The general conclusion that has so far been reached may be summed up in the statement that intrinsic Value is found in the creation of Joy through the apprehension of Truth by

means of Power; and the persistent effort to help in doing this is Goodness. In so far as this is in some degree achieved, it is Beauty. Whatever helps in realizing it has instrumental Value. Goodness has supreme Worth. Beauty has supreme Value. Goodness cannot be effectively realized without Power. Beauty yields Joy, which is its subjective aspect. Nothing has value that has not some degree of Reality. Reality, rightly apprehended, is Truth. These would seem to be the fundamental Values. All others are, in various degrees, instrumental. Of the three great values, Goodness is the most directly under our own control; to seek it strenuously is to find it; Beauty can only be realized in a limited way; and Truth, in any complete sense, can only be reached by a slow and gradual process. Hence Goodness can be regarded as yielding a direct imperative; Beauty is found rather than consciously achieved; and Truth is pursued through what may be an endless quest. If there is to be any order of excellence among the intrinsic values, I think Goodness should be placed first, Beauty second and Truth (so long, at least, as it is only an object of pursuit) third. But they cannot really be divorced from one another. The *Worth* of Goodness lies in the effort to create Beauty, and thus to *give it Reality*. The artist endeavours to create it in a limited way, the philanthropist in a more extended way; and their creative efforts are themselves a part of the beauty that they create. It is reasonable, however, to believe that Reality as a whole is a Cosmos, *i.e.* that it is beautiful throughout. But the beauty has to be realized through a creative process. The complete or ultimate Good would thus be found in apprehending the Truth that Love and Power give Reality to Beauty and Joy. Thus all the six aspects of Value would be included in the conception of a Cosmos, realizing itself through a long process. The belief that Reality is such a Cosmos is at least a large part of what is meant by Religion; and to the consideration of this we must now proceed.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PLACE OF RELIGION

We now come to the consideration of the place of Value in Religion. This is a subject of considerable difficulty, partly because there are so many different religions. It is not easy to give any general definition that is applicable to them all. Many religions involve metaphysical conceptions of the nature of the universe and of the place of human life in it; and these could not be at all adequately discussed in such a sketch as the present. What has to be said about it may be reserved for the following chapter. But there is a good deal in the religious attitude that is not directly dependent on such theories. What is specially characteristic of almost all religions is a certain attitude of Reverence or Worship; and we have to ask how this is connected with valuation.

The various aspects of Value that have now been considered all involve a certain progress towards ideal ends that are not fully achieved in human life as we know it. We can hardly be said to have reached Truth and Reality in any complete sense, but only what is true and real so far as it goes. We know that $2 + 2 = 4$, so long as we are concerned with purely numerical relations; but we do not know that two things added to other two things will remain four. They may combine into one, or they may split up into an indefinite number. We do not reach absolute Reality. In any complex investigation we are never sure that our analyses are complete. It was at one time thought that physical atoms were the ultimate elements in the analysis of matter; but this is now known to be incorrect; and the process of analysis is still proceeding. Similarly, we cannot be sure that the syntheses that have so far been made have any finality. A good deal is known about the spatio-temporal system; but it is not known, and can hardly be said to be even probable, that it is the whole of Reality. Certainly we have not attained to any

complete vision of the Whole. It is equally apparent that human Goodness never attains to any final end. The good in some degree lack power; and the consciousness of futility is apt to paralyse the ardour of pursuit even in the greatest heroes. In Beauty we may find what, so far as it goes, may be regarded as a realization. It gives at least a momentary, and may even yield a lasting, satisfaction. But the limitations of the Truth and Goodness that are expressed in it, infect it in some degree with their own imperfections. The forms of social unity are also in many respects unsatisfactory. Hence we must always aspire to a deeper and more complete truth, a purer and more strenuous goodness, and a larger and more harmonious beauty than any that we are able to realize on earth. And it may even be added that, if we could realize them, it is not easy to see what significance would remain in human life. We should have reached the end of our endeavours. But at least there is no immediate danger of such a consummation. In the meantime, it is true that the aspiration towards it is only to be found in those who have developed some degree of insight into reality, some degree of active benevolence, and some degree of appreciation of what is beautiful. Before these have been, in some considerable degree, developed, the consciousness of any superhuman greatness does not take the form of aspiration, but rather that of awe and dread. We learn gradually to have some degree of reverence for wisdom, creative activity, and harmonious perfection; but it needs a considerable development of these modes of valuation before we can have any real reverence for the complete realization of them. Until we have reached some considerable degree of development of them, the thought of their complete realization is apt to be regarded with fear, rather than with reverence. At very imperfect levels we have the soothsayer instead of the philosophic thinker; the powerful chief instead of the benevolent leader; the magician instead of the creative artist. The germs of the higher values may be said to be implicitly contained in these. But at this stage ultimate reality is thought of as the realm of mystery, duty as the thunders of the law, beauty as a supernatural revelation. Something of this remains even at levels of development that are considerably higher

than those primitive stages; and this seems to me to be the element of truth in Dr. Otto's conception of the Holy which has recently attracted so much attention. According to him, this element of awe in the presence of something that is not understood, is the essential characteristic of the religious attitude. If so, religion would seem to have the peculiarity that what is most essential in it appears most prominently in its rudimentary beginnings, and tends to disappear in the course of its development.[1] It is true that something of it remains in the form of reverence, but reverence appears to be a mode of admiration (which is of the nature of Love) rather than of dread. Dr. Otto, in the account that he gives of the Holy, refers a good deal to Goethe; and it is certainly true that Goethe was interested in the awe-inspiring and supplied striking illustrations of it; but he did not consider it to be the essential feature of religion. In the account that he gives of religion in *Wilhelm Meister's Travels*, he makes a sharp distinction between Fear and Reverence. He distinguishes three main forms of Reverence—the reverence for what is above us, the reverence for what is on a level with us, and the reverence for what is beneath us. Perhaps his account of these is not wholly satisfactory; but it does seem to point to three distinct attitudes that are found in religion. They may be described as different modes of reverence; or they might even be said to be different forms of Love. The first mode is essentially a form of admiration, the second of loyalty, and the third of benevolence. We admire what is above us; we are loyal to those with whom we co-operate, and who are, more or less, on our own level; and we are benevolent towards those who need our help and who, in that sense, may be said to be beneath us. It may be admitted that the first of these attitudes involves a certain element of awe, though not of dread. Goethe

[1] On the whole, modern research hardly seems to confirm the view that even the most primitive types of religion rest exclusively on fear and awe, though that aspect is no doubt present as an element. It would seem that, even in primitive religions, utilitarian considerations with reference to the production and preservation of life were prominent. Thus they rested to a large extent on the recognition of instrumental values. In later religions the intrinsic values have been increasingly brought to the front. On the earlier stages of religious development, reference may be made to the recent writings of Mr. W. J. Perry.

connected it with the worship of God the Father; and the attitude of children towards their parents does, I suppose, usually involve a certain element of awe and bewilderment; but this is apt to disappear pretty rapidly. Perhaps even admiration may not be very persistent; but there generally remains some consciousness of superiority in certain respects. Goethe thought that the Christian conception of the Holy Spirit as a pervasive influence might be connected with the idea of loyal co-operation among those who are, in the main, in a position of equality; while, finally, the most distinctive feature of Christianity is seen in the idea of benevolence towards the suffering and erring. Goethe did not put it quite in this way; but I believe I am not seriously misrepresenting his meaning. Heine afterwards gave an essentially similar expression of these three religious attitudes.[1] They may be connected with the three main types of intrinsic value. What is beautiful calls for our admiration; what is apprehended as true demands our loyal adhesion; while goodness seems to consist essentially in active benevolence.

It is possible that in this interpretation of the religious attitudes hardly enough justice is done to the element of awe that generally persists in religion. Reverence does perhaps nearly always retain a certain element of awe; and to that extent Dr. Otto's contention may be admitted. But it seems true at least to say that in the higher religions awe is combined with love; and it is this combination that appears to be expressed by the term 'reverence.' Pure awe, without love, is to be found only in those to whom the higher values do not appeal. Milton represents this as appearing in the attitude of Satan:—

> Abashed the devil stood,
> And felt how awful goodness is.

But even those whose attitude is not altogether Satanic may still feel some degree of awe in the contemplation of what is absolutely true and real. It remains, more or less, for all of us an unattainable ideal, and retains a certain element of mystery. So does supreme goodness. Similarly, even the best

[1] In his *Hartzreise*.

of men—perhaps, indeed, *especially* the best of men—may be well aware that they have not attained to what Kant characterized as a Holy Will, a Will in which there is no sense of conflict between inclination and duty. It is here perhaps that Dr. Otto's conception of the Holy is most in place. Beauty also, as we have noted, tends in its higher phases to pass into the Sublime. Greek Tragedy and even the most striking of the Shakespearean tragedies—perhaps especially *King Lear*—may be held to be sublime rather than beautiful; and in the apprehension of the Sublime there is an element of awe. So far, I think it may be admitted that Dr. Otto is substantially right. But it is true also, as Goethe urged, that in the higher religions the awe that is fear passes gradually into the reverence that is love. Some historical references may help to bring this out.

It is not very definitely known how religion, as distinguished from primitive superstition, first began in the history of the human race. The most recent investigations appear to connect both it and the general beginnings of what we call civilization with the life of ancient Egypt.[1] There religion would seem to have begun primarily, or perhaps rather to have culminated, in the worship of the Sun as the giver of light and warmth, of the power that develops plant and animal life, and of everything that contains clearness and beauty. It is thought that civilization spread outwards from this early beginning to almost every part of the world, taking somewhat different forms in different religions and losing something of the comprehensiveness that belonged to its source. All this may still be somewhat open to question. What is more apparent is that, in later times, there have been three main sources of the spread of intellectual, moral and aesthetic expressions of what may be regarded as fundamental religious attitudes. These sources are found in India—at first, it would seem, in the north, but latterly in the more southern parts; in Judaea with

India

Judaea

[1] On this reference may be made to the interesting writings of Mr. W. J. Perry, especially *The Origin of Magic and Religion* and *The Children of the Sun*. The views expressed in these books are based, to a considerable extent, on the elaborate work of Sir J. G. Fraser and on the studies by Dr. Rivers, Professor Elliot Smith and others. Of the value of these researches I am not qualified to judge.

Jerusalem as its centre, and in Greece with its centre ultimately in Athens. The most conspicuous feature in India—though, of course, not the exclusive feature—is the search for the deepest spiritual truth, a search that may be regarded as beginning in the Vedic poems and culminating in the teaching of the Buddha and in the speculations of Shankara. It yields a religion of a predominantly meditative and intellectual type; and there is still a good deal that may be learned from it. It is the source of some of the deepest of our modern European speculations. F. H. Bradley's philosophy is largely akin to it in its highest developments. The Jewish prophets, on the other hand, emphasized goodness or righteousness;[1] and this attitude reached its finest expression in Christianity and captured large parts of the East in the form of Mohammedanism. With the Greeks art was the predominant feature, expressed largely in sculpture and music, but most adequately in the Homeric poems, of which the authorship is unknown, but which appear to have grown almost spontaneously out of the artistic genius of the race; just as the energy and versatility of our own people did once find permanent expression in the Elizabethan drama. Much even of the finest philosophy of the Greeks took a definitely artistic form. This is true to some extent of the philosophical and moral teaching of the Indians and Jews as well: but the artistic form was not as predominant or as finely cultivated with them as it was with the Greeks. I think it was largely their sense of form that gave lucidity to their scientific expositions, as well as to their more purely artistic work.[2] The Indians still meditate; and the Jews, though dispersed about the world, still preach and prophesy. The Greeks, unfortunately, are as a national force to all intents extinct; but their work, having a certain perfection of form in

[1] Largely, it would seem, because they had been taught, by Moses or others, to think of human life as governed by law, and of law as ordained by a divine ruler. In India, I think, the work of the lawgiver has tended to be regarded as subordinate to that of the reflective seer.

[2] Mr. R. G. Collingwood (*Speculum Mentis*, p. 53) has urged that the special genius of the Greeks is seen rather in science than in art. If we say that it lay in the sense of formal perfection, the two views may be reconciled. Aristotle and Euclid had it, as well as the poets and sculptors; and Plato, though strongly influenced by Oriental speculation, became an artist in his own despite.

all its aspects, preserves its vitality even more undiminished than the others.[1]

And what is the final outcome? If it is right to believe that human life consists rather in the pursuit of values than in the attainment of them, we may at least confidently affirm that the pursuit shows no sign of slackening. The world has not become perfectly wise or perfectly good, nor has it been either made perfectly beautiful or shown conclusively to be so in its final significance. But we may at least worship the perfections that we cannot hope to achieve. The 'Free Man's Worship,' according to Mr. Russell, consists in devotion to the supreme values in spite of the fact that the conditions of our life on earth do not yield any prospect of the complete realization of them. But it is at least not certain that the pursuit is doomed to ultimate failure. Perhaps by combining the deepest speculations of India with the moral fervour of Judaea, we may still hope to attain some vision of the whole that will not yield in beauty to the finest creations of Greece. But we must have patience. At any rate, it is certainly not for me to determine what the final religion is to be. I have only been seeking to indicate what its place among the intrinsic values is.[2] It endeavours to give them a certain completeness—to wean us, in Goethe's phrase, from what is only half good, and help us to live resolutely, as far as possible, in the Whole, the Good and the Beautiful:—

> Sich vom Halben zu entwöhnen,
> Und im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen
> Resolut zu leben.

If we cannot with any clearness apprehend the perfection of the Cosmos, we may at least hope to achieve some more or less

[1] Count Keyserling's *Travel Notes of a Philosopher* give an interesting survey of most of the civilized peoples of the world from the point of view mainly of their religious significance. They are based mainly on personal impressions; but the conclusions have not been hastily formed.

[2] The significance of religion in human life has perhaps never been more finely brought out than it has been in the remarkable work by Professor W. E. Hocking on *Human Nature and its Remaking*. Caird's *Evolution of Religion*, Bosanquet's *What Religion Is*, and Bradley's *Ethical Studies* may also be referred to on the more metaphysical aspects of the subject.

tolerable approximation to it in the Microcosm. It is, on the whole, true that it is with goodness, as the supreme worth, that religion is mainly concerned;[1] but it leads us also to a certain cosmic outlook, on which it may be worth while to add some further reflections here.

[1] The eloquent and illuminating work by Professor Sorley on *Moral Values and the Idea of God* may be referred to with great advantage in connection with this; also the collection of essays by various writers, edited by Mr. A. D. Lindsay, the Master of Balliol, on *Christianity and the Present Moral Unrest*.

CHAPTER IX

THE COSMOS AND THE MICROCOSM

RELIGION, as dealt with in the preceding chapter, may be said to be only of the nature of an aspiration; and it may be asked whether any complete justification can be given for the faith that is implied in it. Certainly I cannot undertake to give it here; and I am doubtful whether it can be given in any form that is wholly intelligible, or at least that is wholly comprehensible and convincing. As Sir Henry Jones has urged,[1] it remains of the nature of a hypothesis which may be, to some extent, verified, but cannot be fully explained and established. Religion is primarily an attitude of the human mind, the attitude of devotion to all the supreme values that we know. But it has, as its counterpart, a certain conception of the Universe in which we live. Some account of this has already been given, especially in the chapter on Nature and Spirit; but some further considerations may now be indicated. In early times the Universe tended to be conceived as meaning little more than the earth on which we live; and even that was very incompletely known. Anything beyond that was very vaguely conceived. We have now learned to think more definitely of a vast spatio-temporal system, of which our earth is a very small part; and it is at least doubtful whether even that vast system is to be regarded as the whole of Reality. Some at least (such as Professor Alexander) extend their views to a more comprehensive Cosmos. This is a term that combines the two conceptions of completeness and ordered beauty. It means the idea of a perfect whole of reality, in which all the intrinsic values are achieved, a whole that is actual and in which there are Beauty, Joy, Power and Benevolence. Have we any right to postulate such a totality? And if so, how is it to be conceived? This is a question to which, so far as I can see, no conclusive answer can be given. We know in part and may prophesy

[1] In his Gifford Lectures on *A Faith that Enquires*.

in part; but the nature of the whole remains, to a large extent, conjectural. Many speculative philosophers, both in ancient and in modern times, have tried to deal with the problem in a comprehensive way; and some of them have achieved a certain measure of success. It can hardly be doubted that the most considerable attempt that has so far been made is embodied in the philosophy of Hegel. He certainly threw a great deal of light on almost every aspect of human life both in its more purely theoretical and in its more definitely practical and aesthetic aspects; and his work has been made accessible to English readers, and has been very ably expounded and criticized. Probably his most enduring service is to be found in his discussion of fundamental conceptions, such as those of Being, Substance and Creative Spirit. He regarded the last as the most fundamental; but perhaps he did not sufficiently connect it with the idea of Value.[1] I have already tried to indicate, especially in the chapter on Nature and Spirit, how this connection may be made. The conception of Spirit as creative seems to supply us with a method of interpreting the Universe in which we live that is more complete and thorough than any other conception can give, and to be fully in accordance with the most recent tendencies in the development of the physical sciences. The most far-reaching results are those to which scientific investigators have been led by the analysis of the atom and by the general theory that is associated with the name of Einstein. The interpretation of the latter is still under dispute. Professor Alexander, who has made one of the most elaborate statements about it, thinks of it as meaning that Space and Time (which he apparently regards as 'infinite' in

[1] Hegel's fundamental conceptions have been very clearly discussed and made accessible to English readers by McTaggart in his *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic* and other writings. But he did not accept the idea of creative spirit, stopping short rather at the conception of the substantiality of spiritual beings. The creative aspect is emphasized in Caird's *Evolution of Religion* and in Sir Henry Jones's Lectures on *A Faith that Enquires*. Hegel's own views were largely vitiated by the fact that he thought of the creative process as occurring only on our Earth. To discuss these metaphysical views would carry us beyond the limits of the present study. An interesting account of the development of Idealistic views in recent English and American philosophy has been given by Nicola Abbagnano (*Il nuovo Idealismo Inglese ed Americano*). It deals chiefly with those tendencies that are more or less definitely Hegelian.

the mathematical sense) are the ultimate realities by reference to which all the particular events within the Cosmos can be explained. As far as I can judge, this may almost be said to be an inversion of the truth. What the new theories help us to see is rather, as I understand them, that what we call Space and Time are limited forms within which particular happenings may be regarded as occurring. The Universe in which we live is a Universe of happenings; and these stand to one another in certain relations of coexistence and sequence. It is convenient to think of these events as occurring within two great forms that are called Space and Time; but it does not appear that these forms have any reality apart from the events. They are only names for the chief relations between changing modes of reality; and the question for philosophy is that with regard to the nature of these changing modes. What they are we to some extent apprehend directly through their appearances to our consciousness. The chief questions that remain are those with reference to their Source and End. The end would seem to be best conceived as the realization of those supreme values with which we have been concerned throughout. The Source may perhaps be best thought of as a spiritual Reality which achieves values through a creative process. What that spiritual Reality is, as distinct from the creative process through which it is gradually revealed, most of us at least can only somewhat vaguely conjecture. There has been a very real progress in the efforts that have been made to interpret it; but even the most recent are open to some degree of doubt or criticism; and it is not within my present province to discuss them, though I have thought it desirable to give some indication of the direction in which I look for light. It is probable that any complete and universal comprehension of it would be destructive of our limited mode of existence on earth. We cannot fully understand the nature of what we refer to as Deity or the Absolute; but we may suppose its nature to be partially revealed in the progressive development of our Universe, as we gradually get to know it. We have seen that the general nature of that development involves what is now often referred to as the 'emergence' of more and more perfect types, containing higher and higher manifestations of the intrinsic values. Professor

Alexander, who has contributed much to the interpretation of this emergent process, thinks of it as culminating in the realization of Deity. This is probably not a quite satisfactory way of thinking of it.[1] Deity must, I think, be regarded rather as standing above the process. Perhaps as good an illustration as any that can be given of the way in which the relation may be conceived is by the analogy of a creative artist, such as Shakespeare, in relation to his particular works. A conception of this kind is, of course, not one that can be verified—hardly even one that can be definitely comprehended. Some may think that it is even definitely precluded by the amount of evil and imperfection that we are constantly discovering in the Universe as we know it. But if Benevolence and Power are essential elements in ultimate value, it seems clear that the former implies the presence of evils that it is the function of the latter to remove. It may be true that everything that exists deserves to be destroyed—*Alles was entsteht ist werth dass es zu Grunde geht*; and yet its destruction may be a necessary element in the realization of active benevolence, without which the most complete value could not be achieved. But, it may be urged, the complete value in that case can never be realized at all. The realization would mean the destruction of benevolence by removing the need for it. So far as I can see, this difficulty can only be removed by supposing that the perfect Whole is of such a nature as to involve both a process and a point of view from which that process is transcended. This is a difficult conception. Perhaps it is not one that the human mind can ever succeed in making completely comprehensible. It does not follow, however, that we may not be able to attach an intelligible meaning to it. To a certain extent some approximation to it does appear even in our quite ordinary human experience.[2] When we contemplate evils that

[1] In the Preface to the new edition of his great work, however, he has suggested some improvements that appear to me to have great value.

[2] It may be thought by some that I ought to refer at this point to some of those super-normal experiences that have been brought to light by psychical research. I refrain, not because I regard them as uninteresting or unimportant, but partly because the exact interpretation of them appears to be still somewhat uncertain, and, still more, because I do not feel myself competent to pronounce a judgment upon them. It seems clear, however, that, so far as they go, they give support to the general view that

are long past, they no longer appear quite as bad as they did in the process of experiencing them. We may even begin to see some 'soul of goodness' in them. Vergil, as we have already noted, said of the horrors of war that it would be a joy to remember even these—*etiam haec meminisse juvabit*. Surely this is not altogether unintelligible. May there not be a point of view that stands 'above the conflict,' and that sees that certain essential values are realized through it? This, however, is a consideration the development of which lies somewhat beyond our present scope. But such reflections at least call attention to the desirability of regarding human life, not merely from the point of view of an individual realization, but rather from that of the development of communities and eventually of Humanity as a whole. Already some reference to such modes of social unity has been made, especially in considering the significance of Goodness and of Religion; but it is now time to attempt to deal with the whole subject in a more thorough and comprehensive way.

What concerns us directly in our present study is not the Cosmos as a whole, which is perhaps beyond the grasp of human thought.[1] It is not even the spatio-temporal Universe, which is probably only a limited aspect of that totality. It is only human life on earth that most of us can hope, with any complete clearness, to comprehend. Man has sometimes been characterized as a Microcosm; but it has generally been the individual life that has been regarded in this way. The life of Humanity may, much more properly, be so described. Much even of this is involved in darkness. We know the past only as it has left traces in recent generations; and the future can only be very dimly conjectured. But at least we have reached a stage at which the whole of our existing civilization may be regarded as forming an indivisible whole; and it is a whole in which both the supreme values and those that are

I am suggesting. Such statements as those of Myers, Flammarion and others cannot be wholly disregarded. Dr. Broad, in his book on *The Mind and its Place in Nature* (chaps. xi. and xii.), has set the example of taking notice of such investigations in a philosophical treatise. In future it will probably become more possible to interpret them.

[1] I do not mean to affirm that it is so; and I am far from underrating the importance of the attempts that have been made to render it intelligible.

more purely instrumental are being strenuously pursued. It is from the point of view of this pursuit that human life is to be regarded in the following part of this book. Everything with which we have been dealing in this first part is preliminary to the consideration of the Common Weal. It may be thought by some that it is an unnecessary preliminary. But it is not really possible to deal satisfactorily with the problems of social life without an understanding of the fundamental aims of human beings in their life on earth. If this were not discussed beforehand, it would be necessary to refer to it incidentally at later stages, at which it would not be possible to give any adequate consideration to it. Any who do not feel the need for it may pass it over. But the problems of human life form a connected whole; and none of them can be adequately understood without some comprehension of what human beings are, and what they aspire to be and to achieve. Human life cannot be treated as if it were a struggle of kites and crows. It is a more or less conscious pursuit of what is best; and it is from this point of view that the study of human society is to be undertaken in the succeeding part of this book. In the following chapter I propose to give a preliminary sketch of the way in which this study is connected with the general problem of Value.

CHAPTER X

SOCIAL VALUES

In dealing with the general nature of Goodness, it has been necessary to refer to the social aspect of life; and it is now time to consider that a little more definitely, especially as it is the subject with which we are to be mainly concerned in the larger part of this work.[1] Almost all living beings are to some extent social. There is hardly such a thing as a wholly isolated life, though there are close approximations to it. But it is in human life that the social aspect is most prominent and most complicated; and, in particular, the values that are pursued in human life are pre-eminently social values. Without reference to a social unity, individual Good would have hardly any meaning. Sometimes, however, our social relations are apt to appear as impediments to the realization of value, rather than as helps. In the East, men tend to look for their highest attainment in isolation; but that is at least generally after service. There is a well-known saying of Rousseau, that 'man is born free, and yet he is everywhere in chains.' This has sometimes been misunderstood, as if he meant to imply that our social relationships were a hindrance, rather than a help, in the conduct of our lives. He meant only that, in many conditions, they tend to become a hindrance. But, even on the best interpretation, it is a very misleading statement. In what sense can it be rightly said that Man is born free? At his birth he is surely one of the most helpless of mortals, and could hardly live for a day without constant attention. Nor can it well be maintained that he is freer in more primitive conditions of life than in those that are more highly civilized. Rather it is true that in simple communities custom lies upon him 'with a weight

[1] On the subject of this chapter, as well as on a good deal of what is contained in Part II, reference may be made, with great advantage, to the book on *Social Purpose*, by Professors Hetherington and Muirhead. Professor Alexander's important work on *Moral Order and Progress* may also be referred to.

heavy as frost and deep almost as life.' If we were to seek for an appropriate general statement about the facts of human birth and subsequent development, we might find it rather in that which was somewhat humorously suggested by Carlyle in his Clothes Philosophy. It is at least literally true that Man is born naked and yet is nearly everywhere in clothes; and, if we take the statement in a somewhat more metaphorical sense, to indicate not merely bodily coverings, but the customs and conventions by which our lives are so largely controlled, the 'nearly' may be omitted. He is everywhere enveloped in traditions by which his manner of thought, feeling, expression, and action is to a large extent governed. Even a Robinson Crusoe cannot altogether free himself from such influences; and, at any rate, a Robinson Crusoe is apt to be rather glad to see the impression of another man's foot upon his island. This fact of association with others imposes upon us many restraints, until at last we do seem to become enclosed within an embarrassing number of shackles, which, however, are seldom merely constraints. They appear to limit our freedom in some directions; but they also guide us into fresh avenues for our progressive development. But these constraints are comparatively ineffective, until custom becomes hardened into law; and it was to account for the validity of law that Rousseau introduced the idea of a Social Contract. This is not an altogether satisfactory conception; for, in order to form contracts, men must already have attained to a considerable degree of social unity. Animals do not form contracts; and yet many of them are in a high degree socialized. The idea of evolution has enabled us to understand this more fully than was possible in Rousseau's time. It is now pretty generally recognized that the most fundamental fact is that of co-operation; and this is found in animal life as well as in human life. This has been very fully brought out by Fabre. Bees, for example, are very obviously a co-operative community. But their co-operative activities, so far as we can judge, are purely instinctive. Human life differs from animal life in being, in some degree, thoughtful. We 'look before and after,' and arrange our lives in accordance with what we thus remember and anticipate. We are not merely co-operative, but purposeful; and co-operative purpose

becomes creative. Man is the only being on this planet who can be said to be, in any definite sense, purposeful and creative; and it is in that fact that the chief significance of our social life is to be discovered.[1]

The creativeness of human life is one of its most important characteristics. It was expressed by Goethe in a very striking phrase:—

> Man alone can perform the impossible:
> He distinguishes, chooses and judges:
> He can impart to the moment endurance.

Many of the animals—bees, beavers and others—have a considerable degree of skill in *making*, but they do not *create*. They go on doing things in the same way, with hardly any variation. *Novelty* in action is an almost purely human characteristic; but it would carry us a very little way without co-operation. It is seldom possible to say, with any definiteness, who was responsible for any important invention. James Watt is sometimes said to have invented the steam-engine; but there were many who had gone some way towards its invention before his time. I believe it would be equally difficult to say who invented the aeroplane. Many people had wished that they might have 'wings like a dove'; and it was only by the putting together of many discoveries made by different people that aerial navigation became possible. The same is even more emphatically true of inventions of a less purely mechanical kind. Shakespeare is generally recognized as the greatest of dramatists; but his methods of dramatic expression were not invented by him. He grew up among a race of dramatists, some of whose work is often hardly distinguishable from his own. The same appears to have been true of the Homeric poems. And the same is true of philosophical systems and of methods of social and political organization. Such constructions are 'not made, but grow.' This is sometimes expressed by saying that human societies are 'organic unities,' but this tends somewhat to obscure the fact they they grow by co-operative purpose. Rousseau went some way towards the recognition of this by introducing the conception of a General Will, which has since

[1] This is more fully discussed in Part II.

been very extensively employed. Bosanquet, in particular, made much of it in a somewhat modified form in his *Philosophical Theory of the State*. But this also is liable to mislead. The General Will of a people is sometimes of the nature of 'panic'—a word that also means a certain general tendency to act. The only kind of General Will that is of much value is that which is the expression of a co-operative purpose directed towards the Common Good. Thus the Common Good has to be taken as the most fundamental conception. The General Will has value only in so far as it is directed towards the realization of this end. It is here that we have to notice the distinction between a Crowd and a co-operative Group, perhaps most strikingly emphasized by Miss M. P. Follett in *Creative Experience* and *The New State*. The distinction is, of course, not a sharp one.

How is this Common Good to be conceived? We have already noticed that it does not appear to be satisfactory to think of it as the Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number, meaning by Happiness a sum of pleasant feelings. I have already referred to the phrase 'Happiness in the creative sense.' Professor Hobhouse has described it as being achieved by the 'harmonizing of impulses.' This may certainly carry us a considerable way. It at least frees us from the impossible task of calculating pleasures, and recognizes that the Good for man is essentially an active and creative Good. It calls, however, for a good deal of interpretation. Harmony has to be understood, not simply in the sense of reconciliation, but in that of subordination and control. It means that Life is to be treated as a work of art, and that Beauty—in the sense of harmonious unity in the creation of what is good—is to be regarded as the fundamental Value.

This is brought about by the development of co-operative Groups. The most primitive of these is the Family; then we have the Village or Neighbourhood, then the District, the Country, the Nation, the Commonwealth; and already we appear to be feeling our way towards the Commonwealth of Nations, including all the countries in the world. As these modes of unity become larger, many distinctions of function make their appearance. In simple pastoral or agricultural

Groups, in which the Family is predominant, as in the society described in the earlier books of the Bible and in the accounts of other somewhat primitive peoples, almost the only social distinctions are those between men and women and between parents and children; but the village or district soon comes into prominence; and then some of the functions of the parent begin to be differentiated. In the simple family the Father and Mother share between them in varying proportions the functions of ruler, priest, and food-producer; but these three functions soon become in some degree differentiated; and each of them splits up into several subdivisions; but it seems true to say that, throughout the whole history of human life, this threefold division exists, and that it becomes increasingly prominent. It is very clearly recognized in the three ruling castes in India and also to some extent in Plato's *Republic*. The priestly caste comes to mean not merely the religious caste, but the caste that is concerned with science and philosophy, with the maintenance of moral traditions, and with the production of art and literature—in other words, with all the intrinsic values. In Plato's *Republic* this caste is also the caste from which the rulers are selected. The philosophers are also to be the rulers; but Plato recognized that this was something of a paradox in his time; and it remains something of a paradox even now. The function of the ruler, however, is a complicated one. He must have or be able to avail himself of every essential element in human life. He makes laws and ensures their observance. He is not directly a creator of supreme Values; but it is his function to protect and conserve them; and thus he holds an equal and in some respects a superior position to that of the priestly caste. According to the view commonly taken in India, he has more Power but less Dignity. The Value which he contributes is instrumental rather than intrinsic; but it is so essential to the maintenance of the social unity that he ranks almost on an equality with the spiritual leaders. Below these two classes of the leaders of culture and the lawgivers, according both to Plato and to the Indian tradition, come the merchants and organizers of industry; and, below these again, the manual workers, who are often little better than slaves. These lower castes also, like the lawgivers,

are concerned mainly with instrumental values. In modern European communities we do not recognize these castes; but it is well to remember that some equivalent for them survives. And, indeed, in our own country it is often true that, as with Plato, the two higher castes are combined in one person. The Earl of Balfour, for instance, is to all intents what Plato understood by a philosopher-king. As philosopher he deals with intrinsic values; as ruler and lawgiver, with values that are in the main instrumental. But, in all societies, however little they may recognize castes, and however true it may be that many individuals have more than one position, the distinctions of function are still pretty clearly marked. The promotion of cultural values is one function; the maintenance of Law and Order is a second; the organizing of industry and commerce is a third; and the leaders in all these forms of work are practically always in need of helpers. But the distinctions are somewhat obscured in our modern societies by the fact that one man in his time may play many parts. What it is chiefly important to bear in mind, for our present purpose, is that they are all concerned with the production or conservation of values, either intrinsic or instrumental. Their functions differ; but they are all contributing something to the Common Good. It may be much or it may be little; and it may be contributed to a large Group or to a small one. It may be practically confined within a Family circle; or it may directly concern only a small Neighbourhood. On the other hand, it may have direct bearings on the life of a Nation or even on the welfare of the world as a whole.

A great deal of emphasis has been laid on Labour in recent times; and much of that emphasis is clearly right. But it is well to remember that the Labour that has most value is that which is co-operative and creative. Such labour is mainly mental and spiritual. Too often the term is confined to manual work; and too often what is chiefly aimed at is to do as little of it as possible and to have the greatest possible recompense for it. Of course, it is true that most labour has only an instrumental value. It aims, in the end, at the production of values that are more intrinsic; and it is right that men should be as little as possible occupied with what is only instrumental and

as much as possible with the creation of the higher values. Perhaps the most notable statement of the Gospel of Labour is that which is contained in Carlyle's *Past and Present*; but the labour on which he lays most stress is that of the Poet, the Thinker, the Prophet, and the Creative Artist—not what he called 'beaverism.' 'A small poet,' he says, 'every true worker is.' But this is only true when he is creating real values that are, in some degree, intrinsic. It is clearly right that pure drudgery (which is concerned mainly with instrumental values) should be made as small as possible, and that the conditions for the higher development of life should be made as universally accessible as possible. It is chiefly here that the work of the social reformer becomes important. But this leads to the consideration of Social Ideals.

What it is important to emphasize for our present purpose is that the conception of the Common Good to which we appear to be led is one that is essentially progressive. It is not one that can easily be supposed to become completely realized at any particular time. It rather sets before us certain ideal aims to the realization of which we may hope to approximate by degrees. A human society is not to be regarded as a statical mode of existence. It is a mode of unity that lives and grows and that aims, as an individual life does, at the realization of certain supreme values. It is, as has been said,[1] 'a fellowship where free men and women help each other to achieve what beauty and purpose they can in their lives.' A society, like an individual, may be more or less perfect in goodness. Certain ideals are implied in its very essence. Plato's scheme of classes, to which reference has already been made, is definitely expounded as an ideal arrangement that is to be consciously aimed at, though it is largely based on what he found already existing. Similarly, the caste system in India seems to have grown up from what may be described as historical accidents, the conquest and subjugation of certain races by others; but it has come to be regarded as having a certain permanent value, and as capable of being more fully developed so as to realize this inherent value more perfectly.[2] And something of the same

[1] J. L. and B. Hammond, *The Rise of Modern Industry*, p. 246.
[2] This is explained in Part II, especially in Chapter V.

kind is becoming continually apparent. The forms of unity that historical circumstances have brought into being, especially when there has been a long process of development, are seldom wholly without some justification and some value; but they are nearly always open to a good deal of criticism; and, if this criticism is to have any real weight, it must rest on some definite understanding of the good that is being aimed at in a human society. Most people would agree that Plato did not succeed in fully understanding the good that was being realized throughout Greek life; and it is very likely that our modern social reformers, such as Mr. Shaw, Mr. Wells, the Webbs, Mr. Graham Wallas, Mr. and Mrs. Bertrand Russell, may also miss important elements. The rôle of prophet is not an easy one. Yet it is not difficult to note defects in any existing system. Thus, when we consider the life of a community, whether it be a Family, a Neighbourhood, a District, a Nation, a Commonwealth, or Humanity as a whole, we almost inevitably regard them from two points of view, one interpretative and one critical. Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Politics* are, to a large extent, studies of the conditions of life that were found more or less definitely established in the contemporary life of Greece; but they (especially Plato's) contained also much criticism of the existing conditions and sought to indicate a more excellent way. Plato's account is mainly critical. Aristotle's is, to a considerable extent, a defence of things as they were against Plato's criticisms; but, whether we attack or defend, we must have in our minds some conception of the values that are to be regarded as most important. In modern studies the two aspects of the subject are generally more sharply distinguished than was possible in the time of Plato and Aristotle. The idea of evolution is now applied to human societies as well as to individual organisms. What is now known as Sociology is, to a large extent, a study of the historical process by which existing forms of society have been created and developed; but it includes also some attempt to distinguish what is better and what is worse in the different forms that have existed; and this is more definitely attempted in what is now called Social Philosophy, which may be, to a large extent, separated from the more descriptive and historical

parts of Sociology. Plato may be regarded as the first who made a serious attempt to develop this mode of study. In more modern times Rousseau was the writer from whom the most powerful impetus to this difficult study was derived. The idea of a Social Contract, which had been previously suggested, received from him a more definite formulation; and his conception of a General Will gave it a fresh interest. The great French Revolution owed its inspiration very largely to his teaching; and the ideals that were made prominent by it were expressed in the threefold watchword, 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.' Perhaps we can hardly do better than make an attempt to consider shortly the meaning and value of the conceptions that are indicated in this formula. It may be convenient, however, to take them in a different order, beginning with Fraternity.

This is evidently based primarily on the unity of a Family Group; and it thus is very closely connected with Plato's treatment. He sought to abolish the private Family, with the object of making the whole community, or at least the whole of its ruling class, into a single Family. The ideal State thus conceived was criticized by Aristotle and others; and it is now generally recognized that the ideal set before us by Plato is both impossible and undesirable. It does not follow, however, that the idea expressed by the term Fraternity or brotherhood is without value in considering the aims of a human society. What the term is meant to express is not always to be found, in any high degree, within a family group. Perhaps even 'birds in their little nests' do not always agree; nor do human beings in their somewhat larger homes. But it is true, on the whole, that a more intense mode of unity is often found in smaller groups than in those that are more extensive. Hence Fraternity is naturally taken as a term for the most complete form of unanimity, just as Neighbourliness is taken for one that is somewhat less intimate and Patriotism for one that has to be more definitely cultivated by the use of flags, songs, ceremonies, and many other devices; while the still larger unity involved in Cosmopolitanism is generally felt to be rather too vague to be at all definitely conceived, except as a religious aspiration, by more than a few individuals. At the same time, it becomes

increasingly apparent that it is essential to advance from the smaller to the larger modes of association; and it is not difficult to see that there has been a gradual development towards it throughout the course of human history. We can trace the growth of it, for instance, pretty definitely in the history of the Jews. In the early books of the Bible we find the Family sentiment predominant, though it may be open to doubt whether the references to particular individuals and their families are to be quite literally understood. Gradually at least it becomes apparent that what we are concerned with is Tribes and their amalgamation into a Nation. The later prophets emphasized the ideal of a unity of mankind; and Christianity made that ideal a living force throughout the world. It remains true, however, that its cultivation is a slow process; and most people would now agree that the result is not to be attained by Plato's method of abolishing the Family, but rather by the development of a gradual process of expansion from the Family through the School to the Neighbourhood, the District, the Nation, the Commonwealth, and so finally to Humanity as a whole. I should be inclined to say that the best race or mixture of races is the one that is best able to appreciate others. The difficulties in the way of Fraternity in the past have been largely due to the failure of different races to understand one another. This often leads them to think their own race somehow superior to others. No doubt, there are differences; but it would not be easy to arrange an order of merit. The world has now, in a sense, become smaller; and there is comparatively little difficulty in gaining an appreciation of the circumstances and attitudes of different peoples. The spirit of toleration, combined with improved methods of education, may be expected to remove the difficulties that still remain. Even East and West are gradually meeting. Religion has played, and will probably continue to play, a large part in this development; and to that, as well as to some other aspects, we shall have to make some reference later.

Evolution of Unity

Now Fraternity, thus understood, implies Liberty. The quality of Brotherhood, like the quality of Mercy, 'is not strained.' It cannot be enforced, though it may be promoted by suitable institutions. It is now pretty generally recognized

Liberty

that Plato was right in thinking that the institutions that serve this end are educational institutions; and it becomes more and more apparent that the spirit by which these must be governed and pervaded is the spirit of free development. But it is not only through schools and colleges that this development takes place. All life, as Plato realized, is a process of education; and it is being more and more realized that the older ideas of Duty and Discipline have to give place, to a large extent, to the development of the spirit of co-operative freedom. All science, all art, all literature, all religion, and even many games and other forms of co-operative activity, are essentially educational; and even political institutions have this as one of their most essential ends. Hegel, in his Philosophy of History, treated the development of Humanity as the gradual expansion of the sphere of Freedom. At first it is apt to appear that only one person is free in any social group, the King in a Nation, the Chief in a smaller Group, the Father or sometimes the Mother in a Family, the Leader in any special enterprise. Carlyle did much in recent times to revive this conception. But even he did, at least in his more reflective moods, recognize that the best Leader is one who has taken his marching orders from what is best in the general consciousness of his people. Leadership thus becomes essentially co-operative; and, when this is recognized, it is seen that there is some truth in Rousseau's conception of a General Will. It is a Common Good that is sought; and those who seek it must have some common understanding of the Good at which they aim. How far this involves the active participation of the members of the community in deciding upon particular actions and policies is a question of detail. It must depend, to some extent, on the stage of development at which the members of the community stand. But it seems clear that the general process of development is in the direction of co-operative freedom. But this does not mean complete individual liberty. It is liberty within conditions that have to be to some extent legally formulated. Only law, as Goethe said, can give us liberty. It is only when each one has his proper place and function—his 'Station and its Duties,' in Bradley's phrase—that he can attain to the kind of service which is 'perfect freedom.' But it is this spontaneous

and intelligent service that has to be cultivated. It has to be developed from within, rather than imposed from without. True liberty, as Mr. Graham Wallas has put it, means 'the capacity of continuous initiative'; and this grows very gradually.

And now we have to ask, What about Equality? The answer is partly provided by the general view of society to which reference has just been made. Equality, in any complete sense, does not exist among human beings. This may almost be said to be obvious; but it has been made more definitely apparent by such inquiries into human faculty as those that were instituted by Francis Galton and that have since been pretty extensively carried out. Before that there were only private impressions and much conflict of opinion. Charles Darwin, for instance, inclined to the view that human beings were pretty nearly equal in mental ability, and that the differences that appeared were due to effort and cultivation. Carlyle, on the other hand, contended very emphatically that there were enormous differences, but almost purely of a quantitative kind. Those who excelled others excelled them in all respects. It is now pretty definitely known that neither of these views is tenable. It has been ascertained that the faculties of different human beings are diverse both in quantity and in quality; and that they are, to a very large extent (as Carlyle also urged) inherited. Absolute equality is, consequently, not to be thought of so long as we are considering functions. But we may substitute for Equality another term of similar origin and to some extent similar meaning, *viz.* Equity. It is evidently desirable that the Stations, Duties and Equipments of different individuals should, as far as possible, correspond to their fitness; but, of course, in a complex society it is not easy to attain to more than a tolerable approximation to this. Here again it is chiefly by educational tests that it can be made possible. But to discuss this would involve the consideration of details that lie beyond our present scope. We shall have occasion to return to them in the following part.

PART II

THE PROBLEM OF CITIZENSHIP

CHAPTER I

EARLY THEORIES OF CITIZENSHIP

In the first part of this book an attempt has been made to explain the meaning of value and its place in human life. In doing this—especially in considering the meaning of Goodness as one of the most fundamental, if not quite the most fundamental, of all values—it was necessary to make some reference to the social aspect of the pursuit of values. We have now to give more definite attention to that aspect. It is in the life of communities, rather than in the life of individuals, that the great values are gradually achieved. This is most definitely seen in the case of goodness, which can hardly be understood at all without an explicitly social reference. But it is hardly less apparent in the other main aspects of value. In the individual life truth is almost entirely a quest. It is largely for this reason that it has so often been said that the search for truth is better than its attainment: the former is felt to be more appropriate for a human being. It is only in the general life of the race that any definite achievement of ultimate truth on a large scale can be expected. It is embodied in records that are never completely present to any individual mind. It is in the history of the race also that beauty is gradually apprehended and achieved. But it is in the case of goodness that it is most clearly apparent that the value has to be realized afresh from day to day in the relations of individuals to one another. Civilization means, in the main, the development of beneficence and the extension of its range. For most individuals its range is necessarily very limited.

The word 'citizenship' and the corresponding terms 'civic,' 'civilization,' *etc.*, point to the fact that it was in the life of cities that the social aspect of life was first prominently emphasized. In a self-contained family individuals are conspicuous. Normally they live for each other, but have comparatively little sense of external relations. Personal affection

is the primary bond. Plato, as we have already noted, sought to extend the family relationship to a larger community; and Christianity also has laid stress on the brotherhood of mankind. But the relationship, when thus extended, can hardly have quite the intensity that it sometimes achieves within a family group. 'Heaven lies about us in our infancy,' if not in the sense that Wordsworth intended, at least in the sense that, in a well-regulated family, a child is almost in the position of a little god. What he does and what is done for him has a pretty obvious reference to his own personal good; or, if it ever seems to be otherwise, he generally knows how to make the fact known. And, in so far as he gradually learns social obligations, they are obligations of a pretty obvious kind to other individuals. This is, in the main, true also in simple village communities. They are aggregations of individuals and family groups, co-operating with one another to a certain extent, but with little sense of being members of a complex whole with an elaborate organization to which they owe a certain loyalty. It is in the more comprehensive unity of a city that this consciousness is developed. We find family life described in the early chapters of the Bible; and its interest centres in individuals, or at least is depicted in an individual form. At a later date we find the interest being gradually concentrated in Jerusalem. That city, however, tended to be thought of as unique—a place to which many people went up, rather than a place in which many lived. Benares seems to have acquired a somewhat similar uniqueness in India. But it would appear to have been in Greece that cities first came to be thought of as the units of human life, individuals having little importance except as members of such wholes. The cities that were thus regarded were not indeed cities quite in the sense in which we commonly understand the term. They were not very emphatically 'town' as opposed to 'country,' but rather civic centres with a country district definitely attached to them. Some people, however—very notably Socrates—were keenly conscious of the antithesis between town and country. Socrates, like Dr. Johnson, despised the green fields and cared only for the personal contact with his fellow-men that life in a city made possible. It is from the intensive life of such comparatively

small regions that our modern conception of citizenship has been derived.

But the Roman world introduced a very notable change in the general conception of citizenship. Ancient Rome was a city; but it was a city that gained an almost world-wide dominion; and a man might be a Roman citizen without ever having seen the city. He belonged to a great nation[1] which had gradually built up a definite code of laws; and his sense of civic obligation became, in the main, a sense of the supremacy of law. During the time of the dominance of the Catholic Church in Europe, Rome acquired an even more complete control of all the aspects of human life, cultural and economic as well as more purely legal. In more modern times there is no single centre that holds any similar pre-eminence, and most people now think of the particular nation to which they belong as that to which their ultimate loyalty under heaven, or under their private consciences, is almost entirely due. This has, no doubt, been considerably modified by the Christian conception of the essential unity of mankind; and this conception, under the influence of Comte and others, has been gradually affecting the minds of many who are not specially associated with Christianity. To this tendency we shall have occasion to refer at a later stage. In the meantime, it seems best to trace some of the main stages by which the conception of citizenship has been developed from its early beginnings in Greek speculation to the present time.[2] It might be thought that the general conception is simple enough; yet it is a problem that has exercised some of the

[1] Of course, the Roman commonwealth was much more than a nation; but I think it has been rightly noted by Mr. F. S. Marvin (*India and the West*, p. 149) that the general conception of nationality was first definitely created by the Roman Empire.

[2] On the contributions that were made by Greece and Rome respectively to the general conception of citizenship, reference may be made to Book I of Professor MacIver's treatise on *The Modern State*. See also Professor Ernest Barker's book on *Greek Political Theories*. For modern views, readers may consult the *Studies in Political Philosophy* by the late Professor Vaughan and the book by Professor Barker on *Political Thought from Spencer to To-day*. Further references will be given in the following chapter and in some of the succeeding chapters. It may be noted that books dealing separately with individual writers are generally more satisfactory than comprehensive histories.

most subtle intellects from very early times; and it can hardly be said that it has even yet been solved in a way that carries complete conviction to reflective minds. The reason is that under its apparent simplicity there is a very real complexity; and that it has tended to mean somewhat different things at different times and places. The good citizen has sometimes been thought of simply as one who is obedient to the laws of his particular community; but in modern times, at least in Western countries, the citizen is generally thought of as one who has some responsibility for the making of the laws as well as for the obeying of them; and thus the question arises as to the grounds for both these responsibilities, and as to the limits to which each of them should be held to apply. Even if it is thought that the chief or only duty of a citizen is to obey the laws, it may be asked why he is bound to do so, and whether he has never any right to rebel. The inscription over the dead at Thermopylae, telling that they lie there in obedience to the laws of Sparta, strikes most people as having a certain sublimity; and so does the attitude of Socrates in refusing to make any attempt to escape from the punishment to which he was condemned. In recent times we may find a parallel in the saying that was current during the War, 'Who dies if England lives?' Yet Sparta and Athens and England alike could live only in the lives of their citizens; and, even in honouring the dead who have died for their country, most people would now think that we ought to say something more about them than that they were obedient. Sometimes, indeed, especially in thinking of some of the actions of their enemies, many people might be disposed to say that it is possible to be too obedient. There are few Englishmen at least who would refuse some measure of respect for John Hampden and for the Pilgrim Fathers, and even for the extreme pacifists in more recent times and for meditative people who hold themselves somewhat aloof from the communal life. Now, it was the perception that the laws that men are expected to obey are different in different states, and are consequently open to some question in them all, that first led reflective minds to realize that there is a somewhat difficult problem underlying the duties of citizenship. The difficulty of the problem was felt by some of

the earliest thinkers in Greece; and it is felt, perhaps even more strongly, by many in our own time.

The first way in which the difficulty appears to have been felt by the Greeks showed itself in the suggestion of a doubt with respect to the 'naturalness' of the civic bond. A distinction was drawn between what exists by nature[1] (*φύσει*) and what exists only by some artificial convention (*νόμῳ*). No one is likely to question the right of fire to burn or of plants to grow; though we may believe that we also have a right under certain circumstances to extinguish the fire and to uproot the plants. The behaviour of the fire and of the plants is natural, and so is our behaviour with regard to them. Under certain circumstances all fires and all plants and all human beings tend to behave in those ways. We hesitate even to deny that dogs have a right to bark and bite; though we may think that we also have a right to try to teach them to exercise these rights with moderation. All this seems natural and simple. But we do not appear to find any quite similar regularity in the behaviour of states and in the duties that are imposed upon their citizens; though perhaps the contrast presented itself in a rather more striking way to some of the early Greeks than it does to us. We know more than they did about the variations in natural objects; and we are better able to perceive the essential uniformities in human action beneath their often rather superficial differences. Still, it remains true that it seems, on the face of it, that the laws in some states are imposed by the will of a single individual, in others by a few, while in some of them every citizen, or every male citizen of a certain age, or everyone who owns a certain amount of property, is regarded as having a right to some share in the making of the laws. It seems also that in some communities—such as the ancient Medes and Persians—the laws that have once been established are regarded

[1] It has been noted by Professor Gilbert Murray (*Five Phases of Greek Religion*, p. 126) that *φύσις* means *growing*; so that it might almost be taken as equivalent to *evolution*; but it seems clear that it was not understood in this sense in early Greek thought. It was not realized that, in the modern phase, 'constitutions are not made, but grow.' As Sidgwick observed (*Development of European Polity*, p. 353), the state of nature has generally been thought of, not as what has grown, but rather what is bound by laws of nature (which have sometimes been regarded also as laws of reason).

as almost, if not quite, unalterable; whereas in others they can be more or less easily changed. Reflection on these differences leads very readily to the conclusion that the rights and obligations of citizens can hardly be regarded as being involved in the nature of things, in the same sense in which the burning of fires and the barking of dogs may be so regarded. It would seem absurd to ask for any justification of the latter; whereas the former, on account of their uncertainty and variability, seem obviously to demand it. Of course, it does not follow that no justification can be found. What is artificial may have as good a right to exist as anything that may be described as natural. An electric heater in a room is not, on the face of it, any more immoral than a fire in the forest; nor does a trained watchdog seem any more objectionable than the hound that hunts in a pack. We now know, indeed, that what exists by nature calls for some explanation, just as what exists by convention does. What is true is rather that, in the case of what is artificial, the explanation can more readily be found. Just for that reason, however, it is generally more profitable to ask for it. Why the wild dog howls may be a difficult problem for the naturalist. It is probably easier to understand why the sheepdog obeys its master's whistle. So too the ancient family tradition, to which Antigone appealed, may have been more mysterious than the law that she sought to resist. In all such cases, what is artificial presents a more immediate problem than what is natural, because the problem presented by the former is one that we may more easily hope to solve. Now, it would be vain to attempt to discuss here all the ways in which the solution of the fundamental problems of citizenship has been sought; but some of the chief directions in which light has been supposed to be found may be briefly indicated.

The general views that Plato ascribes to Socrates in the *Republic* may be taken as giving us the first serious attempt to deal with the problem;[1] and it certainly remains one of the most interesting. The general foundation of the doctrine there expounded is that the organization of human society is based

[1] Perhaps there were earlier attempts in India, but the records of them are not equally clear and explicit. See Lord Ronaldshay's *India: a Bird's-eye View*, pp. 134–8.

upon the weakness of the individual. A single person is not self-sufficient. He cannot satisfactorily supply all his needs, and so has to combine with others; and the association with others tends to multiply his demands. The only way to meet these wants satisfactorily is by the differentiation of functions. By specializing in particular forms of work, men and women gain a greater efficiency in a variety of departments than would otherwise be possible. What springs primarily from this is the division of labour for the satisfaction of material wants. But the growth of trade and commerce leads to conflict with other societies; and hence a body of men organized for defence becomes necessary; and to make this defence efficient those responsible for it must be differentiated from those who are employed in industrial pursuits. They form a distinct class, and can hardly fail to become a ruling caste. But the work of government is soon seen to be distinct from that of fighting, and to call for very special preparation. Hence an elaborate system of education becomes necessary; and the greater part of the *Republic* is occupied with the consideration of the form that this education has to take. It is recognized, however, that even the best form of social organization is apt to be unstable; and a good deal of attention is accordingly given to the more or less degenerate forms of social organization that appear naturally to arise. There is a downward path in social life, against which it is not easy to contend; and for this reason it is best to regard human life as a preparation for a better world. All this, and much more, is set forth in a style of great imaginative beauty, in which many fertile suggestions are embedded. But it does not fall within our present scope to deal with these in detail. The contention on which Plato laid most stress was the general principle that kings must be philosophers. This would now be almost universally admitted in the sense that those who are responsible for the general organization of a community, whether kings or associated bodies of statesmen, must have a clear insight into the greater values of human life and into the ways in which the more instrumental values may be best used for their promotion. It would not be easy to exaggerate the importance of his emphasis on this, though it may now be regarded as almost

self-evident. On the other hand, it would be generally admitted that his detailed suggestions were of doubtful wisdom even for the simple form of City State that he had in mind and, in any case, not directly applicable to the larger communities with which we are now mainly concerned. In particular, his suggestions for the abolition of the Family and the transformation of the whole community into a single family were felt to be somewhat grotesque even in his own time and are still more clearly inapplicable to the larger forms of association with which we have now to deal.

Aristotle's contribution is of a more sober but hardly less weighty kind, and is at least more readily applicable to modern conditions. In order to understand his attitude, it is necessary to consider his two main treatises, on Ethics and Politics, in close connection with one another; and, indeed, for any complete understanding of it, it is essential to consider his views on psychology and metaphysics as well; though it is true that he separated out these studies more definitely than Plato had done. His general view of society is based upon the complexity of human nature. In particular, he conceived that it must be regarded as containing three distinguishable aspects. His view of these was largely derived from Plato; but he treated them somewhat more definitely, and applied the distinction in a way that can be more readily used in our own time. There is the purely bodily or, as it might be called, the merely vegetative aspect of man's life, the aspect that is concerned simply with physical growth. This is only indirectly under the control of the higher faculties. Next above it is what may be called the animal aspect—the various appetites, impulses, instincts and emotions, which in man are to a considerable extent under the control of reason. They are capable at least of 'listening to reason.' Finally, there is the more purely rational aspect of human life—the ruling power, which Aristotle regarded as connecting the human with the Divine. On the basis of this classification, he regarded social life as undergoing a process of evolution. In its earlier phases it is concerned with little else than the maintenance of life. Its interests are almost purely economic. But gradually it begins to aim, not merely at life but at good life; and this involves

the control of the appetites and passions by the dominating power of reason in its more purely practical aspect. In the *Ethics* the various virtues of the civic life are considered in detail; and in the *Politics* an account is given of the merits and defects of different modes of organization, chiefly from the point of view of their serviceability for the development of what is best in man's practical activities. But the third aspect of man's life—the more purely rational, the specifically human, as distinguished from what is largely animal—has also to be considered. This is what connects man with the Divine; and the development of society has the realization of this as its ultimate aim. It is here that we escape from the life of struggle, and find peace through the cultivation of our higher powers. It is chiefly at the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics* that this aspect of human life is made prominent; but it is clear that Aristotle had it in mind throughout his whole treatment of the social and political life. It is part of what the late Dr. Bosanquet used to call his 'plot' to bring this out by degrees.

There is a certain finality about the work of Aristotle. In spite of an element of hesitation and occasional ambiguity, it may be doubted whether any clearer view of the essential aspects of human life has ever been put forward than that which has been supplied by him. But it is, of course, expounded and illustrated, for the most part, with reference to the existing conditions of Greek life in comparatively small City States; and, in order that we may get the full benefit of his ideas, it is necessary at least to restate them in the light of modern conditions and with the help of modern knowledge.

The changes that took place in the social and political outlook after the time of Aristotle may be traced mainly to the conquests of his pupil Alexander, the consolidation of the Roman Empire, and the cosmopolitan influences that are associated with the Stoical philosophy and the Christian religion. The two former influences resulted in the collapse of the Greek City States and the practical realization of an international—we might even say an almost cosmopolitan[1]—

[1] It is perhaps well to remember that the term 'cosmopolitan', as originally used, had a somewhat larger signification than that which is now commonly attached to it. It implied a certain community not only among

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community. Stoicism and Christianity, again, especially in their association with the Roman Empire, gave powerful support to these tendencies. The former, though founded in Greece, flourished chiefly under the Roman Empire. It emphasized, more strongly and more onesidedly than Aristotle had done, the universality of reason and its authority over the other aspects of human life; and one of its most notable products was the rationalized system of Roman Law, on which the laws of most European countries have been to some extent based. The Stoical brotherhood was, however, practically confined to the 'wise man.' Christianity included the sympathetic woman and also the 'sinner' and the 'little child'; and this gave to the general conception a more extensive scope and a deeper and more tender meaning, but at the same time increased the difficulty of its practical application. While Stoicism laid the foundations of a universal system of law, Christianity was from the first strongly opposed to a purely legal attitude. Hence it soon became apparent that there must either be a conflict between the legal and the spiritual or some definite separation of functions. It was obvious from the outset that the Christian point of view was to some extent opposed both to the purely economic and to the purely legal aspects of life. This opposition was particularly expressed in the three great sayings 'Take no anxious thought for the morrow,' 'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's,' and 'Seek first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.' The first and the last of these sayings seem to set the purely spiritual interests of life not only above but almost in complete opposition to the economic and political interests; while the second seems to suggest a possible compromise. Men like St. Francis may be taken as representative of the former attitude, which could only appeal to the few. The latter was much more difficult to carry out, and the attempt to apply it led to almost inevitable conflicts;

human beings, but among all beings throughout the universe or cosmos. See on this *Five Stages of Greek Religion*, by Professor Gilbert Murray, p. 119. It may be said that it is now beginning to acquire once more something of its old meaning, though with a clearer consciousness of the essential difference between human life and all other forms of being.

for the claims of Caesar and of God can hardly be altogether kept apart. One or other of the two sides is almost bound to predominate. Hence the long struggles between Church and State, between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines, throughout the Middle Ages, especially in Italy. On the one hand, we have Macchiavelli and the Princes whom he defended; on the other, Savonarola and others. Both sides, however, tended to favour a somewhat cosmopolitan attitude. Christianity claimed to be a world religion, and the secular powers were at least brought together in their struggles against its domination. The cosmopolitan outlook in political theory is perhaps best represented by Suarez.[1] But gradually the distinct nationalities asserted their independence of one another, as well as of the central spiritual power; and the conception of national unity became prominent, especially in those countries in which Protestantism was securing a firm footing. The result is best seen in the splendours of the Elizabethan age in England. In order, however, to have a reasonable foundation for the new nationalism, it was necessary in some way to reconcile Caesar and God; and such a reconciliation appeared to be found in the doctrine of the 'Divine Right of Kings.' This is a conception that is probably derived in the main from the Jewish theocracy, and it became prominent through the popular circulation of the Bible. But, of course, the idea is found also in other Oriental countries, where the ruling monarch is often regarded as of divine descent, or even as being himself divine. As Seeley pointed out, in *Ecce Homo*, the claim of Jesus to be 'the King of the Jews' was made to rest on a supposed divine descent. Even the Roman emperors tended to assume a divine prerogative. The attitude which Bismarck[2] did so much to create in Germany is a striking modern parallel. In modern times, however, it has become more common to think that 'the voice of the people is the voice of God'; but this also is an illustration of the tendency to regard any established power as having a divine sanction. Carlyle sought to attach a similar

[1] On the importance of his work, reference may be made to the book by T. J. Lawrence on *The Society of Nations*, p. 27.

[2] Reference may be made here, with great advantage, to the interesting account of Bismarck's attitude which is given by Mr. Laski in his book on *Sovereignty*, chap. v. See also Ludwig's book on Bismarck.

prerogative to his 'Heroes.' Few would now take any such doctrine very seriously, and it is hardly necessary to consider it at any length. It is part of the general belief that Might is Right, which can only be maintained in the somewhat qualified form that what is right has a certain tendency to acquire might in the long run, and that no action is completely right which aims at results that are manifestly impossible. In what sense this is true, we have already noted in Part I, and we may be in a better position to judge in the sequel. In the meantime, it was soon felt that some better sanction for the authority of governments was needed than the simple claim to a divine right; and the history of modern political theory is mainly a record of the different ways in which such a sanction has been sought. It is a pretty long history; but happily a very satisfactory account of its principal stages is now accessible to English readers in C. E. Vaughan's history of modern political theories, including his valuable Introduction to the political writings of Rousseau and his edition of the *Social Contract*. The theories that are chiefly deserving of attention are that of the Social Contract, leading up to the idea of a General Will or Group Mind, that of Organic Growth, that of Utility, that of the Evolution of Freedom, and that of Co-operative Creation. Most of these theories appear in a variety of forms, and they cannot always be sharply distinguished from one another. The idea of Co-operative Creation appears to me, as I have already indicated, to be the most satisfactory; but it may be well to lead up to it by some brief reference to the older views.

The theory of a Social Contract has had a long history. It is noticed in Plato's *Republic*, where it is propounded by Glaucon and defended by Adeimantus. It appears that it had been propounded, in a distinctly enlightened form, at a much earlier time in India.[1] The general contention, in the statement given by Plato, is that human beings would prefer to pursue their own individual self-interest without restraint, but find by experience that in such a condition they suffer more than they gain, and consequently are led to enter into an agreement to submit to certain restraints for the sake of security. In modern times Hobbes adopted what is to all intents the same

[1] See Lord Ronaldshay's *India: a Bird's-eye View*.

general conception, but gave it a good deal more definiteness. He conceived that the natural condition of human life is a state of war of all against all; and that this state is found to be so intolerable that men agree to sacrifice their independence by setting up a form of government. Such a government can only fulfil its essential function if it is recognized as having an absolute authority. The chief weaknesses of such a conception are pretty obvious. Even the life of animals cannot be described as one of war of all against all. There is a sort of social organization even among creatures so lowly as bees and ants. Most animals live in groups, in which there is some degree of care for the young and friendly relations at least between the sexes. There is no historical evidence in support of the view that the relations between human beings were ever purely hostile,[1] or that there ever was a time at which they entered into an agreement to live at peace. Even if there had been such a time, the agreement could hardly have been of the nature of a contract; since there would have been no definite parties between whom the contract could have been entered into and no legal forms by which it could have been sanctioned; nor could later generations have any real ground for regarding it as binding. Its binding force could lie in nothing but the realization of its advantage, leading to a general agreement to secure this advantage and make it permanent.[2]

The transition from Hobbes to Rousseau may be regarded as having been made by Spinoza; but his views are based on a profound philosophy of life, and contain too many anticipations of later thought to be capable of summary reference in such a sketch as the present.[3] Somewhat similar remarks might

[1] It would seem, indeed, that war is a comparatively late product in the development of societies. See the account of its origin by Mr. W. J. Perry in *The Growth of Civilization*, chap. xx.

[2] Sidgwick, as we have already noted (p. 117), pointed out that a State of Nature has generally been conceived as bound by laws of nature or reason.

[3] Spinoza has been fortunate in his expositors. His general philosophy was sympathetically dealt with both by John Caird and by Martineau and Sir F. Pollock. The book on his Political and Ethical Philosophy by Dr. R. A. Duff is most admirable; and there is a good account of his general philosophical position by Mr. H. H. Joachim. The account in Vaughan's *Studies* is also extremely sympathetic, and Professor Alexander has given a fresh vitality to his general outlook.

be made about Locke.[1] Rousseau, though continuing to speak of a Social Contract, admitted that it could not be regarded as a historical fact, and gave it a new meaning by his conception of a General Will.

The conception of a General Will, which was introduced by Rousseau, has played a large part in subsequent political speculation. In particular, it was revived in our own country by T. H. Green in his *Principles of Political Obligation* and afterwards emphasized by Dr. Bernard Bosanquet in his very valuable book on *The Philosophical Theory of the State*. Hence it is important to have a clear understanding of what is meant by it.

Rousseau did not, of course, mean by the General Will a will that is shared by every member of the community; nor did he even mean what is willed by the majority at any particular time, though he thought that, with some qualifications, the decision of a majority in a popular assembly supplied the best available indication of the General Will. If I rightly understand his meaning, he thought that at any particular time it is possible to form a sound judgment, so far as the necessary limitations of human intelligence permit, as to the line of action that would be most beneficial for the community. This judgment is made practically effective in a free assembly of the people; and the decision of the majority in such an assembly is the best expression that can be had of such a judgment. The important point is that such a decision is not reached by a number of individuals acting independently, but by their co-operation with each other in an assembly specially convoked for the decision of the question. It is not arrived at by an appeal to 'the man in the street,' but rather to the man in the assembly-room. Some might think that it would be better to appeal to the man in a small committee; but, of course, it would be open to a general assembly to appoint as many special committees as might be thought desirable. The assembly may seek as much guidance as is necessary; but, in the end, the majority decides. This seems to be the essential foundation of modern democracy. It appears to rest on the assumption

[1] Some interesting comments on Locke's attitude will be found in Professor Hobhouse's *Elements of Social Justice*, pp. 34–5.

that, just as Socrates maintained that no man is willingly deprived of the good, so no community is willingly deprived of what is on the whole for the good of the community; or at least that there is no better way of ascertaining what is for the good of the community than by an appeal to the whole body of the people. This can hardly be said to be self-evident; and it will have to be considered somewhat carefully at a later stage. Dr. Bosanquet has used Hegel's expression 'real will' to indicate, it would seem, that the actual decision arrived at in any particular assembly may not be wholly satisfactory. But, if this is what is meant, the 'real will' would seem to be only another name for the common good, *i.e.* for what is on the whole best for the community; and we are left in the dark as to how this common good is to be discovered.[1] It may be true that the best way to discover it is by summoning a large assembly of the people to discuss it; but it can hardly be said that it is obvious that this is the best way. It is clear at least that it could only be applied in a very small community. It is well to remember, however, that the conception of the General Will was used by Rousseau chiefly for the purpose of finding a basis for the Social Contract. He realized that it could not be maintained that there had ever been a time at which an actual contract had been drawn up; and that what ought rather to be urged is that it rests with any particular community to draw up such a contract for itself. The terms of the general contract would then indicate the way in which particular policies are afterwards to be determined, which might be in some cases by the decision of a King or President, in others by the votes of an elected Chamber, possibly subject to the approval of a Second Chamber, in others by a referendum. In this way the General Will would mean primarily the decision as to the form of the Constitution. It is in this sense that it has been interpreted by President Lowell.[2] The best illustrations of the General Will in this sense would be found in the establishment of the American Constitution and of the

[1] On the views of Hegel, Green and Bosanquet, reference may be made to Professor Barker's book on *Political Thought from Spencer to To-day*. Further consideration of them is reserved for the next chapter.

[2] *Public Opinion and Popular Government*, especially p. 9.

French Republic after the Revolution. But of course both of these constitutions were in reality drawn up by a few highly trained minds, after much discussion in small committees. When such constitutions have been drawn up by experts in whom the mass of the people have confidence, their acceptance by the people is not very difficult to secure; but it may be doubted whether the General Will in such cases means much more than such an expression of confidence. According to President Lowell, it is in the establishment of such fundamental principles that the General Will is found. It does not mean agreement on any particular policies, but only agreement on the methods by which policies are to be determined, *e.g.* by the majority of votes or by reference to arbitration or to a committee of experts, or whatever other method may be thought best. In this sense the General Will may hardly be distinguishable from the Will of All or at least of the overwhelming majority. Such interpretations of the General Will carry us, however, pretty far away from the conception of Rousseau, and especially from the theory of the Social Contract, which it was primarily intended to support.

We have noticed that the attempt to interpret the General Will has led to the identification of it with the Real Will, *i.e.* with the Common Good that would yield a lasting satisfaction. What that Good is, is not always very obvious for nations, any more than it is for individuals. Sometimes it is to be found rather in some change of heart than in any more external benefit. As King Lear exclaims:—

> But for true need—
> You heavens give me that! patience, patience, I need!

But the Good is generally thought of as the achievement of some more or less external end that would yield happiness. It has been pointed out by Vaughan that Spinoza, who may be said to have partially anticipated Rousseau's conception of the General Will, connected it more closely than Rousseau did with the idea of a Good to be achieved by it, namely, the promotion of Happiness; and that he may thus be regarded as one of the chief founders of the modern school of Utilitarianism. But it was Hume who first supplied it with a clear

and definite basis; and it is probably true, as Vaughan has said,[1] that 'of all utilitarian systems, whether in Politics or in Morals, that of Hume is at once the subtlest as a piece of reasoning and the least out of harmony with the facts.' It was Bentham, however, who did most for the practical application of it; and much was contributed to the clarification of the general doctrine by J. S. Mill, Henry Sidgwick and others. It was an almost purely English theory; and, as we have already noted, it has now practically died out even in the country of its origin, or at least has become greatly transformed. The attractiveness of the theory—an attractiveness that appealed specially to a people that has, on the whole, been more distinguished in action than in speculation—lay chiefly in the directness with which it seemed possible to apply it to particular problems of statesmanship and social reform. The question 'Will this measure tend to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number?' seems, on the face of it, to be capable of being answered in a pretty definite way; and the answer would appear to furnish us with a satisfactory guiding principle for practical legislation and philanthropy. It is only found to be unsatisfactory when we inquire more closely into the meaning of happiness, or, in other words, into the conception of ultimate value.[2] This has been briefly dealt with in Part I of the present book, and need not be further considered here. It cannot be denied that Bentham rendered a very valuable service to the study of law and of social progress by his emphasis on the general happiness of the community as the end to be aimed at; but we have already noticed that most of those who now carry on his work in this direction do not think of happiness as a sum of pleasures but rather as an end that is reached by the development of a finer sense of the values that are pursued in human life. But the work of the utilitarians was not wholly dependent on their particular conception of what constitutes the ultimate value in life. Much of the work that was done by J. S. Mill and other followers of Bentham was of great

[1] Vol. i. p. 364.

[2] Recent writers who have been influenced by Bentham tend at least to abandon his purely hedonistic basis. Mr. Laski, for instance, in his *Grammar of Politics*, follows Professor Hobhouse in speaking of 'Happiness in the creative sense.'

service, whatever view we may take of the intrinsic values in human life. In the meantime, it may at least be allowed that the substitution of the conception of a Common Good for that of a General Will was a step towards clarity.

What really upset all the foregoing theories was the introduction of the conception of evolution, a conception which has itself been subject to a long process of development. The theories so far referred to had but little reference to history, and especially to the idea of a gradual advance in the ordering of human life. Early thinkers were apt, on the whole, to conceive of a process of degeneration rather than of progress. Plato represented the inferior forms of constitution as growing gradually out of those that are more perfect. Aristotle came nearer to the conception of development, but gave it only a very limited application. His distinction between the primitive communities that exist only for the maintenance of life and the more highly developed ones that exist for the promotion of the good life, is almost the only way in which the idea of evolution enters into his treatment of politics. The more modern conception of contract involves the recognition of a somewhat similar advance from the state of nature, which is prior to the contract, to the civic state that results from it; but this advance tended to be thought of as a sudden one, not as one that goes on continuously. The idea of the General Will provided rather more scope for the recognition of successive stages; but the changes to which it was most readily applied were revolutionary rather than evolutionary. A more definite recognition of evolution was first supplied by the Historical School, represented by Vico and Montesquieu; and the most eloquent expression of the more organic conception of society that was introduced by this school was given by Burke.[1] The significance of the change is best seen in the well-known passage in which he explains the new conception of the Social Contract to which the organic theory of society leads. 'Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts, for objects of mere occasional interest, may be dissolved at pleasure. But the State ought not to be

[1] Besides the account of Burke's views that is given in Vaughan's *Studies*, reference may be made to the very valuable study of Burke's political work by Professor MacCunn.

considered nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico and tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and then dissolved by the parties. It is to be looked upon with other reverence, because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular State is but a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place.' Translated into somewhat less florid language, this evidently means that the social bond is not properly to be regarded as a contract at all, but a vital unity which is implied in man's nature from the beginning, but is gradually brought into clearer and clearer consciousness as human life develops. Perhaps Burke, with his conservative instincts, his reverence for the past, and his distrust of the future, would not have altogether approved of such a translation of his language; but it is to such a conception that the organic and historical view of society almost inevitably leads.

In more recent times the organic conception has acquired a new significance through its connection with the general doctrine of biological evolution. Man's life has in this way become connected with the life of the lower animals; and a more definite meaning has thus been given to the state of nature that preceded the formation of civic communities. That state ceases to be conceived as a condition of 'war of all against all'; for it is pretty obvious that some of the lowlier forms of animal life serve as the very types of industrious peace; and, if this can hardly be said of those that are most nearly akin to us, at least even they are hardly as fiercely pugnacious as more or less civilized nations sometimes are. We are rather led to think

of the races of mankind as having sprung from an assemblage of primitive groups, bound together by instinctive affinities, and somewhat roughly kept in order by powerful leaders whose divine right lay in their age and strength. The view of the origin of human society that is thus suggested is somewhat sharply opposed, not only to the idea of divine right, but also to the conceptions both of Hobbes and of Burke. According to Hobbes, the state of nature has to be thought of as purely anarchical, and as giving place afterwards to a condition of absolute rule as the only tolerable alternative. According to Burke, there has been rather a gradual establishment of orderly methods of government, accompanied by sentiments of loyalty and chivalry, which are in constant danger of being rudely swept away by the passions of the 'swinish multitude.' Carlyle's doctrine of 'Heroes,' and even Nietzsche's conception of the 'Superman,' may be regarded as belated variants upon these 'aristocratic' conclusions, rendered somewhat violent (especially in the case of Nietzsche) by the fact that they have become 'untimely' (*unzeitgemäss*). Comte's Religion of Humanity, on the other hand, is perhaps a somewhat less untimely, because more carefully guarded, attempt to revert to the conception of control from above. According to the more purely biological conception of evolution, especially as represented by Herbert Spencer,[1] we are led to think rather of a gradual development from a state of conflict between groups to a condition of co-operative industrialism, tempered by such an element of competition as may be necessary for the elimination of the 'unfit.'

A less purely biological conception of evolution is represented by Hegel and Mazzini, with whom Vaughan closes his account of the development of political theory. Hegel's view can hardly be properly understood without some account of his general system of philosophy. It must suffice here to state that his view is one of spiritual evolution rather than one that is primarily physical. In this respect it is more nearly akin to Bergson's 'creative evolution' or to the 'emergent evolution'

[1] Huxley's opposition between the natural or cosmic order and the moral order can hardly be said to rest on purely biological conceptions. It is more nearly akin to the doctrine of Hobbes.

of Professor Lloyd Morgan than to that of Darwin and Spencer. His general conception was that what is rational tends to become real. As applied to political development, this is taken to mean that there is a gradual growth towards free self-determination. Hegel thought that this process is one of almost unconscious development, but little dependent on the deliberate purpose of individuals. Reason is so deeply rooted in the nature of things that it is bound to triumph in the end. Mazzini, on the other hand, was more inclined to emphasize the need for individual initiative. Hegel was accused, perhaps unjustly,[1] of undue servility to the powers that be. Certainly no such charge could have been brought against Mazzini. But they both believed that 'through the ages one increasing purpose runs.' It is possible to connect this view, as Bosanquet did, with Rousseau's conception of a General Will; but it is the Rational Will that is emphasized by Hegel, and it is only by slow degrees that that Will can be said, in any effective sense, to become 'general.' At any rate, it is its rationality,[2] and not its generality, that gives it its ultimate sanction. Still, as man is at least potentially a rational animal, it does tend to become the general will.

A theory of the type that has just been referred to is somewhat closely connected with the idea of a Group Mind, which has recently been defended with great vigour by Dr. McDougall, and which certainly helps to give a more definite meaning to the conception of a General Will. The conception of a Group Mind is one that has often been employed in dealing with

[1] It is certainly wrong to accuse him of being an extreme supporter of the Prussian State. He was even charged by some of his contemporary critics (especially Dr. Schubarth) with having an *anti-Preussische Richtung*. He appears to have been more interested in the British Constitution (with the monarch as a 'dot upon the i') than in the Prussian. Certainly the ultimate emphasis in his *Philosophy of History* is on the evolution of freedom. By his constant reference to this historical development, he probably did more than any other writer to enforce the conception of an increasing co-operative purpose through the ages. I think Vaughan was decidedly unjust both to him and to Fichte, and also, though in a rather less degree, to Comte. To Rousseau and to Mazzini he did very ample justice.

[2] Professor Hobhouse, in his book on *The Metaphysical Theory of the State*, has criticized Hegel's view with some severity; but his own conception of 'the Rational Good' does not seem to be very far removed from what Hegel meant by 'the Real Will.'

animal life. Such facts as the assembling of certain species of birds at particular times for the purpose of migrating in a flock from one country to another, suggest the possibility that there is a certain community of mind in the birds of the species. The tendency of a flock of sheep to behave as a single body has been taken as another illustration of what is meant; but in this case at least it seems more natural to take it as an instance of the imitative tendency or the tendency to follow a leader. Perhaps the conception of telepathy, which has been much used in recent times, might furnish another method of explanation. At any rate, among human beings, the behaviour of crowds is sometimes rather similar to that of a flock of sheep. But it is at least doubtful whether anything is gained by postulating the existence of a single mind in such groups. As applied to human beings, however, this view connects itself closely with the doctrine of F. W. Maitland and others, that corporations may rightly be described as 'persons.' For certain legal purposes it is often convenient so to regard them; but it may be urged that this is due to the fact that the legal way of regarding persons is a somewhat superficial one. This view at least, it may be noted, comes rather oddly from Dr. McDougall. In his remarkable book on *Body and Mind* he has given his support to the doctrine of Animism; that is, to the view that the human Mind or Soul is to be regarded as an entity distinct from the Body and capable of surviving it. It would be difficult to think of the Soul of a nation or people as having any similar independence.

Views of this kind, however, cannot at least be regarded as belonging to the past, as most of the others to which reference has been made may be said, on the whole, to do. We now pass to ways of regarding the social unity that are definitely held by influential writers at the present time.

CHAPTER II

THE PRESENT OUTLOOK IN SOCIAL THEORY

Most of the theories that have been referred to in the preceding chapter are now mainly of historical interest, though a great deal may still be learned from them. This applies very emphatically to the writings of Plato and Aristotle in ancient times and in more modern times to those of Spinoza, Rousseau, Hegel and the Utilitarians, and to the general conception of organic unity. Rousseau's conception of a social contract is now generally abandoned; but the idea of a general will has been applied by Green[1] and Bosanquet, with the help of modifications suggested by Hegel, to the interpretation of the more purely political aspects of social life; and indeed, with further modifications, it retains a certain place in most of the recent theories of politics. The Utilitarian view was applied, in a modified form, by Sidgwick; and it has, to some extent, coloured the doctrines of Professor Hobhouse, Mr. H. J. Laski and others; but happiness is at least now generally understood in what is described as a 'creative sense,' rather than as a simple sum of pleasures. The idea of a social organism was kept alive by Durkheim and others; and it is still recognized as having a certain value for illustrative purposes. Among the more recent views, those that ascribe something of the nature of personality or group mind to social structures may be regarded as connecting pretty closely with the organic conception; and it may be best to begin with views of this kind in what has to be said in this chapter about recent social theories.

Maitland may be specially mentioned as one who laid stress on the personality of social groups, especially those that are described as corporations. These are not communities, but

[1] Green's special contribution has been very ably summarized and expounded by Professor Muirhead in his book on *The Service of the State.*

rather, to use the valuable distinctions that have been made by Professor MacIver, associations or institutions. Maitland wrote as a lawyer; and for legal purposes it is often very desirable to be able to treat corporations as having similar responsibilities to those that can be ascribed to private individuals. Nations also are held to be accountable for their actions, and are, to some extent, controlled by the principles of what is called international law. To that extent they are regarded as having a sort of personality, and though it used to be somewhat irreverently said that such associations have 'neither a body to be kicked nor a soul to be damned,' yet they can certainly be subjected both to censure and to punishment. They may also be said to entertain opinions and to have characters. Our own country, for instance, has sometimes been referred to as 'perfidious Albion';[1] and we are perhaps even more familiar with the qualities that have been ascribed to some other countries. But, though it may not be easy to say what are the characteristics that are required to constitute personality, I believe it would be generally admitted that they are not all to be found in a nation or state or in any other corporate group. But such groups may be said to have opinions, purposes, hopes and fears; and hence it may be urged that, in some sense at least, they have a mind.

To discuss this question at all adequately would hardly be possible within the limits of such a treatise as this. Dr. Broad, in his very interesting book on *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, has shown how difficult it is to give a precise account of what is meant by a mind even in human individuals; and, when we descend to lower forms of life, it is still more difficult to determine how far it is right to postulate the existence of what can properly be called a mind within particular organisms, and how far such minds can be regarded as individual or as belonging to groups. Dr. McDougall, the writer who has laid most emphasis on the *Group Mind*, has also discussed in his book on *Mind and Body* the relations of particular minds to

[1] For a more adequate account of English characteristics, reference may be made to Dean Inge's book on *England*; and, for a still more adequate one, Professor Barker's book on *National Character* may be consulted.

the organisms with which they are connected; and thus his view deserves to be treated with a good deal of respect. It may be well to note, however, that there is a certain ambiguity in the use of such expressions as *The Soul of a People*. Even when we speak of the mind or soul or spirit of an individual, these terms are not always to be understood as implying any separate or substantial existence. In the well-known lines, 'John Brown's body now reposes from his toil, But his soul goes marching on,' it is surely evident that the soul that is referred to is not an individual or substantial entity, but rather a mental or spiritual attitude that may be adopted or shared by many distinguishable individuals. But the one meaning passes very easily into the other; as it does also in the use of the word 'spirit.' When Brutus exclaims

> We all stand up against the spirit of Caesar;
> And in the spirit of men there is no blood;
> Oh, that we then could come by Caesar's spirit,
> And not dismember Caesar!

the ambiguity is very apparent. Of course, it was only one aspect of Caesar's spirit that Brutus wanted to extract, *viz.* his ambition. Similarly, when St. Paul says, 'Be of one mind one with another,' 'mind' seems clearly to mean a spiritual attitude that many may share. In view of this, it seems at least safer to speak of the co-operation of different minds within a group, rather than of a single group mind. All or the great majority of people in a group may be of one mind, *i.e.* they may be unanimous in pursuing something that is good, not merely for themselves individually, but for the group as a whole. We appear, as I have already noted, to find evidences of such unanimity in some animal groups as well as in human societies; and occasionally, as in the migration of birds at particular times, it is difficult to understand the unanimity without postulating some more intimate mode of communication between them—perhaps similar to telepathic communications between human minds—than is commonly to be found in the co-operative activities of human groups. But such communications do not appear as yet to have been quite definitely explained. What is clear is that there are often

occasions on which particular ends are unanimously or almost unanimously sought by all the members of a particular group. The defence of one's country is one of the most obvious ways in which such unanimity may be completely or approximately realized. Such an object may be rightly described as a common good. On the other hand, it is possible that several people may be unanimous in seeking some good that can only be enjoyed by one or a limited number. In such a case it may give rise to conflict, rather than to co-operative effort. The illustration that Kant gave is perhaps as good as any that could be offered: 'What my brother Charles wishes I wish also,' *viz.* Milan. This is evidently not a common good giving rise to co-operation, but an individual good giving rise to conflict or competition. Two countries may each desire the possession of a particular colony; or two sets of players may each desire to win a particular game. On the other hand, when some genuinely common good is sought, nearly every one separately desires it; and this may be called a general wish or will. If we mean by the mind or soul or spirit that which enables us to be aware of pleasant or unpleasant feelings, of various modes of sense data, of objects in the spatio-temporal system, of goods to be pursued and evils to be shunned, of beings to be loved or hated, to be aided or resisted, it would seem that some of these experiences are private to individual minds; whereas it may be affirmed of some others that they can, in a quite intelligible sense, be said to be held in common by the members of a group, and even in many cases to have but little meaning without reference to certain groups. This applies especially to those experiences that are directly concerned with things that have to be done or achieved. The objects that we most highly value and seek to attain would, in many cases, have little meaning for us if we did not think of them as being shared by others; and it would sometimes be quite hopeless to dream of procuring them if we could not rely upon the co-operation of others. Hence, whether it is right or not to speak of a Group Mind, we may at least venture to affirm that there are certain purposes that are common to a group and certain ends that can only be enjoyed by a group. Hence, setting aside the larger conception of a Group Mind as too speculative to be discussed here, we may

confine our attention to the conceptions of a General Will and a Common Good.[1]

It was, as we have already seen, Rousseau who first formulated the conception of a General Will; and it still retains a considerable value, His expression was, of course, *volonté générale*; and I think it is true to say that the French *volonté* does not quite as clearly distinguish between Wish and Will as our English terms do. Even in English the distinction is not always very sharply marked. Green has quoted the phrase of the apothecary in *Romeo and Juliet*, 'my poverty, but not my will, consents'; and has noted that the act to which his will did not consent was one for which he might lawfully have been hanged. What he meant was that he did not *wish* to do it, and that he was only impelled to it by his poverty. But he undoubtedly willed the action and performed it. Now, it can hardly be denied that sometimes all or the great majority of the members of a social group wish for the realization of certain ends, such as success in war, the possession of important territories, the improvement of sanitary conditions, *etc.* In general, only a limited number of the members of a group can be properly said to *will* these results. The actual support that many of them give may be a very small and negligible quantity, especially in large and imperfectly organized communities with a more or less autocratic form of government. Rousseau recognized that it was only in small groups capable of assembling together for the purpose of decision, that the general will could be made completely effective. No doubt, there are devices by which it can be made partially effective even in large societies. The invention of the ballot-box was declared by Bosanquet to be on a level with that of the lever or the screw. It enabled the views of a large number of people, who could not all meet

[1] The legal conception of Group personality has been ably defended by Mr. Wilfrid Richmond in his *Essay on Personality as a Philosophical Principle*; but it seems less confusing to speak of a Group, when highly co-operative, as super-personal rather than as personal. A nation, for instance, may be so described. We commonly refer to a nation as 'she'; but it would seem absurd to apply such a designation to a group for commercial or recreational objects. As Professor W. E. Hocking has put it, 'the State attains a growing *appearance of personality*' (*Man and the State*, p. 375). The whole conception of Group Minds is very fully discussed in his book. Part IV, chap. xxiii.

together for discussion, to record their opinions on some important questions. Of course, the invention of the newspaper, of the post-office, of the telegraph, of the telephone and similar devices, may be mentioned as having also contributed something towards making the wishes of the various members of a large community accessible to one another and making their wills to some extent effective; but it remains true that the general will is not the will of all and may not even be the will of the majority. As a rule, it is rather the will of a compact body of people who have a clear conception of what they conceive to be for the good of the community and who use all the available means for the realization of that good—men like Chatham, Mazzini, Bismarck, Gladstone or Chamberlain, working in conjunction with others who were in agreement with them or came under their spell. In smaller groups, there is more possibility of arriving at agreement by discussions in which all may take part. It is thus somewhat difficult to give a definite account of the General Will as an effective principle in the conduct of human affairs. Bosanquet, who was the writer who laid most stress on it in recent times, made use of some ideas derived from the philosophy of Hegel in the interpretation of it. His views, as we have already noted, were subjected to a somewhat searching criticism by Professor Hobhouse in his book on *The Metaphysical Theory of the State*,[1] and Miss M. P. Follett and Professor MacIver have helped greatly to clear up the significance of the conception as applied to modern communities. More recently the subject has been very ably discussed by Professor W. E. Hocking in his book on *Man and the State*. He points out that Bosanquet recognized that the General or Real Will of a community has value only in so far as it is directed towards the Common Good. But it can hardly be assumed, and neither Hegel nor Bosanquet supposed that it could, that the Actual or effective Will of a community is always so directed.

[1] Professor Muirhead made a very good defence of Bosanquet's view in a series of articles that he contributed to *Mind* in 1924, and he has since discussed it, with special reference to Professor MacIver, in the same Journal (January 1928). It is, of course, true that the General or Real Will may be interpreted in such a way as to identify it with the effort to promote what is best. I think, however, that Professor Hobhouse is right in laying emphasis on the Common Good rather than on the General Will.

Surely, therefore, it is much clearer to lay the emphasis on the Common Good, and to recognize the value of the General Will only in so far as it is directed to that Good. Nations, as well as individuals, are often mistaken with regard to their real Good, though it may be true that they are not willingly deprived of it.

In most modern communities important decisions are usually arrived at, especially in matters that are not absolutely vital, by some convenient method of voting. In such cases the decision is that of the majority. This method at least serves for a time to put an end to fruitless quarrelling. Nearly everybody now agrees that this is the best method of arriving at a decision on many doubtful issues. Those concerned in such decisions do not all agree with the decision, but they nearly all agree with the method of reaching it; and they at least temporarily *accept* the decision. President Lowell appears to regard this as the typical illustration of what is meant by a general will;[1] and I understand Professor MacIver also to use the expression in this sense; and, in effect, it appears to have been what Rousseau himself intended it to be interpreted as meaning. It is not the will of all, nor yet is it the will that expresses itself in the decision of the majority; but it is the will that accepts the result of the voting for that occasion. The minority may reserve the right, as D. G. Ritchie urged,[2] of endeavouring to turn themselves into a majority at some later time. In this way we appear to arrive at a perfectly clear view of what may be understood by the General Will.

But the conception has been somewhat modified, as we have already indicated, by ideas derived from the philosophy of Hegel. Bosanquet, in particular, sought to identify the General Will with what Hegel described as the *Real Will*; and this is taken to mean, not the decision that is taken or accepted for the time being, but rather the decision that *would be accepted* as finally satisfactory. The Real Will, in this sense, bides its time. It is not content with what is merely provisional, but

[1] He considers that it means primarily the Will *for* the State rather than the Will *of* the State. Mr. R. M. MacIver has also emphasized this view in his book on *The Modern State* (p. 488).

[2] *Natural Rights*, p. 195. The view was repeated by Ritchie in several of his writings.

takes it only as an instalment. This also appears to me to be a clear conception; and, indeed, it may have been to some extent in Rousseau's mind. When he says that the General Will is 'always right' (*toujours droit*), it is difficult to interpret this as referring to anything but what would finally be accepted as the greatest good for the community. But it is at least not quite obvious that Rousseau had definitely distinguished between the two possible interpretations; and, if Bosanquet had made the distinction clear to himself (as I fully believe he had), it is at least doubtful whether he succeeded in communicating it to the majority of his readers.[1] It is not a great mystery, however. It is only a repetition of a very ancient doctrine. When Socrates affirmed that 'no one is willingly deprived of the good,' he was stating what is in one sense a paradox; but, in another sense, it may almost be said to be a truism. No one is *completely* satisfied so long as he lacks anything that is really good; and, in the same general sense, it may be maintained that no community is completely satisfied so long as it lacks anything that is really for its good. This is certainly a consideration that it is well to emphasize from time to time. We have already had occasion to notice it (p. 53) in dealing with Goodness as one of the intrinsic values; and it seems clear that it is quite as applicable to communities as it is to individuals. But, in both cases, there is considerable difficulty in discovering what the highest good at any particular time is. It certainly does not always make itself effectively present either in the lives of individuals or in those of social groups. Groups, as well as individuals, can only in the end (to use a favourite expression of F. H. Bradley) be 'justified by faith.' They may trust that 'somehow good will be the final goal of ill,' but they cannot be sure that in any particular action the real good is being achieved. But we may now try to make the meaning of the Common Good a little more clear and explicit.

[1] I think it is unfortunate that he continued to make so large a use of Rousseau's expression, 'the General Will,' when what he had in mind was what Hegel called 'the Real Will,' *i.e.*, as I understand it, the Will that is directed to the Real Good. The 'Actual Will' of any particular community is not always directed towards this. It may be that Miss Follett also assumes too readily that the purpose of a Co-operative Group will be a good purpose.

Any active group may be said to be aiming at some common good, *i.e.* at something that would satisfy the needs that are more or less clearly felt by the members of that group. This applies, not merely to human societies, but also to creatures that are much lower in the scale of being. M. Fabre has taught us—as, indeed, many earlier writers had done, though with less fullness and precision—to look to societies pretty far removed from human life for examples of citizenship. It is not in the ape nor even in the faithful dog, which are in many respects nearer to ourselves, that they are most conspicuously apparent, but rather in such relatively low creatures as ants and bees. In a hive of bees there is a common good being energetically pursued, though few would think it right to apply such a term as General Will to their strenuous activities. They are almost certainly pursuing a good that they have never consciously apprehended. But is not this true, to a very large extent, of the majority of human beings? May it not even be true to some extent of all? Could most members even of so simple a group as a Cricket Club explain quite clearly and fully what is the good that is sought in that association? They may be aware that they seek exercise, that they seek fellowship with other like-minded human beings, that they seek the joy of co-operative activity and of the successful pursuit of an end; and they may be aware that they are learning the important art that is described as 'playing the game.' But it may be doubted whether these ends are at any one time distinctly present to their minds, and whether the relative importance of each of them is clearly apprehended. The objects that are aimed at in a large community are still more complex; and it is pretty certain that they are seldom clearly present to the minds of its members. It may be more or less true that the wills of the members are directed towards the realization of the ends; and, no doubt, if the community were to be suddenly dissolved, some consciousness of the values that had been lost would speedily be awakened. But, until this consciousness has been quite definitely aroused, it may be somewhat misleading to say that the good is *willed*. The question, however, is largely one of definition. So long as we understand that a group is achieving some good, it does not greatly matter whether we

speak of the Common Good or of the General or Real Will. It is at least true that the activities of the Group are, consciously or unconsciously, or perhaps most often semi-consciously, directed towards the realization of that Good. One of the great advantages of a fully organized group lies in the fact that it is gradually led to formulate its aims in some explicit way, in which they can be subjected to criticism. Without this, it may very well happen, as President Lowell has urged[1] that a small group may be a greater danger to the community as a whole than isolated individuals could be. A family or a trade union or a board of directors may be more opposed to the good of the country or of the world than their individual members could well be.

This leads us, however, to the further question, how the Human Good is to be conceived. That is really the question that we were trying to consider in Part I. The answer would seem to be that the Good consists in the realization of all the Values, both intrinsic and instrumental, that human beings are engaged in pursuing. But some of them are pursued by individuals separately or with only slight and occasional help from one another. Others need continual co-operative effort: and it is chiefly for the sake of these that a variety of groups are formed. It has often been said that the Good that is sought is Happiness; but, without further definition, this is only the substitution of one word for another. The view of Bentham, that Happiness means a sum of pleasures, has already been noticed.[2] Almost everyone now recognizes that it cannot properly be thought of in that way. Those who still speak of Happiness as the end explain that it must be understood as meaning Happiness in the creative sense. Professor Hobhouse's conception[3]

[1] *Public Opinion in War and Peace*, p. 123. He states that 'in the immediate future the public has probably less to fear from individual than from co-operative selfishness.' But co-operative selfishness is generally more open to public criticism and control; though unfortunately, in the case of national decisions, the control is apt to take the form of war. The consideration of this must be reserved for a later stage (below, Chapters IX and X). What is most important is that the Group spirit should be so developed as to include a more and more comprehensive reference.

[2] Part I, Chapter VI, pp. 58–9.

[3] See *The Elements of Social Justice*, chap. i., and *The Rational Good*, chaps. iv.–vi.

of the 'harmonizing of impulses' is closely connected with this. But there is one other conception that has to be taken into account before we can consider at all definitely what is to be understood by creation.

One of the most important contributions to Social Philosophy that has been made in recent years is that contained in the two remarkable books by Miss M. P. Follett on *Creative Experience* and *The New State*, the general ideas of which were to a considerable extent incorporated in the latest edition of Bosanquet's *Philosophical Theory of the State* and in Professor MacIver's recent work on *The Modern State*. What has to be said about Creation must be reserved for a moment. In the book on *The New State* the emphasis is laid chiefly on the fundamental distinction between a Crowd and a Co-operative Group. This is a distinction that has often been overlooked or very imperfectly considered even by writers who have emphasized the organic nature of society. Many writers, notably Le Bon, have laid great stress on the crowd consciousness, and have tended to represent it as being characteristic of all modes of communal life. Even Durkheim, in the latest of his published works (*L'Éducation Morale*), says that a nation is to be regarded simply as an *organized crowd*. Of course, if the stress is laid on '*organized*,' this may be allowed to pass; but, when it is organized, it is no longer a crowd. What Miss Follett has taught us to see, more clearly than anyone else had done, is that the distinction between a Crowd and a Co-operative Group is not merely a matter of organization. A Crowd may be to some extent organized by the police, and still remain essentially a crowd, liable to all those contagious impulses that so many writers have noted as specially characteristic of such casual aggregations. Among animals, a flock of sheep may be taken as an illustration of what is meant by a crowd. It may be organized by a shepherd. In pastoral countries flocks are often beautifully organized and learn to follow their leaders with great docility. The hosts before Troy, which appear to have been little better than crowds, were appropriately described as being under the control of the 'shepherds of the people' (ποιμένε λαών). Whenever the control is removed or seriously weakened, such crowds are very liable to panic and disorgan-

ization. A hive of bees, on the other hand, or a collection of ants, seems to stand in no need of such guidance. Its members are more or less consciously engaged in the pursuit of a common good, to which each one duly contributes its appropriate share. No doubt, the distinction, like most other distinctions, is not one that can be quite sharply drawn. A co-operative group may degenerate into a crowd; and it is also true that, by carefully devised methods of organization, and especially by suitable methods of education, a crowd may be transformed into a co-operative group. But the transformation has to be made from within, not by any merely external organization. Durkheim was, no doubt, to some extent aware of this; but, until the distinction was made clear by Miss Follett, even the most careful writers were liable to ignore it.[1] It is here, of course, that the importance of civic and moral education comes in; and I think it is true to say that even Durkheim's book on education—excellent as, in many respects, it is—suffers a good deal from the fact that he had not the distinction at all definitely in his mind. He tends, in consequence, to lay too much emphasis on law and discipline and too little on co-operation and free development. This is a subject to which some further reference will have to be made at a later stage. But, with Durkheim, this was on the whole only a matter of emphasis. Carlyle, especially in his later writings, was a much worse offender in this respect. He tended habitually to think of a community as little more than a collection of individuals—'mostly fools'—incapable of any genuine co-operation. That this is not without an element of truth in most existing societies need not be denied; but the other side has to be borne in mind. Carlyle's strictures on parliamentary debates, which have been repeated by some of his followers, are, from Miss Follett's point of view, in the main quite wrong—so far, at least, as the debates are well conducted. It is by discussion, by 'the tierce and quart of mind on mind' (to use a phrase of Tennyson's), that the members of a group become co-operative. No doubt, such discussion is most effectively carried on within a com-

[1] The distinction is, however, well emphasized also in McDougall's book on *The Group Mind*, pp. 62 *sqq.*; and, of course, it is substantially contained in the theories of Hegel, Green, Bosanquet and others.

paratively small group. A carefully selected committee, or a Royal Commission appointed to consider some special problem, supplies perhaps the best illustration of a genuine Group Mind; yet it may be noted here incidentally that few people would think of describing such a group as a *Person*. It is probably true that the discussions within a Cabinet[1] are often more fruitful than those in a Parliament. But the latter are at least reported to the public, and may become the basis for many useful debates throughout the country. Carlyle himself did at least recognize the value of the 'Smoking Parliament' in Prussia; and much of what he said about this was very timely as illustrating the way in which a fruitful interchange of views and suggestions may be most effectively made. Some of his earlier essays on society were also instructive from this point of view.[2] That there should be genuine co-operation, and not merely expressions of hostile or divergent attitudes, is the essential consideration. This is, of course, not a new discovery; but *The New State* has certainly made its significance much clearer than it was before, and, by doing so, has greatly helped us to a better understanding of the process by which a General Will may be formed. Much further light on the same subject has more recently been supplied in Professor MacIver's book on *The Modern State*. What it is now most important to bear in mind is that what we have to try to cultivate is not what can be well described either as General Will or Real Will, but rather as Good Will. The Will of a particular Group is often antagonistic to other Groups. It is enough to remember Cato's *Delenda est Carthago*, without dwelling upon more recent instances.

In what has so far been stated, it has been possible to give illustrations of co-operative activity from animal groups as well as from human societies; but we now pass to the consideration of a process that is more purely human. What distinguishes man, on the whole, from all the other beings on our planet, is the fact that he is capable of becoming creative. Reference has

[1] There are some interesting statements about Cabinet discussions in Professor Graham Wallas's *Great Society*, p. 278.

[2] The essay on Carlyle in Edward Caird's *Essays in Literature and Philosophy* may be referred to about this.

already been made to this in Part I, where the distinction was emphasized between Nature and Spirit. That the distinction is not a quite sharp one was there fully admitted. It is probably true that a process of creative evolution can be traced pretty far down in the scale of living beings. But, on the whole, it is only in human life that it is quite explicitly present. Many other beings are capable of *making*. Bees, ants, beavers, many birds, and other animal beings, are quite able to construct for themselves dwellings and storehouses, often of a somewhat elaborate kind; and presumably there was some time at which the species acquired these capabilities; but it seems to be, in the main, true that they do it either in virtue of their inherited instincts or by the imitative impulse. They do not invent. It may be replied, no doubt, that the number of human beings who can be said to invent is also very small; and it may be added that even among animal beings there must have been some that first initiated the rude beginnings of those structures that appear now to be erected by instinct. I suppose this must be true; and it must also be admitted that some animals show considerable powers of adapting their constructions to new conditions. There are few, if any, quite sharp divisions in nature. It is sometimes difficult to tell what is to be regarded as plant and what as animal. Some animals appear to be almost human, and some men to be not much above the beasts. Yet the general distinctions are sufficiently apparent. What it is specially important to notice here is that not only are there very few men who can be said to have made inventions, but that there are very few inventions that can be ascribed, definitely and exclusively, to any one man. Inventions are practically always co-operative products—quite always, I suppose, if we take account of their necessary preconditions. This applies to artistic creations as well as to inventions of a more purely mechanical type. There were bards before Homer as well as heroes before Agamemnon; and the later creations grew out of the earlier. For the purpose of such higher forms of invention the whole human race has to be regarded as a Co-operative Group. When Goethe says that 'man alone can perform the impossible,' he must be understood to mean that what is impossible for one generation is made possible for those that

succeed it. Shakespeare would have been impossible without a long previous history of poetic and dramatic writers, perhaps hardly possible without Marlowe and some of his other contemporaries and without the stimulating intellectual atmosphere of the Elizabethan Age. But 'the little more' that a creative mind can add may become very much. This idea of creativeness in human life is, however, so important that it may be worth while to dwell upon it a little more at this point.

In referring to human life as creative, it has to be borne in mind that the term is now used in a somewhat different sense from that in which it was used in previous generations. It used to be understood to mean the making of something out of nothing. Now it means rather the evolution of what is already implicitly present. Even the creation of the Universe as a whole is seldom now thought of as taking place completely *ex nihilo* by the simple fiat of some pre-existing Being. Rather it tends to be regarded as a gradual process of unfolding, in which, indeed, something new is generated, but generated in accordance with an ordered plan. Some reference has already been made to this in Part I; and the distinction that was there drawn between Nature and Spirit may now be called to mind. If we recognize that there is an upward urge in Nature, it is at least very doubtful whether it is to any considerable extent consciously guided. It is not as yet very definitely known how far it is legitimate to postulate any conscious foresight in the 'emergence' of higher characteristics. This is a matter that is still *sub judice*. It is pretty certain that animals are only very dimly aware of the higher values that are gradually achieved in the process of their evolution. Possibly, as we have already noted (pp. 47–9), they may be more conscious of the negative values, and may strive to some extent to escape from them, but without much clear apprehension of the best way. No doubt, this is largely true in human life as well. The saying of Cromwell that men never go so far as when they do not know where they are going, has a considerable element of truth, both for good and for ill. But in human life there is at least nearly always some consciousness of the values that are being pursued; and this consciousness tends to become more and more clear as the process advances. The bird in building its

nest, the bee in collecting materials for its hive, the beaver in erecting its dam, might all be said to be engaged in creative activities; but such making is at least very different from what takes place when an architect plans a house, and still more from that which is involved in framing the constitution of a state. It was this difference that gave rise to the antithesis in Greek thought, to which reference was made in the preceding chapter, between what exists by nature and what is based upon convention. Everywhere, subject only to very slight modifications, trees grow in the same way; and there is not much difference between individuals in the various species of birds and beasts in different parts of the world, except in so far as they have been bred and domesticated by man. Ruth, as Keats suggested, heard 'among the alien corn' the selfsame song of the nightingale to which he was listening. Perhaps she might also have witnessed the selfsame activities of bees and ants and some of those other lowly creatures that Fabre watched; but at least she saw no aeroplanes and did not feel the want of the morning papers; and, if she could have read Keats, it is not likely that she could have understood him. But all the changes that are thus implied have been brought about very slowly and not by the exertions of any single person.

The element of creativeness in human life has been much emphasized by many recent writers on social problems, as well as by Miss Follett. Mr. Russell, for example, in his *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, has made a sharp antithesis between the more purely acquisitive and the more creative tendencies in human life. Perhaps he represents them both rather too much as if they were separate instincts.[1] People have usually some grounds for seeking to acquire possessions, *e.g.* provision for the future needs of themselves or families, the kind of reputable extravagance that has been emphasized by Mr. Veblen, leisure for creative activity, *etc.* They do not gather things as the jackdaw does. Creative activity also is seldom based on an inborn impulse, but is usually directed

[1] For the more restricted meaning of Instinct, reference may be made to McDougall's *Social Psychology*, chap. v. Perhaps, however, he confines the term rather too strictly to the simpler impulses. For some criticism on this, reference may be made to Professor Graham Wallas's *Great Society* and to the book on *Social Purpose* by Hetherington and Muirhead.

towards the production of valued objects. But it seems to be true enough to urge that what is best and most distinctive in human life is found in the tendency to create rather than in the tendency to preserve and retain. It is gradually coming to be recognized, partly through the influence of William Morris and other constructive artists, that the joy as well as the glory of human life is found in the production of lasting values. Even happiness, as we have already noted, is now generally interpreted in a 'creative sense.' But, of course, this implies receptivity and sometimes passivity as well. The mere fact that creation is co-operative implies the need for the former; and Wordsworth's emphasis on a 'wise passiveness' is not altogether to be forgotten. Even Mr. Russell has recently stated that he has 'hopes of laziness as a Gospel.' The important thing, as Goethe noted, is to 'co-operate with others *at the right time*.'

When emphasis is laid upon co-operation, however, it must not be supposed that the place of leadership in social progress is to be ignored. The Divine Right of Kings is an ancient doctrine that has had its day and is not likely to be revived; but something akin to it was preached by Carlyle and to some extent supported by Ruskin and others. William Morris followed them with great qualifications in this. Probably the Divine Right of the Hero or Superman will have to give place to the more modest claim of the born leader to be allowed to lead. We have seen that it is at least doubtful whether the power that serves to bring about the realization of the Common Good can be said to be effectively present in anything that can be properly described as the General Will of the community. The General Will is better thought of, on the whole, rather as giving support to the activities that are directed towards the production of what is best. These activities may be developed and encouraged by discussion and co-operation; but at all times, and especially at times of special difficulty and danger, there is apt to be a call for piercing insight, swift decision and heroic effort. Bosanquet himself, as we have noted, referred in one place to the need for what he described as an 'iron will.' It is to be feared that the General Will, however it may be interpreted, is seldom made of so stern a stuff. It would seem to be the special business of the Hero or Leader to supply this

element. Even a flock of sheep has its leader; and in most human societies something of the sheeplike element tends to persist. Especially in any great national crisis we do not wait for the General Will to direct us. We ask rather—indeed, we may say, the General Will asks: Who has the necessary insight and determination to see the matter through? Sometimes he may even have to select himself. This would seem to be the element of truth in the Carlylean doctrine of the Hero; and it is probably not an element that we can afford to neglect altogether. But Carlyle himself recognized (very definitely, for instance, in the case of Mirabeau) that the typical hero is one who has absorbed the best wisdom of his time and understands what, in a quite intelligible sense, may be called the Real Will of his people. In one of Carlyle's own striking images, he may be said to absorb the light and turn it into lightning. Probably Mussolini may be regarded as the most striking illustration of such a Hero who has appeared in recent times. He seems to be attempting to do in Italy almost exactly what Carlyle would have wished to see done in England. It appears, however, to have been mainly from Nietzsche that he derived his inspiration. Perhaps it might have been well if both Carlyle and Nietzsche had remembered the saying of Christ, 'He that would be chief among you, let him be your servant.' It is not the Hero as King that is wanted, but rather the Hero as Prime Minister.

The recognition of the part that is thus played by the Leader serves to call attention also to the part that is played by imitation in the development of social life. M. Tarde was the writer who brought out this aspect of group life most fully and convincingly; but it was also strikingly emphasized by Bagehot. Sidgwick, with characteristic balance, remarked that 'imitation will not explain everything, but it will explain a good deal.' Imitation, of course, may appear in many different forms. Henry V is represented as exhorting his soldiers at Agincourt to 'imitate the action of the tiger.' Such imitation would bear very little resemblance, either in its object or in its psychological features, to what is described as the 'imitation of Christ.' But certainly, in some forms, imitation is of considerable social importance. Miss Follett is perhaps a little too scornful of it.

It is better to create than to imitate; but the artistic creator at least generally begins, in Stevenson's phrase, as a 'sedulous ape'; and the same is probably true to some extent in all forms of creative activity. The kind of imitation that is most valuable, however, is seldom *pure* imitation. It might be better to describe it as *assimilation*. The best illustration of it in recent times is probably to be found in the adoption of Western methods by Japan. The imitative impulse appears to be innate;[1] co-operative creation has to be cultivated.

In connection with the general idea of co-operative creation, it may be worth while at this point to refer to the work of Benjamin Kidd. His first book, *Social Evolution*, was well received in many quarters, and did a good deal to stimulate interest in the study of social questions; but it was not very favourably regarded by experts. His general conception of the subordination of the present to the future was somewhat crudely stated; but in some of his later writings his meaning was made clearer. He was essentially urging the importance of those creative activities that are *forward-looking* in their nature, and that may be contrasted with the mere enjoyment of the present. But this was emphasized in a one-sided way.

A much more valuable contribution to the whole subject has recently been made by Mr. R. M. MacIver in his two important works on *Community* and *The Modern State*. In these books he has called attention to the fact that human societies are of different types that can be somewhat sharply distinguished. Some have grown up naturally, like animal groups, without any definite recognition of a common good that is to be achieved by them and consequently without anything that can properly be described as a general will directed towards the realization of that good. Primitive village communities are of this type, and many other societies approximate to it. Some other groups have been formed more definitely with the object of securing some specific end. Religious and educational groups are of this character. So are Guild organizations; and so are States. The distinction, however, like most

[1] It is not, however, to be regarded as an instinct, at least in the limited sense in which that term is understood by Professor McDougall in his *Social Psychology*.

other distinctions in human life, cannot always be quite sharply drawn. Primitive families grow up naturally, though, of course, with some consciousness of the ends that they subserve. It is only at a later time that the purposes of family life are definitely realized, and that rules are devised for the control of marriage with the object of making clear the objects that are in view and of providing sanctions for the realization of those ends. The family thus becomes an 'association' controlled by the institution of marriage. The recognition of these distinctions helps us to understand the sense in which, as we have already noted, several writers—especially legal writers[1]—have urged that a human society may be regarded as a person or as having a soul. This would seem to be most intelligible with reference to some of the larger modes of social unity. Mr. MacIver's distinction between communities and associations helps to bring out what is meant. It is natural to speak of the 'soul of a people' when we are considering a homogeneous nation or any community that exists for all the purposes of life. On the other hand, when we are speaking of an association that is formed for some special purpose, it is more natural to refer to it as a 'body.' We commonly speak of a 'body of men' engaged in some particular work. We even refer to religious 'bodies.' The term 'corporation' carries the same implication. Any individual, in like manner, who is highly specialized in his work may be regarded in a similar way. Even Bosanquet said that some men might be thought of as pistons or in a similarly mechanical fashion. The familiar phrase 'a crank.' applied to people who have a very narrow outlook, calls attention to this.[2] In contrast with such limitations, a nation may certainly be said to have a soul. It does not follow, however, that it has a soul quite in the sense in which that term can be used with reference to an individual person. A Greek City State could be thought of on the analogy of an individual life, as it was by Plato,[3] because it did concern itself with all the

[1] The recent book by Professor E. Jordan on *Forms of Individuality* may be referred to in this connection.

[2] But in this case the personal reference seems to have been prior to the mechanical one.

[3] It is well to remember, however, that even Plato's analogy had reference primarily to the functions of the human *body*.

aspects of the lives of the citizens; but few modern communities can be regarded quite in this way. They are mainly concerned, in their corporate capacity, with the more purely legal aspects of life. In other aspects, the interests of their citizens may be largely international. In such circumstances, they can hardly be thought of as persons in any complete sense. But the whole being of any well-constituted community may be characterized as 'a fellowship where free men and women help each other to achieve what beauty and purpose they can in their lives.'[1] This is what I am seeking to emphasize throughout, no doubt with many imperfections of statement. Human life cannot be understood except as a quest for values, intrinsic and instrumental.

With the help of the distinctions that have now been indicated, we may proceed to notice some of the most important co-operative groups that exist in modern communities.

[1] J. L. and B. Hammond, *The Rise of Modern Industry*, p. 246.

CHAPTER III

CO-OPERATIVE GROUPS

THE distinction to which I have already referred, that was very clearly drawn by Professor MacIver, between communities, associations and institutions, is one that is of great assistance in dealing with the various groups that have to be recognized in a complex society. Perhaps it might be preferable to call them groups for general purposes and groups for special purposes; since they all tend to involve some degree of conscious and more or less deliberate association. A nation, in particular, may be called a community in a sense in which a state or church is not; and a school or college or trade union or club, or even a particular government, is a society of a still more limited kind. Such smaller groups tend to become more and more restricted in their scope as civilization advances. Their special place and function are gradually defined with constantly increasing precision. In somewhat primitive conditions of life, a family or a small district may contain within itself almost all the interests by which its members are vitally affected; while, on the other hand, in a more developed phase of civilization, even a nation may be very far from exhausting the most fundamental interests of its members. A cultivated Englishman may, without ceasing to be patriotic, be almost more deeply interested in the affairs of Greece or Rome, or India or China, than in those of his own country. He belongs naturally or, as we say, he may have been 'naturalized' as a member of a particular nation; and, according to the old Greek distinction, his interest in what lies outside may be said to be relatively artificial or conventional. But it has to be recognized that man is by nature a conventional animal, which is another way of saying that he is an animal guided by conceptions of value which may carry him pretty far away from his immediate environment. Hence it is seldom possible to regard any person in a modern society as belonging, definitely and exclusively, to

any single group; but it is generally possible to point to some group with which he most actively co-operates; and it can hardly be denied that, in the case of most adult Europeans at least, the nation is the group by which the general activities of their lives are most vitally affected, though at particular times their attention may be mainly absorbed by smaller or larger modes of unity. It may be well at this point to notice briefly what appear to be the most important of these groups. The family seems clearly to be the smallest of them and the one that, next to the nation, approximates most nearly to being, in the full sense of the word, a natural community—though it would certainly be strange to call it a 'person.' A primitive village is little more than an aggregation of families; and, on the other hand, an organized city, such as those of ancient Greece, may almost be regarded as a little nation, just as a commonwealth, such as the British, may be regarded as an expanded one. Thus the nation and the family may, on the whole, be taken as the two extreme types of co-operative communities. It must be recognized, however, that in both of these there is nearly always an element of association as well as simple community. In civilized communities the family is controlled by the institution of marriage, which is regulated by the State organization. Again, England, Scotland and Wales may, from many points of view, be regarded as separate nations; but they have become associated under a common legal control. It is better to call them distinct countries rather than nations. From such instances it seems clear that the distinction between a simple community and an association is not one that can be sharply drawn. Families may have begun as simple communities, like the corresponding groups in many forms of animal life; but in civilized countries they are associations controlled by the institution of marriage. A nation, in like manner, could hardly exist without some form of state organization, though it may be possible in some cases to distinguish the purely national life from the aspect of conscious control. There may, for instance, be a national language, a national religion, a national dress, national customs, national literature and art; and these may be hardly at all affected by the State association. They may have grown up, to a large extent,

naturally and spontaneously or at least under influences that have not been definitely organized and enforced.

It is almost inevitable that human beings who live in close proximity to one another should in some ways co-operate with one another; but sometimes their modes of co-operation are hardly more conspicuous than their antagonisms. Milton compared the early modes of life in Great Britain to the quarrels of kites and crows. It is usually the antagonism of other groups that forces them to combine at least for purposes of defence and often also for purposes of aggression. It was the invasions of Danes, Saxons, Angles, Romans, Normans and others that gradually welded England into a nation with definite laws and modes of association. Before such a process takes place, there may be customs, but hardly any consciously formed rules of behaviour. Usually those living in close proximity tend to intermarry among themselves; though sometimes the men prefer to capture their wives from neighbouring tribes. In such circumstances they may be said to be communities; but they have little or nothing that can be characterized as associations or institutions; and, in such circumstances, they can hardly be said to form co-operative groups. Gradually, however, such modes of existence are found to be intolerable, and some methods of association are slowly evolved.

A definitely formed family or nation can hardly be described as a simple community. It is regulated, if not by clearly formulated laws, at least by customs that have almost imperceptibly grown up, and that generally come to be regarded as having some religious or quasi-religious sanction. Gradually they form themselves into Tribes or Clans that have some definitely recognized rules. In particular, some methods of family life become established and enforced. As soon as this is the case, they become associations, and not merely communities. The family, in particular, becomes an association; and the clan or tribe has at least a chief or group of leaders who exact some degree of obedience. Here there are at least the beginnings of what at a later stage becomes a definite state organization, generally with religious sanctions attached to it, and with some recognized methods of family life. There are thus three modes of association—the religious mode, which later appears as the

authority of the Church; the legal mode, which later becomes the organized State; and the more special mode of family life, within which most of the industrial work of the society is carried on, and which is subject both to the religious and to the state control. In more developed communities we have the district, which, when it is comparatively large and complex, may come to be recognized as a nation; and, on the other hand, we have the family, which is sometimes apt to present itself as being, in some degree, opposed to the nation. The *Antigone* of Sophocles contains one of the best known representations of the kind of conflict that may arise between the obligations of the family and those of the larger community. The family and the nation thus come to be recognized as associations for more or less clearly defined purposes, and not merely as communities that have grown up out of natural impulses and the fact of juxtaposition. The modes of association that thus arise are of various kinds. The family is primarily an organization for the production and care of children; but it is also concerned with the production of the materials that are necessary for the protection and sustenance of life. Among those that are necessary for protection some objects of religious veneration are generally included. Three modes of association thus begin to be gradually distinguished—those that are cultural or religious, those that are vocational, and those that are legal. The relations between these will occupy our attention at a later stage. In the meantime, it may be well to refer somewhat more definitely to the leading groups that have to be recognized in a modern community.

Human life is highly complex, and there are evidently many ways in which groups may be formed for the purpose of co-operation. Some of these may be characterized as natural; others may be said to be more or less artificial. In general, those that are to be found even in animal life must be regarded as natural. Among many classes of animals, especially among birds, there is something quite similar to the family group, and many animals are in the habit of associating with one another in flocks or herds, which may be compared to human tribes. Some, such as bees, have somewhat complex organizations, which have even been compared to states; but here it must be

admitted that the resemblance is not capable of being pressed very far. There is nothing in animal life that bears any real resemblance to the complex life of a nation or commonwealth, nothing that can properly be compared to the organization of a school or church, and hardly any real analogues of those vocational groups that arise from division of labour. Yet if we call such purely human groups artificial, it has at least to be recognized that such artificiality arises from deeply seated requirements in the nature of man.

In referring to the most important groups in the human race, it might seem most fitting to begin with those, such as the family, that are common to us with the lower animals, and to trace the evolution upwards to the more purely human modes of unity. But in the present study we are not regarding the matter historically; and it has to be recognized that the family as a human institution takes its character from the fact that it exists within a larger whole. On this account, we might begin rather with the comprehensive conception of humanity and proceed downwards from that to the smaller and simpler modes of unity. Perhaps this may be the natural order for some future writer. In the meantime, we must recognize the general truth of Vaughan's contention,[1] that it is not humanity, but rather the nation, that is, on the whole, the most comprehensive mode of unity that has at present been effectively realized in human life. Some have tended to speak of the State, rather than the Nation, as the ultimate form of orderly community; but it seems clear that the Nation is a larger mode of association than the State, unless the meaning of the latter term is somewhat unduly extended. Accordingly, I begin here with the Nation, and then proceed to notice various modes of grouping that arise within the nation and some that appear to point beyond it.

It is not easy to say, with perfect accuracy, what constitutes a nation. Usually a nation consists of a more or less homogeneous people, of the same or similar race, speaking for the most part a common language, inheriting common traditions,

[1] In his *Studies in the History of Political Philosophy*, especially in the chapters dealing with Comte and Mazzini, to which some reference will be made later.

subject to a common government, occupying for a considerable time a country of adequate size for the maintenance and defence of the people, and separated from other countries by natural boundaries of sea or mountain. Great Britain approximates to these requirements; but it would not be easy to point to any country in which all these conditions are completely fulfilled. Even in Great Britain there are considerable differences in race, language and traditions. In most of the European countries the boundaries are not very definitely fixed—a frequent source of antagonism. Ancient Greece is generally regarded as having been a nation; but there were many distinct governments within it, as well as considerable differences in language and traditions and probably in race. The Olympic Games and the Amphictyonic Council were among the chief bonds of unity; but the latter seems to have resembled the modern League of Nations rather than any purely national unity, and it appears to have sometimes tended to give rise to disunity rather than the reverse. In India similar differences have nearly always existed on a very much larger scale. The Jews continued to be reckoned as a nation even after they had become dispersed in a number of different countries. Their unity in other respects—especially in religious and moral traditions and regulations—sufficed to hold them together for a considerable period, especially while the countries in which they lived had as yet no very firmly established forms of national life. The main essential for the existence of a nation is that the people who constitute it should be like-minded and should regard themselves as a distinct community. But it is not easy for them to maintain this attitude if the other conditions that have been mentioned are lacking. When all or most of the conditions are present in a tolerable degree, the people may be regarded as forming a little world by themselves; or at least their relations to other peoples may be treated as quite subordinate considerations. But it is becoming increasingly difficult for any people to be so regarded. Taking such a nation as a starting-point, however, we may proceed to consider the modes of unity that are contained within it and afterwards the ways in which it may co-operate with other nations.

Evidently it may be expected to consist of a population

that maintains itself and probably increases in numbers from generation to generation. Hence there will be families existing in accordance with some recognized traditions. The people will support themselves by some modes of work; and so there may be expected to be a number of industries of different kinds, the workers in which will naturally co-operate with one another to a certain extent, though they may also have many external interests. The children will have to be prepared to become citizens by some kind of education either within the families or in institutions specially provided for the purpose. Unless they are a very peculiar people indeed, they will have some views about their place in the universe and the place and value of the lives that they carry on in it; and they will probably have some institutions, of a more or less definitely religious character, in which these views will be in certain ways expressed and inculcated. Finally, in order that this somewhat complex mode of life may be carried on harmoniously, they can hardly fail to have some institutions for the purpose of framing and enforcing general regulations. If the country is large, they may have definite forms both of central and of local government. It may happen, as it did in ancient India[1] and Greece, and at a later time in Italy, that the local government is the dominant form. Again, unless the nation is very fortunately situated, it must have some means of defending itself, either as a whole or in its autonomous parts, against any neighbours who may wish to encroach upon its territories or interfere with the lives of its people. The management of this would naturally be vested in the same government or governments by which the internal affairs are controlled; or at least the two departments for internal and external control would be closely connected with one another.

Thus we may take as the chief modes in which co-operative life is to be found within the nation (1) the Family or Home, (2) the Neighbourhood or District, (3) the School or other educational institutions, (4) the Vocation, (5) the Church or other religious and moral institutions, (6) the State, which may be a single national State or a number of city States,

[1] Not, however, to quite the same extent in India as in Greece. See Lord Ronaldshay's *India: a Bird's-eye View*, chap. xi.

or may exercise control (as in Great Britain) over several distinguishable nationalities. But the people who constitute the nation may also have relations of a more or less friendly kind with other peoples; and it will, consequently, be well for us to consider somewhat more definitely what is to be understood by a (7) People. Intercourse between peoples may form the basis for a larger mode of unity, for which it may be convenient to use the term (8) Commonwealth—a term that has recently been employed a good deal in connection with the various Dominions that are more or less definitely associated with our own nation. On each of the modes of unity that have now been referred to, it will be well to offer a few general observations.

1. *The Family or Home.*—The Family is the smallest of all the modes of co-operative unity, and in some respects the most primitive; but it is probably never altogether independent of larger groups within which it is included. Of all the modes of social unity it is the one that is most obviously based on 'nature,' and it is the one that is most prominent in almost all primitive communities. Even in most forms of animal life there is some analogue of the life of the Family, especially in cases—such as several species of birds—in which the young are particularly helpless and take a long time to reach maturity. It is common to refer to some of the higher forms of human activity, especially poetry, as 'flights.' Milton, in one of his early letters, used the expression πτεροφυέω, 'I am letting my wings grow,' thus bringing out, as others had done before him, the analogy between human life and the life of a bird. Like so many other aspects of human life, the family exists, according to the well-known saying of Aristotle, for the mere sake of living, but is continued afterwards for the sake of living well. Its primary function, of course, is the protection and care of the young, including, even in the case of animals, some of the rudiments of their education; and incidentally it involves also the protection of the mothers. But, in the end, marriage and the formation of a private home serve other purposes—some good and some less good—than those that are involved in these forms of care and protection. Family affection forms one of the chief foundations for love of country. Most people tend to think of their native country as their Mother Land (*Bande Mataram !*)

or the land of their Fathers (*Vaterland*). It is probably in the family also that the conception of private property is formed and developed. The protection that has to be given to the young consists largely in the supply of food and shelter. A solitary individual, with no one definitely dependent upon him, may lead a vagabond life, or maintain himself very simply, after the manner of Thoreau or Walt Whitman or even of Diogenes. It is, as Burns expressed it, 'thae movin' things ca'ed wives and weans' that are the chief force leading to the accumulation of property. Those who are eager to acquire large possessions are generally actuated, more or less explicitly, by the hope of 'founding a family,' or at least of giving one a good start.[1] Hence those who, like Plato in ancient times and modern socialists, regard private property as an anti-social institution, are naturally antagonistic to the exclusiveness of the family; and it is, no doubt, true that in some respects that exclusiveness becomes less important in many developed communities than it is in more primitive ones. Many of its educative functions are taken over by the school or by methods of apprenticeship, and many of its protective ones by State regulations; and it is sometimes apt to appear as if it retained little more than the tendency to cultivate 'selfishness for two,' or at least that too exclusive regard for a very narrow circle which is commonly referred to as 'clannishness.' To this aspect of the subject we may have occasion to refer later.

Apart from the care of children, however, and what is immediately connected with that, marriage and the formation of a home serve the purpose of bringing about a better understanding between men and women than would probably be possible in any other way. Plato and most of those who have wished to abolish the family, or to weaken its position, have sought to minimize the differences between the sexes; but few in modern times would deny that they are considerable and far-reaching, though it is rash to generalize about them and difficult to explain them with precision. Lotze was one of the first to attempt to set them forth definitely;[2] and a good deal may now be learned from the writings of Mr. Havelock Ellis

[1] See on this Mrs. Bosanquet's book on *The Family*, pp. 74 and 163–5.
[2] In his *Microcosmus*, Book VI, chap. ii.

and others. Almost the only general statement that it seems at all safe to make is that men are usually more specialized in their aptitudes and interests; whereas women, apart from those specialized functions that are directly associated with motherhood, are more adaptable to a variety of interests. The monogamic marriage may be said to offer a special opportunity for profiting by whatever differences there are, which, though sometimes irritating, must surely tend to the enrichment of human experience. In particular, the family provides a definite sphere, though not the only sphere, for women's work.

It is evident that the lives of most women, even when many forms of employment in public positions are open to them, must continue to be very largely carried on within the limited sphere of the Family, or at least with the Family as their centre of reference; and it depends very largely upon the structure and traditions of the Family whether they can find within that narrow province satisfactory opportunities for the realization of their personalities and for influencing the development of human life. Under the best conditions they may occupy a sort of queenly position, exercising control over many departments and profoundly influencing the destinies of many people. Sometimes, no doubt, perhaps too often, such a position may prove too exacting for them, and their powers may be dissipated over too great a variety of petty interests. This was urged very emphatically by the late Professor D. G. Ritchie. But Mrs. Bosanquet and others have urged, in reply, that it is in general a valuable privilege to have control over so many important functions. No doubt, there are two sides to this, as to most other aspects of human life; and we shall have an opportunity at a later point (Chapter X) for calling attention to some further considerations with regard to it.

2. *The Neighbourhood.*—A Family is, of course, never isolated or complete in itself. A well-established form of family life, moreover, can hardly be found except as one of the institutions in a country where it is, in some degree, legalized and protected. But there may be, and often are, families that have comparatively little connection with anything so large and complex as a nation usually is. They belong almost exclusively to some small clan or isolated district. It seems

natural, therefore, to regard a Neighbourhood as the next form of social unity after the Family.

But the term Neighbourhood is a somewhat vague one. The question 'What is a Neighbourhood?' is as difficult to answer satisfactorily as the older one 'Who is my Neighbour?'[1] We all know that the latter question was answered by the story of the good Samaritan, the main point of which would seem to be that a neighbour is one who behaves in a neighbourly fashion, helping others whom he finds in serious need of help, however remote they may be from one another in their habitual place of residence, and however different in race and traditions. Mere proximity, at least, is hardly enough to constitute a neighbourhood. In many parts of London, for instance, people who have lived for a considerable time in the same street, sometimes even in the same house, may be complete strangers, ignorant even of one another's name. Similarly, people living on opposite sides of the border between England and Scotland, before the Union of the two crowns, might be very close together, and yet their habitual attitude might be one of hostility. On the other hand, after the Union, a much more considerable separation could be regarded as not destroying neighbourhood; and Wordsworth could write, without any impropriety, referring to Burns—

> Neighbours we were, and loving friends
> We might have been.

Still, propinquity, which is the original meaning of neighbourhood, is an important element in its ultimate significance. 'Great is juxtaposition.' Unless there is some definite occasion for feud, those who live close together are apt to enter into more or less friendly relations. Bishop Butler, a careful and not very optimistic observer, laid stress on this. 'There is,' he said,[2] 'such a natural principle of attraction in man towards man, that having trod the same tract of land, having breathed

[1] Lippman, in his book on *Drift and Mastery*, p. 37, says: 'I might possibly treat my neighbour as myself, but in the vast modern world the difficulty is to find my neighbour and treat him at all.' This passage is quoted, with suitable comments, by Professor G. P. Adams in his excellent work on *Idealism and the Modern Age*, p. 29.

[2] In the first of his Sermons on Human Nature.

the same climate, having been born in the same artificial district or division, becomes the occasion of contracting acquaintance and familiarities many years after; for anything may serve the purpose. Thus relations merely nominal are sought and invented, not by governors, but by the lowest of the people; which are found sufficient to hold men together in little fraternities and co-partnerships.' Even hereditary enemies, as the English and the French were long supposed to be, are apt in time to form a real attachment for one another, even apart from common interests and mutual dangers. On the whole, then, we may understand a neighbourhood as meaning a region in which there are people living sufficiently close together to have friendly intercourse, and generally disposed to help one another in difficulties, and to regard themselves as having in some respects a common good. Usually those who live in this fashion will learn a good deal from each other and tend to approximate in other things than local relation. They will tend to have some common laws or customs, some common methods of defence against possible enemies, some common institutions of various kinds—perhaps common or similar schools and temples, meeting-places for trade and games, *etc.* When such institutions multiply within a district, the community is apt to become a State; and it is, of course, possible to have quite small City States. But a Neighbourhood need not be a State. It may be a district within a State, owing allegiance perhaps to a distant sovereign, as in the case of colonies. Or, again, they may form independent communities, governed rather by custom than by definitely formulated laws. The simplest instances of such communities are clans, which may be regarded as little more than extensions of the Family. They have generally a common name: they are the Campbells or O'Neils. In such a community the chief is usually still regarded, more or less definitely, as the Father of his people. In Indian family groups, it is perhaps more often a woman who is thought of as the Mother and guiding spirit.

It is usually in some such associations that men first acquire those ideas of loyalty and readiness for common action which are afterwards applied on a larger scale. 'A man,' it has recently

been said,[1] 'who loves one English county, one Scottish glen, an Australian township or a Canadian province, is sure to prove himself a patriotic citizen of the Empire when the test comes. . . . In these matters . . . it seems that the lesser includes the greater.' In a similar spirit, Mr. G. D. H. Cole has stated:[2] 'Only if men can learn the social spirit in their daily contact with their neighbours can they hope to be good citizens of the larger community.'

Even within an organized State the neighbourhood generally retains a considerable degree of significance. The conception of Representative Government, as held in Great Britain at present, depends on the view, which is rapidly ceasing to be true, that each locality has its own special interests and opinions, which have to be supported in the central government by one or more of those who belong to the locality, and who may be supposed to have its interests at heart and to understand its peculiar outlook. One of the most touching passages in the speeches of John Bright is that in which he dwells upon the sentiment that attaches to the presence of one's 'own people.'

Neighbourhood takes many forms, according to the special circumstances in which it arises and the special kinds of community in which it issues. The good Samaritan in the parable was moved by compassion. His neighbourliness showed itself in sympathy for suffering and readiness to take part in its alleviation. The word 'sympathy' suggests primarily such a community in suffering; and the corresponding term in some other languages—notably the German *Mitleid*—is more definitely bound down to this particular meaning. Conviviality is perhaps a more common way of seeking to realize the spirit of neighbourliness; but it is more apt to show itself in somewhat objectionable forms. 'When drouthy neebors neebors meet,' and their brotherly affection shows itself in being 'fou for weeks thegither,' one may a little doubt the value and disinterestedness of the sentiment. An Irish wake seems to combine the two aspects of sympathy and conviviality. The graver

[1] F. G. Roberts, *Jess of the River*, Introduction.

[2] *Introduction to Social Theory*, p. 169. See also *The Common Weal*, by Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, chap. iv.

forms of symposium, as depicted by Plato, may easily reach a higher level. In the Christian communion, the element of conviviality has become almost purely symbolic;[1] but it is still partly dependent upon that primitive attitude of neighbourliness. Common Games are another mode of neighbourly association in which the spirit of community may be to some extent developed; and this may be effective over a large area. It can hardly be doubted that the Olympic Games did something to sustain the spirit of neighbourhood among the Greek communities, and helped to save them from breaking up altogether into a number of conflicting States; and perhaps the British Commonwealth is to some extent bound together by a similar tie. But this carries us rather beyond the ordinary meaning of neighbourhood.

In modern times the conception of the State has been so universally predominant and has been so impressively emphasized that it has become somewhat difficult for us to think of a genuine community at all except in that highly organized form. It has sometimes been maintained that it is necessary for the proper development of human personality that one should be a citizen of a large community. 'Great men,' said D. G. Brinton,[2] 'are not born in small islands. The less the area of a state, the less the variety of its life; the fewer the stimuli to thought and emotion, the narrower the range of observation.' This is a very questionable doctrine. A good deal depends on what one means by small and great. A very small island, quite cut off from the larger life of the world outside, would probably not be very likely to produce great men. On the other hand, in a 'Great Society,' such as Mr. Graham Wallas has depicted, the citizen is apt to be swallowed up in the whole, and not to find sufficient scope for the development of his individuality. It is under such conditions that 'the individual withers and the world is more and more.' What is best for most people is probably to belong primarily to a comparatively small community, within some definite place in which the greater part of his life is carried on, but not so as

[1] In some religious communities, such as the Moravian Brethren, this aspect has been very strongly emphasized.

[2] *The Basis of Social Relations*, p. 187.

to be entirely cut off from the larger life. Early village life in India appears to have been of this type.[1] It was under such conditions also that the great men of ancient Greece were bred. They were members of comparatively small cities, and had a considerable share in carrying on the life of their little community; but they were also in contact with the larger life of Greece as a whole, and even not entirely cut off from other outlying parts of the world, such as Egypt, Sicily, Asia Minor, *etc.* The Greek thinkers in general—notably Plato and Aristotle—were disposed to think that it was hardly possible to get the full benefit of the civic life unless the community to which one belonged was sufficiently small to enable all the active citizens to assemble together for the discussion of important problems, and to have some personal knowledge of one another. Rousseau, in more recent times, may be cited in support of a similar view. One might refer also to the Hebrew prophets and to such men as Shakespeare and Goethe, and even Napoleon. No doubt, the invention of printing made some difference to the modern world; but it is a difference that tells, to some extent, on both sides. It seems to be still true that the first lessons of citizenship are best learned in a comparatively small community. It is partly owing to the recognition of this that emphasis has been laid in recent times on the importance of local government. Miss M. P. Follett, in her book on *The New State*, has brought out the value of this in a brilliant and inspiring way. The newer type of Garden City aims at the intensive cultivation of the spirit of citizenship within a narrow area,[2] but, of course, always with an outlook on the larger life outside.

3. *The School.*—Education is a term that may be used in a wider or in a narrower sense. In the wider sense it means the process by which the development of an individual personality is brought about. This is, of course, a process that goes on normally throughout life. Goethe may be specially referred

[1] See Dr. Radhakamal Mukerji's book on *Local Government in Ancient India* and Lord Ronaldshay's *India: a Bird's-eye View*, chap. xi.

[2] The book by Dr. Stanton Coit on *Neighbourhood Guilds* may be referred to with advantage in this connection. Bosanquet, in the third edition of his *Philosophical Theory of the State*, expressed his indebtedness to that book, as well as to Miss Follett's.

to as one who constantly thought of his whole life as a process of education; and the same conception is prominent throughout Plato's *Republic*. In this sense also Indian sannyasis and other recluses may be said to be in search of education. But the term is more commonly understood in a narrower sense, in which it means the process by which the young become gradually initiated into the most essential mysteries of the community of which they are to become members, and by which they become fitted for the performance of some particular function within that general life. It is in this sense that it has been said[1] that 'the goal of education is citizenship. It is for the creation of good citizens that Colleges and Schools exist.' It is in this sense also that we are to understand the famous declaration of Milton,[2] 'I call a complete and generous education one which fits a man to perform justly, skilfully and magnanimously all the offices, both private and public, of Peace and War'—except that few could hope to gain an education of quite so complete a character as this. Even in this sense, no doubt, education must be supposed to go on throughout life, but there is usually a special period that is almost entirely and deliberately given up to it. This is the period in which the individual receives his *schooling*, a term that we may here use to cover all the deliberate training, instruction and culture that he receives in the home, the school, the college and the university. This educational function is hardly ever absent even in the most primitive communities. Even birds can be seen teaching their young to peck and to fly;[3] and even in very simple communities the young are generally taught to carry on the same activities as those that are practised by their parents. In more advanced forms of civilization the matter is not so simple. Here it is generally necessary to seek assistance outside the family, in various kinds of schools and colleges. In some Eastern countries, such as India, where the family is a more important institution than it is in the West, a larger share of the educational work is carried on within it. Where this is the case, the influence of

J. Milton on Education

[1] Dean Welldon, *Recollections and Reflections*, p. 137.

[2] *Tractate of Education.*

[3] Lloyd Morgan and Benjamin Kidd have given illustrations of this. See especially the former's *Habit and Instinct*, pp. 38–41, and *Animal Life and Intelligence*, pp. 453 *sqq.*

the mother is generally conspicuous; and it is in such circumstances that it is particularly desirable that the mother should have a wide outlook on life rather than more specialized interests. But, even in Western countries, there have been conspicuous instances of men who were educated almost entirely at home. The case of J. S. Mill is perhaps the most remarkable; and in his case the education was conducted by his father. What is apt to be missing in such cases, especially if the family is small, is the development of the power of co-operating readily with others. Yet it can hardly be maintained that Mill was lacking in this.

As the break with the Family becomes more pronounced, the civic function of education becomes more and more apparent; and the school stands out more and more definitely as the instrument of initiation into the general life of the community. Its function in this respect is perhaps most definitely apparent in such a country as the United States of America, where children of the most diverse parentage have to be transformed into members of a very large and complex organism. That such children may be described as 'twice-born' is more evident than it is in countries where the transition from the Family to the larger community is simpler and more gradual. In England, more particularly, the function of the school is apt to be somewhat obscured by the lingering traditions of a rather rigid system of caste. Here the initiation that takes place is liable to present itself as the initiation into a particular caste, rather than into the general life of the community. Mr. G. D. H. Cole, for instance, remarks[1] that the Public Schools and Universities in England are 'scenes not so much of education as of the social training of a ruling caste.' Elementary education, on the other hand, has tended in some degree to appear as an effort to keep the labouring classes in what has been regarded as their proper place of subordination. But even in England this is rapidly ceasing to be true; and, in any case, even this very limited form of education is still a species of initiation into a particular type—though it may be a very antiquated type—of community. But it is important to bear in mind that education in the best sense is not the preparation for the life of

[1] *Social Theory*, p. 2.

a particular class or caste, nor even primarily for some special work or vocation. The original meaning of School as implying *leisure* is worth bearing in mind; and, along with the recognition that all citizens should have their fair share of schooling there naturally comes the implied recognition that they should have their fair share of leisure—some opportunity of detachment both from the Family and from the Workshop, some chance of profiting from the liberating tendencies and forces that are at work in their environment. It can hardly be doubted that the value of Latin and Greek in modern education has lain largely in their power of facilitating this detachment from the work of everyday life, from the commonplaces by which we all tend to be limited—'*was uns alle bändigt, das Gemeine*.' They help to give us an entry into the larger brotherhood of humanity. Though it may not be much of a deprivation to have 'small Latin and less Greek,' it is a real loss to have wisdom by these two entrances quite shut out. It is not, however, the actual languages of Greece and Rome that are specially important—even Keats preferred to take his Homer through Chapman—as a certain insight into their way of thinking and living, and especially into the conceptions of civic obligation which they probably did more than any other peoples to foster. A good general History of the World—such as has been provided by Mr. H. G. Wells—laying stress on the contributions to civilization that have been made by different peoples, is a great boon in this connection.

The study of languages, in general, however, is not to be undervalued from our present point of view. The contempt that is sometimes poured upon the study of words is not wholly deserved. The work of such a man as Browning's Grammarian, who 'settled *Hoti's* business,' 'properly based *Oun*,' is not rightly regarded as pedantry. Words are the embodiment of thought. In learning their meaning and use, we are to some extent retracing the processes of thought out of which the words grew. Such processes are creative; and it is through the use of words that the processes become co-operative. This applies also to mathematical symbols and other signs that stand for meanings. What is true, in the way of qualification, is that all such signs should be dealt with in close connection

with their applications. The dangers of a pedantic linguistic study lie in the tendency to make it merely analytic. It has to be recognized that the chief value of words, as of musical sounds, lies in their creative power—their power of making 'out of three sounds' 'not a fourth sound but a star.' It has been well said by an Eastern sage[1] that 'the entire object of a true education is to make people not merely do the right things, but enjoy the right things—not merely to be industrious, but to love industry.' This result is attained only when the work is free and creative; and it applies to the work of linguistic study as well as to other forms of work.

It is hardly now necessary to insist that, along with this more literary aspect of education, the scientific aspect is not less important. If the book is the general symbol of the one, that of the other may be found in the microscope. Science, though in the end synthetic, seeks first, in general, to analyse the complex objects that we apprehend into their component parts. Its danger, as Goethe urged, is that, in analysing objects, we may miss the link that connects the parts together. In Wordsworth's phrase, 'we murder to dissect.' It is well to remember, however, that science is here understood to mean any orderly and systematic method of analytical study. It is not confined to the study of physical objects. Nor, of course, do books lose their importance in scientific study. But it is generally true that the best books for literary study are old books that have long been recognized as classics; whereas for scientific purposes the best books are very often those that are just in the process of being written; and the contents of these are in general known only to a few of the best teachers.

The educational value of games as instruments for the cultivation of the civic virtues has long been recognized in England. 'Playing the game' has come into common use as an expression for the spirit of fairness and loyal co-operation in all sorts of activities. It is well to remember, however, that the conception thus used is of a somewhat limited kind. It is in some danger of meaning only loyalty to one's particular party or set, together with the recognition of some elementary rules of fair play. Recently, however, attempts have been made to introduce the

[1] Swami Rama Tirtha, *In Woods of God-realization*, p. 382.

general conception of social service in forms that are almost of the nature of games. The most conspicuous instances of these are found in the activities of Boy Scouts and Girl Guides. The only caution that has to be borne in mind is that there is always some danger that things taken up, half in play, in early life may not be very seriously regarded in later life. People sometimes 'put away childish things' in a sense different from that intended by the apostle. They abandon what is good in their earlier life, not merely what is undeveloped. Hence it is important that the work of social service should be studied with some care. This has now been pretty fully recognized. It has been specially emphasized by the advocates of systematic moral and civic education in schools—a form of education that has been adopted in principle, but not as yet very thoroughly carried into practice.

4. *The Vocation.*—We have now to notice more definitely the fact that the citizen of a community is, in general, not merely one among many others, but one who has some special function to fulfil in the common life. In primitive societies this is much less apparent than it afterwards becomes; but there is at least hardly any society in which the respective functions of men and women are not somewhat sharply discriminated; and usually there is also some difference between the work that is expected of the old and of the young, though here, of course, the distinction cannot be so sharply marked. Even among some of the lower animals, such as bees, there is some recognition of diversity of function. Among human beings in a complex community it is pretty obvious that there are considerable differences of taste and natural capacity between individuals. There have, no doubt, nearly always been some who have tended to minimize such distinctions. Socrates, for instance, in his anxiety to make it clear that all human ability and all human excellence are dependent on some kind of knowledge, was rather prone to deny that there is any other difference among human beings than that of the presence or absence of knowledge and of the insight that knowledge brings. Similarly, in more recent times, Carlyle was rather emphatic in maintaining that the capable man is capable in all respects, and that the dunce is a dunce in everything. This view is partly

traceable to the legitimate desire to get rid of fallacious views about separate 'faculties.' But, if modern psychology is right in abandoning this term, and the misleading suggestions that it carries with it, it at least still finds it necessary to recognize 'dispositions'; and it seems clear that some dispositions are innate. Musical ability, in particular, is found to display itself very often at an early age, and not always to be accompanied by any conspicuous power in other directions. If the same is less apparent in the case of other kinds of ability, this may be due largely to the fact that most other kinds do not naturally lead to any similar outward manifestation. But, if we had exact records of the inner lives of those who have shown any marked ability in particular directions, it is probable that we should find it to be much more often true than is commonly supposed that the child was 'father of the man,' and that their interests at the age of sixty were not very widely different from those that were present at the age of ten.[1] If this is substantially true, it follows that each individual is naturally led into different modes of activity from those to which others are attracted. Just as no two individuals are quite alike in their features, so it is probable that no two are quite alike in their natural dispositions.

It soon becomes apparent, moreover, that there are great advantages in such individual differences from the point of view of efficiency in the work of the community. The benefits that follow from division of labour have been emphasized by many writers on the structure of society, especially in its economic aspects, from Plato to Adam Smith and the later writers on economic science. One of the latest and most complete statements on this subject is that given by Marshall in his *Principles of Economics*.[2] To dwell at length upon these benefits would be beyond our present scope; but some of the most obvious ones may be briefly referred to.

It is very obvious that, if a man is specially qualified for some particular kind of work, such as carpentry or painting, and is able to devote his whole life to it, the results are likely to be much better than they would be if he only gave part of his time to it and others with less natural aptitude worked

[1] Bosanquet appears to deny this. See *Science and Philosophy*, p. 104.
[2] Book IV, chap. ix.

during the rest of the time. This is due not merely to the fact that the worker with special aptitude starts with a better equipment than the others, but also to the fact that, by working continuously at his particular task, he acquires additional skill by constant practice. 'Practice makes perfect.' And indeed one who devotes himself, heart and soul, to any particular kind of work, is very likely to discover better ways of doing it. It is mainly in this way that progress has taken place.

There is, moreover, often a saving of time in the continuous employment of one person at one occupation. In passing from one thing to another, it is often necessary to pass from place to place, sometimes to change one's clothes or wash one's hands; and in any case, it usually takes time to get into the spirit of a different occupation.

It is a matter of constant observation, besides, that men usually enjoy working at things that they can do well; and this fact gives a special zest to their work, provided always that it is not too monotonous. From most forms of work some occasional relief is felt to be necessary. Hence it must be recognized that it is possible to carry the division of labour too far. Some kinds of work are so monotonous and uninteresting as to be soul-destroying when persisted in for any length of time. In such cases, it is important that the hours of work should be short, and that as much relief as possible should be provided.

One of the chief advantages of division of labour is that it makes co-operation easy, natural and pleasant. If there were no division of labour at all, there would be hardly any co-operation. Everyone would make his own clothes, build his own house, cook his own food, and be in general independent of everyone else. A community of such people would hardly co-operate at all except for purposes of defence. Some social reformers, such as Mr. Edward Carpenter, have thought it desirable to approximate to this condition of individual independence; and it may be allowed that, for some solitary thinkers, with versatile powers of self-help, such an arrangement may be advantageous. But it does not appear that it has ever been carried out with any thoroughness, or practised for any length of time, by the father of a family. It seems clear that, if practised

by people in general, the work would not only be very badly done, but the lack of intercourse with others would have a very narrowing effect. Moreover, all men in such a condition would be rivals, and tend to be critical and probably jealous of one another; whereas, where there is division of labour, each one is able to recognize the excellence of others in their own particular work without rivalry or jealousy. The possibilities of division of labour are, indeed, so great that it is hardly necessary, except in the case of some very simple and rather mechanical occupations, for any two people to be engaged in quite the same pursuit. Almost everyone may feel that the particular work in which he is engaged is unique. This is, of course, pretty apparent in the case of the finer and more creative kinds of workmanship; but it is true to some extent even in comparatively humble tasks. It is well to note here also that this consideration applies not merely to different individuals within the same community, but also to different communities. The more different nations are able to excel in different kinds of work, the less danger is there of international rivalries and jealousies.

The recognition of distinct vocations, however, though founded on natural differences and almost a necessity in any large community, is apt to lead to some undesirable consequences. There is often a tang of evil in things intrinsically good, as well as a soul of goodness in things evil. In particular the division of functions tends to lead to a separation of classes, and sometimes to a considerable degree of antagonism between them. Those who perform particular services are apt to think themselves—sometimes without much reason—superior to those who perform services of a different kind. To begin with the simplest and most obvious case, the division of labour between men and women tends, in general, to make men think themselves superior to women, and to regard the special services that are rendered by women as being in some degree degrading. This may be partly due to the fact that the functions that commonly fall to the lot of women are of a relatively primitive kind, not admitting of much fundamental change. In fact, within their limits, they do not admit of very much further division. Women are, more often than men, concerned with a

number of relatively small tasks, rather than with a single limited and absorbing one. This, as we have already had occasion to note, has been specially emphasized by the late Professor D. G. Ritchie. Fundamental though the work of women is, it has not on the whole the imposing and progressive character that belongs to many of the forms of work that fall more commonly to the lot of men.

Apart from this distinction, which is found to some extent in almost all communities, there are other class differences that very readily arise in most societies. Those who are specially concerned with government or with religion tend to be thought of as belonging to a superior class. Women, when they are queens or priestesses, are usually freed from the disabilities of their sex. The military class in a community is also very commonly associated with the ruling and priestly classes. We find this association very strongly marked in Plato's sketch of an ideal commonwealth, and it is to be found, in some degree, in almost all actual forms of social organization. Again, those who are engaged in creative or organizing work—artists, captains of industry, and the like—are apt to be thought of as a different race of beings from those who assist them in the more purely manual or mechanical parts of their labour. There is, of course, some real basis for this distinction. The poet is deserving of a different kind of honour from that which may be given to the man who prints his work. The work of the man who paints a great picture is of a different order from that of the man who makes a frame for it. The man who invents a machine renders a greater service than the man who works it. But there are many gradations between purely creative work and that which is purely mechanical; and class distinctions based on such differences are apt to become artificial and mischievous.

The most extreme instance of this tendency to create somewhat artificial class distinctions is found in the caste system that prevails in India. It would seem that this system, in its vertical as distinguished from its horizontal aspect, was originally intended to mark the distinction between those who were engaged in the higher and more spiritual forms of work and those engaged in work that was more purely manual and

mechanical; but it degenerated into a hereditary distinction of caste. At first it meant that those who possessed certain intellectual and moral powers were regarded as belonging to a higher caste than those who were deficient in such powers. Now it tends to mean rather that those of particular parentage are regarded as belonging to a higher caste and are expected to display certain qualities and to do certain kinds of work. No doubt even this is not a wholly unreasonable arrangement; for heredity does count for something in human life. Galton's book on *Hereditary Genius* can hardly be said to have shown that *genius* is inherited; but it went some way to show that certain forms of ability do tend to be transmitted, either by actual inheritance or by educational influence, from parents to children.

In Western countries there is, of course, no such rigid system of caste as that which is found in India; but it certainly cannot be said that class distinctions are unknown. We still have hereditary rulers, but the inheritance proceeds only to the eldest son; and, though most other offices are not hereditary, there is still—especially perhaps in England—a strong feeling of difference of status due to different modes of life. The professions, for instance, are still to a large extent regarded as presenting a sphere for a higher kind of life than that which is to be found in the trades; and, in general, there is a distinction between the kind of employment that is suitable for a 'gentleman' and that which is not. This is partly due to the fact that the possession of a liberal education is more essential to some forms of employment than to others, and may more confidently be assumed to be present in those who exercise them. The more intense specialization that is required in modern times, together with the wider diffusion of liberal education in all classes, may tend gradually to make this distinction die out. What chiefly keeps it alive is probably the more or less unconscious recognition that some forms of work are more intrinsically valuable than others. It can hardly be doubted, for instance, that a genuine religious teacher, a great artist, a capable surgeon, an original mathematician, a brilliant inventor, or a competent farmer, renders more important services to the community than a brewer, a confectioner, a tobacconist,

or a low comedian; though these may be very worthy people. It is hardly necessary to refer to some other occupations in which very worthy people could not easily be supposed to be engaged. At any rate, the recognition of distinctions of this kind is obviously more justifiable than that of distinctions based mainly, as class distinctions often are, on difference of birth or fortune.

5. *The Church*.—Religion plays a large part in human life everywhere. It does not fall within our province here to take note of different types of religion, but only to indicate briefly its place in the life of the community. It may be described as a cultural force, partly moral and partly speculative. Among the Jews, and somewhat less definitely among the Romans, it was mainly a moral force: among the Greeks it was somewhat more speculative, and perhaps it may be said to be even more decidedly so throughout India. In modern Europe there is generally an attempt to maintain a fair balance between the two sides, though it can hardly be denied that in England the moral aspect has preponderated and in Germany the speculative. How this cultural force is related to the force that is vested in the State, is one of the greatest problems that the human race has been confronted with throughout its history. It is a problem to which we shall have to give a good deal of attention at a later stage in this inquiry. We have already noted the way in which it came into prominence in the political speculations of Mediaeval Europe. The exhortation to 'render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's,' is one that it is extremely hard to fulfil. It generally appears that everything that matters much in human life, at least in the general life of a community, is both Caesar's and God's. What is chiefly clear is that, if men were more united in their religious conceptions, the power of moral considerations in the ordering of the world would be immeasurably strengthened. Even as it is, Churches are often great centres of educational and philanthropic work, and they control to a considerable extent the organization of the Family. Their influence on moral and civic education is specially important. What is chiefly desirable with regard to this is to keep these aspects of religious work as free as possible from questions that create divisions among

religious sects. The work of the Moral Education League and of the Moral Education Congresses has gone far to show that this is possible to a much larger extent than was formerly believed.

6. *The State.*—Professor Edward Jenks complained[1] that there are 'careless speakers and writers who use the words "State," "Nation," "Society," "Community," "Race," and so forth, as convertible terms, or, what is even worse, as meaning different things at different times in the same speech or book.' He might perhaps have added 'Country' and 'People.' It is certainly desirable to define such terms as accurately as possible, though it must be admitted that words so commonly used in popular discourse can hardly be defined with such accuracy as is to be expected in treatises on mathematics. Mr. Jenks himself explains that he understands by the State 'the institution by which government is carried on'; and he goes on to note that 'in some cases (though they are becoming rarer each decade) it is correct to speak of the State as a single institution, with subordinate institutions under its control. This is the condition of things, for example, in England, where King, Lords, and Commons, in Parliament assembled, exercise supreme authority. In other cases, notably in the British Empire as a whole, and in the United States of America, the powers are shared among various co-ordinate authorities—President, Congress and Supreme Court, and again between Federal and "State" authorities (in the American use of the word). Here it would be more correct to describe the Federal State as a group of institutions than as a single institution.' It will be seen from this that it is not easy to give a quite satisfactory definition of the term. I suppose the States that form the American union would hardly be regarded by us as States at all. It would rather seem to us that it is only the United States as a whole that ought properly to be described as a State. But the Americans refer to the whole as the Nation and to the constituent parts as States. It is vain to look for complete uniformity in the use of such words; and it seems

[1] In his book on *The State and the Nation*, p. 3. The subject has since been more fully discussed by Professor R. M. MacIver, especially in his works on *Community* and *The Modern State*.

doubtful whether we can, without doing some violence to the English language (and indeed to some other languages as well) draw as sharp a distinction as Mr. Jenks suggests between the State and the Nation. I believe it is more in accordance with the ordinary usage to say that the difference, when we are referring to a Nation State, not to a City State or District State, is rather one of emphasis than of complete difference in meaning. When we speak of the State, we are thinking of a community in which there is a strong and well-developed form of government, and we have that fact definitely before our minds; whereas we may speak of the nation without particularly thinking about its government. But it seems to me to be a mistake to identify the State so definitely with the institutions by which the Government is carried on as Mr. Jenks and others suggest. When Laertes says, with reference to Hamlet, that

> on his choice depends
> The safety and the health of the whole state,

he seems to mean by the state not any particular institutions, but rather the community as a whole; but he is thinking of it with special reference to Hamlet as one who is or may soon be at the head of its government; and I believe this is the usual way in which the word is used. Certainly, if the government were practically in the hands of a somewhat despotic monarch, it would seem strange to refer to him as the State. Louis XIV has always been condemned for saying[1] that he was the State (*L'État c'est moi*), and yet, if the State meant simply the government, he may not have been far wrong. It used to be common indeed to refer to the king of a country as if he were the country. In Shakespeare's historical plays we constantly find 'England' and 'France' used as designations for the kings of these countries. An extreme instance is found in the play of

[1] It is somewhat doubtful whether he ever did say it. The saying may have been invented by Voltaire. Bryce, however, has urged (*Modern Democracies*, p. 236) that the statement ascribed to Louis XIV was substantially true at the time. This depends, of course, on the sense in which the term 'State' is to be understood. He may have been the ultimate authority for the making and enforcing of laws; but he could hardly have maintained that authority without the support, if not of the general will, at least of the general consent, of the people.

King John, where Hubert lifts up the dead body of Prince Arthur, and the Bastard exclaims, 'How easy dost thou take all England up!' This is certainly more extreme than the saying ascribed to Louis XIV, since the Prince had not even been acknowledged as king. But all such expressions strike most of us now as very strange. Even when we are thinking of the ruler of a country, we think of him as ruling in virtue of the open or tacit consent of his people; and, when we speak of a state, we think not merely of the institutions by which the government is carried on, but of the whole community as standing behind and supporting those institutions. Thus the State really means the Nation, but the Nation regarded as an organized community enforcing its will through governmental institutions. On the other hand, when we simply speak of the nation, we are not necessarily thinking of any government at all. We may speak, for instance, of national music, national poetry, national religion, national language, national dress, national traditions, without implying that the government has anything to do with the establishment or maintenance of any of these things.

It would be well, however, to recognize more definitely than is commonly done that when we speak of *the* State we mean something different from what we mean when we speak of *a* State, just as we mean something different when we speak of *the* Church from what we mean when we speak of *a* Church. The distinctions that have been drawn by Professor MacIver between communities, associations and institutions help to clear up the confusion. *The* State, as contrasted with *the* Church, is a particular mode of association formed for a special purpose. *A* State, on the other hand, is a community which contains the particular mode of association that is called *the* State. *A* Church, again, like a particular form of government, is an institution. Thus it is hardly possible to avoid a certain amount of ambiguity in the use of such terms as Church and State. We have to be on our guard, when the terms are used, to note the exact sense in which they are being employed. Sidgwick, an eminently careful writer, set a good example in this respect by saying, in his *Elements of Politics*,[1] 'I shall mean

[1] P. 221.

by a State, what I have also called a political society or community, *i.e.* a body of human beings deriving its corporate unity from the fact that its members acknowledge permanent obedience to the same government.' But it is open to others to define the term in some other way. In common use, it must be recognized that it is somewhat ambiguous. I think it would be best to confine the term, as far as possible, to the sense in which it is used by Mr. MacIver, *i.e.* for an independent, or largely independent, political organization established and recognized in a particular country or region. When the region is sufficiently large and distinct to be recognized as a country, it is a Nation. When it cannot be so recognized, it may be called a Province or Region. This is the way, on the whole, in which the terms are commonly used in America. But it is perhaps hardly possible to have complete uniformity in the use of terms that came into common use before there was any exact study of their meaning. In the present chapter we are only concerned with a rather general survey of the chief groups that have to be recognized as existing in almost all parts of the world.

The special problems connected with the State in the sense of a mode of political or legal organization will have to be considered in a later chapter.

7. *The People or Race.*—There is considerable difficulty in establishing the exact racial characteristics that belong to any particular people; though recently a good deal of attention has been given to the subject. But usually those who live in close proximity for any considerable time, successive generations continuing in the same place, tend to become to a large extent assimilated to one another in language, habits of thought and action, and perhaps even in temperament. Intermarriage gradually softens any differences that may have been originally present, and produces a considerable degree of that 'likeness of kind' which some sociologists[1] regard as the most potent bond of union. People who have thus become assimilated tend to think of themselves as a single race or family. The Jews liked to believe that they were all the seed of Abraham. The Greeks at least thought that they were racially distinct from the barbarians with whom they came in contact. In more

[1] Notably Professor F. H. Giddings, in his *Principles of Sociology*.

modern times many Germans have been anxious to emphasize their common Teutonic or Aryan ancestry; and people in England often speak of the peculiar excellence of their 'breed.' But it is probably true, as Benjamin Kidd contended, that in all these cases the apparent likeness is due fully as much to common traditions as to common race. Still, it is not to be denied that race counts for something in bringing about this kind of community; though competent observers are becoming a little more chary than they once were in making sweeping generalizations about the characteristics of Celts, Teutons, Anglo-Saxons, Slavs, *etc.*; and about the modes of social unity to which they are naturally inclined. Anything that is stated here on that subject must be regarded as very tentative.

So far as the inhabitants of Western Europe are concerned, the view that is now commonly accepted by ethnologists[1] is that there are three distinguishable types; and these are now referred to as the Nordic, the Mediterranean and the Alpine. It is not known how far back the distinctions between these can be traced, but they appear to be partly connected with climatic and topographical conditions. The Nordic race is associated, as the name implies, with northern countries and the Mediterranean with the warmer regions of the south. Both tend to be somewhat long-headed (dolichocephalic), but the latter are darker in colour, as might be expected from the regions to which they primarily belong. They tend also to be less stolid and persistent and more imaginative and mercurial. Most European countries, our own included, contain a certain mixture of the two, but in different proportions. The Alpine race is associated chiefly with some of the mountainous regions in the South of Europe. They are broad-headed (brachycephalic); but it would seem that this characteristic tends to become less marked when they descend into the plains. It seems possible, therefore, that they are not originally different from the Mediterranean race, with which they appear to have something in common.[2] It is thought by some that what is

[1] See especially *The Races of Europe*, by W. N. Ripley.

[2] The general facts about the European peoples, with special reference to Great Britain, are very fully given by Professor Ernest Barker in his very admirable book on *National Character*.

commonly referred to as the Aryan race in India is closely related to the Nordic; and some are inclined to believe that the darker peoples in the South of India, commonly called Dravidians, are of the Mediterranean race; but these views are somewhat speculative.[1] The general facts about the European peoples may perhaps be regarded as pretty definitely established.

This classification of races is now substituted for the older classification into Teutonic, Latin and Celtic, which is based on language and cultural traditions rather than on race. The two methods of classification do not correspond to one another; but the Teutonic languages and cultures are mainly associated with the Nordic race and the Latin with the Mediterranean. Most of those who are referred to as Celtic peoples appear to be predominantly Mediterranean. Some may be Alpine or even Nordic. It is possible that the recent emphasis on racial characteristics, as distinguished from linguistic and cultural traditions, has tended unduly to minimize the importance of geographical and social conditions in the determination of national character; but we are gradually learning that all these factors have to be taken into account. The special characteristics of peoples in other parts of the world are not quite as definitely known; though, of course, they have been described in general terms by many travellers.[2] Even with regard to European peoples, the characteristics that are commonly noted have to be accepted with a good deal of caution. D. G. Brinton has remarked[3] that 'precisely that trait or those traits which are the most distinguishing characteristics of a group vary the widest in the individuals of that group'; and he adds that 'when we speak of mental traits or ideas common to the group, we mean that they may be held as expressed by scarcely half of that group.' Some of them have been produced by education or imitation. Still, in countries that have had a fairly continuous historical

[1] See the book by Mr. Gilbert Slater on *The Dravidian Element in Indian Culture*. It would be interesting to learn whether Gandhi is of the same race as St. Francis, and Shankara as Bradley; but it is unlikely.

[2] Professor Eugene Pittard has recently brought out an elaborate book on *Race and History*, in which practically all the races of the world are discussed. But, so far as I can judge, the science of Ethnology is still in a rather uncertain condition even with reference to Europe.

[3] *The Evolution of States*, p. 32.

development, it seems possible to assign pretty definite predominant characteristics. But it would certainly not be safe to assume that most Germans, for instance, or most Englishmen, have the characteristics that generally belong to the Nordic race. Goethe, for instance, has drawn a very sharp distinction between the characteristics that belonged to his father and his mother respectively; and he thought that he had inherited a good deal from both. It seems probable that his father was of the Nordic race and his mother of the Mediterranean; but there is no definite evidence about this. In Prussia there seems to be a considerable infusion of Slavic elements; and that probably means an element that is partly of Asiatic origin. In many European countries also (our own included) the Jewish element is present to a considerable extent, and generally plays a prominent part. They bring with them traditions of long standing, as well as characteristics that are more purely racial. It is probably an advantage to a nation, in general, that its people should have an infusion of several races. It has been noted[1] that the ancient Greeks were 'magnificent mongrels.'

8. *The Commonwealth.*—It is convenient to use this term to characterize a community of a more comprehensive kind than most nations and including some diversity of races. The term was applied to the British dominions under Cromwell, mainly, no doubt, because they could not be described as kingdoms. More recently the term has come again into common use at a time when the King is almost the only definite bond of union among them. The Roman Republic before Augustus had in some respects a similar character, though it was more closely bound by law. Even after it became an Empire it did not emphasize racial superiority. The fact that a man was a Roman citizen, subject to the laws and sharing in the privileges which that term implies, counted for much more in his life than the question whether he was of a native Italian stock or was a Jew, a Greek, a Celt or a Teuton. Professor Gilbert Murray has remarked[2] in this connection that 'Rome had a

[1] J. L. Myres, *The Dawn of History*, p. 283.

[2] In a note to the first edition of Mr. H. G. Wells's *Outline of History*, p. 283.

great advantage in her imperial development, *viz.* that she was a city and not a nation. A nation implies some unity of race and race prejudice. We should have said to St. Paul, "Citizen or no citizen, you are really a Levantine Jew." But a Roman, apparently, did not think of saying so. Hence the great freedom with which emperors and senators were taken from other races.' But perhaps it might be retorted that the lack of racial cohesion was one of the elements that led to the decline of the Empire. However, the conception of a Commonwealth, as a complex community, not confined within a special country, and not necessarily implying any close affinity of race, is one of such importance that it seems to demand a special chapter to itself.

CHAPTER IV

THE IDEA OF A COMMONWEALTH

THE larger modes of organized community may be conveniently regarded as advancing—at least in the general history of the Western world—from the City State to the Nation State,[1] from that to the Empire, and then to that form which must be characterized as still in the making, and which it seems best to designate by the term Commonwealth. Ancient Athens may probably be taken as the most characteristic type of the first; France perhaps, in the early years of the eighteenth century, of the second; the Roman Empire of the third; and Great Britain, with her various Dominions and Dependencies, of the fourth. The first presents in some respects an attractive ideal, and it has been made specially attractive to us by the literary glory that was shed upon it in and after the Periclean age, and by the modified picture of it—transformed, no doubt, almost beyond recognition—that is set before us by Plato in his *Republic*. Its attractiveness lies largely in its compactness. The citizens could have personal acquaintance with each other; and all their interests, from poetry, religion, philosophy and government down to the simplest rudiments of education and the humblest industries and amusements, could, without much difficulty, be regarded as forming a living whole. The Nation also has its special attractions. It has a large and varied territory, with its people under the control of a single system of law and usually nurtured on a more or less well-established form of religion and more or less widely diffused literary and artistic productions, all tending to promote some degree of unity in difference, some pride in the past and some hope for the future. The Empire is perhaps somewhat more austere and

[1] It is, of course, not implied here that these stages occur in a definite historical order; nor am I here taking account of early village communities, such as those that have recently been described by Professor Mukerji, which have but little definite organization.

awful. It may spare the conquered, but it is still more apparent that it beats down the proud. Yet it also attracts us by the glamour of its almost world-wide dominions, comprehending the most diverse peoples, and subjecting them all to a uniform system of law. The Commonwealth has grown out of the conception of Empire, but has gradually tended to base itself less and less upon a uniform system of law and organization, and more and more upon ties of a less palpable kind—partly upon the recognition of community in race, language and traditions, and partly, perhaps very slowly, upon a growing consciousness of the unity of mankind as involving a Common Good. But there are no sharp divisions between these four great types. In a wide sense they may all be described as Commonwealths. The full significance of the idea of a Common Good, however, can hardly be realized until we have reached the most comprehensive type. In the first type everything tends to be under the direct control of the State. The individual citizens are known and put in what is regarded as their proper place. Plato would take them in hand even before they are born. In the second type there is apt to be an alternation between Despotism and Revolution. This is seen most conspicuously in the history of France, considerably less so in our own. The third type has a certain persistent uniformity in fundamentals, but little unity in respect of racial sympathies and cultural developments. The fourth tends to subordinate the more purely legal and political aspects of unity to the bonds that are more subtly woven out of racial affinities, spiritual and cultural interests and industrial co-operation.

The British Commonwealth[1] is the most representative example of such a Commonwealth at the present time. It has always to be remembered, however, that it continues to have some of the characteristics of an Empire as well.[2] The term Commonwealth seems to have been first definitely used in English in connection with the government of Oliver Cromwell, which was to all intents monarchical, and was tending to be

[1] Reference may be made to Seeley's *Expansion of England* and to Professor Barker's book on *National Character*, pp. 131 *sqq.*, and to *The Foundations of Civics*, by Miss E. M. White, pp. 112 *sqq.*

[2] Reference may be made on this to the book by Mr. L. S. Woolf on *Economic Imperialism*.

recognized as such. The present British Commonwealth, on the other hand, is nominally a Monarchy, but rests mainly on community of race, language, cultural and economic influences, and traditions of governmental institutions; the degree of this community varying greatly in different regions. Australia and New Zealand, for instance, are bound to us by unity of race and language and by a variety of persistent traditions, somewhat modified by contact with peoples of a more primitive type, and weakened by remoteness and by the diversity of physical conditions. Similar remarks would to some extent apply to Canada; but, as the population is to a very considerable extent French, both by extraction and by language, and differs widely in its religious and cultural traditions, the bonds of unity are more purely political and industrial. On the other hand, their near neighbours in the United States have long ceased to be connected with us by any definite political ties, and their racial affinities are being gradually weakened; yet, as President Murray Butler has recently urged, they may still be regarded as included among the Commonwealth of peoples who belong together by long traditions of language, literature, religious and moral convictions, ideals of life and methods of government. The great utterance of Wordsworth still applies to them as to ourselves:—

> We must be free or die, who speak the tongue
> That Shakespeare spake; the faith and morals hold
> That Milton held.—In everything we are sprung
> Of Earth's first blood, have titles manifold.

The 'tongue' may, on both sides, have undergone some transformations, and 'the faith and morals' have not remained exactly as Milton held them; but the essential affinities are still there. India is, of course, not bound to us by any ties that are quite similar. Even if the dominant race is 'Aryan,' and perhaps partly 'Mediterranean,' like our own, it has been long estranged from us by differences of climate and other conditions, which have rendered it somewhat reluctant to co-operate with us. The statement of Seeley[1] is still, to a large extent, true, that 'the light we bring is not a glorious light shining in darkness,

[1] *Expansion of England*, p. 282.

but a somewhat cold daylight introduced into the midst of a warm glorious twilight.' It is bound to us mainly by political necessity and historical causes, though fortunately possibilities of better understanding and more vital unity would appear still to remain open. Somewhat similar remarks might be made about Ireland. Both these territories are bound to us, on the whole, only by the apprehension of the possibility of something worse. These remarks may perhaps suffice to indicate the somewhat loose way in which this type of Commonwealth coheres, and at the same time the fine possibilities of a deeper unity that it contains or suggests. Anatole France has said that 'the British people has no country but the sea.' This is, of course, an exaggeration.[1] It might be put otherwise by saying that we have learned, more than most other peoples have, to think of the sea as a highway that unites us rather than as a barrier that estranges us. I suppose this is largely true also of the Spanish and the Portuguese and other colonizing peoples. On the other hand, many competent observers, such as Emerson, have emphasized our insularity as tending to concentrate our interests to an unusual degree within our own country. Probably these opposing tendencies counteract one another to a considerable extent. It may be true that the majority of our people are rather more cut off from contact with others than most peoples are; but some—a constantly increasing number—have exceptional opportunities for contact with the larger life outside.

It may be well to note further at this point that circumstances connected with the Great War, and with the developments that have followed hard upon it, have given at least hints and suggestions of the possibilities of more extensive modes of unity. The famous phrase about making the world 'safe for Democracy' may perhaps be suspected of containing some degree of cant; but there seems to be at least an element of truth in the view that there are certain political and cultural sympathies that connect our Commonwealth with other

[1] R. L. Stevenson, however, also wrote: 'I will never leave the sea; I think it is only there that a Briton lives.' It may be at least approximately true, as Mr. F. S. Marvin has stated (*India and the West*, p. 16), that 'all who have taken a decisive part in moulding the British State and character have had experience of an amphibious life.'

countries that are considerably different from us in racial and historical traditions, and that may contain the promise of larger modes of unity in the future.

At the time of the French Revolution and throughout the Napoleonic Wars that followed hard upon it, there appeared to be a profound difference between the political outlooks of France and Great Britain; and indeed the two countries had come to be regarded as traditional enemies. It was largely the United States of America that helped—largely, no doubt, at first through antagonism—to bring us together and to enable us to see that both peoples were really at one in their love of liberty, though their conceptions of the kind of liberty that is most desirable were widely different. They appear now to have come somewhat more closely together in this respect; and, so far as Democracy may be taken as the name for political liberty, it may fairly be claimed that France, Great Britain and the United States are at one in their devotion to it. Although in some respects (including some not very good political traditions) we are fully as closely related to Germany as to France, yet in this respect we are somewhat sharply divided from the former. For, though the Germans are also lovers of liberty, the liberty to which they are devoted is, in general, not political. It has been said by Heine that they love it as a grandmother, the French as a mistress, and the English as a wedded wife. The German ideal is rather, on the whole, that of spiritual freedom for the elect—*i.e.* freedom in religion, science, poetry, and music—leaving the government of the masses to political experts.[1] So long as this is true, the lovers of political freedom will probably continue to feel that, in a certain very real sense, they belong to a Commonwealth. But it is to be hoped that some approximation may soon be possible between this attitude and that which continues to be dominant in Germany. We can hardly desire to have another generation of traditional enemies. It should always be remembered that our own love of political liberty has been a very gradual growth; if indeed it has even

[1] The most definite statement about this with which I am acquainted is that contained in the *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen*, by Thomas Mann. Happily, however, he confesses that he is a pessimist and that he does not expect that the Germans will adhere to this 'unpolitical' attitude.

now become very deeply rooted. The liberty that Englishmen have chiefly prized has, I believe, been liberty of individual action, rather than co-operative freedom. We are only very slowly learning to appreciate the more creative conception of liberty.

At any rate, however that may be (for it is not very safe to generalize about national characteristics), it seems clear at least that the somewhat heterogeneous Commonwealth to which we have been referring, must serve as the type for the sort of world-unity that we may reasonably hope for in the near future. It will not be a uniform system, but will be bound together by a variety of cultural, political and industrial considerations. It could not be regarded as a perfect unity—there is no perfect unity among men; but if the world as a whole were as closely bound together as England and the United States are at present, or perhaps even as closely as England and France have recently been,[1] it would surely be a very great gain for humanity. In order to see how far this is possible, however, we must now try to understand a little more definitely the nature of the community that we seek to develop.

The term Commonwealth suggests at once that what is aimed at in any complete form of social unity is a good that is common to the whole body that is concerned; and indeed it suggests that the good must be of such a kind as to be capable, in the end, of being shared by the whole human race. This is what I have been trying to bring out by pointing to the gradual advance from smaller groups, such as the Family, to those that are more and more comprehensive. When we say, however, that the good that is aimed at is one that is common to the whole group, it is well to admit at once that this does not necessarily mean that it is a good that can be shared equally by all the members of the group. There is a famous saying of Spinoza, that 'the highest good is common to all, and all may equally enjoy it.' That they *may* equally enjoy it, cannot, indeed, be denied; and we are justified in trying to make this

[1] Or as Central Europe might be if the scheme advocated by F. Naumann and others for a closer unity between Germany and Austria were to be carried into effect.

possible, and in hoping that it will somehow be achieved. But, if we are right in the conception that we have adopted of the essential nature of the highest good, we must recognize, not only that it can hardly be enjoyed equally by all, but that it is doubtful whether, here and now, it can be enjoyed in its fullness by any. For it is a good that is always being created, and is of such a kind that the act of creation appears to be involved in its very essence. Even the good that we may be said to inherit from our fathers, we must, according to the well-known saying of Goethe, earn afresh in order that we may possess it; and indeed, if we are to possess it, we must, in a sense, add to what we have inherited. We cannot, like the man in the parable, wrap it up in a napkin. We can only have it in the act of making it our own. And this is true, not only of the highest good, but in some degree of everything that is really good for man. Our houses, as well as our friendships, have to be kept in constant repair. All that we can properly say is that the creative activity in which human life consists is one in which all may share according to the measure of their capacity. Human happiness, as Aristotle expressed it,[1] is an energy of the soul, in accordance with its highest excellence, and in a life that has a certain completeness. No one really has it, but everyone may play his part in achieving it; and, in doing this, he may be held to enjoy it; for it is one of those things that are only enjoyed in pursuit.

In dealing with those things that constitute the human good, it is not always easy to distinguish between what can be said to belong to particular individuals and what can be said to belong to a whole community. Air and sunshine are not appropriated by particular individuals; yet some individuals are so placed in crowded cities as to derive very little benefit from them. The value of a house depends a good deal on the extent to which it enables those who live in it to avail themselves of these advantages. Water is more obviously restricted, and most solid objects can only be used by one person at a time. Hence, when we use such an expression as 'the Wealth of Nations,' we do not usually mean what is common to all the individuals in the nation, but rather, for the most part, things

[1] *Nicomachean Ethics*, I. vii. 15.

that are distributed among the individuals in the nation; though some of the things thus distributed are capable of being taken and used for purposes, such as national defence, in which the whole community is concerned. If everything could be divided up into equal parts, or into parts proportioned to the needs of each individual, the goods thus distributed might be said to be possessed in common. But when the amount is limited or incapable of subdivision, possession by one implies the deprivation of others. It is with reference to such cases that the saying of Proudhon, that 'property is theft,' has some justification. And indeed, when we speak of Wealth, it is usually of possessions of this kind that we are thinking. We do not usually reckon air and sunshine as parts of wealth, still less do we think of just laws and good education as parts of national wealth—mainly, no doubt, because their value cannot be estimated with any precision, and, in any case, cannot readily be transferred. In view of these difficulties, it will be well at this point to consider a little more definitely what is meant by Wealth and what is its relation to the Common Good.

It is obviously sometimes convenient to think of the good that we seek in a community, and that is more or less fully realized in different communities, in terms of their wealth; and to understand by wealth material things that can be possessed by particular individuals to the exclusion of others. It is convenient to think of it in this way, because such things can usually be weighed or measured, preserved for a certain length of time, and transferred from one person to another. But the fact that they can be owned in this way makes it difficult to regard them as constituting a good for the community. Yet it is evident that in some cases the possession of a material thing by one person may really be for the benefit of a whole community. If there were only one violin in the world, it would probably be best that it should be left in the hands of the person who was most skilful in playing it; and if he made a practice of playing it in public, though it might be said to be his private property, the enjoyment would be public. It was in this sense that Aristotle defended private property against the limited form of communism that was suggested in Plato's *Republic*.

'It is clearly better,' he says,[1] 'that property should be private, but the use of it common.' The general principle appears to be that which was expressed by Carlyle in the phrase 'The tools to him who can use them.' This, of course, applies only to things that are of the nature of instruments. The exclusive possession of the materials that are used for food and other consumable objects is less easy to justify; and in time of extreme famine it would not be allowed; though it is precisely in times of difficulty that it is most important that the instruments should be in the hands of those who are best able to use them. We are not here concerned with the attempt to determine more precisely to what extent private property in consumable things can be justified, a question to which we may have occasion to return later. At present we are only considering the general meaning of wealth, as commonly understood, and indicating in what sense it may be regarded as a common good. The mere fact that it is possessed by individuals need not prevent it from being a benefit to all or at least to many. Thucydides hoped that his History would be 'a possession for all time,' and it seems likely to prove so; and, though it is not the exclusive possession of any individuals or groups, yet the number in any particular group who can be said, in any effective sense, to possess it is comparatively small.

Wealth, however, is commonly taken to mean certain material possessions having a monetary value in exchange. Economists used to be in the habit of employing it exclusively, or almost exclusively, in this sense. Ruskin, as we have already noticed, made an emphatic protest against this in *Unto this Last*, insisting that Wealth means Welfare, and that 'the only Wealth is Life.' The protest was, to some extent, called for; and it has not been altogether ineffective. It is now comparatively common for writers on economics to lay stress on Welfare, rather than on Wealth. It must, however, be admitted, I think, that the protest was expressed in too extreme a form. Wealth cannot be identified with Welfare without doing violence to the use of words. It is nearly always understood, not as equivalent to Welfare, but as indicating certain conditions that tend to

[1] *Politics*, ii. 5.

promote welfare. When, for instance, Wordsworth says of Nature that

> She has a world of ready wealth
> The mind and heart to bless—
> Spontaneous wisdom breathed by health,
> Truth breathed by cheerfulness,

it is evident that he does not mean by Wealth material commodities or their equivalent in money; yet he appears to distinguish the wealth that Nature yields from 'the mind and heart' by which it is received and which it 'blesses.' The distinction, no doubt, is not very sharply pressed; and it would be somewhat pedantic to dwell much upon it. But it is also somewhat pedantic to insist that it should be altogether ignored. The conditions of welfare are not quite the same thing as the welfare that they promote; nor is that welfare identical with the life in which it forms an important element. Heroic self-sacrifice may be a fine expression of life; but it would be somewhat strained to characterize it as either wealth or welfare. I should be disposed to understand wealth in the widest sense as meaning the things or circumstances that tend to promote welfare, and welfare as meaning the conditions in which the most important aspects of life are sustained and enhanced. But when we speak of wealth, we generally take it to mean things that some people or some nations have, and that other people or nations do not have. If, however, we understand wealth as being limited to possessions that can be measured by some generally recognized standard of value, it is evident that this excludes some important possessions. Health is, in general, a more real good to have than most things that are more purely material and more easily measured. Knowledge, insight, skill, friends, influence, a cheerful disposition, are also things that it is worth while to have, and that cannot, except within very narrow limits, be estimated in terms of cash; and the possession of them does not normally imply the deprivation of anyone else. They certainly contribute to the well-being of anyone who has them. It may be well also to remember the point of the famous inscription, 'What I gave I have.'

Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* has been generally recognized as the book that most definitely laid the foundations of

modern economic studies. But it is coming to be recognized more and more, as we have seen, that the emphasis has to be laid on Welfare rather than on Wealth. There is perhaps, however, still some tendency to emphasize the satisfaction of wants instead of the enhancement of creative powers. If the view that we have taken of the essential significance of Value and Worth is correct, such an emphasis must be held to be mistaken. Indeed, hardly anyone would venture to maintain that a nation that has great material resources and much luxurious expenditure stands higher among the countries of the world than one that has shown rich thought, literary and artistic production, moral and religious depth, inventive skill, and fine humanity. Happily, our own country, which has been among the richest in material production, has also excelled in most of these other respects. Indeed, it is perhaps even true that it is to the industrial side, as much as to any other, that not enough serious attention has been given. Our industrial prosperity has been largely due to natural advantages rather than to anxious care. It is on the whole true that our industrial life has been allowed to grow up without much guidance, attracting the comparatively selfish and energetic elements of the community and lacking the restraining influence of the wiser heads and the more generous hearts. This is, no doubt, mainly due to the fact that very few heads were wise enough to know what sort of guidance would be really helpful. The theory readily won currency that unchecked competition is, on the whole, the best system for the production and distribution of wealth—a theory that seems to have just enough truth to make it difficult to refute and just enough attraction for men of energy and resource to make it easy to accept. It needed the somewhat violent eloquence of Carlyle and Ruskin, the precept and example of William Morris, and the patient researches of some of the Fabians to introduce a better way of thinking; but some of the more academic writers also, such as J. S. Mill, Alfred Marshall and William Smart, have given strong support to the tendency to place Welfare before Wealth. It is still true, however, that the utilitarian basis of so many of the writings on economics has stood somewhat in the way of a sufficiently clear apprehension of the significance of the change.

There has, in consequence, been a certain cleavage between the cultural and the economic traditions in dealing with human affairs, which has prevented social studies from gaining as high a position among academic disciplines as is rightly their due. Even in Adam Smith's own University it is only in quite recent years that anything like an adequate position has been accorded to them. It is important that the study of economic problems should be more closely associated with ethics, political theory, and the history of institutions than is commonly the case even now. But the London School of Economics and Political Philosophy has certainly gone some way to put this right.

Social studies have in some respects had a more fortunate history in France. Comte and Le Play emphasized the importance of a broader method of dealing with social problems, and the influence of these in our own country has been considerable. It is perhaps most conspicuously seen in the writings of Professor Patrick Geddes, who, however, has approached the subject mainly from the biological side. What Le Play has chiefly laid stress upon was the interaction between a locality, with all its special characteristics, and the people who dwell in it. The place, it is pointed out, makes the people, and the people react upon the place. It is, no doubt, mainly on this account that we find so many differences between distinct races, temperaments, customs, and habits of thought and feeling throughout the world. Such differences, for instance, as are found between the Alpine and the Mediterranean races are probably due, to a very large extent, to the fact that the former were for many generations dwellers in the mountains, the latter in the plains. It has already been noted that some of the physical distinctions tend to disappear when they change their habits in this respect. It is on such grounds that Professor Geddes, following Le Play, attaches so much importance to regional studies. The saying of La Rochefoucauld still holds good, that 'the accent of a man's native country dwells in his mind and in his heart as well as in his speech'; and sometimes it is the accent, not of a country, but of a very small district. 'What is the most important product of the mines?' asked Le Play; and his answer was, 'The Miner'—subdued to what

he works in, 'like the dyer's hand.' Certainly a country that is mainly agricultural or pastoral is apt to display characteristics that are widely different from those of a people who are largely employed in mines or factories. It is, no doubt, mainly distinctions of this kind that make it so difficult for the English and the Irish to understand one another. The difficulty is complicated, in this particular instance, by differences in the religious and historical outlooks of the two peoples; but these differences are probably traceable, to a large extent, to the more general differences in habits of life and thought. Even within the same nationality, and in close proximity to each other, the dwellers in towns are apt to be markedly different from their country cousins; partly no doubt, because people with particular tastes and temperaments tend to drift into the towns, but also because the conditions of town life affect the characters of those who are subjected to them. Sometimes, again, the differences between peoples are so great as to present themselves almost as fundamental oppositions. 'East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.' But, of course, as Mr. Kipling was well aware, this is only a limited truth. The religions of the Western peoples came to them almost entirely from the East; and the East has not been altogether reluctant to adopt many of the scientific conveniences and some of the forms of government and social organization that were first devised and developed in the West; not to mention less desirable modes of approximation. In philosophical speculation also there has been a frequent interchange of ideas, greatly to the benefit of both sides. It remains true, however, that to understand the citizens of any place, we have to take account of the characteristics of the region in which they live and of the nature of their social inheritance. However well England and India may learn to understand and appreciate each other, it will probably continue to be the case that the English tend to be more alert and persistent with reference to things seen and handled, while the inhabitants of India, even if closely akin in race, are more meditative, more pliable, and more open to influences of a purely spiritual kind. Such differences have always to be borne in mind. Even when we try to think of an ideal society, we have to think of it as situated

in some place having special features that are bound to affect the lives of inhabitants. Its life will have to be carried on, as Bishop Blougram urged, in 'Rome or London—not Fools' Paradise.'

In dealing with the question of production, it has been customary for economists to distinguish the three main functions of Land, Labour and Capital. These terms evidently come down to us from a time when the fundamental basis of all production was agriculture. Capital may have meant primarily the cattle with which a farm was stocked, and may have been afterwards applied to the machinery or implements employed in the cultivation of the soil. It is now used in a very much wider sense for everything that has been created by man and that is instrumental in the production of any form of Wealth. Land, on the other hand, is no longer thought of as the only form of raw material to which labour may be applied. These changes have involved some transformations in the use of closely related terms. Rent, for instance, which meant originally the payment made for the advantages that were offered by any particular portion of land, has been extended to mean any payment for natural advantages of any kind. It is in this sense that the convenient term 'Consumer's Rent' was introduced by Alfred Marshall. It remains true, however, that there are three main aspects in the production of wealth or in the creation of any form of human welfare. Production is never—even artistic production is not—a pure creation. It always starts from some pre-existing material, which may be land or ores or trees or the mind of a child or anything else that has not yet received any special cultivation, or that is capable of receiving more. To this material Labour is applied, which is always in some degree creative, and nearly always in some degree co-operative.

A distinction has sometimes been drawn between Labour and Work. 'The ox labours,' it has been said,[1] 'but he does not work.' Again, 'the man who is just now cleaning my office window is performing labour, but the designer of the building

[1] Quoted by Plumb and Roylance in their interesting book on *Industrial Democracy*. They do not approve of the distinction that is drawn in the sentences that they quote.

in which my office is located did creative work.' So far as there is any real distinction here, it seems to me that it is badly expressed, and on the whole reverses the proper meaning of the words. A machine may be said, and commonly is said, to work, but it does not labour. The expression 'useful work' has been conveniently applied in physics to the action of a mechanical force; but it would seem absurd to refer to it as 'useful labour.' It seems best to confine the term Labour to that more or less creative form of effort which only human beings can exercise. What is thus created by labour may then be used for the creation of something different, usually something that stands higher in the scale of values. When the newly created material is thus used to assist in a further act of creation, it is what is properly meant by the term Capital; and no considerable advance can be made in human welfare without the use of these three factors—raw material, labour and capital. There is always something that may be described as raw material to start with, though even that may have had a history in which some creative effort has been involved. The mind of a child, for instance, on which the educator acts, can seldom be regarded as a purely virgin soil. But relatively it may be so described. The more or less raw material is then operated upon by some form of creative effort, which nearly always involves the use of some instruments that have been previously created by human labour. Sometimes, of course, the raw material co-operates, more or less actively, with the producer. When the soil has been prepared and the seed sown, all accomplished by certain movements, 'nature does the rest within,' *cetera Natura intus facit*, according to the phrase of Bacon. The wheat grows of itself without any direct assistance of the farmer. What we conveniently personify as Nature operates upon it from within. So also, still more apparently, when the teacher operates on the mind of a young child with the help of books and other appliances, the child's own mind responds with a creative effort of its own. His nature 'performs the rest within,' or the activity of the educator is futile.

All this, it is important to remember, has no direct bearing on the question, what recompense should be made, in the way of Rent, Wages or Interest, to those who supply the three

factors that are concerned in the work of production. To this we shall have occasion to refer later.

Labour is generally to some extent painful and limiting. People who work at special trades or professions often bear some marks of their particular kind of toil. Charles Lamb inquired humorously,

> Who first invented work and bound the free
> And holiday-rejoicing spirit down?

And he suggested that it must have been the

> Sabbath-less Satan, he who his unblest
> Task ever plies 'mid rotatory burnings.

We may venture to believe that it had a more respectable origin. What Lamb objected to was the drudgery of office work. But what is drudgery to one may be a joy to others. There are some who do not dislike the kind of work that was abhorrent to Lamb. He did not regard the study of the Elizabethan dramatists as drudgery; but probably Shakespeare might have regarded that as drudgery. Anything is drudgery that takes us away from that kind of work for which we are best adapted. It is true, however, that it is not always joyful to 'labour in one's vocation,' and that most people feel the need of some 'avocation' to which they can turn for relief. We need holidays; and it is well to remember that a holiday means originally a holy day, of which the Jewish—or perhaps the Babylonian—Sabbath is the great exemplar. And a holy day means primarily a day on which we become, or seek to become, healthy or 'whole.' In our ordinary work, the whole man is not, in general, present; but only, in Horatio's phrase, 'a piece of him.' The process of making whole is perhaps what is best understood by 'liberal education,' as distinguished from the training that fits one for some particular form of work. Both these modes of education go on normally, in a more or less definite way, throughout life; but it is the liberal form that is most universal in its application. It is well to remember that the term School is derived from the Greek word for Leisure; and this serves to remind us also that the great purpose

of Leisure is to make and keep us whole. Even the finest forms of creative work may become in some respects narrowing; and those that are less purely creative are apt to have this defect in a much greater degree. Hence the production of human Welfare involves Leisure as well as Labour; and the best employment of Leisure and the best means of securing it are among the chief problems for every man, and especially for every organizer of the social order.

Some forms of Labour are necessary for the very existence of the social order. Others may to some extent be regarded as superfluities; and in the case of a few it may even be questioned whether they are not in reality pernicious. Yet those that are most necessary are not always the most attractive. In any organized community, especially in cold countries with uncertain climates, like our own, it is necessary to have a sufficient supply of food, clothing, house accommodation, and suitable arrangements for lighting and heating. It is necessary also to have some provision for the education of the young, and to have some means of protection against possible enemies from without and possible dangers from within. Hence, while people may to a large extent be left free to choose their vocations and to pursue their avocations as they please or as their special circumstances may dictate or suggest, it is necessary that there should be some organization for the adequate provision of what is essential for the whole. It is mainly from this necessity that governments arise, and that the citizens of a community are, in some degree, subject to their coercion. Some social reformers are anxious to eliminate this element altogether; and I suppose everyone would wish to keep it within the narrowest limits that are consistent with peace and security and with the provision of the main essentials of life. It is well to remember that coercion is in its nature negative. No one can really be compelled to *do* anything. He can only be prevented from doing something by the use of chains or bolts and bars. But, of course, it can also be made more unpleasant for him not to do certain things than it is to do them; and it can hardly be denied that, for the maintenance of social order, this is sometimes necessary. Even apart from this element of force, an organized government may exercise important

advisory functions. All this will have to be carefully considered at a later stage.

Reflection on the various considerations to which reference has now been made, may lead us to see that there are three main aspects in the life of any well-organized community. There are the various vocations in which people work, and by which the necessaries and conveniences of life are supplied. This is the sphere with which the study of economics is concerned. Next there are the leisurely occupations, which are essentially educational or cultural, aiming at the production, not of what is necessary or convenient for life, but rather of the substance of life itself, what is desirable or necessary for the best kind of life. It is this that constitutes what is sometimes referred to as the soul of a people. In the third place, there is government—the organization by which the life of the community is directed, so far as this is necessary, by which it is protected from without and from within; the power that guides and, if necessary, coerces. The remainder of the present study will be mainly occupied with the consideration of the relations between these three aspects of the Commonwealth, with special reference to their bearings upon the possibility of World Citizenship.

I have referred to these three aspects of a human society in relation, primarily, to the conception of a Commonwealth, because it is in the complex mode of unity to which that term has been specially applied that the three aspects of social life become most prominent and most readily distinguishable. But they are present in every form of social unity, in a family, a district, a country, a nation or an empire. Even a school may be a Little Commonwealth. But it is chiefly in the larger modes of unity that it becomes important to discriminate between the three aspects, because it is chiefly here that they are apt to give rise to divided loyalties. Loyalty to one's trade may interfere with loyalty to one's church or to the laws of the state within which one lives. No doubt, such oppositions may arise even within a family or even in the consciousness of a solitary individual. Bodily needs, cultural aspirations and the sense of obligation may fight with one another even in the mind of a hermit. But the respective provinces of these aspects of human

life become specially apparent when we are able to read them in the larger letters of a complex human society. Hence it seems best to consider them in their relations to national and international modes of unity rather than in their bearings upon smaller groups; though we may afterwards be led to consider also the part that they play in more limited modes of human intercourse.

CHAPTER V

THE THREEFOLD COMMONWEALTH

The basis upon which the three aspects of the Commonwealth are founded is not very hard to discover. Even as early as the time of Aristotle it was clearly enough pointed out; and modern studies of biology have only made it more apparent. Though man is more than an animal, he has an animal side to his nature; and, though an animal is more than a plant, it has an aspect that is essentially vegetative. Hence man has a vegetative and an animal aspect, as well as an aspect that is distinctively human. Though

> It is not growing like a tree
> In bulk that makes man better be,

yet he does grow more or less like a tree; only in a much more complicated fashion. The industrial side of life is primarily occupied with the satisfaction of those wants that grow out of the need for physical maintenance, growth and reproduction. No doubt, needs of a much higher and more elaborate kind are added to these, and are satisfied by industrial methods similar in kind to those that subserve the more purely nutritive functions; but it is the latter alone that are omnipresent throughout life and that in times of stress are seen to be immeasurably the most important of the things with which the industrial aspect of life is concerned.

But man is also an animal. He has instincts, emotions and passions, however exactly these may be defined and analysed by comparative psychology.[1] Certainly he stands high among the animals, taking his place among the more gregarious species. He lives and moves within a pack, and is more or less

[1] Professor McDougall's book on *Social Psychology* is, I believe, the most complete and reliable on this aspect of the subject. But the application of the term 'instinct' is partly a verbal question. For some criticisms on McDougall's treatment, reference may be made to Graham Wallas's *Great Society*, chap. iii., and to Hetherington and Muirhead's *Social Purpose*, pp. 52 *sqq.*

directly controlled by its inherited traditions and by the perceptions and previsions of its leaders. His animal tendencies are thus under control, at first from without and afterwards from within. He is subject to the outer law of the pack and to the inner law of his acquired aversions, making themselves felt by degrees as the voice of conscience.

But though man is thus both a vegetable and an animal, he is also very distinctly human; and that means especially, if we are right in what has gone before, that he definitely values and more or less tentatively creates. He has thoughts that wander through eternity and imaginations that grow inexhaustibly.

It is these three aspects—the vegetative, the animal and the distinctively human—that form the foundations for the three main aspects of social life; though, in their more complex developments, they tend to become more and more inextricably intertwined. It is chiefly the complicated ways in which they combine, conflict, and become entangled with one another, that make human life so difficult, so perplexing, and so full of almost insoluble problems.

The vegetative aspect is the most inexorable. There are few words more terrible than starvation. The stomach does not listen to reason. But, as Aristotle noted—and, indeed, as Plato noted before him—the animal impulses do so listen. We can, in some degree, exercise a direct control over our instincts, our passions and emotions; and the community can help us to control them. It is on that fact that the more purely political side of life is primarily based. We are subject to the control of the pack, and that control tends to become more and more insistent, entering at last into the very texture of our minds and dispositions. Man, as Rousseau emphatically put it, 'is everywhere in chains.'

On the other hand, however, it is no less true that

> Stone walls do not a prison make,
> Nor iron bars a cage.

There is an element in man's nature that is uncontrollable from without, and that enables him to be a kingdom within himself. This is the region of pure thought, supreme values and creative imagination. Yet here also he is not entirely solitary. Rather

it is just here, more emphatically than in any other aspect of his life, that he is 'the heir of all the ages.'

Thus the three main aspects of the life of the Commonwealth would seem to be clearly distinguishable. But it may be well now to notice some of the chief ways in which the distinctions have made themselves apparent in human thought and history.

The Indian caste system, in its more purely vertical form, is a good illustration of what is meant by the three aspects of the Commonwealth. It appears to have been based primarily on differences of race; but it can hardly have been merely this somewhat accidental circumstance that gave rise to so definite a mode of organization; or at least its long persistence must have been due to the fact that it corresponded to a natural demand of the social order. The most interesting exposition of it with which I am acquainted is that which has been supplied by Mr. Bhagavan Das in his two writings on *The Science of Social Organization* and on *Social Reconstruction*. The vertical division of the Indian castes, it is true, is into four classes, not including the Outcastes; but the members of the fourth class are only helpers to those of the first three, who represent the main functional divisions. The classification, like some others that have been made, is connected with obvious differences of function in the human body. The body is regarded as falling naturally into four essentially distinct parts—the head, the breast and arms, the lower half of the trunk, and the feet and nether limbs; and, corresponding to these there are four distinct castes in the social organism—the brahmans, the ksattriyas, the vaisyas, and the shudras. The correspondence is graphically represented in the Hindu mythology by the statement that the brahmans issued from the mouth of Brahma, the ksattriyas from his arms, the vaisyas from his thighs, and the shudras from his feet; but this does not appear quite to represent the real connection of the functions of the different classes with parts of the bodily organism.

The brahmans, corresponding to the head, are the intellectual and spiritual leaders of the whole society. They are philosophers and saints, but not kings or politicians. They may draw up laws, but it is not their business to enforce them. They are

priests and teachers, supported by the community and rewarded for their services with high honour. The ksattriyas, corresponding to the arms and shoulders,[1] are the political and military rulers. In the framing of their laws they would generally be assisted and guided by the advice of the brahmans; but it is their special business to see that the laws are carried out, and to protect the general interests of the whole. Their reward lies in the possession of great power. The vaisyas are the captains of industry. Their reward is their wealth—which, however, they are expected to use for the good of the community. The shudras, finally, have no special function but that of service, which they owe to the other two classes, who allow them in return the necessaries of life and amusements (the Roman *panem et circenses*).

The general significance of what is thus described is somewhat more pointedly expressed and illustrated by reference to the conditions of our own country in the following passage :[2] 'The head priest, presumably the man of highest wisdom, receives the highest *honour*; for instance, the Archbishop of Canterbury, who is the chief "Brahmana" of England, takes precedence of all, except the sovereign and his family, in that country. The sovereign, the chief man of action in time of peace, and the generalissimo or military dictator in time of war, has necessarily the greatest *power*, in every country. The *wealthiest* man in every country is always some merchant and not even the king himself. And no one can *enjoy a holiday* so whole-heartedly as the workman. Under the Roman Catholic culture in the Middle Ages, Europe seems to have observed this partition somewhat more clearly, as did India till recently. In ancient India it seems to have worked fully.'

Mr. Bhagavan Das defends this general conception of social order, and urges that, if the principles involved in it were more fully recognized throughout the world, a better order of society would speedily be established. 'All the true brahmanas,' he says,[3] 'the scientists, men of letters, priests, legislators, of all

[1] It may be remembered that Ruskin also liked to speak of 'head men' and 'shoulder men.'

[2] *Social Reconstruction*, p. 62.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 69–70. For a fuller account of the caste system, reference may be made to Sir Valentine Chirol's book on *India*, chap. ii.

faiths and climes, could then co-operate with lessened exclusiveness and thinned barriers of caste, creed, nation and race, and increased good will, in a world-wide educational organisation, for the advancement of sound knowledge and good law, for the benefit of the whole of humanity. So, all the true ksattriyas of all countries and creeds could join in a federalist political organization for the protection of the good from the evil, and for the preservation of peace and order throughout the whole world. So, all the true vaisyas of all lands and religions could combine in an international economic organization, for the enhancement of the comforts of life of all the populations of all countries. And so all the shudras could similarly co-operate, under guidance, in an international industrial organization, for the production of all necessaries of life in ample measure, for the use of all the peoples of the earth.'

Here we have a very definite system of castes set up as a social ideal; and it is indicated that such a system has actually existed, not only in India, but to some extent in Mediaeval Europe and even in many modern countries. It may be noted also that the ideal arrangement described in Plato's *Republic* bears a considerable resemblance to the caste system that is here set forth, and is also based on an analysis of the individual organism. Indeed, the resemblance is so striking that some have supposed that the Platonic sketch was definitely derived from the more rigidly complete Indian model. It seems clear that there had been a good deal of intercourse between Greece and some Oriental countries in the centuries preceding the dawn of Greek speculations,[1] but it is doubtful whether we are entitled to assume any direct connection. The distinctions on which the castes are based are deeply rooted in human nature, and in some form they are to be found embodied in the social system in almost all well-established communities. Their special prominence in India appears to be largely due to the fact that the divisions there were originally based upon differences of race, or at least were to some extent connected

[1] The book on *The Origin of Tyranny*, by Professor P. N. Ure, may be referred to in this connection. In Professor Urwick's book on *The Message of Plato*, the influence of Eastern speculation on Plato is certainly exaggerated.

with such differences. It does not appear that this was the case in Greece, except in so far as there was a class of slaves.

In Mediaeval Europe there was a division of classes very similar, as Mr. Bhagavan Das points out, to that which is found in India. The clergy correspond to the Brahmans, the knightly class to the Ksattriyas, and the merchants and craftsmen, more or less definitely organized in guilds, to the Vaisyas, with the workmen as helpers corresponding to the Shudras. The mediaeval castes, however, do not appear to have observed any clear conception of subordination, such as is found in India and demanded by Plato. There was a keen contest for supremacy between the clergy and the knightly castes, seen especially in the struggles between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines; and perhaps it may fairly be said that the merchants and craftsmen were slowly undermining both the others. It is noteworthy also that the cultured people were not always on the side of the clergy. If mediaeval society could properly be said to be a system of castes at all, it must be confessed that the individuals within the castes did not very readily 'observe degree, priority and place.' They seem to have been perpetually in a state of more or less suppressed revolt. The difference from India in this respect may be due partly to the greater patience of Oriental peoples and partly to the fact that the division of classes in India corresponds to some extent to differences in race. The subservience may be compared to that of the Saxons to the Normans in England after the Conquest. It is to be remembered also that Plato conceived that the due subordination of one class to another in his *Republic* could only be secured by a fabled difference in the materials of which they were made—gold, silver and copper. In Europe it has generally been the class that possessed the gold, rather than that which was golden by nature, that has secured pre-eminence.

In modern Europe nothing of the nature of a definite caste system is to be found. Some relics of such a system, no doubt, may still be discovered; in England perhaps rather more notably than in most countries, owing, I suppose, to the prominence that was at one time given to the distinction between the inheritors of 'Norman blood' and the inferior 'Anglo-Saxon'

population. It remains in the distinction between 'professions' and 'trades'; or between those who may claim to be 'gentlemen' and those who cannot. 'Gentle' and 'simple' was the older antithesis. This distinction has tended, in recent times, to give place to that between those who possess some property (*rentiers*) and those who are almost entirely dependent upon a weekly wage—often expressed, not very accurately, as that between Capital and Labour. These divisions are twofold; but the threefold division is also recognized to some extent. In Germany the distinction is often drawn between the *Lehrstand*, the *Wehrstand* and the *Nährstand*, *i.e.* between those who are employed in teaching or some other form of culture, those who are employed in the army or navy or in other departments of the more purely political organization, and those who are employed in industry or commerce. This corresponds almost exactly to the three main castes in India. The distinction, however, is in this case a purely functional one, and does not imply any form of social subordination. Perhaps even the Indian one does not now imply such subordination; but at least it runs rather more strictly in particular families than it does, or perhaps has ever done, in Europe.

In the Indian caste system there is not only the vertical arrangement, proceeding downwards from the Brahmans to the Shudras and from them to the Outcastes, but there is also a horizontal (or at least more or less horizontal) division on more purely functional lines. Particular families, that is to say, are occupied in particular kinds of work—fishing, pottery and so forth—and are strictly forbidden to do any work that does not belong to their caste. The subdivisions that are thus made are so minute as to strike an outsider as both ridiculous and tantalizing. But, no doubt, in a crowded population of very poor people, it is very essential that no one should be allowed to take another man's job. Even in the much richer Western countries, the Trade Unions have found it necessary to adopt some similar restrictions, though not of so meticulous a kind. And, even when we drop altogether any conception of essential and permanent differences in caste, it remains true that there are distinctions between different types of employment, which tend in many respects to differentiate those who are engaged

in them from one another. Even among ourselves a mining village or a fishing village or a pastoral district may sometimes appear to be almost a little world in itself. But it is still more important to note that the distinction between the three main classes—*Lehr*, *Wehr* and *Nähr*—does not altogether lose its significance. Attempts have sometimes been made to reduce them to two; but such attempts seem always to show themselves, on reflection, to be unsatisfactory.

Plato may, to some extent, be classed among those who have made a twofold division; for he regarded the two upper classes in his Commonwealth as being substantially one, distinguished mainly in respect of age, capacity and experience. This prevented him from doing full justice to the special functions of the two higher classes. Still, he did recognize the distinction. He does not specially refer to any class of slaves; but probably he assumed its existence.

Some religious teachers also, by the emphasis that they have laid on the distinction between the secular and the sacred, have tended, in a somewhat similar way, to split the life of the community in two. The saying 'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's,' may be taken as suggesting a twofold division of life into its spiritual side, which is all-important, and its secular side, which is unimportant, but cannot be entirely ignored. This view may be held to be supported also by the other great saying, 'Take no thought, saying, What shall we eat? or What shall we drink? or Wherewithal shall we be clothed? for your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things. But seek first His kingdom, and His righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you.' No doubt this ought to be interpreted in conjunction with the saying of St. Paul, 'If any provideth not for his own, and specially for his own household, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an unbeliever.' Taking these sayings together, we are perhaps entitled to say that the Christian conception of life does recognize its threefold character; but the emphasis that is laid on one aspect, as against the other two, is liable to give it a dual appearance; and it is hardly too much to say that, in practice, this has sometimes led to a rather sharp division between the attitude

of mind that is made prominent on Sundays and that by which conduct is mainly directed throughout the rest of the week.

Another reference, of a somewhat similar kind, may be worth giving. Carlyle, in one of the most eloquent passages of *Sartor Resartus*, put into the mouth of 'Teufelsdröck' the declaration that there are only two modes of life that are deserving of the highest honour. 'Two men,' he says emphatically, 'I honour, and no third. First the toil-worn craftsman that with earth-made implement laboriously conquers the Earth, and makes her man's . . . A second man I honour, and still more highly; him who is seen toiling for the spiritually indispensable; not daily bread, but the bread of Life. . . . These two, in all their degrees. I honour; all else is chaff and dust.' This was written early in Carlyle's life; and what is specially noteworthy about it is that, during the remainder of his literary career, he was almost entirely occupied in doing honour to Heroes of a third type—Mirabeau, Cromwell and Frederick the Great—who were mainly concerned, neither with the industrial nor with the spiritual side of life, but rather with affairs of state.

Another notable instance of an attempted twofold division has been provided by Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb. In their book on *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, they have set forth a proposal for the reconstitution of government on a twofold basis, in which the 'political' functions are to be distinguished from those that they describe as 'social.' What they suggest is that there should be two Houses of Parliament, as at present, but that the House of Lords should be abolished, and that another House should be instituted, co-ordinate with the present House of Commons, but dealing exclusively with social problems, and leaving those that may properly be described as political to the House that we already have.

'What we may call the Political Democracy,' they say,[1] 'dealing with national defence, international relations, and the administration of justice, needs to be set against what we may call the Social Democracy, to which is entrusted the national administration of the industries and services by and through

[1] P. 111.

which the community lives. The sphere of the one is *Verwaltung, autorité régalienne*, police power; that of the other is *Wirtschaft, gestion*, housekeeping. The co-operative commonwealth of to-morrow must accordingly have, not one national assembly only, but two, each with its own sphere; not, of course, without mutual relations to be hereafter discovered, but co-equal and independent, and neither of them first or last.' They add[1] that they should both be chosen by the same electorate, consisting of the whole body of adult citizens, but suggest that the constituencies should be differently arranged. The second of the two Houses would, among other things, have control of education;[2] so that at least one aspect of the more spiritual side of life would be under its care.

It is evident that, according to this scheme, the 'social' aspect of the Commonwealth is regarded as being almost purely economic. It is to be feared that the more liberal aspects of education and other sides of the cultural life of the community would have but scant attention under such an arrangement. And it is not easy to see how two such co-ordinate authorities could be expected to work harmoniously together. Almost all important problems would have both social and political aspects. International relations, for instance, tend to be largely industrial; and sometimes they are cultural. But indeed the whole conception appears to me to be one that could hardly be satisfactorily applied in such a country as Great Britain. The problems of a great community could surely not be cut in two to such an extent as is here implied. There would have to be some definite means of bringing them into organic connection with one another.

As against all such schemes for a twofold organization of the Commonwealth, the proposals of Dr. Rudolf Steiner, in his book on *The Threefold Commonwealth*[3] (a work that attracted a good deal of attention a few years ago), seem to me to have much to recommend them; though it is probable that they also would require pretty extensive modification in detail and perhaps even in principle. But, before proceeding to give some account of this scheme,

[1] P. 122. [2] P. 120.

[3] *Die Dreigliederung des socialen Organismus.*

it may be well to try to bring out, as clearly as possible, the distinctive features of the three sides of life to which reference was made at the end of the last chapter, and which we have had constantly before us in the present one.

It would obviously be a great mistake to suppose that the industrial aspect of life is concerned only with such material needs as food and drink, clothing and shelter. These are, indeed, the primary and most urgent necessities in all parts of the world, though in some considerably more than in others (in modern England, for instance, probably a good deal more urgent than in ancient Palestine). But even these material needs tend to take on forms that are not purely material. Common meals are regarded in many places as having an almost sacred value, being the only or chief occasions on which a whole family or college or other community is assembled together for a common and necessary function. The most notable illustration is, of course, to be found in the great Christian sacrament. Clothes and houses also cannot be regarded as ministering only to physical necessities. It would seem, indeed, that clothes were first used, like the fine feathers of some birds, rather for ornament and dignity or as charms than for protection. It has often been found necessary to curb the tendency to excess in this direction by sumptuary laws or by conventions (such as men's evening dress). On the other hand, all the arts have their economic aspect, and the labourer in literature, art and religion is generally recognized as being worthy of his hire as well as those whose business it is to provide us with food, clothing and houses. But it is possible to separate off, to some extent, the problems that are involved in 'getting and spending' from those that are involved in political organization and in the cultivation of the higher and more definitely creative powers of humanity.

The great majority of mankind spend the main part of their waking life in work that aims primarily at the satisfaction of needs that are, directly or indirectly, of a material kind; and, as Carlyle put it emphatically in the passage to which I have referred, they are apt to be considerably 'marred' in the process. Most men and women bear, if not in their bodies, at least in the texture of their minds, some more or less obvious signs of

their special work in life. This is, no doubt, most immediately apparent in the case of those who are often referred to specifically as 'workers' or as belonging to the 'labouring class'—somewhat misleading expressions: but perhaps it enters quite as deeply into the constitution of those whose employment is of a different kind. The artist, even when he is a poet, the man of science, the teacher, the preacher, the philosopher, as well as the organizer of industry, are all liable to bear, both in their bodies and in their minds, some marks of their limitations. And, indeed, even the man who has no regular occupation by which he earns his livelihood, is quite as liable to show the limitations that accompany such an exemption. It has been noted[1] that the English, more than other people, have a desire to pass simply as 'gentlemen,' rather than as any particular kinds of workers; but this does not, in general, make them appear any less limited to other observers. Thus, in all sorts of ways, positively and negatively, the citizen is made what he is, to a very large extent, by his position in the industrial sphere. It has been said that a 'man is what he eats'; but it might be truer to say that what a man is depends greatly on the way in which he gets what he eats. For this reason, if for no other, it is important that the amount of time devoted to work, at least in this limited sense of the term, should not be excessive; and that the work should not be more monotonously uniform than its nature necessitates. To secure this and other important ends, careful and somewhat elaborate organization becomes essential. This is now pretty generally recognized. The policy of pure *laisser-faire* has been everywhere discredited. Thus the industrial aspect of life compels us to turn to politics.

The work of government is very largely concerned with industry. As soon as it is recognized that the policy of pure *laisser-faire* is unsatisfactory, the function of government in relation to industry becomes conspicuous. The exercise of this function is necessarily coercive; and in this sense it cannot be denied that the most prominent feature of the State is the exercise of force. Victor Hugo's phrase, *qui dit droit dit force*, must be recognized as sound; though Treitschke's declaration

[1] The late Henry James was particularly struck by this.

that 'the State is Force'[1] may be admitted to contain an exaggeration.

A great deal of the work that is done by modern governments —and, indeed, in some respects even more by ancient ones— is sometimes described as 'socialistic'; but it is probably best to confine this term, not to the mere control of certain aspects of the industrial life for the sake of the common good, but to the actual management of industrial activities. Governments have nearly always undertaken the carrying on of some forms of industry; and, as we all know, this form of State activity becomes specially prominent in times of war. Even in times of peace, the preparations for national defence may involve a good deal in the way of industrial undertakings. Among more purely peaceful occupations the work of the Post Office is probably the most conspicuous of those that are controlled by the State in most modern communities. This seems to be due partly to the simplicity, uniformity and urgency of its work, partly to its openness to public criticism, partly to its international character, and partly to the fact that postal matters affecting the welfare of the State have sometimes to be open to investigation by the government. In some countries the larger forms of transport are under direct State control. This also seems to be partly—perhaps mainly—due to the fact that railways, especially in continental countries, have great strategic importance in time of war. For a similar reason governments are apt to exercise a specially vigilant care over what are described as 'key industries,' such as agriculture, the extraction of coal and iron and other minerals. In most other industries governments are, in general, content to exercise only certain limited forms of inspection and supervision. On the whole, we may say that the main functions of government are generally recognized as being the framing and enforcing of laws relating to the protection of life, health and property, to the fulfilment of contracts, the prevention of crime, and the provision of a certain minimum of educational and cultural

[1] Perhaps 'Macht,' however, might be translated as Power rather than Force. The State is not always using force; but it always has the power to use it, when necessary. On the general place of Power and Force in the State, reference may be made to Professor Hocking's *Man and the State*, chap. xiii.

facilities. In this last function at least it comes into close relation to the third of the fundamental aspects of human life.

This side of life is that to which the policy of *laisser-faire* can be most readily applied. Nobody can be compelled to write poetry; and, since the time of Milton at least, it has been pretty generally recognized that it is equally futile to try to suppress it or other forms of literary and artistic expression, or to limit their kind or amount; and few would wish that governments should determine its merit; though many might desire that, when its merit has been recognized by competent judges, the government might endeavour to see that it has some appropriate remuneration. Similar remarks apply to other forms of literature and art. Yet public galleries and theatres are often endowed by the State or by local authorities; and this may be regarded as an important side of national education.

The general question of education presents a good deal of difficulty. Technical colleges, being essential for the proper carrying on of industries that are of national importance, may seem to fall naturally within the region that is legitimately open to government control. The case of liberal education is somewhat more difficult, as it belongs more definitely to the cultural side. It seems right that it should receive something in the way of State endowment; but it is more doubtful whether the State should seek to exercise much control over the content or the methods of its work. The same is more emphatically true of religion. Yet it seems right, in view of the vital importance of these aspects of national life, that the State should at least secure the provision of a certain minimum. Something of the same sort may perhaps be said with regard to the cultivation of the fine arts. The teaching of moral principles presents some difficulty, owing to its close connection with religion. But these are questions with which we may have an opportunity of dealing later.

The three aspects of the Commonwealth, to which reference has now been made, cannot evidently be sharply separated off from one another; and it is now time to try to determine, at least a little more definitely, what their right relations to one another are. The recent statement of Dr. Steiner, to which I have already referred, seems to me to throw a good deal of

fresh light on this; though his detailed suggestions are perhaps not of much value. Like Plato and others, he connects the three aspects of the Commonwealth with the threefold structure of the human organism; and the special manner in which he brings out this relationship helps to explain the way in which he thinks of the three aspects. He urges, as most of the others do, that there are three main functions in the social organism, just as there are three main functions in the human body. According to his way of looking at it, the three main functions in the body are (1) the nervous system, having its centre in the brain; (2) the circulatory system, having its centre in the heart; (3) the nutritive system, having its centre in the stomach. I must confess that this analysis 'stumbles' me somewhat at the outset. The circulatory system seems to form part of the nutritive. I should have supposed that it would be better to take the afferent aspect of the nervous system as the first of the functions, the efferent connecting with the muscular system as the second, and the nutritive and circulatory system as the third. The heart, as the most important of the muscles, might still be connected with the second function. Assuming that we may interpret the three main functions of the bodily organism in some such way as this, we may then say that the corresponding functions in the social organism are (1) its more spiritual aspects—science, art, literature, philosophy, religion, liberal education, everything that is intimately connected with the development and expression of human personality and the realization of the ultimate values in life; (2) its more mechanical aspects—the protection of life and property, the defence against aggression from without, the establishment and enforcement of laws, morality in its more external aspects, duty and discipline, everything connected with justice and with the State (in the narrower sense of that word) and with the subsidiary values that are involved in that; (3) its more assimilative aspects—the use and control of natural forces, the practical applications of science, technical education, everything connected with the industrial side of life and with the production of the more purely instrumental values.

It is at once evident that this way of working out the analogy between the physical and the social organism, though bearing

a certain resemblance to the method adopted by Plato in his *Republic*, leads to very different results. A few remarks about this may be useful.

Of the three aspects that are recognized both in Plato's scheme and in the one that is here suggested, partly in accordance with the views of Dr. Steiner, though the bodily parts with which they are connected are at least approximately the same, only the third can be regarded as having any complete correspondence in the two schemes. What Plato refers to the region of the heart is the element of spirit or passion. The fact that he regarded this aspect of human nature as being essentially allied to the more purely rational aspect makes the difference between his theory and the more modern one less conspicuous than it would otherwise be: nevertheless, there does appear to be a fundamental distinction. On both theories, indeed, it is this aspect that is most difficult to understand. Perhaps it is best to think of it as relating essentially to the more purely animal impulses and emotions, such as anger, fear, natural affection and the like, which in the individual have to be controlled by reason, and in society have to be governed by law. In popular language, these are commonly referred to the heart and its 'deceitfulness.' How far this can be physiologically justified, we need not here attempt to discuss. I may as well confess, as I have already indicated, that I do not attach much importance to these suggestions of correspondences between the physical and the social organisms. They are sometimes useful as supplying hints, but it seems futile to pursue them into details. To describe a human society as an organism at all involves a very questionable comparison. Still, it is perhaps worth while to note the different hints that are supplied to different writers by the attempt to follow out this comparison. In comparing Plato's views with those recently set forth by Dr. Steiner, we may note an important divergence with regard to the first of the three aspects, as well as with regard to the second. Plato, by connecting the first aspect purely with the head, tends to give it an exclusively intellectual interpretation; whereas Dr. Steiner, by thinking of it in relation to the whole nervous system, is able to give it a much wider application, including everything that can properly be described as spiritual

—covering poetry, for instance, as well as philosophy and religion. It is perhaps not altogether fanciful to believe that Plato's limitation in this respect is largely responsible for his failure—in spite of his strongly artistic temperament[1]—to do complete justice to the place of some forms of poetry in education and in life. In this respect the newer theory seems to be an improvement.

Now, if we ask how political theory is affected by these differences, there are several things that it is important to notice. There are obviously different ways in which the State may be regarded in relation to the general life of the community. It may be thought of as the organizing and controlling power by which the whole life of the community is governed. This was, in general, the view that was taken by most serious thinkers among the ancient Greeks. It was perhaps the natural view to take in a small City State. Any other view—and, of course, there were other views—would have seemed anarchic. In small and simple communities a somewhat rigid unity is almost inevitable. 'No division of power,' as Bagehot says,[2] 'is then endurable without danger, probably without destruction: the priest must not teach one thing and the king another; the king must be priest and prophet king—the two must say the same because they are the same. The idea of difference between spiritual penalties and legal penalties must never be awakened, —indeed, early Greek thought or early Roman thought would never have comprehended it: there was a kind of rough public opinion, and there were rough—very rough—hands which acted on it. We now talk of "political penalties" and "ecclesiastical prohibitions" and "the social censure"; but they were all one then.' In the large Nation States, on the other hand, with which we are most familiar in modern Europe, there are few who would be prepared to subscribe to it. Even here there would seem to be characteristic differences. The view commonly taken in this country, as we have already noted,

[1] I am assuming here that the utterances of Socrates in the *Republic* are to be taken as representing Plato's own views. A good deal of doubt has recently been thrown on this; and it is a question about which I am not qualified to decide. Reference may be made to the treatment of it by Professor A. E. Taylor and others.

[2] *Physics and Politics* (*Works*, vol. iv. p. 444).

has tended to be considerably different from that which has been taken in Germany. The Germans have been apt to regard the State as a great protective force—almost, if not quite, non-moral—controlling all the outward activities of the citizens, but leaving a certain inward freedom. We, on the other hand, have learned by our chequered history that inner freedom can only be secured by incessant vigilance. Most of our leading thinkers have been rather apt to think of the State as only that particular aspect of national organization which is concerned with defence against external enemies, with the protection of the life and property of the citizens, with the enforcement of treaties and contracts, with the making of laws for the regulation of those activities that can be conveniently controlled from without, and for the promotion of the general welfare of individuals in so far as they are clearly incapable of promoting it for themselves. Some would be disposed to cut down its functions a good deal more than this; and, at any rate, most Englishmen believe, or used to believe, that the burden of proof rests decidedly with anyone who seeks to extend the activities of the State. The Greeks, especially the Athenians, were perhaps as great lovers of freedom as we are, and certainly greater lovers of art; yet Plato, like most of them, was prepared to think of the State as the power by which art and every other aspect of the common life was rightly controlled; and he compared this control with that which the head, assisted by the active co-operation of the heart, exercises over the rest of the bodily organism. Hence he thinks of the rulers as being philosophers as well as kings, and as concerning themselves with every department of social life. The organism is one, and it has a single controlling organ.

Now, it is here that we see the most prominent respect in which Dr. Steiner's view, as I am trying to interpret it, diverges from that of Plato. He recognizes a real trinity in the Commonwealth. It is three in one, as well as one in three. The separation of its functions is as real as their essential unity. The philosopher is not to be the king, nor is he to be the captain of industry. It remains, indeed, to be seen whether there are to be any supreme captains at all. It is not the function of the brain, at any rate, to exercise any direct control over the

circulation; and the stomach has to carry on its particular work without the immediate guidance either of the head or of the heart.

A view of this kind is evidently opposed to any hierarchy of castes or rigid subdivision of classes. It cannot properly be described as Pluralism. The three fundamental functions are not to be thought of as belonging to particular sections of the community, any more than they belong exclusively to different parts of the human body. The nervous system is not confined to the head, nor the muscular or circulating system to the heart, nor the nutritive system to the stomach. The physical organism is a systematic whole, and its leading functions are distributed practically throughout it. The social organism—if it is right so to designate it—is also a genuine unity, and all its members have their share in each of its leading functions.

Aristotle pointed out that Plato's ideal State would, after all, be two distinct States. The philosophic rulers and their auxiliaries would be one State, the members of which would differ from one another only in age, ability, and degree of education. The captains of industry and their dependents would be another State, subordinate to the first, the members of which would differ in wealth and in the nature of their occupations. Perhaps the slaves also, whom Plato carefully refrains from mentioning, would eventually form a third State, more or less antagonistic to the other two. It is doubtful, therefore, whether the whole society would long retain its boasted unity. The Indian communities, with their elaborate castes, are even more obviously rent asunder.

Now, such a society as Dr. Steiner conceives, if I rightly understand it, would be the very antithesis of all this. The divisions that he admits, and that he thinks it important to emphasize, are not divisions between people, but only distinctions between those fundamental functions which may, indeed, be more prominently exercised by some than by others, but in which every human being ought to have some share. Religion, liberal education, science, poetry, music, all forms of creative art, belong, no doubt, to the exclusive realm of the spirit; but it is a realm into which all are admitted as citizens. The defence of the country, of individual life and property,

the establishment and enforcement of just laws, are, no doubt, more the business of some than of others; but, in some degree, they are everyone's concern. So too, though there are many different forms of industrial activity, nearly every one is, in some degree, either a capitalist or a labourer. The great majority are both; and certainly every one is a consumer.

Thus, what is here emphasized is not that the social organism consists of three parts which have to be carefully kept separate, but only that it has three distinct functions that ought to co-operate with one another, but that ought not to interfere with each other's free activity. The community as a political organization must not interfere unduly with the same community as an economic organization or as a spiritual unity. But this does not mean that these three modes of social unity are not to exercise incessant vigilance over each other's doings and, where necessary, to criticize and resist. It is this way of thinking of the whole commonwealth as at once one and three that is Dr. Steiner's contribution to social theory; and it seems to me to be a contribution of the highest value. But, of course, it raises the difficult problem as to how it is possible to maintain both the aspect of unity and the aspect of triplicity. I am not sure that Dr. Steiner has provided any quite clear and practicable solution of this problem; and accordingly, in what follows, I do not profess to be expounding methods of which he would have approved. His methods, in fact, appear to me to be too impracticable to deserve serious consideration.

What I now seek to do is to consider methods by which the spiritual unity and the industrial unity may be maintained and enhanced, and how the State, as the controlling power within the Commonwealth, may contribute to the promotion of these two modes of unity; and I seek to deal with these problems, not merely from the point of view of a single limited community, but from that of an extensive commonwealth and eventually of the world as a whole regarded as a universal Commonwealth.

CHAPTER VI

THE CULTURAL ASPECT OF LIFE

THE cultural or spiritual aspect of life means essentially, as we have seen, the distinctively human aspect. The industrial and legal aspects are due, in the main, to our contacts with the lower forms of existence. We have to support and develop our physical organisms, like the plants and the lower animals, but in much more complex ways; and the need for government is also largely, though not exclusively, due to the weaknesses that we bring up from the animal side. It is on the spiritual side—*i.e.* on the purely intellectual, the moral and the artistic side—that we are truly human and that we aspire to what we more or less definitely dream of as divine. Hence it is chiefly on this side that the greater prophets tend to dwell. It has been noted of Kropotkin[1] that 'his chief interest in mankind lay neither in politics nor in economics, but in the moral attitude of man towards himself and others.' In this sense 'culture' is sometimes contrasted with civilization. 'Our culture is what we are, our civilization is what we use.'[2] This distinction has been more fully recognized by continental writers[3] than it has been among ourselves. It is in this cultural aspect that we become aware of those great values that have been previously referred to as ultimate or intrinsic values. We aim at the realization of truth, beauty, and goodness through the cultivation of the more purely creative elements in our nature. We pursue science and philosophy, not merely because they are useful in industry and in the organization of law and political institutions, but because our human nature craves for light. We take some

[1] By Professor Mavor, *My Windows on the Street of the World*, vol. ii. p. 105.

[2] MacIver, *The Modern State*, p. 325.

[3] Not always, however, in the same way. Sometimes the antithesis has even been made in the opposite sense to that which is here indicated. Kropotkin was one of those who adhered most strictly to the particular way in which the distinction is here drawn.

interest in the arts, not merely because they are pleasant or entertaining, but because they open up visions of the higher possibilities of our humanity. We devote ourselves to religion and to the pursuit of goodness, not from fear of the police or supernatural powers, but because, as human beings, we have a craving for perfection in ourselves and others. It is true, no doubt, that even in these higher endeavours we are not wholly free from the influence of those tendencies that have grown up with us from the vegetative and animal sides of our complex constitution. Often—in some of us very often—they hamper us, and sometimes they may be used to help us, but at least, for good or for ill, they are always with us.

In these upward efforts, as in all other aspects of human life, we progress by co-operation. Even the cloistered saint is seldom entirely alone; and at least it is pretty certain that no one ever began life as a saint. St. Francis assuredly did not; and in India it is recognized that no one becomes a sannyasi till comparatively late in life. As Hegel urged, to become as a little child is not quite the same thing as to remain a child. The Saint recovers something of that natural piety which, it is to be feared, often dies away in early life rather more rapidly than Wordsworth suggested. Moreover, where there is co-operation, as there is in spiritual growth, there is nearly always the possibility of conflict as well. Hence spiritual unity tends to be always something of a problem, rather than an actual achievement; and so we have to take account here of some of the chief obstacles in its way.

Some of the divergences that are most prominent in the spiritual attitudes of different peoples are clearly due to very simple and obvious circumstances. Material influences affect our attitudes in a variety of ways. It is not to be expected that there should be any very close resemblance in spiritual outlook between the average native of India and the average native of Great Britain: the conditions provided by nature are so different in the two cases. In this particular instance of diversity, it is probable, as we have seen, that there is no great original distinction of race among those of the inhabitants who have been most influential in the development of the cultures of the two peoples. It is believed that the leading race in India,

commonly characterized as Aryan, is of the same stock as the Nordic race which has been predominant in England; and even some of the other important elements in the population are supposed, as we have already noted, not to be very widely removed in their origin from some of the European stocks by which, in direct or indirect ways, our British civilization has been largely influenced. Hence purely racial distinctions may in this instance be, to a considerable extent, discounted; and most of the differences in outlook may be referred to more external conditions. No doubt, this is subject to some qualification. Our spiritual attitude in Great Britain has been affected, to an incalculable extent, by influences derived from Judaea; and the Indian attitude probably owes many of its characteristic features to the superstitions of the earlier inhabitants of the country. Still, much may be accounted for by the natural features of the respective countries. The brilliant sunshine in many parts of India throughout a large part of the year, varying but little from day to day, causes the demands for material satisfaction in the way of food, clothing and housing to be comparatively slight, and encourages leisurely and contemplative habits and the belief in beneficent powers behind the workings of nature. The cloud effects sometimes almost give the impression of visible regions of the blest above. On the other hand, the presence of a number of noxious forms of animal life and the overwhelming floods at particular seasons suggest powers of evil against which it is vain to contend. Thus a certain antithesis arises between the hopelessness of our present existence[1] and the better world that lies behind and above. This upward-looking tendency has been greatly helped by impressive mountains and rivers and especially

[1] The various causes that have given rise to pessimism in India have been very thoroughly discussed by Lord Ronaldshay in his book, *India: a Bird's-eye View*, chaps. xxii.–xxiv. On the more general problem of the spiritual outlook of Eastern peoples, reference may with advantage be made to Count Keyserling's *Travel Diary of a Philosopher*. The comments of several English travellers also, such as Mr. Russell and Mr. Dickinson, are worth referring to, especially Mr. Russell's book on *The Problem of China* and Mr. Dickinson's *Appearances*. More recently the general conditions of life in India have been very instructively dealt with in Mr. F. S. Marvin's book on *India and the West*, and still more fully in the great work on *India* by Sir Valentine Chirol

by the thought of the lofty Himalayas, which even now at their highest defy the efforts of the mountaineer, and to which a special sacredness is attached, similar to that which the Jews associated with Sinai and the Greeks with Olympus.

In Great Britain the general conditions are obviously very different. There is little in the way of transcendent glory, though much that is 'green and pleasant.' Even here some of the most profound spiritual reflections have been for ever linked by the genius of Wordsworth with the picturesque scenery of the Lake Country and with the peaceful hills that surround the Wye Valley, overlooking Tintern Abbey. Other illustrations will readily occur. But, in general, our surroundings are relatively tame, neither greatly elevating nor greatly depressing; and we are seldom faced with overwhelming dangers from beast or flood. At almost all seasons there are difficulties to be contended with; but they are nearly always difficulties that can be overcome by patient and strenuous effort and some quickness in adapting means to ends. Thus we readily learn neither to hope overmuch nor to give way to despair. We are more or less ready to

> welcome each rebuff
> That turns earth's smoothness rough—

to believe that nothing is so evil that it cannot be made better and nothing so good that we can rest in it as final. We turn to science, industrial organization and politics, where the Indian turns rather to philosophy and religion.

Such differences, in more or less clearly marked degrees, are to be found throughout the world, and go far to account for the diversities in spiritual outlook that we find in different regions of the earth. It is easy to exaggerate the extent to which such influences operate in the lives of different peoples. It can hardly be doubted that Montesquieu,[1] for instance, exaggerated them very grossly. He even attempted to account for the conception of metempsychosis by the physical conditions of life in India.[2] There are other sources of cultural division that

[1] *Spirit of Laws*, Books XIV–XVII.
[2] *Ibid.*, Book XXIV, chap. xxiv.

are somewhat less obvious and that may yet be no less far-reaching.

Racial distinctions are closely connected with those that arise more directly from external conditions. It is uncertain how far it is right to regard all the races of mankind as descended from a common stock. It seems to be thought by those best qualified to judge that the probabilities are against this view. But it is at least pretty clear that many of the distinctions that are more or less obvious can be traced to the different conditions under which different peoples have had to live. We have to accept such distinctions now as involved in the order of nature; and they are often rather complicated and difficult to understand. In describing the characteristics of any particular people, writers are very easily involved in self-contradiction and paradox. Yet no one can well doubt that the Jews, for instance, are somewhat different from the majority of the inhabitants of European countries in the texture of their minds as well as in the fashion of their features; and that these distinctions have a tendency to persist from generation to generation. Nor are the distinctions between the three or four leading races in Europe much less apparent; though they are rather more liable to be obscured by intermixture and by common traditions and methods of education. And there are pretty obvious contrasts in the peoples of other continents and islands. These contrasts are apt to be greatly accentuated by differences in the languages that have grown up and been transmitted from generation to generation in connection with the lives of different peoples; though it is, of course, not safe to assume that the language spoken by a particular people gives any direct clue to its racial affinities—an assumption that has often given rise to serious errors. Differences of dress, social customs and religious beliefs tend, in some degree, to accompany these other differentiating conditions; and thus the inhabitants of different countries gradually get into the habit of thinking of themselves almost as if they belonged to distinct species. Not only do they lack the sense of 'likeness of kind,' so much emphasized by Professor Giddings and others, but they are strongly impressed by the appearance of difference. This consciousness of difference is accentuated by the underlying

conviction of the essential unity of mankind, which makes it difficult for any people, without a good deal of education and reflection, to regard the ways of other peoples as anything much better than perverse eccentricities. Even such near neighbours as the French and the English have been liable to feel in this way about one another. Even so well-educated and fundamentally fair-minded a man as Dr. Johnson seems to have felt differences of this kind very strongly, though his attitude was, no doubt, partly a more or less humorous pose. All this, of couse, is a good deal modified by migrations, conquests and intermixtures, which gradually give rise to some degree of mutual understanding and toleration. Some even tend to become rather overcritical of the traditions in which they have been born and brought up, and to admire unduly what is relatively strange. But, on the whole, it remains true that the differences between peoples, whether they are due to the circumstances in which they have lived or more indirectly to the subtle influences of heredity and tradition, form a great barrier in the way of satisfactory international relations; and what we have now to consider are various ways in which these differences may be removed or softened, so far as they affect the spiritual outlook, as distinguished from the industrial and the more purely political relations between different peoples. It will probably be best to begin with those differences that are of a somewhat purely intellectual character, since they are the differences that can be most readily understood and modified by explanations. Those that have their seats rather in the emotions and the will are more elusive.

It may be well to note at once that, in seeking to secure a certain intellectual unity, whether within a particular country or in its relations to other countries, it is probably best not to aim directly at complete uniformity but only at the gradual elimination of misunderstandings. It is hardly desirable that all men should agree in their opinions. If they did, it would probably turn out in the end that they agreed in being wrong; for it is by seeing different sides of the truth and bringing them together that the whole truth becomes at last apparent. The mediators are nearly always the final revealers. But to make such mediation possible, it is at least desirable that those who hold

different opinions should not think of one another as fools or charlatans; and, in order to get rid of such an attitude, it may sometimes be necessary to begin by eliminating any elements of mere folly or charlatanry that may have crept into the beliefs or modes of thinking or speaking that are characteristic of any particular peoples. To attempt this would be a large undertaking; and all that we can hope to do here is to give a few illustrations of what is meant.

The most extreme differences in ways of thinking and speaking about the general structure of the universe in which we live, and about particular aspects of that universe, are, I suppose, those that subsist between Eastern and Western peoples; yet it seems true to say that there is hardly any prominent way of thinking in the West for which a pretty close parallel could not be found in the East. Hence it is not very safe to generalize about differences, especially as both East and West are very comprehensive terms of reference. On the whole, however, it does not appear to be very far wrong to say that in the West we almost all tend to begin by thinking about the particular things that present themselves to us in our ordinary experience, things that we can see and handle, and only advance, if at all, rather tentatively to larger generalizations, which we often regard as merely hypothetical and subject to constant correction and modification; whereas most people in the East hardly consider that they have begun to think at all until they have reached some vision of the whole and have made it into a religious or quasi-religious conviction. Spinoza is perhaps the most prominent illustration of a similar attitude in the West; but he was essentially Eastern by intellectual tradition, and the same applies to some others who might be mentioned. Of course, what is here said about the East applies much more obviously to India than to Japan; and what is said about the West applies more to England than to Germany; but I think it can hardly be denied that as between Asia, on the one hand, and Europe on the other, the distinction is broadly true. It connects with what has already been stated about the influence of environment and the general conditions of life; and it shows itself, I think, in the different ways in which the infinite tends to be thought of in the two continents

respectively, and especially in the contrast between Indian ways of regarding this subject and the ways that have tended to predominate in Europe. The tendency of the Greek thinkers was to regard ultimate reality as limited, whether in the materialistic conception of Atoms or in the more refined conception of Forms. The infinite tended to be thought of as, at the best, a chaotic material waiting to be formed. Even Parmenides can hardly be taken as an exception. In Indian philosophy, on the other hand, what is ultimately real has usually been thought of rather as a boundless whole, and particular things that have 'name and form' have been thought of as relatively illusory. It is, however, easy to exaggerate this antithesis. It is true that Atomism and Monadism and other types of Pluralism have played a large part in the development of European science and philosophy; but they have seldom been allowed to flourish without some degree of criticism and opposition; and, though a good deal of this opposition is traceable to Oriental influences, no one can deny that our European ways of thinking have been profoundly modified by it. On the other hand, it is probable that we are apt to be unduly impressed by those aspects of Eastern speculation that are most remote from our own tendencies, and to forget that they also have had their critics and opponents. The conception of Reality as the Absolute or Brahman and of the finite world as Mâya or illusion, due simply to ignorance, is apt to strike the Western mind as incredible, or even absurd.[1] We can only understand it in the modified form presented by F. H. Bradley, according to which Appearance has at least a certain 'degree of Reality,' and the ultimate Reality 'lives in its appearances'; and we may be prone to ignore the fact that in India also there is a modified form of Monism, which can be much more easily understood by us. It has recently been maintained by a scholar of considerable repute[2] that Mâya does not properly mean illusion, but only a finitizing process. This view may be erroneous, though it has received a certain amount of support; but at least it is

[1] This has been well brought out by Lord Ronaldshay in his very interesting book, *The Heart of Aryavarta*.

[2] Sir John Woodroffe. See his book, *The World as Power, Power as Mind*. There is ground for doubting, however, whether his view about this is quite correct.

undeniable that in India itself a modified form of Monism has found wide acceptance. The commentaries of Shankara, in which the more extreme form of Monism is defended, have undoubtedly had a deep influence—perhaps a more extensive influence than any other philosophical system; but the modified Monism set forth by Ramanuja and ably supported at the present time by the saintly scholar Govindacharya[1] of Mysore, according to which the conception of Mâya is rejected altogether, appears to have affected recent Eastern thought—at least among trained dialecticians—in a degree hardly less potent than the extreme doctrine of Shankara himself. The essential difference is that Shankara thought of absolute reality as without qualities, and consequently regarded all qualities as illusory; whereas Ramanuja considered that absolute reality must include all qualities in a perfect unity, and that the finite world must be thought of as a process towards perfection. It is easy to bring this into relation to modern interpretations of Christianity, in which God the Father and God the Son appear to fall into the background, and the emphasis is laid rather on God the Holy Ghost, *i.e.* on the nisus towards the supreme value. The best representatives of modern Christianity appear to be those who think of themselves, in the well-known phrase of Heine, as Knights of the Holy Ghost. In this way an approximation has become possible, and even easy, between Hinduism and Christianity; and there is nothing that could contribute more to the spiritual unity of the world than such an approximation. Thus there is a bridge between the more uncompromising tendencies of Eastern and Western speculation, which at least enables us to see that what presents itself to us as unintelligible is not allowed to pass unchallenged in the East. It is here that we may see the most hopeful opening for mutual understanding and perhaps eventually for complete agreement in philosophical thought.

But it is not only between East and West that the need for

[1] Reference may be made, more particularly, to his *Life of Ramanuja* and to his latest work, *A Metaphysic of Mysticism*. He is, however, a mystic, rather than a philosophical thinker. The influence of Ramanuja is seen in the teaching of Ramakrishna and his disciple Vivekananda and probably also to some extent in the writings of Rama Tirtha, Rabindranath Tagore and Professor Radhakrishnan.

reconciliation has been strongly felt. In Europe itself there has been a gradual divergence between the tendencies of thought in philosophy and in the special sciences respectively. It is, on the whole, true to say that there was no such opposition until the early part of the eighteenth century, when the purely materialistic tendencies of the physical sciences became prominent and were opposed by the idealistic speculations of Berkeley and Leibniz and afterwards by the scepticism of Hume. A little later the elaborate speculations of Kant (a man of science as well as a philosopher) and of the later German idealists—some of them, such as Schopenhauer, a good deal influenced by Oriental ways of thinking—created an apparent gulf between the methods and results of philosophy and those of the physical sciences. The antithesis thus created is only beginning to break down in our own time, not by a victory on either side, but rather by a slow approximation. In science, as we have already noted, the atom has been broken up, the conception of special forces—such as that of gravitation—has been largely set aside, and evolution has begun to be interpreted in a less purely mechanical fashion. These changes have been met by the growing recognition in philosophy that pure thought, though very valuable for the clearing up of fundamental conceptions, is not an altogether adequate principle of explanation or interpretation. What the outcome of these transformations will be, it is not for us here to attempt to determine; but it may be confidently affirmed that they hold out an extremely hopeful prospect of complete reconciliation between science and philosophy on a basis that could be readily accepted both by Eastern and by Western thinkers. It has already been abundantly shown by the brilliant work of Sir J. C. Bose, to which reference has already been made,[1] that Indian investigators are quite capable of taking a share in the more purely scientific work as well as in the more speculative constructions. What is chiefly needed is the definite recognition that there is a great deal that still calls for patient research, and that the results so far attained must be regarded as tentative. Here, as elsewhere, co-operative endeavour from all sides would seem to be the only path to ultimate success.

[1] See above, p. 42.

Diversities in religious attitude are necessarily, to a large extent, connected with philosophical differences. Most forms of religion imply, even if they do not definitely affirm, some interpretation of the universe which can only be made clear by metaphysical reasoning. Here also the contrast between the more mystical conception of the East and the more practical tendencies of the West tend to become prominent. It is true, of course, that the dominant religion of the West has come to us from an Eastern source, but mainly from what is perhaps one of the least mystical and certainly one of the most intensely practical of Eastern peoples. The pure mystics, in general, do not quarrel. There is very little difference between a St. Francis and a typical Oriental sage; though certainly there is *some* difference even there. But in the practical application of religious conceptions to the lives of large bodies of people, especially when these conceptions are definitely brought into relation to political movements, there is room for the greatest diversities and for violent opposition. Even the founder of the Society of Friends, with all his horror of physical violence, was seldom slow to make use of every other form of violence against those from whom he differed; nor does even the Founder of Christianity itself appear to have been always meek. Krishna is represented as having been even an enthusiastic fighter. Something of this appears to be almost inevitable. Religious convictions, even when they are of a somewhat negative type, embody the whole attitude of those who hold them towards the central problems of life; and the more enthusiastically they are held, the more intense is their opposition to any other attitude. A Laodicean frame of mind is more abhorrent to the true believer than one that is more definitely 'cold or hot.' Religion, in fact, seems to be best understood to mean a complete devotion to what is regarded as the supreme value in life; and this admits of no compromise. Still, it is not impossible for one who is greatly devoted to one supreme object, provided he has some power of imaginative insight, to learn to appreciate the similar devotion of another person to a different object or to the same object differently conceived. A man may be religious without being a fanatic. What is chiefly opposed to the religious attitude is indifference or hypocrisy or what the

late Dr. Bosanquet, adopting an expression from Sir Walter Scott, referred to as 'fushionlessness,' conformity to rules without any appreciation of their spirit.[1] A religious attitude means an intensely earnest attitude. Religious wars have been, in general, more bitter than any other forms of strife. Even Christianity brought 'not peace, but a sword.' Even wars that are not primarily religious can hardly be carried on effectively without giving them a quasi-religious character. Any attempt to soften antagonisms thus conceived is resented by those who feel them. The saying of Swift has not altogether lost its point, that 'some people have just enough religion to make them hate one another, not enough to make them love one another.' They are prone to think that whoever is not for them is against them; and the only real means of reconciling them is to show that the saying may be inverted—that, in reality, those who are against them may be friends in disguise who are co-operating with them for some larger end. But is it possible to convince them of this? Sometimes, at least, I believe it is not altogether hopeless; but it involves taking long views.

It seems to me that the first essential is to try to make a clear distinction between religion and politics. I do not mean that religion may not have important bearings upon politics. When President Wilson stated that his object in entering the Great War was to 'make the world safe for Democracy,' it might fairly be said that he was stating what was, to his mind, a religious object. He did not, I suppose, think of Democracy simply as a particular method of government, but rather as expressing a right view of men's relations to each other; and, so conceived, it is essentially a religious conviction. It would seem that it was a similar conviction that led Saint Joan to support the King of France and Oliver Cromwell to oppose the King of England. But, in general, it is possible to keep God and Caesar a little more apart from each other. The greater part of the laws that are laid down and enforced by government are devised to meet special difficulties and are based largely, as Burke contended, on considerations of expediency. Perhaps it can hardly ever be said that they have no bearing upon the deeper interests of the spiritual life: but they

[1] *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, p. 98.

seldom place very serious barriers in the way of the promotion of those interests. Stealing, for instance, is in most countries an offence against the law; and it is possible to urge that sometimes, as Proudhon so emphatically urged, the possession of particular forms of property, which are recognized as legitimate, is essentially theft. But the possessors of such property may be induced to employ it for the general benefit; and, so long as this is easy and customary, it may not be felt that there is any necessity for interference on the part of the government, or for rebellion against the government. Even where the case for rebellion appears stronger, it may be felt that the evils involved in strife are greater than those involved in faulty social arrangements. It appears to have been on such grounds that Gandhi was at last impelled to draw back from purely political agitation. A religious attitude seems almost necessarily to involve a certain conviction that all things work for good, and that sometimes our best service is only to stand and wait. But there are certainly other times when a strenuous action like that of Mazzini is called for; and, of course, always religion implies a certain fervour in the pursuit of what is seen to be good.

Bosanquet rendered a valuable service, in this connection, by reviving the old antithesis between legality—'claims and counter-claims'—and the religious faith in the essential goodness of the universe.[1] The antithesis is put in a more one-sided way by those who, like Swinburne, oppose the attitude of the artist to that of the moralist, or who, like Nietzsche, desire to get 'beyond Good and Evil.'[2] Even Wordsworth conceived of the moralist as one who

> has neither eyes nor ears,
> Himself his world and his own God.

This could hardly be maintained of the political and social reformer. It would seem to be more readily applicable to certain types of religious absorption. But there is room for different

[1] See the chapters dealing with this in *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*. Also his little books, *Some Suggestions in Ethics* and *What Religion is*.

[2] Nietzsche's phrase, however, *Jenseits vom Gut und Böse*, should, perhaps, be translated, 'Beyond Friendliness and Antagonism.' It does not refer to Good and Evil in the definitely moral sense. The word *böse* can hardly be translated into English.

modes of goodness. What we have chiefly to remember is that moral conceptions based on political expediency cannot be expected to be in complete harmony with the more refined claims of equity, and that the endeavour to bring about more ideal conditions has to be tempered by patience and by appreciation of the goodness and beauty that flourish even in an imperfect world, and that indeed sometimes appear to be made possible only by its imperfections.

Similarly, it has to be recognized that the religious attitude itself must be expected to undergo change. For its ultimate basis it is dependent on a complete theory of the universe; and this cannot be attained at a leap. Hence it has recently been well contended by Sir Henry Jones[1] that religious belief is essentially hypothetical, subject to the testing of experience and philosophical criticism. In connection with this we have to recognize an element of truth in the view commonly known as Pragmatism. It was set forth brilliantly but in an extravagant form by William James. What Dr. Schiller calls Humanism is a more moderate variant of the same; and the arguments of the Earl of Balfour in favour of founding belief on philosophic doubt are closely connected with this view. It seems to me to be erroneous, as I have already urged, in so far as it implies that Truth *means* merely what is found to work in dealing with the experience of life; but it does not appear to be wrong to say that this is one of the most satisfactory *tests* of truth in matters on which a more exact criticism is not available. Such a test, however, tends to lead people to somewhat different convictions under different kinds of experience. Hence toleration of differences should be regarded as essential in matters bearing upon religious beliefs. This appears to be more fully recognized in some Eastern countries than it commonly is in Europe—mainly, I believe, because in Europe religion has been so much mixed up with politics. It is generally recognized in India that there are different stages through which men naturally and almost inevitably pass on the road to truth, and that the process must not be unduly hastened.[2] This does not,

[1] In his Gifford Lectures on *A Faith that Enquires*.

[2] This has been very well emphasized by Professor Radhakrishnan in his little book on *Hinduism*.

of course, mean that direct efforts may not rightly be made to promote unity. It does not even mean that people may not rightly emphasize their own convictions and criticize those of others. Even ridicule may sometimes be a rough test of truth. But the saying of Coleridge retains its force, that until we understand a man's ignorance we must remain ignorant of his understanding. Happily there are signs that our missionaries to other countries are beginning to realize this. The efforts that have recently been made by Professor J. N. Farquhar and others to understand Eastern ways of thinking, though perhaps not wholly successful, are highly encouraging. But even in Europe there is room for a better understanding between different types of religious belief and religious organization; and at least it may be safely affirmed that the spirit of toleration is more and more urgently called for. For a time it is probable that we must be content with toleration of differences and not look for any immediate unity. This, however, is a matter that involves some reference to politics; and we must return to it at a later stage.

The modes of unity that have now been referred to as intellectual and religious are obviously two of the most fundamental aspects of spiritual unity; and it is even possible to understand them in so large a sense as almost to include all its aspects. But this would probably involve some undue stretching of their meaning. The more purely ethical and the more purely aesthetic aspects of life have also to be recognized as belonging to the spiritual side; and, though they all tend to be closely associated with the religious aspect, they can hardly be held to be completely covered by it.

I have already referred to the way in which Bosanquet distinguished between the more religious and the more legal aspects of ethics. He also agreed with Aristotle in associating the religious aspect with the speculative or intellectual, as distinguished from the more purely moral or political virtues. Into the consideration of these distinctions we cannot pause to enter further here. It is more important to take account of the aesthetic aspect of the spiritual life. Perhaps it is specially desirable to emphasize it in this country, since it is generally recognized that, in spite of the splendour of our poetical

literature (a good deal of which from Gower to Browning and Tennyson is devoted to moralizing), the aesthetic side is not sufficiently prominent in the general life of the country. In Dogberry's phrase, we are 'full of piety, as can be proved upon us by good witnesses.' Special circumstances have given greater prominence to preaching in Great Britain than it has probably had in any other country in the history of the world, with the exception of our own daughter lands in America. Lamb's saying about Coleridge, that he never heard him do anything else, might be applied to a good many others. Thus, in the general consciousness of our country, religion and morality (nearly always in close conjunction with each other) have tended to be somewhat unduly stressed as against the more purely intellectual and especially the more artistic aspects of the spiritual life; and it is desirable to make some attempt to redress the balance. Even Ruskin, our most notable teacher on the aesthetic side, tended to subordinate art to moral conceptions; and his master, Carlyle, though acquiescing in the saying of Goethe that 'the Beautiful is higher than the Good,' seemed almost to be led in the end to subordinate them both to the conception of political power. And, indeed, whenever the conception of Duty is separated from that of Beauty, it tends more and more to mean modes of action that have to be enforced. It is the 'stern daughter of the voice of God,' and is not felt to be particularly endowed with 'benignant grace.' The Jews very notably thought of the moral life as subject to commandments; and even the emphatic utterances of the Founder of Christianity have not prevented that way of thinking from dominating a large part of the Christian world. On the more purely philosophic side Kant helped powerfully to reinforce it; and some powerful writers in recent times, under the leadership of him and Carlyle, have tended to give fresh vigour to the conception of 'Duty for Duty's sake.' Such a conception has, of course, a certain sublimity. Nelson's 'I have done my duty' rightly appeals to us; and we readily acquiesce in the saying—

> Who sweeps a room as for Thy laws
> Makes that and the action fine.

Yet anyone who has watched the sweepers in an Indian home may be led to suspect that, if they had thought less of the law of their caste and more of the beauty of the room, their work might have been more satisfactorily accomplished. One is, in consequence, sometimes tempted to break a lance in support of the old chivalric conception of Duty for the sake of Beauty. No doubt, it would have to be accepted with a difference. If Goethe's saying is to be accepted, the conception of Beauty must be given a somewhat larger significance than that in which it is commonly understood. I have already tried to explain how the supreme Good is to be conceived as creative, and how what is thus created may be described as Beauty. Even the ancient Jews could sing of the 'beauty of holiness' and admire the towers of Zion. They were not always thinking about commandments and penalties.

Nor need we. I suppose it is on the political side that we have most reason to be satisfied with our national achievement so far; and that means that we have been largely concerned with those things that kings and laws can cause or cure. Even our interest in religion has been mainly in its bearing on practical conduct rather than in its more intellectual or meditative aspects or in its expression in forms of beauty. Yet it is perhaps in the latter aspect that spiritual unity can be most readily promoted. At any rate, it is by the careful study of the different ways in which different peoples tend to emphasize one or other aspect of the ultimate spiritual values that we may hope to bring about a better understanding between all the nations of the world. Matthew Arnold rendered an important service in this respect by the emphasis that he laid on the antithesis between the attitudes of the Hebrews and the Greeks; but, though helping to make the Greek attitude clearer to us, he perhaps succumbed a little too much to the British tendency to lay the chief stress on the more practical side. Ruskin, as we have already noted, had even more emphatically the same tendency. Swinburne, on the other hand, erred on the other side. He over-emphasized the antithesis between the aesthetic and the moral aspects, slightly at least at the expense of the latter.[1] William Morris, on the whole, main-

[1] See above, p. 67.

tained a better balance between the two sides. In Germany the intellectual side has tended to predominate. In France, and still more in Italy, the aesthetic aspect of the spiritual life has been more fully recognized. Among Oriental countries India has obviously given most support to the intellectual and religious aspects. In China the different aspects of the spiritual have perhaps been more evenly balanced. President Naruse, of Tokio, rendered a great service by inaugurating what was described as the 'Concordia' movement, which aimed at an intensive study of the cultures of all the peoples of the world, with a view to the promotion of a better understanding between them. The outbreak of the Great War, followed soon after by the death of Naruse, put a stop to this movement for a time.[1] It is to be hoped that it will soon be revived in connection with the propagandist work that is associated with the League of Nations.

The story of the Tower of Babel calls attention, in a picturesque fashion, to one of the chief sources of disunion among mankind. It is one of the gravest results of the plasticity of human nature, that people who are settled for any considerable time in a particular region, without much contact with others, tend very speedily to develop modes of expression, and especially modes of pronunciation, that are peculiar to themselves. Even in a country that is on the whole so well unified as England, the dialects in different parts are so widely removed from one another as to render the inhabitants of one part almost, if not quite, unintelligible to those of another. As between different countries, of course, the differences are still more sharply drawn, even where, as throughout a great part of the South of Europe, the general basis may be regarded as identical. At the present time, with our ready facilities for travel and the general habit of reading at least some newspapers and hearing some public speeches, it ought soon to be possible to preserve some degree of uniformity within each country. Even in the United States of America, where people

[1] Count Keyserling and some others have since contributed a good deal towards the accomplishment of this object. The periodical *Goodwill* is the organ of an association that aims definitely at the continuation of the work that was inaugurated by Naruse.

of the most diverse origins are being constantly brought together, a certain uniformity is preserved with a tolerable degree of success, though at the expense of some degradation of the language that forms the basis. If it should ever seem possible and desirable on other grounds to have a union of the States of Europe, the differences in speech, and even in written and printed characters, would be among the most serious obstacles. It is also one of the chief difficulties in the way of developing a genuine national life in India.[1]

It seems unlikely that any purely artificial language, such as Esperanto, without any genuine literature behind it, could ever be adopted for general use, though, on many grounds, it is very desirable that it should. In Mediaeval Europe Latin served moderately well as a common vehicle for international intercourse, and it is still so used in the services of the Catholic Church and in some of the ceremonies and official statements in many Universities and other academic institutions and for formal documents and inscriptions; but, of course, it has never been of much use for general intercourse, except among people of some considerable degree of culture, and even among them it tended to be used in a somewhat degraded form. At a later time French served the same purpose in a somewhat more successful and general way; and I suppose it is still true that French is better understood throughout Europe than any other language, though perhaps English is now almost as well known. Spanish is, of course, widely diffused throughout large parts of America, especially in the South. But I suppose it is true to say that, in the world as a whole, English is now more universally understood than any other language. The diffusion of this somewhat monosyllabic speech, in preference to some of the more finely inflected languages, has been regarded with a certain horror by Treitschke and others. But, for general international use, a simple vehicle is evidently preferable to a more elaborate one, and is less in danger of suffering degradation. International jealousy may prevent its general adoption. It is well to remember, however, that it is a doubtful advantage to any country to have its language used internationally. It

[1] On this and other aspects of Indian life, reference may be made to Sir Valentine Chirol's book on *India*.

inevitably suffers some degradation in the process. Its use in this way has also an unfavourable reaction on the country of its origin, which has been felt both in France and in England. It discourages the study of foreign languages in these countries, and they thus lose the unquestionable advantage of being able to express their thoughts easily and habitually through more than a single medium. English, moreover, on account of its relative simplicity and lack of inflection, is less likely to suffer degradation than more complex languages would; and our extensive poetical literature must also serve as a safeguard. The language of Shakespeare can hardly ever be wholly bereft of its force and beauty. If it were to lose some of the intricacies of its spelling, this would not be a very serious deprivation.

For the purpose of reading, as distinguished from speaking, attention has recently been called by Mr. Russell[1] and others to the advantages of the Chinese script, which can be used and understood by peoples whose spoken languages are widely different. It is doubtful whether anything of this sort could ever be of much general use; and those who are capable of appreciating its value would also, in general, have no difficulty in acquiring the use of a common international language. It appears to be true, however, that the Chinese script is very useful as a means of intercourse between well educated people in different countries; and it is possible that it might be brought into more general use for this somewhat restricted purpose.

Any real spiritual unity, whether within a single country or throughout the world as a whole, must be based upon a certain unity (which does not necessarily mean uniformity) in the education of the people. There are many circumstances that militate against this. Education, like so many other terms, is somewhat ambiguous. What is called Liberal Education is that which is specially concerned with what is here described as spiritual development; and it is this alone that we have now to consider. A good deal of what is commonly called education is essentially technical, and concerns the industrial

[1] See *The Problem of China*, pp. 35 *sqq*. But contrast the statement about it by Mr. H. G. Wells in his *Outline of History*, p. 132. Hegel also emphasized its defects; but it is not certain that the criticisms that have been passed upon it are necessarily fatal to its use in the particular way that Mr. Russell has suggested.

aspect of life, rather than the spiritual. What is called Civic Education, again, is to a considerable extent political in its aim; and the teaching of history has some tendency to lead in this direction also. In some countries—perhaps to a certain extent in all—there are apt to be even more definite attempts to give a political bias to the education that is given in the national schools. It is only with the more purely spiritual aspect that we are here concerned; and even with that we are concerned only from the point of view of unity. But this has to be considered both within particular countries and in the world as a whole.

One of the difficulties in any discussion of Liberal Education is due to the fact that it is of its very essence, as the word Liberal implies, that it should have a certain freedom; and that it is, consequently, not possible to lay down any rigid rules with regard to it. But the term Freedom is misleading. It ought not to be understood as implying anything of the nature of Licence or Chaos. Its essential meaning is rather that of development from within as distinguished from imposition from without, spontaneous creativeness as contrasted with mechanical receptivity. How to combine this element of freedom with orderly progress is perhaps the most difficult problem with which the genuine teacher is confronted. To attempt to deal with it here would carry us far beyond our province. We have only to notice some circumstances in educational work that tend to militate against spiritual unity, whether within a single country or throughout the world.

It can hardly be denied, I think, that there have been very considerable improvements in this respect in our own country during the past half-century or more. Before that time there was in England and Wales a sad lack of unity in the national education. Only a small proportion of the population received anything worthy of the name of liberal education; and even that was of a somewhat narrowly limited kind. It was often referred to as the 'education of a gentleman'; and a very unhappy division of classes was created or preserved by the distinction thus implied. Some powerful voices had, of course, been already raised in protest. The view expressed in the phrase that 'simple faith' is more than 'Norman blood' helped at least to clear away the division so far as it depended on an assumed superiority

of race. A deeper note was sounded by T. H. Green in his famous declaration[1] that 'as it was the aspiration of Moses that all the Lord's people should be prophets, so with all seriousness and reverence we may hope and pray for a condition of English society in which all honest citizens will recognize themselves and be recognized by each other as gentlemen.' The distinction here referred to was not recognized in any quite similar fashion, or at least in any quite similar degree, in Scotland; and hence the general education in that country, as distinguished from the more specialized culture, was for a considerable time generally recognized as superior—a superiority that seems now to be rapidly disappearing.

The kind of division that is now to be dreaded is not so much that between different social classes as that which is created by the increasing specialization of studies. Those who have devoted themselves mainly to literary studies and those who have devoted themselves mainly to the study of the natural sciences are sometimes apt to feel that they belong to different worlds. Philosophy, however, is coming more and more to form a link between them; and there are other links. Perhaps what is chiefly to be regretted is that some of the older sources of culture are tending to be less universally available, especially those that were derived from the study of Latin and Greek. The study of Latin is a great help to clarity of thought and dignity of expression. Its loss may be partly, but only partly, compensated for by the increasing study of Logic and the exact sciences. Greek, on the other hand, is chiefly valuable for its revelation of absolute beauty. Good translations, such as those of Professor Murray, may go some way to preserve this element of culture; and the practice of performing Greek plays may also help to supply what is needed, especially when (as is now becoming common in America) a Greek theatre is definitely attached to the Universities. The more purely historical interest of Greek and Roman civilization is being made more accessible by comprehensive studies of general

[1] *Works*, vol. iii. p. 476. Cf. also the paper by the late Dr. Bosanquet on 'Ladies and Gentlemen' in the *International Journal of Ethics*. It has recently been reprinted in the posthumous collection of essays on *Science and Philosophy*.

world history, such as those that have been inaugurated by Mr. H. G. Wells. In these various ways there may, in the end, be a sufficient compensation for some loss in the direct study of Latin and Greek. There is, at least, some force in the contention of the late Professor C. E. Vaughan,[1] that the study of modern languages, being easier, leads more directly to the appreciation of the literatures that are expressed through them. Still, with all this, even one who cannot pretend to have worshipped at the temple's inmost shrine must feel that there is a real danger of a loss here which is at least in need of some compensation.

On countries more remote it would be rash to make any confident pronouncement. One may note, however, the antithesis, in this, as in many other respects, between China and India. In the former the higher culture has been based almost entirely upon the ancient indigenous classics; whereas in the latter the higher education is almost exclusively European. Both extremes are to be regretted. In particular, there is still some doubt as to the wisdom of Macaulay in barring out the ancient literature of India. The growing interest in Indian philosophy may be expected to lead to some modification in this respect.

Moral and religious education is at once one of the most difficult and one of the most hopeful aspects of the educational problem. It is difficult, because there are inevitable differences of a very profound kind to be faced. It is hopeful, because it helps us to see how such difficulties may be met. On the more purely ethical side a good deal has already been accomplished. The work of the Moral Education League, the Congresses that have been held in several important centres, and the model lessons that have been supplied by Mr. F. J. Gould, have shown that a great deal can be done in this kind of education on the value of which there can hardly be any difference of opinion. The Boy Scout and Girl Guide movement has also shown how practical moral conceptions can be communicated with much of the attractiveness of a game. It is on the more purely religious side that difficulties are felt. These cannot, I

[1] See the reference to his view in the Memoir prefixed to his *Studies in the History of Political Philosophy*, vol. i. p. xiv.

suppose, be altogether met until there is a more general agreement about the toleration of differences in this province. Without such an agreement even political history cannot be satisfactorily taught. It seems clear that parents cannot be altogether debarred from the right of imparting their own religious convictions (on which they may not themselves be at one) to their children, and of looking for educational institutions in which these convictions will at least not be treated with contempt. On the other hand, it is no less clear that children have a certain right of access to other opinions about which, as they grow up, they will have to form their own conclusions. In our own country, some knowledge of the Bible seems indispensable for the understanding of our history and literature. But surely children should not be taught to repeat creeds of the truth of which they cannot possibly be ripe to form an intelligent opinion. Here, as in so much else, respect for differences must go along with the effort to reach an ultimate agreement. It is perhaps too soon to think of a world religion; but such books as *The Great Religions of the World*, by Professors H. A. Giles, Rhys Davids and others, enable one at least to have glimpses of the possibility of an ultimate synthesis. For us in this country it seems specially desirable to try to bring about a mutual understanding between Hinduism and Christianity,[1] and to appreciate more and more fully what Christianity means and implies. Happily there are at present many signs of progress in that direction.

How far governments are justified in endeavouring to promote the cultural life of the community is a question that we are not yet in a position to determine. It is clear that it is not the function of government to regulate the activities of those who are engaged in the promotion of pure science, philosophy, religion, literature, the plastic arts, or general education; but it can help to provide a place for these activities in the general life of the community and to give them encouragement and help. It is sometimes said that its proper business is simply that of 'removing hindrances' from these activities; but this

[1] I do not refer to Mohammedanism, because our contact with this is less direct and intimate. Some readily intelligible light on this may be derived from *The Gleam*, by Sir F. Younghusband, in which it is brought into relation with some of the recent phases of English speculative thought.

is probably too limited a view to take of its proper function. It is now pretty generally recognized that it is at least its business to make provision for the rudiments of general education, and to ensure that they are made accessible to every member of the community. If we are right in thinking that the essence of citizenship lies in co-operative creation, it is very necessary that that spirit should be cultivated from an early age. We cannot assume, as some writers are prone to do, that there is a co-operative instinct in human beings. Social psychologists, such as Professor McDougall, do not recognize any such instinct. But it can be readily cultivated; and it is obviously important that it should be cultivated from an early age. Whether the State should provide some generally acceptable form of religious worship is a more controversial question. If religion means devotion to all the higher values, it seems clear that the cultivation of this spirit is of supreme importance for the life of the community; and it cannot be assumed that it will be adequately provided by private enterprise, in a form that is suitable for all members of any group. That different forms should be tolerated is perhaps too obvious to call for special emphasis; and I think Mr. Laski[1] and others are right in contending that no prestige should attach to the form that is provided by the State, any more than in the case of general education. What is important is that that form should be as little controversial as possible, and should be of a kind that could be used without offence on occasions of national ceremonial. Beyond this, it does not lie within my province to determine its nature. It would have to be readily adaptable to changing conditions of thought and of spiritual development; and it seems clear that its emphasis should be mainly on the generally recognized essentials of the good life. It is hardly necessary to dwell further upon this, as I believe it is rapidly coming to be generally acknowledged in this country. It is gradually being recognized—partly with the help of psychical research—that the essential meaning of religion lies in its ethical spirit rather than in dogmatic theories. It has been recently urged[2] that 'Had Western civilization devoted its

[1] Especially in his *Grammar of Politics*.

[2] By Principal Jacks, *The Legends of Smokeover*, p. 248.

energies to Beauty and Joy, instead of to Power and Wealth, not one of the creeds would be in existence.' This may be an exaggeration;[1] but certainly excessive devotion to the instrumental values tends to obscure those that are intrinsic. Some creeds have been apt to be accepted, as it has been wittily put, as a sort of 'insurance against fire.' It is not against fire that we have to be insured, but against the predominance of the lower elements in our nature over the higher.

The antagonism between different forms of worship is probably due in the main to a misconception of the meaning of worship. We have become so accustomed to the formulation of creeds and to the attempt to gain universal acceptance for them that we are apt to forget that it is largely for political and even partly economic reasons that we are led to insist on this. The spontaneous worship of what, for some reason, is admired or feared, does not necessarily involve anything that can be called a creed. As Professor Gilbert Murray has pointed out,[2] most people in our own country are constantly recognizing a variety of gods, such as Father Christmas, Britannia, John Bull, *etc*. We not only speak about them, but we make images of them, and they are, to some extent, worshipped. It is not supposed, except in early childhood, that any of them are persons in the sense—which is not altogether easy to define—in which we are persons. But it may be doubted whether even very primitive peoples believe this about the objects of their worship. When we talk of our fathers having 'worshipped stocks and stones,' we are apt to forget that Wordsworth was willing to describe himself as a worshipper of Nature and that Ruskin was ready to kneel before a great picture that he admired. A better understanding of what worship—the recognition of worth—means, would help to promote a much greater degree of toleration than is often found even at the present time. There is a very notable statue of Liberty in America and there

[1] It should not be understood as implying that we are not to attempt to formulate views about the supreme values, but only that we should recognize that any formulations must be regarded as being, to some extent, tentative and provisional. Even the most strenuous of the philosophers and the most profound of the mystics are liable to error; and they have generally recognized this.

[2] *Four Stages of Greek Religion*, p. 28.

is a statue of Physical Energy in London; and, in a sense, it is quite true that the things thus represented are worshipped—perhaps not always quite wisely; but they are not supposed to be divine Persons. Nor was the Goddess of Reason regarded in that way in Paris. Worship is one thing: the formulation of a creed is quite another. It is being gradually recognized that it is the former, not the latter, that is the essence of religion—the recognition of supreme Value or Worth, not a particular formula that we are called upon to believe. The former is something that we can know and feel: the latter is too often little more than a form of words. The more fully this comes to be recognized, the more will it be possible to secure cultural unity, not only within nations, but between nations. Indeed, it is not too optimistic to state that it is being rapidly achieved.

What has now been stated about religious or quasi-religious symbols may be applied also to other forms of symbolism. Words are symbols, and here also different peoples become attached to the particular modes of expression with which they have become familiar. Even within a single nation there are often great differences in this respect. In our own country, Wales has a language of its own; and many Welsh people are greatly attached to their own modes of expression. There are similar differences in France and in most other countries. Even if there were a generally recognized language for international intercourse, it might still remain true that different regions retained special languages. Indeed, if there were one generally recognized language for international intercourse, it would probably be easier than it is at present to permit a great variety of local forms of communication. The toleration of different traditions in this respect is on the same footing as the toleration of other forms of symbolism, though it does, no doubt, present more difficulties than the toleration of most other symbolic differences. The general recognition of the importance of this kind of toleration would help to remove many difficulties both within countries and between countries. But it presupposes the existence of some common medium of intercourse in addition to the local varieties.

CHAPTER VII

THE ECONOMIC ASPECT OF LIFE

For the mass of mankind in all countries their daily toil is what necessarily absorbs the greater part, or at least a very large part, of their attention. Their toil, it is true, may be partly, or even wholly, in the interest of spiritual development. They may be teachers or artists; or, if they are builders or gardeners, their work may have, to a large extent, an artistic aspect. Perhaps all work ought, directly or indirectly, to have that aspect. Or, again, their work may be political or legal. But they are at least generally concerned, in some degree, with the handling of material things, with the use of certain tools or machinery, *i.e.* with things that have only an instrumental value; and their aim is partly that of securing means for the support of their bodily existence and that of their families or dependents. This is so much a universal necessity that it might be thought that, here at least, they should all be united, like a band of brothers, in a common endeavour. Yet it is very evident that it is on this side of life that many, probably even most, of the serious quarrels between men have arisen. The reason is mainly that what is here sought is not what is good intrinsically and universally, but only what is good for some special purpose, and often merely for particular individuals or groups. The economic interpretation of history is, no doubt, somewhat one-sided; but no one can deny that the economic side has been extremely prominent in the history of the world. Quarrels about religion may have roused deeper feelings and even provoked actions of greater cruelty; but they have not been so persistent and widespread.

The chief grounds of industrial conflict are very obvious. The means of physical subsistence are in most places somewhat limited and precarious, and they differ greatly in amount and quality from place to place; and it is a sphere in which new inventions are constantly being made, which often create

serious disturbances in the social order. It is natural that every individual and every group should wish to have the best, or at least not the worst, for themselves and those who are most dear to them; yet the majority must often be content with what is far from the best; and, in times of famine or derangement, they may suffer sore distress. In the meantime, they may be well aware that there are people in other places, perhaps not very remote, who have abundance and could well afford to part with some of it. Hence arises discontent even in very simple forms of social life. But, with the development of more complex forms of industrial life, the causes of division become more and more acute. Division of labour gives rise to many natural inequalities. Some kinds of work are harder, less interesting, more precarious, requiring longer efforts in the way of preparation, than others; and it is less and less easy to interchange different modes of employment that require specialized training. Again, the population in any particular place tends to increase; and neither the space to be occupied nor its productivity tends to increase in the same proportion. Men acquire vested rights in certain places, and the late comers have no property, and have to serve those who are in possession. Naturally they begin to think, if they have leisure to reflect, that, as Proudhon pointedly put it, all property is essentially theft. In highly developed industrial communities, with much machinery and elaborate methods of production, a somewhat sharp division arises between those who have a considerable amount of property and those who have little or none. This opposition is commonly described, not altogether inaccurately, as that between Capital and Labour. Its most obvious form, especially in Western Europe and North America, is seen in the opposition between those who own the larger kinds of property in land or houses or machinery, and those who are under the necessity of working in their service. It is seen that, under such conditions, a large number of people never have a real chance of earning much more than the barest necessaries of existence, and even these somewhat precariously; whereas others, not always obviously superior in merit, are, from the outset, hardly ever in any serious danger of being without a sufficiency of what is necessary for the support of

life, and are often not even under the necessity of giving serious attention to the problem of securing the material means of subsistence. It is felt that there is some grave injustice in this arrangement; and this is a persistent source of discontent and opposition. The opposition is made more acute and more complicated when changes take place somewhat suddenly in industrial methods. The story of the quarrel between Cain and Abel seems to refer to some opposition of this kind, probably between agriculture and manufacture; and the changes that took place in industrial methods owing to the rapid increase in the use of the steam-engine and later mechanical inventions throughout the last century are a more obvious modern instance.

The problem, however, is not a purely local one. It is not merely individuals in particular countries or districts who feel themselves to be in a disadvantageous position in comparison with others. Some districts and countries are more favourably situated than others from an economic point of view. They have a more fertile soil, a better supply of mineral resources, a readier access to the sea, or are in other respects better adapted for human habitation. The English-speaking peoples, for instance, are felt to have considerable advantages in these respects, owing to their extensive possessions throughout the world; and other peoples—especially in countries that have a rapidly increasing population—are, in consequence, rather apt to press their claims for 'a place in the sun.' That this is the source of many international jealousies, and tends to lead to disastrous wars, is too obvious to call for special emphasis or illustration here. But it forces us to give some consideration to the statement to which we have had to refer more than once already, that 'property is theft.'

The general origin and justification of private property seems clear enough. It is not confined to human beings. 'Foxes have holes and the birds of the air have nests.' There is hardly any animal—one might almost say, hardly any plant—that does not appropriate to itself some particular place that it claims as its own and defends against intruders. And, in all such cases, the first comer is apt to have the advantage. Those that arrive late may find that there is no place reserved. In

the animal world there seems to be no means of dealing with this problem except conflict and gradual adaptation to new conditions. Nature is, to a large extent, 'red in tooth and claw'; and, in its ruder phases, human life is not intrinsically different from that of other animals. But we have gradually become different; and we may become more widely different as we develop further. On the one hand, we make larger claims: on the other hand, we have more refined methods of adjusting our claims. No bird claims more than one nest, whereas a human being may be the owner of hundreds of houses. On the other hand, no bird can discuss questions of equity with another or compromise on some arrangement for mutual convenience; whereas human beings, as co-operative creators, may be, and ought to be, open to such considerations. Reference may be made to Miss M. P. Follett's book on *Creative Experience* for illustrations of the way in which such adjustments are made—though perhaps she is a little too optimistic about them. Questions of equity, however, belong properly to the political aspect of life; and we are not directly concerned with them at present. What we are at present concerned with is the consideration of the conditions that are essential for the carrying on of the industrial life successfully; and it seems clear that one of those conditions is that certain forms of property should be well under the control of those individuals or those groups who are best qualified to use them for the common good. This is the economic justification of property, whether it be private or communal. How far it carries us is quite another question. It would seem that the justification of it involves at least the qualification that it is to be used for the common good; and, if we were right in the emphasis that was laid on co-operative creation, there would seem to be a certain presumption in favour of the possession of property by groups rather than by individuals. This question will have to be considered shortly. In the meantime, what it is chiefly important to bear in mind is that property, in the sense in which it is here defended, is property that is used creatively, not property that is simply enjoyed. The distinction, like most other distinctions that can be made with reference to human life, is not one that can be quite sharply drawn. The possession of books

and pictures, for instance, may be primarily for enjoyment; but it may also serve as means of education for future productive work. But, in general, it is not very easy to justify possessions that are not put to some definitely creative use. The only real justification would seem to lie in the uncertainty of life. We seldom know quite clearly how far we may be able to use any resources that we may happen to possess; and it may not be obvious that we could do any good by parting with them. In general, a good deal of what individuals possess is in the form of money or documents by which it is represented; and a large part of this is in the hands of bankers, through whom it is made available for a variety of purposes. To the general question of private property, however, we shall have occasion to refer later. For the present, it may be best to pass to the consideration of the question, how the general justification of the creative use of property bears upon the antithesis that is commonly recognized between Capital and Labour.

The antithesis between Capital and Labour, as we have already had occasion to notice, is to a considerable extent misleading. It comes to us from a time when the functions of organization and management (which are essentially forms of labour) were imperfectly understood. For a good many years now the term *entrepreneur* has come into general use. It cannot be easily rendered into English except by 'Undertaker,' a word that has acquired some unpleasant associations. Any person or body of persons who 'undertakes' the organization of a business must usually have or acquire certain forms of capital. It may, however, be borrowed; and, in that case, the interest on it is one of the charges on the undertaking.[1] The Undertaker, as such, is not a capitalist. His earnings are not interest (which is the form of payment that is made for capital), but profits, which may happen to be negative, *i.e.* losses. It seems to be best to regard his earnings as the wages that are paid for organizing skill; though, on a more searching

[1] The legitimacy of interest has sometimes been called in question. I believe it was Böhm-Bawerk who first clearly explained the ground for it. It is partly insurance against risk, but mainly a payment for the advantage of *time*. The saying that he who gives soon gives twice (*bis dat qui cito dat*) is the clue to its significance. The Undertaker, by borrowing, gets capital *at the right moment*, and it is chiefly for this advantage that he pays.

analysis, they might be said to be partly of the nature of Rent on natural ability and partly of interest on acquired skill, which is a form of Capital.[1] But similar refinements might be applied to all forms of Labour. On the whole, it seems to be substantially true to say that all those who are directly concerned in any business enterprise are essentially labourers; and this applies not only to work of a purely industrial kind, but also to services that are spiritual or political in their character. Clergymen, professors, schoolmasters, lawyers, soldiers, Cabinet Ministers, and even ordinary members of Parliament, are now generally recognized as workers who earn some sort of wage. Within any kind of undertaking, the antithesis is not between Capital and Labour, but rather between different kinds of Labour; though it is true that the difference of kind may involve differences of degree and also other differences which can be analysed into distinguishable elements. Some kinds of labour are harder than others. Some are more nearly of the nature of pure effort, while others imply natural ability or special training. All this has to be taken into account.

In recent years it has sometimes been more definitely recognized than it commonly was in the past that the success of any complex undertaking often depends, not merely on the skill and foresight of the Undertaker, but also on the diligence and loyalty of those who co-operate with him. The system of Profit Sharing was introduced with the object of giving expression to this recognition. It has sometimes been objected that, in strictness, it ought to be accompanied by Loss Sharing in times of difficulty. But it may be doubted whether this is a valid objection. The success of an undertaking may often be largely due to the interest that is taken in it by those who are employed in carrying it on. Losses are probably more often due to miscalculations on the part of the Undertakers or to circumstances that could not be foreseen or guarded against. Still, it must be admitted that the method of Profit Sharing, or even what has been described as Welfare Sharing, does not carry us very far towards the solution of the problem of the

[1] Distinctions of this kind have been carefully drawn and elaborately developed in Marshall's *Principles of Economics* and to some extent in later works.

right relationship between those who employ and those who are employed. Some arrangements of more universal applicability appear to be called for.

The antithesis between Producers and Consumers, like that between Capital and Labour, is to a certain extent artificial and misleading. Only a limited number of the products of Labour can be properly said to be consumable at all. No one can consume the *Iliad*, and it is to be hoped that no one will ever consume the Taj Mahal. The distinction has arisen primarily from the simple cases of food and drink. There is an obvious difference between eating and drinking and the labour by which what is eaten and drunk is procured. Even here, if we descend a little in the scale of life to some of the lower animals, and still more to some of the plants, we find that eating and drinking are almost the main work of their lives, though there is usually some degree of difficulty in finding what is to be eaten and drunk; and it is only too easy for human beings to relapse into a similar attitude, and to think, like Sir Andrew Aguecheek, that life essentially consists of these activities. On the other hand, if we consider some of the higher activities of life, such as the writing and the reading of books, though the one may be called production and the other consumption, it may sometimes be the case that the latter is as hard work as the former. At any rate, as Sheridan observed, easy writing often makes hard reading. The labour is more or less distributed between the producer and the consumer. Probably the profit derived from the work is usually distributed in pretty nearly the same way. Each gains what he creates for himself. Similarly, the work of teaching is often a work in which he who teaches learns as much as he who is taught, and he who is being taught does most of the work. Still, on the whole, a fairly clear distinction can be drawn in most cases between productive labour and the relatively passive consumption of its product; and it is generally to a large extent true that it is the demand that determines the supply. This is true even of some of the finest products of human genius. We could hardly have had the rich Shakespearean drama without the eager and appreciative audiences for which the plays were written, nor the great Italian artists without the need that had been created for some

expressive representation of religious and other vital conceptions. No doubt, it is also true that a great genius may go far to create his audience: Wordsworth and Browning did so in the end. It is well to bear in mind such instances as these, and not to think only of purely industrial products; for, though industrial activities are primarily concerned with material things, they may often so fashion those things as to serve spiritual ends. It has begun to be recognized in our own time, largely through the influence of such writers as Ruskin and William Morris, that the cultivation of artistic appreciation is one of the most hopeful directions—perhaps even the only hopeful direction—in which we may look for the liberation of human labour from its thraldom to machinery. Thus the work of cultivating the consumer is an essential step in the way of providing better conditions for the producer. It is to a large extent true that the public gets what it wants. Degraded wants produce degrading conditions of labour; and the supply of the finer and more humane forms of labour grows with the growth of a wise demand. 'A thing of beauty is a joy for ever': it blesses him who has it and it ennobles him who makes it. And even the more purely material satisfactions are sanctified by their subservience to these more spiritual ends.

'In all labour there is profit.' Whether the labour that is expended by particular people is productive of anything that is of real advantage to the human race may sometimes be open to question. There may be some doubt, for instance, whether the very considerable amount of labour that is devoted in many parts of the world to the production of intoxicating drinks, opium, tobacco, and other drugs, or again on the production of sensational stories, makes any contribution to the welfare of mankind at all proportionate to the exertion that is expended on these objects. It is probable, however, that none of them is wholly without use in its proper place. On the other hand, even things generally recognized as useful may often be produced and used to an extent that is not really beneficial. Mr. Edward Carpenter[1] and others have urged that many of the things that

[1] Especially in his book on *Civilization: its Cause and Cure*. Here the term 'civilization' is used in one of the senses in which it is contrasted with 'culture.'

are commonly regarded as essential elements in civilization do not really contribute anything of importance to human well-being, and are rather harmful than otherwise. Simpler ways of life, which would call for less expenditure of labour, have thus had many advocates. Problems of this kind, however, cannot be satisfactorily dealt with from a purely industrial point of view. They involve considerations that are spiritual and sometimes political, rather than industrial. The question that is generally felt to be more pressing in the strictly industrial sphere is that which concerns the wages of labour—the question, namely, whether the reward that goes to the various classes of labour is fairly apportioned. This is evidently a very difficult question to answer. Economists are able to explain, usually with the help of a good deal of somewhat elaborate mathematical reasoning, how it comes to be apportioned as it actually is. But this does not suffice to show that the apportionment is intrinsically just; though it may show that it would be extremely difficult to make any considerable changes in it. It depends on the interaction of the two forces that are commonly described as Demand and Supply; and the attempt to make any real and lasting improvement would generally involve the introduction of certain changes in both these factors. But it is almost the whole business of human life to find means of counteracting natural tendencies that are opposed to the intrinsic values that we pursue. What has always to be remembered is that unemployment is, in general, an even greater evil than low wages.

The supply of labour in any country depends, of course, very largely on the natural rate of increase in the population and the extent to which immigration or emigration takes place. These are matters which it is very difficult to regulate in any definite way without giving rise to a good deal of hardship. A comparatively fixed population like that of France (though in this case the fixity is somewhat artificially created) can be dealt with more simply than one like that of pre-war Germany, in which there has been a rapid natural increase, or like that of the United States, in which, in addition to the natural increase, there is a great deal of immigration, or like that of Italy or Ireland, in which there is a great deal of emigration,

or like that of Great Britain, in which there is a considerable amount of both. This is one of the circumstances that make it important to have a world outlook, and not a purely national one. Some further reference will have to be made to it at a later stage.

The importance of leisure has already been referred to, and the advances that have been made in industrial production have not always been favourable to it. Still less have they always been favourable to the provision of opportunities for the best use of leisure. It is, of course, very difficult to compare one age with another in this respect. The first half or more of the nineteenth century is generally thought to have been a time of special hardship. The rapid introduction of machinery did little or nothing to alleviate the conditions of labour. It was specially with reference to this period that J. S. Mill made the famous declaration that it was doubtful whether the use of machinery had lightened the toil of a single person. Probably that would no longer be true. But the crowding of the population into large cities, especially in some parts of our own country, was somewhat unfavourable to the most wholesome use of leisure, even when it was to be had. On the other hand, it was favourable to the rapid advancement of a limited number of people with some organizing ability, but not in other respects highly cultivated, and with little power of appreciating the needs and difficulties of those who worked in their employment. There appears to be no doubt that conditions have, in this respect, been greatly improved in recent years, but only as the result of a good deal of agitation. In our own country some of the improvement may be traced to the teaching and example of Robert Owen and to the somewhat violent preaching of Cobbett and of Thomas Carlyle and his followers; but much is due also to inventions that really do save labour and make it less exhausting, and to a better understanding of the loss that is entailed by overstrain. It is now pretty generally recognized that better results can be obtained by limiting the hours of labour to times in which the worker can put forth his best efforts rather than by stretching them out to a longer period in which he is tempted to resort to the policy of 'ca' canny.' It is true that this policy has been adopted, like the similar

policy of restriction that is found in the Indian castes, partly at least with the object of allowing a larger number of people to find employment; but it seems clear that this result also can be better secured by shortening the hours of labour than by encouraging slackness. There are, however, many difficulties connected with this which could not be adequately dealt with in such a book as this. It is in view of these difficulties that the need has been felt for some comprehensive methods of industrial organization such as those that are usually described by the term Socialism. Some remarks must now be made on the general significance of this and of some other conceptions that are closely related to it.

Socialism is generally understood to mean the opposite of Individualism; and a certain amount of confusion has arisen from ambiguities that lurk in the use of both these terms.[1] Sometimes they are used in a very wide sense. Socialism may be taken to mean little more than the recognition of the real unity of a society, as opposed to the view that it is merely a collection of independent individuals, who are essentially self-contained. In this sense, any one who is a believer either in the General Will or in Co-operative Creation may be held to be a Socialist. It was probably in some such sense that it was said that 'we are all socialists now.' Or the reference may have been merely to the general recognition that any organized community must aim at giving assistance to its individual members in a variety of ways. In this sense, a State Church, State Schools, even State Prisons and the Workhouse, might be regarded as socialistic institutions. But, in the more definite sense of the term, it refers to some scheme for the carrying on of the industrial life of the community by the State or Municipalities or other modes of communal activity instead of by private Undertakers. In this sense the conception seems to have found a more ready acceptance in Germany than in most other countries. The apparent efficiency of bureaucratic institutions in Germany has tended to give a certain degree of popularity to the conception even in England; but, on the whole, it remains true

[1] In the Prefatory Note to *The Great State* it is remarked that 'that old and largely fallacious antagonism of socialist and individualist is indeed dissolving out of contemporary thought altogether.' I think this is, on the whole, true.

that the English people are, in general, somewhat distrustful of large schemes of collective organization. Many people in this country are prepared to introduce State or Municipal action in large works of general utility, such as roads, railways, water supply, coal and, within certain limits, education; but are afraid that, in the case of smaller enterprises, State or Municipal control would lead to inefficiency and to an undue suppression of individual initiative. Probably the experience of the Great War has tended to modify this attitude to some extent in several different directions.

At any rate, it has long been felt, even in this country, that purely individualistic methods in industry are unsatisfactory. It is often said that what has been chiefly characteristic of our modern European civilization is its general condition of industrial freedom. There have been very few restrictions either on the kinds or on the methods of industrial undertakings; but this lack of control, though in some respects advantageous to the strong, is apt to be disastrous to those who, for any reason, are in a relatively weak position. Even the strong, indeed, are liable to find themselves at the mercy of changing conditions that have no guiding will behind them. This somewhat haphazard condition was well characterized by Emerson in the picturesque phrase that has been so often quoted:—

> 'Tis the day of the chattel,
> Web to weave and corn to grind;
> Things are in the saddle
> And ride mankind.

Freedom from human control is apt to mean subjection to forces of a more disastrous, because a blinder, sort. The dominance of material conditions leads to a certain confusion of values. When human wills—even imperfectly educated wills—are definitely in charge, there is at least some attempt to have a clear conception of the ends that are pursued and the value that is to be attached to them. In a state of free competition, on the other hand, it is apt to be thought that the only determinants of value are demand and supply—the view that was summed up in the senseless doggerel—

> The value of a thing
> Is just as much as it will bring.

The possession of money, as the general symbol of effective demand, is thus apt to be chiefly valued. Labour, on the other hand, tends to be reckoned as the main element in cost of production, and so is regarded as an evil. In such a condition, most people want to have as much money and to do as little work as possible. They like to think of themselves as having no vocations but only certain avocations that take them away from time to time from the recreations and sensuous enjoyments that constitute the real goods of life.[1] It is thought desirable to possess rather than to create,[2] to consume rather than to produce. As Professor Veblen has pointed out,[3] under such conditions waste comes to be even reputable: it is a sign of the possession of what is really valuable. The possessive impulse, as Mr. Russell and others have urged, tends to take the place of the creative. 'Sloth and cowardice,' according to William James,[4] 'creep in with every dollar or guinea we have to guard.'

Carlyle was one of the first, and perhaps the most impressive, of those who emphasized the unsatisfactoriness of the anarchic condition into which society appeared to be drifting. He suggested the institution of a new aristocracy of Captains of Industry,[5] but unfortunately he did not sufficiently distinguish the condition of those under the guidance of such captains from that of slavery or serfdom, which he was evidently quite prepared to tolerate. No doubt, it might be replied that the condition of a wage-slave is in some respects inferior to that of a serf. Serfs were probably often treated by their masters with a good deal of friendly consideration, just as dogs and horses were, either from simple good nature or from a sense of obligation or from the recognition that those who are well treated are likely to be more serviceable than those who are harshly dealt with. At least they were part of the property of their

[1] Several of these points were well brought out, in contrast with Oriental views of life, in an article on 'The Miscarriage of Life in the West,' by Sir P. Ramanathan, in the *Hibbert Journal*, October 1908.

[2] This antithesis is, on the whole, well emphasized by Mr. Russell in *The Principles of Social Reconstruction*. See also *An Acquisitive Society*, by R. H. Tawney.

[3] *The Theory of a Leisured Class*.

[4] *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 319.

[5] The futility of this has been urged with considerable force by Mr. J. A. Hobson in his book on *The Social Problem*, p. 136.

masters, and were naturally cared for as such. Under the modern system the relation between employer and employed is much less intimate. The bond between them is little more than what Carlyle called the 'cash nexus.'[1] Carlyle was even inclined to advocate a return to the system of slavery or serfdom, which he described as the method of 'hiring one's servants for life'—a fallacious expression; for, if they are taken for life, they are not 'hired,' but *possessed* (body and soul). When they are only hired, it is a certain limited portion of their labour that is bought, not their whole being. Carlyle also urged that servants thus possessed should be at least as well treated as horses. But it was rightly pointed out by Professor W. Smart[2] (who was largely a disciple of Carlyle and Ruskin) that human beings cannot, without degradation, be treated as animals, even if, in a material sense, they might live more happily under such treatment. They have independent wills, that have to be respected. They give their labour, whereas a horse only does its work. Most people now recognize that the methods of slavery and serfdom belong definitely to the past; but it is still felt that the present wage system is unsatisfactory. It is unsatisfactory chiefly because it has too little fixity and is somewhat destructive of the sense of fellowship. It tends to split society into groups of warring elements, instead of associations of co-operative fellow-citizens.

The conception of Captains of Industry, however, of which Carlyle made use, and which had already been anticipated in practice by Robert Owen and others, has been highly fruitful, and has led to various schemes for the closer co-operation of employers of labour with those whom they employ. Among its fruits were some of the methods to which reference has already been made—Profit Sharing and what has been described as Welfare Sharing under the leadership of Lord Leverhulme. Such schemes are perhaps a little open to the suspicion of tending to reduce those who are employed somewhat too closely to the servile condition. In particular, it is sometimes

[1] It was, however, pointed out by Arnold Toynbee that 'because of the cash nexus, with its impersonality, a man may now sell his labour without selling himself.' See the remarks on this in Professor Hocking's book on *Human Nature and its Remaking*, p. 286.

[2] *Economic Annals of the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 541–2.

urged that any benefits that are secured by these methods are liable to be counterbalanced by reduction of wages or over-pressure of work. These defects could probably be guarded against; but there is perhaps some truth in the contention that the general conception of Captains of Industry is somewhat too paternal for a stage of social development in which people have learned to appreciate what Burns described as 'the glorious privilege of being independent.'

The line of advance that has recently found most favour in this country is one closely connected with Socialism; and is, indeed, sometimes regarded as a particular variety of it, *viz.* the organization of Guilds. This is an attempt to revive an older method of industrial activity, which indeed was not confined to industry in the narrower sense. Guilds have a very long history. They appear to have been originally associations within particular neighbourhoods for purposes of mutual benefit, and were perhaps more nearly akin to what are now called Friendly Societies than to any other modern institutions. But gradually the term came to be applied to associations of a somewhat different kind, *viz.* for the carrying on of particular kinds of industry or commerce in a co-operative spirit. It was in this sense that the terms Merchant Gild and Craft Gild were employed; and they played a very important part in Mediaeval Europe. The most prominent relics of this type of organization that we still possess are the older Universities, which were originally associations of this sort for the promotion of learning, not organized by a State or Municipality, but conducted by those interested in that kind of work, and enjoying certain privileges guaranteed by the States within whose purview they existed. The Universities, though hardly industrial institutions, were evidently very admirable samples of this type of organization; but so, it would seem, were many of the more purely industrial Guilds. 'The Trade Societies,' it has been said,[1] 'were schools of citizenship.' They had usually a somewhat strongly religious character. Their 'Work was Worship'; and they kept alive the spirit of co-operative action and mutual aid at a time when lessons of this kind were greatly needed. Many students of Mediaeval life have been greatly attracted by them,

[1] M. Fothergill Robinson, *The Spirit of Association*, p. 56.

and have been led to think that they were too lightly permitted to die out. William Morris probably did more than anyone else to show what might be done in modern times in the way of reviving what was best in their methods. He was somewhat akin to Carlyle and Ruskin in his general aims; but, being himself a craftsman, he was able to apply their ideas in a more practical way. He was less inclined than they were to emphasize the importance of captains or masters, and more apt to think rather of leaders or of the co-operation of people standing on a basis of substantial equality. He even inclined somewhat to the ideal of Anarchism as what ought ultimately to be aimed at. But, on the whole, he encouraged the conception of Guilds as what is most immediately practicable; and in recent years many capable writers have given their support to this view; and it certainly seems to be one of the most hopeful lines of development.

The kind of work to which the Guild method of organization seems to be specially applicable is that to which in early times the term 'mystery' was applied, *i.e.* work that involves a somewhat prolonged period of training. What are commonly called the Professions are the most conspicuous examples of this; and the early Universities, whose primary object was that of providing professional training, seem to show the Guild system at its best. The terms Master of Arts and Doctor still serve to indicate what was aimed at by the training that was provided. But in other occupations also, in which there was a good deal to be learned, the Apprenticeship system supplied the necessary means. The young man who began as an apprentice in any particular craft might hope in time to become Master of it, and so take rank as one of the leaders of his Guild. It is the restoration of something of this kind that is aimed at by a considerable number of social reformers at the present time. They urge that by this means it would be possible to abolish the present method of somewhat casual employment of wage earners, forming a class different from and liable to be opposed to the class of employers. The employers would then simply be those who had become Masters of their particular crafts, and those whom they employed would be learners at an earlier stage on the same journey. This certainly seems to be an

excellent plan for forms of work that can fairly be described as 'mysteries,' such as Scholarship, Medicine, Law, Engineering and, in general, those occupations for which some sort of College training is now regarded as important, if not essential. Whether it is equally applicable to those forms of work in which the more mechanical part is simple and easily learned, may be more doubtful. On board ship, for instance, it seems probable that the captain and officers will for a long time be somewhat sharply distinguished from those who work under their direction. A ship is, in fact, the favourite example for those writers who, like Carlyle, have insisted on the importance of the Captain or Master, as distinguished from the simple Leader or *primus inter pares*. But most aspects of the industrial life have very little resemblance to the navigation of a ship, and can be managed on more democratic principles. What kind of organization is the best it is certainly not for me to determine; but I may state that the method of 'Corporations,' described by Messrs. Plumb and Roylance in their book *Industrial Democracy*[1] seems to me the most hopeful of all that have been so far put forward. It bears a considerable resemblance to the plans of the Guild Socialists, but does not involve nationalization, and appears to make better provision for the co-operation of all the factors of production.

Socialism, as I understand it, is primarily a method for the organization of industry on a co-operative plan. If the general view of co-operative creation that is taken in this book is sound, some such plan ought to be aimed at. Communism, on the other hand, is concerned rather with the distribution of wealth; but, of course, this is apt to be very closely connected with the methods of organization for purposes of production. It is noteworthy, however, that, while Socialism is pretty definitely opposed to Individualism, Communism is rather apt to rest upon an individualistic basis. Extremes may be said to meet here. The pure communist tends to think of the wealth that is in the possession of any society as an amount that is

[1] Published by B. W. Huebsch, New York. The general organization of the proposed Corporations is fully explained in Chapter XI. Some of the difficulties involved in Guild Socialism have been noted by Marshall, *Industry and Trade*, pp. 844–7. See also the book on *Guild Socialism* by Professor G. C. Field and Mr. Russell's *Roads to Freedom*.

to be distributed among the individuals of whom the society is composed. This is, of course, a natural distinction; for, while individuals generally co-operate with one another in production, it is usually as separate individuals that they consume. It is true that eating and drinking together has been taken as the symbol of communion; but the reason, I believe, is that it is in that activity that the most extreme opposition is overcome. He who enjoys another's eating and drinking has crossed the last barrier of individualism.

Those who approach the problem of industrial organization from the side of consumption, rather than from that of production, are generally led to support the ideal of equality; whereas those who look rather at the side of production are more apt to favour liberty. Those who are engaged in production have usually powers that are pretty obviously diverse and unequal; and for the exercise of these powers they often need to have a certain control over instruments, and sometimes over persons. The tools go naturally to the strong. It is otherwise with consumption. The strong may have the keener appetites; but at least the pillows and the cordials are properly assigned to the weak. Hence, on the whole, there is a certain tendency towards equality from this point of view. Communists are apt to urge that those who have any special disadvantage in respect of comparative subordination and lack of interest should be compensated by special privileges in respect of consumption and enjoyment. As we saw, the Indian sages urge that it is the Shudras who are specially entitled to food and recreation, the higher castes having honour, power and wealth. William Morris, in a similar spirit, suggested that in his Utopia the dustman should have a fancy dress, an idea that has received the support of Mr. Dickinson.[1] Whether the dustman would enjoy being made a guy of in this way may be open to some doubt, but at least it is true that the use of an appropriate uniform helps to remind people that they have a special function to fulfil in the service of the State; and it may be specially desirable when the service is of a humble order. On the other hand, it is probably not sufficiently realized by most communists

[1] The reference is, of course, to *News from Nowhere*, and to the very interesting dialogues on *Justice and Liberty*.

that many of the rewards that go to the powerful are really of the nature of instruments and obligations. Those who have shown competence in small things are entrusted with the control of the greater. It is to a certain extent the case, even under the present social order, that the most interesting work is not very highly rewarded. Artistic work is surely the most delightful; yet the poet at least is proverbially poor. Milton was supported by his Latin Secretaryship (which can hardly have been very enjoyable) rather than by *Paradise Lost*. Shakespeare was probably more dependent on the comparative drudgery involved in the management of a theatre than on the works that have made his name immortal. In more recent times several poets have had to receive support from the Government; and in some cases the support was quite inadequate. Those who are engaged in the interesting work of research have often to support themselves by what is for them the much less attractive duty of teaching. Painters and musicians are perhaps, as a rule, more fortunate. Hard manual work is, no doubt, nearly always poorly paid; but it is well to remember that it is work of that kind that is often resorted to as recreation. Within limits, it is apt to be both pleasant and healthful; but the limits tend to be overpassed.

It is doubtful whether complete equality in the rewards of labour can be defended as an ideal. Some communists have, however, gone even farther than this. It has been urged that even those members of a community who render no direct services to it should have their livelihood secured. I believe it was Prince Kropotkin who first suggested the idea of a 'Vagabond's Wage,' which has subsequently received a certain amount of support.[1] As far as I can see, such a proposal could only be entertained if the Wage were regarded as a scholarship to enable young people of promise to have the benefit of some *Wanderjahre* as a preparation for future work, or to enable

[1] Those who support this view probably mean by a 'vagabond' one who devotes himself, like sannyasis or contemplatives in a Catholic community, to some aspect of the cultural life, rather than to the industrial aspect of life. Perhaps the Supertramp may be taken as an illustration. Provision for these would seem to be most effectively made by religious or cultural organizations. What is required for their maintenance could hardly be properly described as Wages.

older people to have holidays for the restoration of health. Certainly, in any ideal community, everyone who gives evidence of readiness to serve should at least be able to secure a Living Wage; and this is beginning to be pretty well recognized. But Communists are often individualists in disguise, and are not really inclined to lay much stress on the service of the community as a necessary condition of communal support.

If the citizens of any community are to be expected to serve it loyally on its industrial side, it is clear that they must be provided with adequate opportunities for preparation in this respect. Yet it is important that industrial training should not be allowed to interfere with those more liberal purposes of education to which reference was made in the preceding chapter. The difficulty may be partly met by suitable methods of apprenticeship within the Guilds or Corporations or other methods of industrial organization that may be devised in the future. But it is partly to be met also by the recognition that a certain amount of training in manual work and in business methods has some value in the general education of all citizens, whatever their future employment is to be. The value of the Sloyd method, for instance, has received a good deal of recognition in recent years. The proper treatment of material things is, in fact, an aspect of spiritual development, as well as the proper treatment of persons. Some aspects of this side of education can be introduced in schools in connection with those regional surveys that are now generally recognized as an important introduction to the study of geography.

At a higher level in education, it is important that the study of the industrial aspects of life should be regarded as among the most interesting branches in the work of a University. Mechanical Engineering has long established its place as a University Study, along with such older subjects as Law and Medicine; and other aspects of the industrial and commercial life are gradually receiving a similar recognition; though it has to be remembered that such studies ought to be preceded or accompanied by some studies of a more purely cultural kind. But what is chiefly important from this point of view is that the general study of the industrial aspect of life should have a prominent place among our academic disciplines. Although

our country was among the earliest leaders in the treatment of economic problems, it can hardly be said that we have been very forward in according them the place to which they are entitled in University education. *Quicquid agunt homines* belongs to the study of Humanity; yet, apart from the London School of Economics, the equipment in this department seems even now to be almost everywhere very inadequate. In several places it is only within quite recent years that anything can be said to have been done in this direction; and the study of pure economics is seldom adequately co-ordinated with that of history and political and social theory. However, there are certainly signs of improvement in this respect.

If there were adequate methods of preparation for the understanding and prosecution of industrial work and some definite organization of the methods of business, by which all the factors of production should have their proper place and their just recompense, it might be hoped that in any community thus equipped industrial peace would prevail almost undisturbed, or disturbed only by the need of occasional adaptation to new conditions of work. The bringing about of such a state of affairs, however, cannot be expected to come of itself within any community. Still less can it be expected to grow up spontaneously in the world as a whole. Even if it be allowed that the economic interpretation of history has been considerably overstressed, it is at least true that industrial problems lie, to a very large extent, at the basis of most of the quarrels that arise between nations. Hence the consideration of these problems cannot be satisfactorily pursued from a purely national point of view, and necessarily involves some reference to the general foundations of the political life, both in its national and in its international aspects.

International unity is at once dependent upon and an essential condition of industrial peace and just methods of economic organization within the several communities that are included in that comprehensive unity. It is not possible in such a book as this to discuss the extent to which the doctrine of Malthus is valid.[1] It seems to be generally agreed that it is to a large

[1] See the statement about this in Professor McDougall's book on *Ethics and Modern World Problems*, pp. 84–7.

extent sound, but has to be stated with considerable reservations. The mathematical form in which it was originally set forth cannot be wholly accepted in view of the fact that an increase of population tends to be accompanied by improved methods of production. But it remains true at least that the pressure of growing populations on the means of subsistence is one of the chief grounds for the tendency in several countries to aim at the extension of their territories. Economic difficulties serve in this way as an occasion for international strife. On the other hand, so long as there is serious risk of international strife, nations are anxious to be in possession of the sinews of war. They compete for the safeguarding of the key industries; and this competition helps to precipitate the war against which it is primarily intended to guard. Both these circumstances stand in the way of satisfactory methods of industrial organization, for which more or less settled conditions of life are essential. Hence also the effort to secure better conditions within any country leads to the desire to find means for the abolition of international strife. Purely economic conditions, however, are of but little direct assistance in the promotion of international unity. The question of the limitation of the population in different countries raises problems that carry us far beyond the industrial sphere. Racial antagonisms enter in here, and it is chiefly on cultural considerations that we have to rely for the mitigation of these. Moral and even religious considerations are also involved in the problem of the limitation of population and in the general problem of the final elimination of war. All that can be claimed, therefore, for the considerations that are referred to in this chapter, is that the concentration of attention on the improvement of methods of industrial organization creates the desire for international peace, and that any failure to secure satisfactory economic conditions in different countries renders the attempt to secure any genuine international unity extremely precarious. How it may be possible to deal with the difficulties that are thus raised will, it is hoped, become somewhat more apparent after we have considered the more purely political aspects of communal life. But it may be as well to admit at once that it does not seem possible to find any method by which the difficulties can be

wholly removed. What we have to hope is that they may be gradually mitigated.

The chief qualification that has to be made, as I have already indicated, of the aim at equality of distribution, is that which was expressed by Carlyle in the phrase 'The tools to him who can use them.' It is not always easy to distinguish between what are tools and what are simply private possession; a scholar's house, for instance, is often his workshop as well as his dwelling-place. His books are, to a large extent, his tools. Similar considerations often apply to artists. Those engaged in political work or on various forms of social organization have to meet their friends and fellow-workers for discussion; and sometimes this can only be conveniently arranged in private houses. Hence some people feel the need for more accommodation than others. It can hardly be doubted that the ideal to be aimed at is that which is expressed in the phrase 'From each according to his powers, to each according to his needs'; but it is by no means easy to determine what are the powers and needs of particular individuals. Often they do not themselves know what their powers are until they have tried. This is the chief justification for individual freedom and for inequality of status; and it is doubtful whether any mode of organization could be devised that would wholly remove the difficulty.[1] It is possible, however, to do a good deal in the way of removing those inequalities that are not involved in the nature of things. Mechanical inventions do help in this. Travel, which is often of great educational benefit, has been made much more possible for almost everyone within recent generations. Good music can be pretty easily heard by people who do not possess any musical instruments. Sanitary dwellings can be, without much difficulty, provided. It is also becoming more and more possible to shorten the hours of exhausting labour. Those who urge, as Anatole France and several others have recently done, that all work that is of the nature of drudgery might be

[1] Professor T. N. Carver, who accepts the general principle of justice that has been indicated, has brought out very fully the chief difficulties that are involved in the effort to realize it. See his *Essays in Social Justice*, especially pp. 142–6. The treatment is free from unnecessary technicalities, and is the clearest exposition of justice in its economic aspect with which I am acquainted.

done by young people working for only a few hours a day, and leaving the rest of their lives free for work of a more definitely creative kind, have perhaps not sufficiently borne in mind some important considerations, such as that 'practice makes perfect,'[1] that what is drudgery for one is an interesting occupation for another,[2] and that only a limited number of people are capable of work that can properly be described as creative.[3] No doubt, the number might be greatly increased by improved methods of education; but such differences as those that are expressed by such terms as Inventors, Organizers and Helpers would pretty certainly remain; and it would remain true that it is best that everyone should be employed, as far as possible, in the kind of work that he can do most efficiently. It may not be possible—perhaps not even desirable —to carry out Plato's scheme for assigning everyone to the work for which he is best fitted, and to confine him rigorously to it; but at least it seems clear that some approximation to this arrangement is the only way in which we can hope to get from each according to his powers. Bradley, in his *Ethical Studies*, brought out the importance of a man's special *Station and its Duties*; and Professor E. J. Urwick, in his book on *The Social Good*, has placed first on the list of the conditions of human happiness that of having a special work for which one is fitted (p. 14). 'The simple fact is,' he says (p. 170), 'that most of us are not artists and are not likely to become artists.' The question then is, whether there is any practicable method by which this arrangement can, in some tolerable degree, be brought about. It has to be remembered also that secure control of the necessary instruments of productive work is an important element in the efficiency of any undertaking. The

[1] It is true, however, that some of the necessary training might be got in childhood.

[2] The task of organizing the necessary work would itself, I should suppose, be a difficult and anxious one.

[3] The most definite statements on this subject with which I am acquainted are those in the book on *Socialism and the Great State*, especially in the essay by Sir L. G. Chiozza Money on 'Work in the Great State.' The scheme involves the breaking off of systematic education at the age of eighteen. This seems a doubtful boon; but, no doubt, some modification might be made in detail without entirely destroying the general conception of the scheme. Still, I do not feel hopeful about it.

saying of Arthur Young[1] about this has, I suppose, not lost its force: 'Give a man the secure possession of a rock, and he will turn it into a garden. Give him a nine years' lease, and he will convert it into a desert.' The desire to hand down the garden that has been created to succeeding generations is also a great force in the promotion of creative effort. Considerations of this kind tell somewhat in favour of certain forms of individual ownership, and lead one to doubt whether any single method of organization is desirable. But the detailed consideration of such problems would carry us beyond the limits of such a book as this. I mention them here only to indicate the necessity for careful study of the powers and needs that have to be taken into account in any attempt to deal adequately with the problems of industrial organization. That great improvements might be made in the existing methods seems clear; and every suggestion that may be put forward should be carefully weighed.

It seems clear that the actual organization can only be brought about by some form of State control under the guidance of experts. We have already noted that it is doubtful whether any forms of industry, with such obvious exceptions as the work of the postal service and possibly of the railways and roads and any other things that directly concern the life of the country as a whole, should be actually organized and directly controlled by the State. The primary function of the State is judicial; and it can hardly be both judge and one of the parties on which judgment has to be passed. If the State were a universal employer, there would be no appeal against its actions and methods. It may, of course, be answered that, with a thoroughly democratic constitution, the State would be controlled by the will of the majority. But, without endorsing the opinion of Carlyle, that the people as a whole means so many millions 'mostly fools,' we may at least note that the people as a whole is necessarily somewhat of the nature of a Crowd, rather than a Co-operative Group. Their minds are necessarily occupied mainly with their own particular tasks. They could not be expected to form any reliable judgment on questions affecting the whole life of the community. The further consideration of

[1] Quoted by Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, Book II, chap. vi. sec. 7.

this, however, belongs properly to the following chapter. But the main point seems sufficiently clear, *viz.* that the State can hardly be expected to occupy satisfactorily the double rôle of universal employer or 'undertaker' and universal judge. It may carry on work that directly concerns the country as a whole, but not the more detailed work that concerns, in varying degrees, particular sections of the community. If we accept the general principle that what has ultimately to be aimed at is that which is expressed in the formula 'from each according to his powers, to each according to his needs,' it is evident that we are committed to the fundamental doctrine which has been emphasized by many recent writers, *viz.* that we should aim at the 'destruction of the whole idea of remuneration for work done and the apprehension of the economic problem as that of dividing the national income without regard to any particular work done among the members of the community.'[1] The qualification that it seems necessary to make is that there must be some means of securing that each one is in the position in which his powers can be used to the best advantage for the common good, and that the remuneration is such as to meet his special needs. The difficulty in estimating these elements is what chiefly stands in the way of any universal application of Guild methods. It has to be recognized that it must, to some extent, be left to individual workers to discover what their powers and their needs are. Until we have more satisfactory methods of doing this, it is probable that the rough method of remuneration by the estimation of the economic value of the services that are rendered will continue to prevail in many forms of industry. It is well to recognize, however, that it cannot be recognized as ultimately satisfactory. No conceivable method of organization could wholly play the part of Providence. Human life is necessarily subject, not merely to the 'blind Fury with the abhorred shears,' but to that other power, hardly less blind, that Ruskin characterized as 'Fors.' Our chief consolation is that the operation of these powers is often the means of calling out some of the finest qualities in human nature, sympathy and active help, without the need for which our life might become little better than a mechanism.

[1] G. D. H. Cole, *Guild Socialism Restated*, p. 75.

But such considerations need not make us any less eager to equalize the conditions of life as far as possible, by public organization as well as by private effort. It must be remembered further that the economic aspect of life, in the sense in which I am here using the term, is not merely concerned with labour, but also with leisure, in so far as leisure means not cultural activity but physical relaxation. In so far as a man's work is mainly cultural, his relaxation tends to be largely physical; and, so far as his work is mainly physical, his relaxation may be expected to be largely cultural. Rest is, to some extent, pure repose; but, to a considerable extent, it is change of occupation. The need for such change is one of the chief grounds for the limitation of the hours of labour. Climatic conditions enter in here to a considerable extent, as they do in the more purely cultural aspect of life. The climate of England tends to promote physical energy, both in work and in play. There are not many who are very strongly tempted, like Wordsworth, to sit upon an old grey stone and dream their time away. In India it is different. Max Müller has quoted[1] the saying of an Indian chief: 'Ah, brother, you will never know the pleasure of doing nothing and thinking nothing; and yet, next to sleep, that is the most delicious. Thus we were before our birth; thus we shall be again after death.' This is not to be taken too literally, any more than in the case of Wordsworth. In such rest the spirit is not altogether inactive, any more than it is even in sleep. I suppose it is in this sense that Mr. Russell, notwithstanding his emphasis on creative activity, has recently declared[2] that he has 'hopes of laziness as a gospel.' This is essentially for the sake of the cultural life; but it is one of the considerations that have to be taken as qualifications on the Gospel of Work. Work is, after all, for the sake of life; and the best part of life lies in the pursuit of the higher values. With improved methods of education and increased facilities for making what is best in it universally accessible, the demand for leisure will be more widely felt, and it will be used to better purpose.

[1] *Origin and Growth of Religion*, pp. 79–80.
[2] *The Prospects of Industrial Civilization*, pp. 181–2.

CHAPTER VIII

THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF LIFE

We have already had occasion to give some account of the place of the political aspect in the general life of a community. It is essentially the legal aspect, and consequently the aspect that involves force; for, as Victor Hugo expressed it, *qui dit droit dit force*.[1] A law that is not carried into effect is no law at all. Hence the political aspect of life has necessarily a certain supremacy over the other two. The spiritual aspect is the finest, the most sublime, and the most truly human. The industrial is the most necessary, the most pressing, the most universal: without it, in some degree, life cannot be carried on at all. But the political aspect is the most commanding. The State is essentially a benevolent Power, directed to the maintenance of all the values, both intrinsic and instrumental. Even the great foundations of religion and morality have been put in the form of legal requirements: 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy strength, and with all thy mind, and thy neighbour as thyself.' But love cannot, in any direct way, be commanded: it can only be developed by a spiritual process of education. We cannot, as it has been said, 'love those whom we do not like'; and we can learn to like them only by learning to understand them. Such learning may, however, be promoted, regulated and enjoined by the political power. Even in the Indian caste system, as we have seen, though the Brahmans have the highest honour, it is the Ksattriyas who have the supreme authority; and, though we do not recognize distinctions of caste, yet we do recognize distinctions of function. Hence, when we come to

[1] Of course, this refers to Law only in the strictly political sense, not in the somewhat metaphorical sense in which it is applied to the uniformities of nature or to the injunctions of morality; and it is sometimes not quite clear whether a particular law is to be regarded as political or as moral, or whether a particular rule (such as the rule of the road) is to be regarded as a strict law or only as a convenient injunction.

the question of the ultimate basis of social organization, it is primarily to the political unity that we have to appeal. However much we may claim independence for the spiritual side or for the industrial, it is through the political side that that independence has to be secured; and through that side also its independence is almost necessarily limited. The Saint may stand nearest to the Divine; the creative Worker may be thought of as most nearly in His image; but it is the King who has to be recognized as His representative on the earth. This is the foundation of the theory of the Divine Right of Kings; and, though we may reject that doctrine in its special application to Kings, we can hardly altogether reject it as applied to the political power in general. For this reason it seems right to consider the political aspect of the Commonwealth last, as that which contains the ultimate authority. At the same time, we must be on our guard against any undue emphasis on its right to exercise control over the others. 'Legality' was rightly regarded by the Puritan divines as a very poor foundation for the moral life; and Pharisaism has become a term of reproach.[1] As Bosanquet has so eloquently urged, it is not on 'claims and counterclaims' that our finest titles and our deepest obligations rest. It is doubtful also whether the State can wisely exercise any direct control over the general industrial life of the community.[2] But, when there is any serious dispute, the political power has necessarily the last word. There is no satisfactory retort to the prison and the scaffold. It is, however, possible, by taking thought at the right time, to organize the political power in such a way as to have it constantly under the guidance

[1] Perhaps not altogether justly.

[2] Italy would seem to be the country in which this is, at present, being more definitely attempted under the guidance of the Carlylean Hero Mussolini; and it may be worth while to quote here what has been said about it by the historian Villari. 'The State,' he says, 'must be reduced to its proper function, *viz.* the maintenance of order, the enforcement of the law, the defence of the country against foreign enemies, and the general encouragement of civilization, education and progress. . . . It must abstain from all activities for which it is unfitted: it must not be a merchant, a manufacturer, a farmer, or even a railway owner, for whenever it has tried to do these things, the results have been disastrous, not only from an economic and financial point of view, but also on account of the disastrous effect which these activities produce on the bureaucracy and on the people as a whole' (*The Awakening of Italy*, pp. 134–5).

of the spiritual and industrial interests of the community. It is certainly a Power; but it is essential that it should be a benevolent Power, *i.e.* a Power directed towards the promotion of the Common Good. Its object is to provide Goodness with the instruments that are necessary to make it effective. The good lack power: it is the business of the State to supply it. In order to understand how this is possible, it is necessary to pay some attention to the conception of Sovereignty.

The conception of Sovereignty has played a prominent part in political theory in the past. It has been thought, mainly on legal grounds, that there should be in every community some ultimate authority to which every person and every institution is subject, and I think there is a sense in which this must be admitted; but the ultimate authority may be highly complex and not easy to define. So long as it is thought of as a king or a parliament or any other single body of people that can be pointed out, the conception may be readily called in question; and it has recently been subjected to a good deal of very cogent criticism by such writers as F. W. Maitland, Duguit, J. N. Figgis, Mr. Laski and others, who are sometimes referred to as political pluralists; and in a less extreme way by Green and others, who cannot be so described. The controversy has been carried on chiefly in connection with the old question as to the relative authorities of Church and State, about which the wars of the Guelphs and Ghibellines were waged. It is very rightly urged that each of these is properly supreme within its own province; and this might be taken as conclusive if it were possible to draw any rigid line round the respective provinces. To a certain extent, of course, they can be pretty clearly distinguished; and some objections that naturally suggest themselves can be disposed of without much difficulty. It is easy to show, for instance, that a Catholic need not be a bad citizen in a Protestant community, or a Protestant or Agnostic in a Catholic community; provided that some degree of toleration is recognized in each case. But recent experience has shown that there are circumstances in which real difficulties may arise, such as conscientious objections to military service or disagreement about the laws of marriage. Many instances of such 'divided duties' can easily be thought of.

The case of Antigone is the classic example of an opposition between the obligations of the Family and those of the State; and somewhat similar illustrations have been supplied by Shakespeare, *e.g.* the situations of Desdemona and of Lady Blanche in *King John*. Difficulties of this kind arise naturally more often with women than with men, since they are, or at least have been, more directly subject to various forms of authority. But, as we know, men also—*e.g.* members of the Society of Friends—may feel a divided allegiance between the religious and the political obligations. It may be urged, however, that such difficulties are not specially connected with different conceptions of Sovereignty. Even if a single ultimate authority is recognized, there may be difficulties in the interpretation of the will of that authority in cases of unusual complexity. Such difficulties can only be met, it would seem, by those methods of 'creative experience' that have been so well described by Miss Follett, who has a sympathetic appreciation of the difficulties of the political pluralists, but yet maintains the essential unity of the Commonwealth. Her conviction is that there is never any absolute clash in such conflicts; but that some satisfactory way out can always be found, by which both the claims are met. This may be too optimistic a view. But it seems right to hold that there is no such thing as absolute Sovereignty in any particular person or group. Even within the Family the conception of absolute Sovereignty has to a large extent disappeared; and it can hardly be doubted that it will disappear more and more within that limited circle. We no longer acknowledge that 'awful rule and right supremacy' that is celebrated in *The Taming of the Shrew*. Yet there must be some method of arriving at decisions in difficult cases within the Family as well as within the State. It is generally recognized that there are different provinces within which one or other of the chief parties concerned naturally decides, when complete agreement is not possible through any of those creative methods that are described by Miss Follett. In *Much Ado about Nothing* the old saying is quoted that 'if two ride on a horse one must ride behind'; but that method of riding has gone somewhat out of fashion. The changes that are taking place in the conception of

Sovereignty within the State are of a similar character. Even if a King is sovereign, he is sovereign only on condition that he observes the principles embodied in the constitution within which he exercises his rule.

This conception of sovereignty is not so new as we are sometimes apt to suppose. It has recently been noted[1] that in ancient Greece 'Tyranny is the first word in democracy.' Men who gain supreme power in a community by their own effort are usually 'Heroes' in the Carlylean sense. They stand to some extent above the antagonisms of classes and seek, even if it is primarily in their own individual interest, to introduce some degree of harmony in the life of the society. They realize that it is their function to spare the humble and control the proud, just as the later Roman rulers did. Human beings, unless their nature has been in some way perverted, have a tendency to do what they are expected to do. If they have been appointed by some particular party or section, they are apt to act in the interest of that section. An absolute ruler, on the other hand, is more likely to realize that it is his function to care for the general welfare of the people. This seems to be the element of truth in the Carlylean doctrine; but the complexities of modern life make it increasingly difficult for any one person to fulfil such a function. Sovereignty in a modern State is necessarily a highly complex conception. In a complex system like our own, the sovereignty is vested, not in any single authority but in the united action of the King, Lords and Commons, co-operating with one another in a complex constitutional manner and subject to periodical appeals to the votes of those people who are recognized as having a right to

Sovereignty in England

[1] By Professor P. N. Ure, in his very interesting book on *The Origin of Tyranny*. How far he is right about its origin in Greece, I am not qualified to judge. He ascribes it largely to economic conditions, and traces its democratic tendencies to these. Even in our own country I have heard it remarked by a shrewd advocate of Aristocracy that monarchy is a 'democratic institution.' Mr. Ure quotes (p. 303) the statement of Aristotle that the Tyrant 'supports the people and the masses against the nobles.' It is perhaps in this sense that we may best interpret the Homeric dictum, that the rule of many is not good: let one man be ruler (*οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω*). But it has to be qualified by the recognition that no man and no body of men is entitled to rule in any absolute sense. They are all interpreters of the Common Good at which the community must be regarded as aiming.

take part in elections. No one of these elements is, in any full sense, sovereign. Sovereignty lies only in the combination of them in accordance with certain recognized principles; and even this may be subject to the right of rebellion if anyone's conscientious convictions are violated by the decision that is finally arrived at. The only ultimate sovereignty is to be found in what some would call the Will of God and others might prefer to describe as conscience or as the conception of the Supreme Good. The various limited sovereignties can only be recognized as more or less imperfect methods for discovering and enforcing what is involved in that final authority. And it must be recognized that in this attempt they may reach conclusions that clash with one another; and that it is, consequently, important that limitations should be recognized in the powers of each, and that there should be, as far as possible, convenient methods of arbitration between them. At any rate, it is no longer supposed that kings have a divine right to govern wrong; and it is at least beginning to be questioned whether the voice of the people is indeed the voice of God. The consideration of this, however, leads us to notice more definitely what is to be understood by a Republic.

The view set forth in the preceding section may be conveniently summed up by saying that any genuine community must, in a certain sense, be a Republic. Kant urged in his book on Perpetual Peace that this is an essential condition for the realization of that object. The sense in which the term Republic is here used is, of course, not that in which a Republic is opposed to a Monarchy. It is hardly necessary to emphasize here the unsatisfactoriness of an absolute Monarchy, though (or perhaps partly *because*) we have had in our own generation a very extreme claim put forward in its behalf. To be ruled by an absolute monarch is almost equivalent to being ruled by an occult power. In Kipling's phrase,

> We know what Heaven and Hell may bring,
> But no man knoweth the mind of the King.

What is here meant by the necessity of a republican government is only that, whatever the technical form of the government may be, it must be so constituted as to enable a genuine

national will to become effective. I understand this to be what was meant also by the statement that it is necessary to 'make the world safe for democracy.' The importance of this, especially in dealing with international relations, does not rest merely on general grounds referring to the rights of individuals to a voice in the control of national policy. It rests much more on the necessity of securing that each nation should be definitely responsible for its actions. If the government is purely monarchical or purely aristocratic, the responsibility rests with the rulers; and, in their dealings with foreign countries, they are to a large extent in the position of agents. This is liable to have at least two evil consequences. On the one hand, agents are bound to have regard primarily to the interests of those for whom they act. They are not entitled to be generous in their relations with other countries; and they may feel some hesitation even in trying to be just. No doubt, this may be felt even by a whole people; for every generation in any community may be held to be in the position of agents for the generations that follow. It is a question of degree. But at least the inhabitants of a country at any particular time may assume that, apart from definite changes in circumstances that cannot be foreseen, those who come after them will not differ greatly, in their general outlook, from themselves; whereas a single ruler or a limited number of officials can hardly be entitled to make a similar assumption. On the other hand, an agreement that has been entered into by a limited number of people, perhaps representing only a particular political party, may not be felt to be binding upon another limited number of people with a widely different outlook. It seems to be partly considerations of this kind that have led Treitschke and others to regard international agreements as valid only for a limited time and subject always to the tacit qualification *rebus sic stantibus*. No doubt, under any form of government, serious changes in the circumstances may necessitate modifications in international agreements, or even repudiation of them, from time to time; but at least, if they are entered into by self-governing communities, it seems clear that they can only be altered by subsequent agreements between these communities. The responsibility in this case rests definitely with the nations

concerned, not merely with individuals or groups acting as their agents.

Hence it is important to understand clearly what is meant by self-government. The phrase that was made current by Lincoln, 'Government of the people, by the people, and for the people,' is obviously somewhat ambiguous. The people who are governed at any particular time are the whole of the people living in a certain country at that time. Those who govern them, on the other hand, even in the most democratic communities, are at most only the people of mature age, and nearly always only a limited number of these, exercising their powers under certain conditions previously determined. Those again for whom the government is carried on are not merely the people living at a particular time, but also all subsequent generations. Hence a certain continuity of national life is presupposed in the use of the phrase. It would seem that this presupposition can only be fully justified by the recognition of a co-operative purpose carried on from generation to generation; and it is largely on this account that it seems essential to recognize the validity of this conception. Even when this is recognized, no doubt, it must still be acknowledged that the purpose may undergo modifications in succeeding ages; but at least it may be anticipated that the modifications will, in general, be gradual, and will give time for the necessary readjustments.

Democracy in modern times is hardly ever understood to mean pure Democracy.[1] This would only be possible, as the Greek philosophers and Rousseau recognized, in a small community, where all the free citizens could meet together for discussion and vote directly on each subject that called for decision. The nearest approximation to such a condition in modern times is to be found in Switzerland. In large com-

[1] Professor Mavor, in his very interesting survey of recent social movements, has remarked that 'in Western Europe and in America people are inclined to attach a somewhat limited meaning to liberty. We are apt to think that we have secured liberty when we have elected some people whom we endow with power to deprive us of it. From Kropotkin's point of view, the rule of democracy, unless it implies the liberty of the individual and of spontaneous united groups of individuals, is as inimical to progress as the rule of an autocracy' (*My Windows on the Street of the World*, vol. ii. p. 104).

munities it necessarily takes the form of representative government, usually with a somewhat limited electorate—limited with regard to age, if not in any other way. No doubt, even in such circumstances, what Walt Whitman called the 'unbounded audacity of elected persons' is somewhat curbed by the prospect of the next election; but it is seldom thought that they should act merely as delegates. They are understood to exercise their own judgment on important questions, subject rather to their party leaders than to their constituencies. And it is assumed that they are elected as people specially qualified to form sound judgments in detail, though bound on some general lines of policy. Thus there are considerable elements of aristocracy in what is commonly understood by democracy in modern times; and those who seek to remove them are probably not the wisest—perhaps sometimes not the most sincere—friends of democracy. Pure democracy, as Kant pointed out, would be apt to be the worst of tyrannies, since there would be no effective check on the will of the majority. A single ruler or a limited group can nearly always be kept in check by popular organizations; but, under the rule of a majority, minorities would be powerless. It would need a very robust faith in the wisdom and goodness of the majority to be content with such a mode of government.

In most modern democracies a check is placed on the decisions of the popularly elected Chamber by the existence of a second Chamber constituted in a somewhat different way. To this some further reference will have to be made shortly. But even in the popularly elected Chamber most of those who take a leading part in the deliberations may, to some extent, be described as experts; and few desire that it should be otherwise. On the other hand, there are not many who would care to entrust the government of a country entirely to experts. It is pretty generally recognized that it is the function of experts to advise rather than to decide. This will have to be considered more definitely in the sequel. In the meantime, it must suffice to state that few who have had any experience in dealing with political problems would care to entrust them either to what is called the 'man in the street' or to what we may call the man in the study. It is safer to entrust them to the man in the

committee-room. Carlyle's description of the Smoking Parliament in *Frederick the Great*[1] may be referred to as an illustration of what is meant; and other illustrations may be found in abundance in the writings of Miss M. P. Follett. It is in such meetings that the operation of co-operative purpose is seen at its best, and that conclusions are reached which may in a real sense be said to express a General Will. Those capable of taking part in such deliberations are not necessarily experts in any particular department, though it is usually important that some of them should be; but it is well that they should all be people of good sense and some degree of mental alertness. This much appears to me to be almost self-evident; and it seems to imply at least some small measure of aristocracy.

If modern democracy is understood in some such sense as this, it is surely apparent that much of the abuse that has been heaped upon it by Carlyle and others is almost grotesquely irrelevant. It is not 'government by talk': it is government by discussion, which is a rather different thing. It is not government by so many millions, 'mostly fools,' though it may be true that it is not altogether fool-proof; no conceivable form of government is that. It is ridiculous also to contrast such a method of government, as is sometimes done, with the control of a ship at sea. The destination of a ship is not determined by the captain, unless he happens to be a Columbus on a voyage of discovery. It is determined, in general, by some Board of Directors, having regard to the wishes of prospective passengers. The captain is provided with his chart and compass and other means of guidance; and he may sometimes take the advice of his subordinates. The Ship of State, on the other hand, has its directors on board, and they have to determine, as she sails, to what port it is best to take her. Thus the analogy breaks down in some important particulars. Still, it is true enough that the management of a State is a more complicated task than that of a ship, and involves far more serious risks; but there is usually more time to deliberate over them.

It is well to bear in mind, however, that it cannot be maintained that the same type of constitution is equally suitable for all times and places. Montesquieu may have somewhat

[1] Book V, chap. vii.

exaggerated the influence of climate upon forms of government, as well as upon other things; but it is, no doubt, in general true that a democratic government, in the sense that has just been indicated, can be most readily worked in countries whose inhabitants are accustomed to changing conditions that call for careful consideration and swift decisions. It may even be true that they are best worked by peoples that have some familiarity with the perils of the sea. It is at least probably not by chance that democratic forms of government have grown up most readily in countries that have uncertain climates calling for constant attention and prompt adaptation to new conditions. It may be more doubtful whether they would work as satisfactorily in tropical or semi-tropical countries, where more constant—or at least more calculable—conditions prevail, and where the attention turns more readily to patient speculation and prolonged reflection than to vigorous action.[1] Recent events have shown that the East is not quite as 'unchanging' as had sometimes been supposed; but at least it would seem that it is not in the most tropical parts of the East that the changes have been most rapid and most successful. This difference must certainly be borne in mind as one of the difficulties in the way of securing the degree of uniformity in methods of national organization which may be necessary for friendly co-operation throughout the world. And at least we must remember the warning of George Washington, that 'in proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened.'

If we were right in the general view that has been taken with regard to the three main aspects of the Commonwealth, it is evidently important that expert guidance should be available with reference to all these aspects. Of course, it is the political

[1] It was noted by Morley (*On Compromise*, p. 105) that 'of all societies since the Roman Republic, and not even excepting the Roman Republic, England has been the most emphatically and essentially political.' The Chinese, on the other hand, appear to be the most entirely non-political of all great peoples. This is the more remarkable as it has been noted by many competent observers (*e.g.* Mr. G. L. Dickinson) that in other respects, both industrial and moral, there is a considerable resemblance between the Chinese and the English.

aspect with which we are here more particularly concerned; but the political aspect is the aspect of national control, and this must necessarily affect the industrial aspect to a large extent and the spiritual aspect at least to some extent. Hence expert advice would seem to be called for with reference to all the main aspects of the Commonwealth. What is to be understood by an expert, however, is a matter that requires somewhat careful consideration. An expert is sometimes apt to be thought of simply as one who has had long experience in some particular type of work. It is, of course, very desirable that he should have had experience; but one who is an expert only in that sense is often somewhat inaccessible to new ideas. The kind of expert who is specially to be sought after is one who has not only had adequate experience but also leisure for thought and for the development of constructive imagination. The proper balance between action and reflection is one of the hardest things to cultivate. Bagehot lamented[1] that 'the whole history of civilization is strewn with creeds and institutions which were invaluable at first and deadly afterwards'; but the same excellent writer had to lament also[2] the amount of evil that might have been spared 'if philanthropists as well as others had not inherited from their barbarous forefathers a wild passion for instant action.' A responsible government must be somewhat Fabian in its policy. It must have facilities both for long deliberation and for prompt decision; and perhaps it is necessary that the two things should be kept somewhat distinct. The deliberation must usually be carried on in comparatively small bodies of experts, while the decision may rightly be made in a large one of a less specialized type.

It has to be noted further that there are many different kinds of expert advice. Some are so obviously necessary that it is hardly worth while to dwell upon them at length. I may refer to a statement that was made on the subject some time ago by Bosanquet.[3] He pointed out that there are 'two orders of experts, the ruler and the adviser.' With regard to the ruler, he referred to the emphasis that Plato laid on the necessity for expert qualifications in him, but added that 'his expertness is

[1] *Works*, vol. iv. p. 481.
[2] *Works*, vol. iv. p. 566.
[3] See the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* for the Session of 1908–9.

to be expertness in the art of life, and his capacity is to lie in adopting and adapting the measures and methods which are instrumental to what makes life worth living.' In this connection he noted also that a true citizen 'must be an expert in the art of being governed, which cannot really be dissociated from the art of governing.' Evidently in this sense every good citizen must be something of an expert—a consideration that it is very necessary to bear in mind, especially when democratic methods are being adopted for the first time in any country, *e.g.* in India.

But even for purposes of advice there would seem to be different types of expert. There are experts in comparatively small details, and there are experts in large departments of life; and what is to be regarded as large or small depends somewhat on the particular purpose in view. The primary difference is that some experts have to be constantly at hand, whereas others have only to be called in for special occasions, *e.g.* to serve on Royal Commissions. In a great emergency, such as the recent War, and the more recent industrial troubles, advice has to be sought in many quarters to which it is not, in ordinary circumstances, necessary to appeal. In such cases what is first of all wanted is someone who would know where that special advice is to be got. But even among those more general advisers whom it is important to have always at hand, there would seem to be considerable differences of type. Some may be wanted only for rather subsidiary purposes in small details. On the information that they supply it is then necessary to form judgments on larger questions of policy falling within particular departments; and it is the experts who are qualified to form such judgments that we are here in search of. Some may be found among the elected members of Parliament or among the permanent officials and separate Boards, such as the Board of Trade; but sometimes it may be necessary to look outside. An Upper House may sometimes be a help for this purpose; but that is mainly when revision is called for. It has been pointed out, however, that an Upper House might be so constituted as to fulfil this advisory function more adequately than is commonly done at present; and at a time when the Reform of the House of Lords is a good deal under

discussion, it may be worth while to notice some suggestions that have been made. An American writer, Mr. H. H. Powers, has recently indicated some points that may be worth considering. His contention is—to put it very briefly—that the essential function of an Upper Chamber has always been that of giving advice to the ruling power; and he contends that a democratic governing body is no less in need of such advice than an autocratic monarch. The Lower House, according to him, expresses the sovereign will of the people as a whole. The Upper House contains, or ought to contain, representatives of the great fundamental interests in the community; and these are the three that have already been indicated. In Great Britain, in particular, he points out that the general principle has been, to a considerable extent, observed. 'The House of Commons,' he says,[1] 'is a body representing the people. The House of Lords was originally a body representing the nobility and clergy. Such in name it still is.' But, he proceeds, 'the actual House of Lords consists, first, of a few hereditary peers who are statesmen by profession. They are almost invariably men of great ability who have been prepared by long study, often by diplomatic or administrative experience and by previous service in the Commons. . . . But more significant are the men of achievement who are advanced to the Lords in recognition of special attainments in particular lines of public utility.' Of course, there are among these the Bishops and some others who represent the more spiritual and educational side. No doubt, as he adds, 'it would be an exaggeration to say that this transformation of an ancient House of Lords into a house of technical experts representing modern national interests was complete, or that the result was wholly satisfactory.' It seems to be most complete on the legal and more purely political side, very one-sided with regard to religion and education, and distinctly inadequate industrially. Its defect was indicated in a saying of Lord Salisbury, 'We belong too much to one class and . . . we are all too much of one mind.' Of course, this defect has now been, to a very large extent, corrected. But, if the special function of an Upper House is that of impartial criticism of legislative proposals,

[1] *The American Era*, p. 286.

it seems clear that what is chiefly wanted in it is an adequate representation of all the separate aspects of national life that may become affected by legislation. That it is tending in that direction is probably true. And Mr. Powers goes on to indicate that in some other countries similar tendencies may be discovered. 'The war,' he notes, 'by its overthrow of the old régime in Germany, cut short what might have been an interesting experiment. The revision of the obsolete constitution of Prussia was under way, and the proposal presented for consideration contained some interesting features. The Lower House was to be of the usual popular representative type. The Upper House, however, was to contain in addition to the hereditary nobility "36 representatives of agriculture, 36 representatives of commerce and industry, 12 representatives of handicrafts, 16 representatives of the Universities, 16 representatives of the Evangelical and Catholic Churches, 36 burgomasters of large towns for the period of their office, 36 owners of hereditary estates, and 36 heads of large industrial establishments," besides others that we need not enumerate. . . . We need not consider whether these are wise selections or whether the numbers (the total was nearly or quite 1,000) were wisely determined. The important thing is to notice the principle adopted. . . . Men fully cognizant of the needs of all important interests would be present to give expert advice. Not only would every delegate be subject to the opinion of those representing other interests, but all would be subject to the will of the Lower House, where solidarity would inevitably be much greater. A body of experts as constituted would in practice lose the power of absolute veto, as has the House of Lords. The final decision would rest with the popular body, as it should. But the House of Experts would be immensely influential, and both by its knowledge and by its *esprit de corps* would present a substantial bulwark against the legislative sabotage so constantly perpetrated in the name of government regulation.' *Fas est et ab hoste doceri.* Mr. Powers seems to be clearly right in thinking that such an advisory body would be too unwieldy; but the general conception may be commended to the attention of those in our own country who are anxious for further reforms in the House of Lords. The fact that the

same problem has been exercising men's minds in other countries as well as our own may be taken as showing that it is a somewhat vital one at the present time. If what has just been stated about it is at all sound, it is evident that what is to be looked for in the end is the establishment of what might perhaps be fairly described as Permanent Royal Commissions for the consideration of problems connected with the three main aspects of the communal life. These commissions would naturally meet sometimes separately and sometimes in joint sessions, and they would probably make independent recommendations to the more popular Chamber as well as criticisms on the proposals of that Chamber.[1]

It may perhaps be worth while to recall the fact that the principle of calling in an expert who had not been elected by a popular vote has already a precedent in our own country. Mr. Lloyd George secured the services of Mr. Fisher as Minister of Education before he was elected as a member of Parliament. That this should sometimes be done was perhaps the only constructive suggestion that was put forward by Carlyle among the somewhat wild and whirling words of the *Latter-Day Pamphlets*. There are some grounds for thinking that he had at one time hoped that he might himself have been invited to take some part in political work in a similar way.[2]

It is doubtful whether any absolutely complete and coherent conception of justice in the organization of human life is possible. Human life is too complex to be satisfactorily enclosed within any rigid organization. It is a creative process, in which individuals have to discover their proper place and function, rather than to have it externally determined for them; and their rights and obligations are largely determined by their place and function. But it is the business of the State to make it as easy as possible for them to find their proper place and to guard against any preventable friction in the process; and it lends its sanction to their rights and obligations.

[1] The book on *Second Chambers* by Sir John A. R. Marriott contains much valuable material bearing upon this subject, and is well supplied with references to other writers.

[2] See the remarkable essay on Carlyle recently published by F. Harris (*Contemporary Portraits*).

It protects life and property, it arranges for the defence of the country against dangers from without and from within; it seeks to ensure that there are suitable provisions for education, not only for the young but throughout life, and for the due payment of wages for services and penalties for disservices. For the proper discharge of these functions it needs, as we have just noticed, the guidance of experts on the spiritual and on the industrial side.

In all its activities it is, in general, true that it has to consider what is best on the whole, rather than what may happen to be best in individual cases. It is concerned with justice, rather than with equity—with what can be enforced as a general law, rather than with what would be fair and proper under special circumstances. Yet it may be gradually modified to suit unforeseen conditions. The treatment of exceptional cases, the exercise of charity, the encouragement of new modes of action, may be undertaken by the State, but in general somewhat slowly and under the direction of spiritual and industrial agencies; and the latter do not always need to wait for the heavy machinery of the State. Often they are content only to claim its indulgence, *i.e.* to claim that its rules should not be so rigid as to disallow or unduly discourage activities that can hardly be reduced to rule. For instance, if a national system of education is provided or a national Church established, it is important that some freedom should be allowed for the carrying on of methods of education or forms of worship differing from those that are definitely supplied by the State; subject only to the proviso that the education is not inefficient and the religion not normally antagonistic to civic rights and obligations. No doubt, there are considerable difficulties about this; and it is just for this reason that it seems important to have advisory bodies within the constitution of the State itself for the consideration of the difficulties that can hardly fail to arise from time to time. Having recognized the necessity for such expert guidance, I may consider myself to be absolved from any definite consideration of the ways in which the State may legitimately exercise control over the cultural and the industrial aspects of the community. The general answer is that it can only do so in so far as it has adequate expert guidance at its

control. But it may be worth while to add some considerations of a general kind.

If we are right in the general view that has been taken of the threefold nature of the Commonwealth, it is evident that we cannot altogether agree with those who are sometimes referred to as 'pluralists,' who maintain that the State should concern itself simply with general laws of conduct, leaving the organization of industry and commerce, on the one hand, and of education, art, science and religion, on the other hand, to independent modes of activity. We have already noted that, to a certain extent, such a view must be admitted. In general, it is true that the State cannot directly play the part of a manufacturer or merchant, any more than it can play the part of a poet or artist or of an educator or religious teacher; but the laws that it frames and enforces may affect profoundly all these forms of activity. Hence the need for some well-organized mode of expert guidance, such as we have been endeavouring to consider. States have varied greatly in this respect. Matters that directly concern almost every member of the community, such as the postal service, are nearly always under State control. Railways, which also tend more and more to affect everyone pretty directly, are not so universally organized by State authorities; but, even when they are organized by private companies, the State is often called upon to interfere with their working or to lay down special conditions; and this is true also of coal-mining and of many other undertakings. On the other hand, few would wish that the State should manufacture cigars, and still fewer would expect it to control, in any constructive fashion, the writing of poetry or the painting of pictures. Apart from the more purely economic activities, to which perhaps sufficient reference has already been made, it is chiefly with regard to general education and religion that differences of opinion and of practice are liable to arise; and it may be best, for the present, to confine our attention to these.

In actual practice, it is evident that there are considerable differences in different communities with regard to the relations of the State to the more cultural aspects of life—differences that can generally be traced to definite historical causes. In our own country, for instance, there is a State religion; and

a good deal of controversy has turned upon this. On the other hand, it is only in comparatively recent years that there has been any organization of general education by the State, as distinguished from the somewhat casual patronage of it by individual rulers; and even now that organization is concerned only with its more elementary aspects. It is true, however, that University education is to some extent supported by the State; but any attempt to control it is generally resented by those who are most deeply interested in the work of Universities. On the other hand, in most other countries there is little or nothing in the way of State control in religion, whereas general education is to a very large extent provided by the State. It does not lie within our province to consider with any detail the historical causes that have led to these differences. The establishment of a State Church in England was, of course, due to the particular way in which the Reformation under Henry VIII was effected; and the different ways in which educational institutions have been organized in different countries may, in like manner, be traced to definite historical causes.[1] Here we are only concerned with the general principles that are involved.

Those who think that the three aspects of the Commonwealth—the cultural, the economic and the political—should be kept rigidly in separate compartments are, of course, opposed to any direct State control either of general education, of religion, or of industry. In recent years it has been mainly with reference to religion that this has been urged in this country, perhaps most emphatically by Mr. H. J. Laski. Even writers, such as Green and Bosanquet, who assign a larger place to the State as an expression of the General Will of the community, consider that it is best that the State should confine itself, in general, to the 'removal of hindrances' to the cultural life. If we are right in thinking that it is important to recognize the oneness of the Commonwealth, as well as its triplicity, it seems clear that this negative function should not be unduly stressed. As Professor W. E. Hocking has urged,[2] 'the promotion of a just mentality in its citizens cannot be omitted from the purposes of the State.' What may still be urged is that it is the

[1] Rashdall's *History of the Universities* may be referred to with advantage.

[2] *Man and the State*, p. 161.

function of the State to provide general laws and general methods of organization, rather than particular details. As applied to religion, this would seem to involve that, if a religious organization is provided by the State, it should be a form of religion that the great majority of the citizens could accept, and that other forms should not be in any way penalized. I think this involves that the established form should not have a rigid creed. It would seem that this is now beginning to be recognized in England. I think it is true also, as Mr. Laski urges, that no special prestige should be attached to it.

With reference to the more general subject of education, it is probably not enough to emphasize the importance of removing hindrances. Active support is called for; but here also I think it should be recognized that the subjects to be taught and the methods to be used in teaching them should not be rigidly prescribed. Even a State that was plentifully equipped with expert advisers would probably have to leave such details to those directly concerned with the carrying on of the work, just as in the case of the industrial life. But, no doubt, in all cases this depends largely on the extent to which the State had at its disposal a sufficient supply of experienced advisers with adequate opportunities for making their views effectively known. That appears to me to be the one thing needful.

If the control of the State were exercised in the way that is thus indicated, the sting would be very largely removed from the conception of coercion. Coercion is one of those words that are apt to arouse a strong feeling of antagonism. Mr. Cole, for instance, seeks to banish it completely from his Guild Organization.[1] Yet it is surely obvious that there can be no organized society at all without this element. It is for this reason that even Bosanquet, who sought to reduce State control in cultural matters to a minimum, yet said emphatically that the State 'is necessarily force.' Some appear to have thought that he was thus endorsing the famous declaration of Treitschke that 'the

[1] See his book on *Social Theory*. Reference may also be made to Mr. MacIver's book on *The Modern State*, where there is a running polemic against force—partly, no doubt, justified, but hardly, I think, sufficiently qualified.

State is Force' (*Der Staat ist Macht*). Probably it would be better to say 'Power' rather than 'Force.' The State is certainly a Power; but it is essential that it should be a benevolent Power directed to the realization of the Common Good. It is only on rare occasions that the exercise of this Power calls for the exertion of physical force. When Power is sufficiently great, it is seldom necessary to employ force. It is perhaps also not sufficiently remembered that force, as applied to human action, is, in general, negative. Strictly speaking, no one can be forced to *act*—not, at least, by purely physical compulsion; he might possibly be impelled by some form of hypnotic suggestion. It has been proverbially recognized that even a horse cannot be compelled to drink. Force can prevent action, but cannot, in any quite direct way, produce it. '*Streng verboten*,' as it has been said,[1] 'is the characteristic utterance of the State.' In a community that is politically well educated, however, the '*streng*' can generally be omitted.[2] It may be said, no doubt, that this is to some extent a quibble. The distinction between positive and negative cannot be very sharply drawn. The schoolboy, 'creeping like snail unwillingly to school,' may feel that the force that impels him is sufficiently positive; and so may the parent who is unwilling to pay for the support of the school. Still, it is well to remember that, when the State provides religion or general education or housing or sanitary arrangements in factories, it is primarily guarding against evil conditions. The benefits that are to be reaped must still be won by individual effort. Imprisonment and other forms of punishment are, as Aristotle would have said,[3] 'negative rewards.' The actual achievement of what is good is still dependent on the individual will. I think the recognition of this might help to remove some of the sting that is felt by many to be contained in the idea of coercion. We are not, in general,

[1] P. N. Ure, *The Origin of Tyranny*.

[2] Several German writers have explained why the stern discipline that is thus expressed was necessary in Germany, owing to the insufficient development of the political consciousness. This is, no doubt, being rapidly modified.

[3] Aristotle's view of punishment as the simple negative of reward is, no doubt, inadequate as a general theory; but it is, on the whole, sufficient in dealing with most of the forms of punishment with which the State is directly concerned.

forced to receive benefits, but only not to be in conditions in which they cannot be received. In ordinary life, as distinguished from the activities of the State, the most common form of coercion is found, not in locking people in, but in locking them out. When we lock a door or a drawer, we are preventing others from making use of the contents of the room or drawer; and in most countries this seems to be a necessary element in any form of ownership. In some countries, in which there is an approximation to communism, even this form of coercion is almost unknown. But to say that anything is possessed by someone is to say that no one else is allowed to use it without the consent of its owner. And this, of course, applies to national or communal property as well as to individual property. There is no effective ownership where there is no effective defence. Unless, therefore, we are prepared to maintain that all property, whether individual or communal, is theft, we can hardly exclude coercion altogether. But it is, no doubt, possible to coerce, not by physical force, but by suggestion or by some kind of taboo; and, of course, the kind of suggestion or taboo that is provided by moral training is the best of all and probably the most effective. But it is sometimes necessary to guard against ignorance as well as against crime. It may be necessary to build a wall or hedge, not merely to guard against robbers, but also against quite innocent trespassers—especially in our own country, where there is no law about this. Hence some degree of coercion could not easily be avoided even in the most perfect of Utopias. But it might be gradually reduced to a minimum, both within nations and in international relations —perhaps eventually it might be reduced to the moral taboo. But it is pretty obvious that such a reduction is not yet possible.

Having considered the general nature of the political unity, we may now proceed to notice more definitely the actual rights and obligations that the State may be expected to confer and maintain. These rights and obligations are, of course, very largely affected by the special organization of the State within which the citizen happens to live; but it would be a mistake to regard them as being created or entirely determined by that organization. There is a sense in which rights and obligations

may properly be described as 'natural' and independent of any kind of political sanction. Even in the sub-human world—*e.g.* among bees and many kinds of birds—it is not difficult to discover anticipations of the recognition of what come to be characterized by these somewhat august designations. Among human beings at least every power and every form of social relationship may be said to bring with it some specific rights and obligations without the need of any external authority. The obligations of parents to their offspring are recognized implicitly by almost all animals and explicitly by almost all human beings; and it does not need much reflection to perceive that these obligations bring with them corresponding rights. Anyone who has a touch of prophetic fire or poetic inspiration would hardly be likely to wait for the political power to confer upon him both the right and the obligation to exercise his special gifts. 'Woe is unto me,' said St. Paul, 'if I preach not the gospel'; and Milton, in a similar spirit, referred, in one of the noblest of his sonnets, to 'that one talent which 'twere death to hide,' though in his case it was the call of the State that had temporarily checked the use of his inextinguishable power. Wherever there is a beneficent force, there is a right of some kind; and, wherever there is an opportunity, there is an obligation.

Nevertheless, it is true to say that the State gives an added force and definiteness to the rights and duties that it finds already existing, and that it introduces some new ones. It gives more definiteness, for instance, to the rights and obligations of parents, and it adds new ones, *e.g.* the right of securing for their children a particular type of education, and the duty of trying to secure one that is adapted to their needs. But the chief thing that it adds is protection and all the rights and obligations that this implies. It is, as we have just noted, an essential feature of the State that it has Power; but it is a beneficent Power. It is its primary function to provide for the defence of its citizens from external dangers and to secure justice for them within its own borders. The citizens have the right to this protection and to the particular privileges over which the protection is extended; and they have the obligation to give their support to the State in its maintenance of its own

power and of the rights and privileges that it bestows. The effective promotion of the Common Good is its ultimate aim.

It is pretty obvious that the conceptions of a right and an obligation are correlative; but it is perhaps not quite so obvious that there are two distinguishable ways in which the one conception may be regarded as necessarily implying the other. The most readily apparent way is that any right or privilege which one person enjoys involves the obligation to respect it on the part of others. Even when one bird has claimed a particular branch for its nest, others are debarred from that position; and to some extent this appears to be instinctively recognized. Among human beings, at least, the recognition tends to become explicit. It would hardly be true to say that 'This is mine' necessarily carries the implication 'This is not yours'; for some good things may be held in common; but it does, at any rate, imply that I am not to be deprived of anything that has been acknowledged as my possession. What is less immediately obvious is that my possession of it implies that I am to use it in particular ways. Mr. H. G. Wells has noted that 'it is the universal weakness of mankind that what we are given to administer we presently imagine we own.' Among friends gifts may be bestowed absolutely; but it is in general clear that what the State gives is given for use. Its privileges are at the same time duties; for the State is no respecter of persons, and only confers what it believes to be just. What is just, as we have already noted, does not necessarily mean what is equal. There are not many respects in which it would be possible to secure any exact equality either in what is conferred upon individuals or in what is required of them. A certain rough equivalence is the most that could well be aimed at. There is a fine saying of Walt Whitman, 'I will not have anything for which everyone else may not have an equivalent'; but even this would not be easy to secure. A niggardly nature makes men's lots so unequal from the start that the balance can never be altogether redressed. King Hal would have been glad to change with the Miller of the Dee if his heart could be made as light; but without this happy disposition the exchange might have been made in vain. What it is really desirable to aim at is that each one should be in such conditions as would enable him to realize

Plato on Justice

most completely the potentialities of his nature in the service of the whole. This was what Plato understood by Justice. He conceived that a just order of society is one in which every individual is doing the work for which he is best fitted and is supplied with the necessary instruments for the fulfilment of his vocation. It may certainly be doubted whether any better summary could be given of the conditions that should be aimed at by the State. In such a society there would not be any complete equality—hardly any real equivalence. One citizen would still differ from another in his rights and obligations, as one star differs from another star in glory. But the peasant would be as secure in his cottage as the monarch (if there was any monarch) in his palace; and each would be in the position for which he was best adapted by nature. Each would have what is due to him; and for each of them his right and his obligation, his due and his duty, would completely correspond. But, of course, no State could be expected to succeed entirely in securing even this result. There are too many incalculable elements in human nature and in the nature of things; and the right men for the right functions are not supplied to order. The State in general can only hope to provide that there are no insuperable obstacles in the way of each one finding and keeping the place for which he is best fitted, and in which he can be of the greatest service to the whole. Even in aiming at this, the State can usually only try to make provision for securing the arrangements that work most satisfactorily *in general*. It can seldom make any definite provision for exceptional cases. It can at best only provide the fittest conditions for men and women of certain general types; not what is fittest for this or that individual, with all his special peculiarities. And even with regard to general types, it can usually only provide opportunities. It must, in general, be left to individuals to discover the best way of using the opportunities that are provided. But any State that could fairly be said to have accomplished as much as this might very well be pleased with its achievement.

Having thus noticed the general conception of rights and obligations, we may now proceed to a somewhat more definite consideration of the particular ways in which they have to be

recognized; though our treatment of this must be of a rather summary kind. It may be convenient to notice first the special rights and obligations that belong to the State itself, then those that belong to particular organizations within the State, and finally those that may properly be ascribed to individuals.

The rights and obligations that belong to the State are, of course, those that are implied in the possession of sovereign authority. It has the right to use its power for the protection of its citizens against aggression from without and for the maintenance of order and justice within its own territories. To this extent at least it appears to have the right of coercion; and it would seem to be the only body to which this right can, in any complete sense, be assigned; though, in a more limited sense, it may be delegated to others. Every body, indeed, which is entitled to lay down regulations for its members may be said to have the right to see that its rules are carried out. It may impose fines and other penalties. A church may excommunicate. But this instance indicates the limits within which special bodies may exercise coercive power. Their ultimate right is that of expulsion; and their members may escape the penalties that they impose by withdrawing from them. In the case of states also it may be said that there is this limitation to their coercive power. The citizen may become a voluntary exile. But it is difficult, and it becomes increasingly difficult, for anyone to escape altogether in this way from state control. If he passes from the dominion of one state, he almost inevitably enters into that of another; and states tend, on the whole, to be less and less ready to receive those who have been rejected by others. Moreover, if a citizen withdraws from a state in order to escape from some obligations within it, the state may even take measures for his recall. To a certain extent this may be done by other bodies as well; but usually the coercive powers of other bodies are more or less definitely subject to the authority of the state. In the last resort, the appeal is not to the power of the particular body immediately concerned, but rather to the police and the law courts and, in extreme cases, to the military forces. The state has thus also the right of applying coercion not only to its own citizens, but to other states, either for the protection of its own citizens or

perhaps even, in some extreme cases, for the protection of the citizens of other states from oppression; or, again, to secure the observance of treaties.

The right which the state thus possesses implies a number of obligations. It implies, first of all, that the state is just, and can be relied upon, in general, only to exercise coercive power where it can be legitimately applied. It implies also that it is powerful, so that its coercion is, in general, effective; for Right without Might is futile; and what is futile is nearly always wrong.[1] The state has thus the obligation of making just laws, and of securing sufficient power to be able, when necessary, to enforce obedience. Sometimes, as we have already noted, it may have to summon a number of private citizens or of special bodies to its aid; and this implies the obligation, on their part, to respond when necessary. We have seen, however, that the authority of the State rests properly upon the General Will or Co-operative Purpose of the people. When, as is often the case, there is any real doubt as to the extent to which it represents that purpose, there is a corresponding doubt as to the citizen's obligation to obey its authority. He may, in such a case, have the right, and even the obligation, to rebel; and the decision with regard to the circumstances in which he has this right must, in the last resort, be left to his own judgment. But the presumption is always very strongly against it. At least, a state in which it can properly be said that this is not the case is evidently in urgent need of reform.

The rights and obligations of particular bodies within the state can only be very summarily referred to. Particular neighbourhoods or districts, so far as they possess some degree of autonomy, may be regarded as little states within the state. Their authority is more strictly confined within their own territories than that of the sovereign state is; and, even within that territory, it is usually subject to the approval of the supreme government. The question how far any particular district has the right to claim autonomy is one that cannot easily be answered. When any part within a large nation —especially a part that has at some previous time been recog-

[1] This was, I believe, all that Carlyle really meant by his apparent identification of Right with Might. See above, p. 61.

nized as an independent whole—is very markedly different from other parts in respect of race, language, religion, or other important national characteristics or traditions, it is generally recognized that some form of Home Rule, approximating more or less closely to complete independence, should, if possible, be granted. But it is obviously very difficult to determine the exact circumstances in which the right to this kind of autonomy can be held to have been established. This much, however, seems clear, that the right to such independence implies at least some special obligations. One is, that the part that claims independence should be a real unity within itself; or, if it contains diverse parts, that the independence of these parts should be carefully guaranteed. It implies also, in general, that the part claiming independence has acquired some aptitude for self-government through the discipline of well-organized local institutions. When there is doubt as to its competence in this respect, it is probably best to begin with the establishment of some smaller institutions of local government before any more complete autonomy is conceded. Our own country has had, and still has, many problems of this kind to consider; and the different forms of constitution that grow up are often bewildering in their variety and complexity; but there are usually real reasons for the different degrees of self-government that are allowed in different regions. The reasons, however, are often too complicated to be even briefly alluded to in such a summary as this.

The Family also may in some respects be regarded as a little State within itself, and it has somewhat similar rights and obligations. From the point of view of its external relations, the father is generally regarded as the head of its government. This is partly due to tradition: in earlier times he was commonly an absolute ruler, and indeed served as the type upon which the conception of absolute sovereignty was based. It is still convenient to have some one person with whom the state or district may deal; and the father is naturally selected for this purpose, because he is usually the bread-winner and most directly in contact with the world outside. But it is now generally assumed that he is a limited monarch, especially in matters of internal management. The parents have certain coercive powers

over their children, but subject to the control of the State. They are under the obligation of supporting their children and providing them with a satisfactory education. In cases of extreme difficulty the union may be dissolved; but the grounds on which this may be done vary considerably in different countries, and cannot properly be dealt with here. Some reference will be made to this at a later stage.[1]

The School has also some of the characteristics of a State. It has been urged by some educational experts and reformers that it is, at least in certain circumstances, desirable to treat it as a little Commonwealth, with the object of supplying a definite education in citizenship; but the consideration of this also would carry us somewhat beyond our present province. But at least in the school there is necessarily a considerable amount of coercive power, subject to the approval of the state and to some extent of the parents. The right which the authorities of the school have to exercise control over the development of the child's or adolescent's mind and character is, of course, accompanied by the obligation to gain as complete an insight as possible into the nature of human beings at different stages in their development and into the best methods of assisting them in their growth.

It is with reference to vocational organizations that some of the most difficult problems arise. This is partly due to the extremely varied characters of the vocations themselves and to the varied forms of their organization. Some are definitely under the control of the government. It is at present, as we have already had occasion to note, being strongly urged that they should be, to a large extent, organized in the form of Guilds or Corporations. One of the difficulties in dealing with them is that they do not all stand on the same level of importance. While some forms of work, such as the fine arts, surgery, medicine, engineering, mining, agriculture, *etc.*, are obviously, at least within certain limits, of great importance to the life of a nation, others, such as brewing, distilling, the manufacture and distribution of some forms of confectionery, drugs and various articles of luxury, are of more questionable utility, or at least need to be more carefully restricted in their use. It

[1] See Chapter X.

is difficult to say much about the organization of a vocation when its right to be carried on at all may be open to question. Apart from this, most of the special vocations, even when they are of undoubted value to the nation in which they exist, differ from districts, families and schools in ministering only to special aspects of life, not to life as a whole. It is at least partly on this account that the work of professions is distinguished from that of most other occupations. The professions, in general, as well as the most essential modes of industrial life, deal with interests that are vital to the whole life of a people; and those who labour in them are more or less consciously aware that they are the servants of the nation, and even bound, if necessary, to sacrifice their lives in the discharge of their duties.[1] It might be difficult to feel in this way about occupations that only minister to the evanescent pleasures of a limited number. Still, most forms of work serve some useful purpose; they at least provide some people with the means of earning their livelihood; and it is important that they should be so organized as to enable this to be done under the most satisfactory conditions. It would seem then to be very desirable that all sorts of vocational organizations should be somewhat carefully watched by the State, and that their rights, privileges and obligations must be largely interdependent and contingent on the extent to which their activities can be regarded as beneficial to the community as a whole.

Similar considerations apply to the rights and obligations of individuals. It may be well to refer here very briefly to some of the chief rights that have been commonly claimed for them, and to notice the obligations that these rights carry with them.

(*a*) *Freedom*.—Individual freedom is the right that is most jealously guarded by the citizens in the majority of ordered communities, and notably of those in our own country. It has to be recognized, however, that individual freedom is necessarily subject to some limitations; and in modern times (especially since the great French Revolution) the need for such limitations has been strongly emphasized. The most

[1] The reader may remember how this aspect was emphasized by Ruskin in *Unto this Last*. But it could only be applied to work that is of vital urgency for the welfare of the community

obvious limitation is that the freedom enjoyed by one individual must be consistent with the equal freedom of others. Another way of putting this is to say that one's right to freedom carries with it the obligation to respect the freedom of others. But even this qualification is hardly enough. The Archbishop's saying that he would rather have England free than England sober may be open to the retort that people who are not usually sober cannot well be free. A drunken man, according to one of the sayings of Heraclitus, is led by a beardless boy 'because his soul is moist.' One who aims at liberty must, in Milton's phrase, be 'wise and good'; or, in the phrase of Heraclitus, he must have a 'dry soul.' He must be accustomed to govern himself by a law within, if he is not to be controlled by the law without. Hence the right to freedom can hardly be one that is inborn. It is rather one that is gradually acquired. For this very reason, however, it seems clear that the cultivation of it should be begun early. Hence those who insist on the importance of granting some degree of freedom even in the initial stages of education are not unwise. The right is won by learning to fulfil the obligations that are implied in it.

(*b*) *Property*.—Some reference has been made to this already. It is not free from difficulty. All things that can be owned at all are somewhat limited in amount; and even what is available for occupation is not all of equal value. Possession of the more valuable kinds generally means that some other people are excluded from possession altogether or have to be content with what is of inferior quality. This applies to some extent to the territories possessed by nations as well as to the things that are owned by individuals. It seems clear that in all cases the right to possess must carry with it the obligation to use what is possessed for the common good. But it is not easy to apply this; and almost all the Utopias that have been devised by social reformers turn mainly on the attempt to provide for a more equitable adjustment. Not much can be added here to what has already been stated. The general principle appears to be that property should, as far as possible, be in the control of those who can and will use it to the best advantage; but sudden changes would probably, as a rule, do more harm than good. The gradual reorganization of methods of industry appears

to be what we have chiefly to rely upon for securing that the right shall be duly accompanied by the fulfilment of the obligations that it implies.

(*c*) *Protection*.—From the nature of the functions that belong to the State, it is evident that the citizen is entitled to expect from it that he should be adequately protected both in his person and in his property. But the State consists essentially of its citizens acting in concert for the common good; and the right that each of them has to be protected implies the obligation that is imposed upon each to take his share, according to his ability, in securing that the necessary protection is provided. This may at particular times of stress involve that he takes his share in military service or in the work of the police. In the case of the former obligation, at least, some difficulties are apt to arise on account of conscientious scruples. Some sects and some individuals object altogether to the use of military force even for defensive purposes; and even those who do not altogether object may feel some scruples on particular occasions. When disputes arise between nations, it is perhaps nearly always true that there is some blame on both sides, and that perfect wisdom and goodness would have prevented the dispute from arising or would have enabled it to be amicably settled; and it is hoped that in future the League of Nations may at least greatly facilitate this method of settlement. In the meantime, it seems clear that each individual has the right and the obligation to exercise his own judgment, and that the State has both the right and the duty to assure itself, as well as it can, that his judgment has been conscientiously exercised. Beyond this it hardly seems possible to go.

(*d*) *Education*.—It can hardly be necessary to say much about the right to Education. Even those who believe most strenuously in the independence of the individual, and distrust most intensely the intervention of the State, would hardly venture to deny that the individual should be given the opportunity of having a satisfactory start in life. They may seek to confine themselves to what has been called

> the old American idee,
> To make a man a man and let him be;

but this at least involves the recognition that, until he has become a man, he ought to be helped in his development. What has to be conceded to the individualist, as we have already noted, is that the best part of education belongs to the spiritual aspect of the Commonwealth, rather than to the purely political, and consequently demands freedom in its methods. Nevertheless, it is the business of the State to assure itself that such education is provided, and to supply it if necessary. The obligations that are thus imposed upon the State, the neighbourhood, the parents, and the young are sufficiently obvious; and the education must have sadly failed in its object if it has not convinced those who participate in it that their privileges bring with them corresponding obligations. How far it is right that the State should concern itself directly with the organization of education, is a difficult question to which it is hardly possible to give a simple answer. It is largely dependent on the extent to which the constitution of a particular state qualifies it to deal with cultural problems. It can hardly be altogether indifferent to the cultural life of the community; but, unless it has direct access to the best advice of those who know, it cannot be expected to deal with it wisely. In our own country it is only recently that it has ventured to organize general education, and that only to the extent of making the barest minimum accessible to everyone. On the other hand, it has felt justified in providing religious instruction of an elaborate kind. In most other countries the State has taken a much more active part in the organization of general education and has left religion relatively free.

(*e*) *The Franchise.*—Although the General Will or Co-operative Purpose by which the life of the Community is carried on is not adequately expressed by the wishes of the majority, yet the election of representatives is recognized as the only practical method of enabling the underlying purpose to make itself effective. Hence it has come to be generally conceded that every mature man and woman should at least have the right to vote for a representative. Against this it can, of course, be urged that the mere counting of votes is a very unsatisfactory way of finding out what the deliberate purpose or the real good of the community is. The amount of thought

and knowledge and genuine purpose that lies behind one vote may be very different from that which lies behind another; and hence there is force in the saying of Schiller that one should *weigh* votes rather than count them. But indirectly they weigh themselves to a certain extent. The man who really knows and cares can generally find methods by which he may influence votes; and it has been contended[1] that, if there were a well-organized system of Guilds which had some influence in their corporate capacity on the government of the country, the man of many interests might really have several votes through his membership in such corporations. But this is a glance into a highly doubtful future. What is immediately important is that no mature citizen should be excluded from some participation in the formulation of the national purpose.

That the right to vote involves the obligation to inform oneself about questions of national importance and to reflect as carefully as possible about them, is obvious. That it actually involves the duty to vote is more doubtful. If, after careful reflection, any one is unable to reach a decision, it would seem rather to be his duty to abstain from voting.

(*f*) *Employment*.—The right to work has been a good deal emphasized in recent times. Sir Henry Jones urged[2] that 'it has been, in a manner, conceded in the past, as the word "Workhouse" implies.' But it has to be borne in mind, as he also noted, that the work done in the workhouse is not altogether useful work. It is chiefly intended as a test of willingness to work. Hence it rather goes to show that the State does *not* effectively recognize the right to work. The reason, no doubt, is that there are very serious difficulties in the way of such a recognition. The State can, at least, however, by means of Labour Exchanges, make it comparatively easy in ordinary times for men to *find* work. If they fail to do so, it generally means that there is no effective demand for the kind of work that they are qualified to do. To set them to do things for which they were not qualified would be a doubtful gain to the community. It seems to be true, however, that there are some useful things that are liable to be neglected, such as the improvement of

[1] See Mr. Cole's *Introduction to Social Theory*, p. 115.
[2] *The Principles of Citizenship*, pp. 167–8.

roads or the opening up of new ones; and, at times when there is difficulty in finding work, the State is sometimes able to provide it in this way. This is, of course, a matter that belongs primarily to the industrial side of the Commonwealth; and it is in dealing with such problems that some such permanent Commissions as have been suggested might be expected to be of special value. However the difficulty may be met, it is evident in this case, as in others, that the right implies certain obligations, *viz.* not only that of qualifying oneself for some particular kind of work, but also that of assuring oneself, as far as possible, that it is a kind of work for which there is a sufficient demand. This last is a duty that it is often difficult to fulfil, owing to the progress of invention and other changes in the general conditions of life. Hence it must be admitted that the right to work is one of those rights that it is most difficult to establish, and that the obligations connected with it rest not merely upon individuals, but on those bodies that are concerned with industrial organization.

(*g*) *Maintenance.*—When men emphasize the right to work, however, what they have chiefly in mind is not work as an end in itself, but rather work as a means of earning a livelihood. The right to maintenance has been more or less definitely recognized; but it obviously involves serious difficulties. It raises, for instance, the problem of over-population, to which some reference will be made in the concluding chapter. However the difficulties may be met, it is very evident that the recognition of the right imposes grave responsibilities both upon the individuals who claim it and upon the bodies that are concerned with industrial organization.

(*h*) *Leisure.*—The right to work has, as its counterpart, the right to leisure. A human being needs rest and recreation, just as an animal does; and he needs also, as the animal does not, opportunities for the cultivation of the intellectual and more purely spiritual side of his nature. But, if we are justified in claiming for the citizen all those rights that have been previously referred to, it is evident that there are also other grounds on which leisure is required. The citizen is not merely a being with one particular vocation. He works to live and to help others to live; but he does not merely live to work. He is a

member of a family, to which he owes particular obligations. He belongs to a particular neighbourhood and to a particular nation; and he has some responsibilities for the general life of the communities to which he belongs. He is responsible also for his own self-development. It is these obligations chiefly that make leisure a necessity, and the right to it depends on its being employed, at least partly, in their fulfilment. It is to be remembered, however, that these obligations have to be learned gradually. Hence it would not be altogether fair to say that some particular class in the community has no right to leisure because it tends to use it merely for sensuous enjoyment, or perhaps for vicious self-indulgence. This would be particularly unjust if the class in question happens to be one that has only recently acquired leisure. A class that has long had the privilege of abundant leisure may perhaps be justly blamed if it uses it for the cultivation of those habits of 'reputable waste' that have been emphasized by Mr. Veblen—though even for these there may sometimes be 'extenuating circumstances.' But at least a class that has only recently acquired some degree of leisure cannot be very severely censured if it knows no better than to imitate the most foolish of those who have long enjoyed it.

The rights of a citizen are pleasant to contemplate; but, when one thinks of the obligations that go along with them, one may well ask, Who is adequate to such things? But happily perfection cannot be expected in human life. Still, whenever anyone fails in the carrying out of his obligations, it must be recognized that his claim to the corresponding rights becomes somewhat shaky.

Reflection on the various rights and obligations that come to light in the development of the communal life tends to convince us that they rest on the fundamental nature of man, and consequently do not depend on any particular circumstances of nationality; though, no doubt, they may be greatly modified in detail by local and historical conditions. Law is thus seen to be in its essential nature common to the human race. Roman Law has, in fact, served very largely as the foundation of the legal conceptions of most European peoples. It had the disadvantage, however, of being based on a somewhat

individualistic philosophy. Hegel's conception of the foundations of law in general is more in consonance with the idea of co-operative creation. Dean Pound's interpretation of it has, I think, helped very materially to bring this out. The Hegelian idea of the reconciliation of opposites is specially valuable; and its application has been well enforced, not only by Dean Pound, but also very strikingly by Miss Follett in her book on *Creative Experience*. Unfortunately Hegel failed to find any means of reconciliation between nations, and so appeared to leave them with a tragic situation to be solved only by war. His tendency to deal with the various aspects of life in separate compartments and in a somewhat too purely intellectual fashion seems to have proved a weakness in this connection. It is now easier than it was in his time to get beyond this limitation. Mazzini, as Vaughan has well brought out, made some advance in theory; and the Hague Tribunal and the League of Nations have pointed the way in practice.[1] It may be admitted, however, that the reconciliation can hardly be brought about by means of purely legal conceptions. We have to go beyond the strictly political point of view, and introduce considerations that belong rather to the spiritual aspect of life. The Jews, the Indians, and the Greeks all seem to have had, on the whole, a keener perception of this than the Romans had attained to. In view of this, it seems best to deal with what remains to be said about it, and about some other closely related topics, in a separate chapter. What is chiefly essential, on the purely political side, is that all nations should be 'republican,' in the sense in which that term was used by Kant, *i.e.* that the decision of each at any time should be capable of being recognized as the deliberate purpose of the nation as a whole, and not merely as the temporary expedient of agents acting on its behalf. It is only on this assumption that they can become genuine members of a League or Federation.

[1] See on this *The Common Weal*, by Mr. Fisher, especially chap. x. On all the subjects that are considered in this chapter, and indeed throughout the book, much light may be obtained from the book on *Social Purpose* by Hetherington and Muirhead.

CHAPTER IX

THE PROBLEM OF A WORLD COMMONWEALTH

THE conception of a Commonwealth leads pretty directly to that of Cosmopolitanism or International Unity. Once it is recognized that there are larger modes of co-operative life than those that are contained within the limits of a single nation, there is no obvious stopping-point short of the whole human race. 'In ethical truth,' as Professor Hobhouse has said,[1] 'there is only one ultimate community, which is the human race. This community, alas! has never yet found organized expression.' But, of course, there are obvious difficulties in the way of such an extension. The British Commonwealth, like the Roman Empire, extends over a very large part of the world; but in both cases the larger unity is dependent upon a national centre. The Roman Empire was held together by law and by a gradual process of cultural penetration. The British Commonwealth depends rather on racial and cultural community, a community which extends in some degree to the United States of America, as well as to the Dominions that are definitely attached to the British Crown; and it extends over countries that are bound to it more nearly in the Roman fashion. It is partly an Empire and only partly a Commonwealth. Thus neither the Roman Empire nor the British Commonwealth gives any definite ground for believing that a World Commonwealth can be regarded as a possibility. If such a Commonwealth is to be realized, it seems clear that it must be different in kind from any mode of unity that has so far existed. It must be a unity in which the independence of the distinguishable parts is fully recognized. The chief difficulty in the way of this lies in the fact that the parts are not merely different, but in some respects opposed to one another. This opposition is found in all the main aspects of group life. On the cultural side,

[1] *The Elements of Social Justice*, p. 199. A similar statement is made by Mr. Russell in his *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 57.

religions are not merely different, but in many cases opposed to one another; and there are also great differences in the ideals of family life, in scientific conceptions and in modes of artistic representation. On the economic side also there are differences in methods of organization; and in some cases there is a degree of rivalry that tends to lead to violent conflict. And politically there are different traditions as to the best methods of government. It is well to remember, however, that even within a single nation all these differences are to some extent present. Not many nations are more perfect in unity than Great Britain; yet there are considerable differences within it. Even in language there are some people who cannot understand one another; in religion people not only differ, but often quarrel; in the economic sphere, disputes are almost of every-day occurrence; and we are by no means all agreed with regard to the best methods of government. But, on the whole, we recognize that, though these are matters about which we may dispute and even quarrel, they do not prevent the recognition that it is well to try to live together in peace, hoping to be able gradually to adjust our differences. In some respects India supplies a better illustration of the possibility of unity in differences. The Hindus definitely recognize, in general, that cultural differences are inevitable. Different attitudes with regard to religion, in particular, are recognized as normal. The division into castes tends to prevent industrial disputes. Such methods are, no doubt, unsatisfactory. They prevent acute quarrels, but do not give rise to much positive unity or cordial co-operation. Hence, in aiming at some degree of international unity, we must be prepared to find similar difficulties, and must not be surprised if they are considerably greater in degree than those that are found within a single nation. And it would seem that we have reached a stage of historical development at which the problem of international unity cannot any longer be regarded as a purely speculative one. On the other hand, we must not expect that it can be solved by any simple methods. What is essential is that it should become part of the General Will of thinking people throughout the world.

The general problem with which we are here concerned is that of the possibility of regarding the complex world of men

and women among whom we live as a single community co-operating together in the pursuit of a common good. To a certain extent it has long been recognized that such a way of regarding our world is both possible and desirable, and indeed even necessary; but never has it seemed so urgent as at the present time, and never has the concrete realization of such a unity of mankind appeared to be so clearly within our grasp. The conception lies, of course, in the very heart of Christianity, and it was placed by Comte at the centre of his social philosophy; but to the average well-intentioned man it has generally been felt to smack a little too much of Utopia. It is now seen to be a matter of practical politics and in some respects indeed almost an accomplished fact.[1] It is true, no doubt, that even in times comparatively remote such a conception of world unity has been within the vision not only of great seers and prophets, but also of some adventurous men of action. Some of the mighty conquerors of antiquity had already gone a considerable way to bring it about. Alexander the Great appears to have aimed at it pretty definitely; and at least he did much to bring about (if, indeed, it would not be truer to say *renew*[2]) a living contact between East and West. The Roman Empire also, from the time of Julius Caesar onwards, had a similar aim; and, especially after its association with Christianity, it certainly did a great deal to establish a common type of civilization in Europe and throughout considerable parts of the other continents that border upon the Mediterranean. Indeed, I believe it is substantially true to say, as Mr. Laski does,[3] that Western civilization was regarded as a single commonwealth before the sixteenth century. The nations were bound together by a common religion, a common culture, and for some purposes a common language. At a later date Napoleon Bonaparte, whatever may be thought of his aims and methods,[4] certainly

[1] Cf. what has been urged by Mr. Laski about the disappearance of the nation-state in his *Grammar of Politics*, p. 227.

[2] Such a book as *The Origin of Tyranny*, by Professor P. N. Ure, helps us to realize how considerable this contact was in early times.

[3] *A Grammar of Politics*, p. 45.

[4] The recent book on *Napoleon: the Man*, by Mr. R. McNair Wilson, seems to me to have made his aims at least much clearer than they previously were to most people; and perhaps his methods followed inevitably from his aims. Ludwig's book is also very enlightening.

had as one of his objects the reunion of the European continent; and the British Commonwealth, in a very different way, has done a great deal to spread its special type of civilization throughout the world. But there has been some reaction against these influences, more particularly against those that were represented in ancient times by Rome and in modern times by Napoleon. Violent methods are apt to have violent ends. Peoples cannot, it has been said, rest upon bayonets. Throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century the principle of nationality has been emphasized with increasing force. Already, in much earlier times, it had its heroes and martyrs. It is associated with such illustrious names as those of William Wallace, Joan of Arc and Wilhelm Tell; but in recent times it has been given a more powerful influence as a general gospel by such men as Mazzini and Gladstone. Their ideals are not necessarily opposed to that of Humanity as a whole; but to a certain extent they stand in contrast to it. The late Professor C. E. Vaughan, in his admirable volumes on the history of modern political theories, attacked Comte somewhat severely for his too exclusive emphasis on the conception of Humanity. 'To most men,' he says,[1] 'humanity is a conception so remote, and so difficult of realization, that it can hardly be said to convey any definite meaning to their intellect, much less to supply a motive capable of influencing action. Put it before any mind which has not received a very special training, and the result will be little better than a blank. And if this be the only form in which the idea of corporate life is presented to men, the consequence must infallibly be that they will have no corporate life at all. To the common run of men the nation is the one and only embodiment of public spirit, of the sense of corporate life, which can in any measure be reckoned adequate. Banish the nation—put the trade union, the Church, the profession, in its stead—and what will have been gained? Only that, in place of an ideal at least comparatively liberal, one narrow, cramping and sectarian will have been set up. Each of these smaller associations has its place. But it is essentially a subordinate place. It is a place within the all-inclusive community which we call the nation. The moment

[1] *Studies in the History of Political Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 242.

any one of them usurps, be it intentionally or by design, upon the functions of the nation, its very virtue is distorted into something hardly to be distinguished from a vice. And so long as human nature is what it is, the only result of Comte's action in weakening nationality will be to make such usurpations more frequent and more venomous. It needs no prophet to tell us that if men are driven from nationality they will take refuge, not in the more comprehensive area of union, but in the less; not in humanity, but in the sect, the class or the clique.' This is emphatic enough; but it has to be qualified by what has been stated by the same writer with reference to the teaching of Mazzini. 'It can hardly be doubted,' he says,[1] 'that the earliest writer to give its due place to nationality was Mazzini. He felt, as few men have felt, the force of the popular sentiment in this matter. He was alive also to its limitations. To him the nation is not, as it is to many, an end in itself. It is strictly a link in the chain between the individual on the one side and humanity on the other. He recognizes, as no previous writer had done, what may be called the personality of the nation. He proclaims its right, or rather its obligation, both to defend itself against all encroachment, whether material or moral, from without, and to develop its inborn faculties to the highest possible pitch from within. He thus gives satisfaction to all that is either valid or worth having in the claims of nationality. At the same time, he marks out the limits beyond which the instinct of nationality becomes dangerous, or even harmful. He denies that it is a final and absolute principle. He persistently subordinates it to the larger claims of humanity. This at once bars out the possibility of any right to aggression as between one nation and another. It subjects all nations alike to the common ties which bind the members of one brotherhood, mankind. By the same stroke, Mazzini gives the only valid sanction to the real rights of nationality. He declares the free development of the national spirit to be essential to

[1] *Studies in the History of Political Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 320. Reference may be made, in this connection, to the recent discussion on nationalism and internationalism in Dr. McDougall's book *Ethics and some Modern World Problems*. See also *The Common Weal*, by Mr. Herbert Fisher, especially chap. ix., and *Citizenship*, by Mr. W. H. Hadow, chap. viii. Durkheim also emphasized the Nation as the ultimate mode of unity.

the true life of humanity. So far as it serves that end, it is nothing but good. As soon as it throws itself athwart that end, it becomes an enormous evil.'

We thus see that it is not the conception of World Citizenship to which Vaughan objects, but only the attempt to substitute it too abruptly for the citizenship of a particular nation. In this he is essentially repeating what had been previously urged by Green and others, that any genuine service of humanity must be based upon and grow out of the life of the good neighbour and the good citizen; and, of course, the use of such terms as Fraternity and Fatherland is a sufficient indication of the undeniable fact that the life of the family is a still more fundamental mode of unity. But the consciousness of community has gradually extended itself from the family to the tribe, and from the tribe to the nation;[1] and it can hardly be doubted that we have now reached the stage at which it must definitely extend itself to humanity. No doubt, there are special difficulties in the way of this. Devotion to humanity has not yet become, as Vaughan evidently thought that patriotism had become, a sense that might almost be described as an instinct. Even Mr. Russell, whose outlook is decidedly international, admits[2] that 'we cannot avoid having more love

[1] It is worth noting that even devotion to the nation has been condemned by Tagore in his book on Nationality; but it has rightly been pointed out (in the book on *Social Purpose*, by Messrs. Hetherington and Muirhead) that what he had in mind was not the nation as such but rather the nation-*State*. The view that he urged is natural in India, which is hardly more of a nation than Europe was in the Middle Ages. It has, to a considerable extent, a national culture, but hardly a national industrial system; and such political unity as it has comes from without. But separate independent countries in India, such as Mysore, may be described as nations; and it does not appear that Tagore's strictures would apply to them. On this, reference may be made to Lord Ronaldshay's book on *India: a Bird's-eye View*, and to the more recent book on *India* by Sir Valentine Chirol. Even in England we can hardly think of our national life without remembering what it owes to the Jews, the Greeks, the Romans, the French and many others. Shakespeare provided us with a national drama; but most of the greater plays are concerned with other countries than England; and we are constantly being reminded that 'there's livers out of England.' Hence it is hardly true to say that there is any great difficulty in getting beyond the conception of nationality.

[2] *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 57. Mr. Laski also describes patriotism as 'a genuinely instinctive expression of kinship with a chosen group' (*A Grammar of Politics*, p. 221). A somewhat similar view is

for our own country than for other countries.' We generally know it best, and have the best chance of being able to do something to help it; and it must be admitted that it is not altogether easy for most people to feel any real community with those who have always lived in a different country, who speak a different language, wear different clothes (if any), have different manners and customs, are subject to different laws, read different books, play different games, have different memories and traditions, and to some extent different ideas of morality and religion. Within a nation some degree of likeness in most of these respects can in general be presupposed, at least within certain dominant groups; and it is natural that these dominant groups, and even the people as a whole, should be eager to emphasize this community, even when it is of a somewhat superficial kind. Hence the force of the appeals that have been made to the principle of nationality by such eloquent leaders as Fichte, Mazzini, O'Connell, Gladstone and, more recently, Gandhi; and the enthusiasm that has been created by them in countries so different as Italy, Poland, Ireland, Wales and India.[1] It must be admitted that the national point of view is prior to the international. Hence, though we are mainly occupied here with the problem of world-citizenship, much that we shall have to consider is not specially concerned with the world as a whole and only indirectly with the concep-

expressed by Mr. Edward Carpenter (*The Healing of the Nations*, pp. 131 *sqq.*). The kind of patriotism that may be described as 'instinctive' in a quite intelligible sense (though not in a sense that would be admitted by such a social psychologist as Dr. McDougall), appears to be found chiefly within comparatively small groups. A devotion to the British Empire, such as that by which Lord Milner seems to have been animated, could hardly be called instinctive; nor, I should suppose, could that form of patriotism which the song 'Deutschland über Alles' was intended to promote among the Germans.

[1] India, as Lord Ronaldshay, Mr. F. S. Marvin and others have urged, is in many respects rather a continent than a country; but its inhabitants tend on the whole to think of it as a country. It is bound together by a common religious outlook, comparable in some respects to that of Europe during the dominance of the Catholic Church. For most purposes, however, it seems true to say that the North of Ceylon should be thought of as part of India, and that Burma and the South of Ceylon should not be regarded as belonging to it. Burma, at least, as we have been taught by Mr. Fielding Hall, has a separate 'soul' of its own. See also on this *The Burman* by Scott.

tion of world unity. It is rightly felt even now by some nations—among others, by the United States—that they must not sacrifice the substance of their national life for the shadow of a more extensive world order. It is at least true, as Mr. Russell has said,[1] that 'A man does right, as a rule, to have his thoughts more occupied with the interests of his own nation than with those of others, because his actions are more likely to affect his own nation.' This, however, hardly applies to rulers; and in any nation that is largely democratic almost everyone may have some voice in the determination of foreign policy. But the first quarter of the twentieth century has already brought a considerable change in this respect. 'These eventful years' have familiarized men's minds—even the minds of those who have not had any very exceptional training—with ideas that tend to carry them beyond the limits of any purely national unity. Most people have become familiar with the general conception of a League of Nations, and many have been led to think seriously about problems that are at least international, if not even cosmopolitan, in their character. It may be well to note here some of the chief ways in which this change has been brought about.

That the Great War had much to do with the change of attitude is almost self-evident. In the early years of the century, although it was well known that preparations for war on a scale of unprecedented magnitude were being made in all the leading European countries, and though its imminence had been emphasized by many competent observers, yet there was in most men's minds an ineradicable disposition to believe that such a calamity was 'unthinkable.' Some clung to the old maxim that preparation for war is the surest guarantee of peace; and others thought at least that all the great nations would draw back from the chasm at the last moment, and arrive at some pacific understanding. Friendly intercourse between the different peoples was probably more general than it had ever been before. Cultivated men in different parts of Europe appreciated one another's work, and were often in relations of cordial friendship with those who shared their special interests in countries that were regarded as their rivals. Some

[1] *Political Ideals*, p. 152.

felt that, in many respects, their debt to certain foreign countries was almost greater than to their own, and were at least fully convinced that what was best in Western civilization belonged equally to them all. German men of letters were as deeply devoted to Shakespeare as their friends in England, and his plays were performed more often, and probably not less well, in German theatres than in our own; and this was no less true of some of our later dramatists. The writings of Scott, Byron, Dickens, Carlyle and some others, were almost as well known in Germany as here; nor was the work of Darwin and Spencer much less familiar. We, on our side, had at least a considerable appreciation of German music, and of German history and scholarship. Those who were interested in philosophy recognized the worth of the contributions of Leibniz, Kant and Hegel, and, to some extent, also those of Fichte, Schopenhauer, Lotze, and even Nietzsche—that good, if somewhat unbalanced, European; and, though the day of Einstein had not yet dawned, the thoroughness of their scientific work, especially perhaps in biology, psychology and economics, was fully recognized. Above all, most of us were aware that Goethe was the best representative of profound reflection on the general problems of life that had appeared anywhere for several generations. Nor were we, I suppose, altogether without appreciation for the songs of Heine and the plays of Hauptmann. It does not fall within the scope of this book, even if it lay within the competence of the author, to determine with any definiteness what the actual causes of the War were.[1] But I think it may be said with some confidence that the causes were not, to any large extent, cultural. Some have endeavoured to show that some peculiarities in German philosophy were, to a large extent, responsible for it. So far as I can see, there is very little truth in this.[2] It might be said, with almost as much force, that the doctrines of Carlyle and some of his followers tended to encourage the worship of Might; and similar tendencies in

[1] As far as I can judge, the statements by Mr. G. P. Gooch (*The War and its Causes* and *Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy*) are among the most carefully balanced. The book by Count Julius Andrássy on *Bismarck, Andrássy and their Successors* is also extremely enlightening.

[2] On this subject, I may refer to Professor Muirhead's judicious book on *German Philosophy and the War*.

other countries might be referred to. But, on the whole, in this case as in that of most other modern conflicts, it would seem that the underlying causes (so far as they were not traceable to the peculiarities of particular rulers) were mainly economic, rather than purely cultural or purely political. The growth of population leads to the desire for expansion; and I think it is true that there was a certain jealousy of the British people, or perhaps rather of the English-speaking people in general, as having control of most of the territories in which expansion was conveniently possible without the sacrifice of nationality. Of course, a certain cultural element is involved in this. The dominant impulse was the desire for a satisfactory outlet for a growing population in which the traditions of national life could be upheld unimpaired. The appreciation of the cultural influences of other peoples was far too feeble a bond of union to maintain peace under such conditions. It would seem that similar difficulties have arisen with reference to some of the peoples in the Far East; and it is extremely doubtful whether they can be satisfactorily met without the co-operative wisdom of a central authority. For this reason I may perhaps claim exemption from any attempt to determine the methods by which they might be met. The use of an international language would, no doubt, help to some extent; and possibly the allocation of certain regions to peoples of different races and cultures could be, in many cases, arranged by a sufficiently wise and powerful controlling body. It is the idea of a purely national loyalty that stands in the way. But, of course, it is obviously very essential that the central authority should be so constituted as to be capable of dealing thoroughly with the cultural and economic aspects of life, as well as those that are more purely legal.

When the War actually broke out, those who had placed confidence in any of the existing bonds of unity had a rude awakening; and many felt almost as if the foundations of their world had been completely wrecked. It was then that the conviction began to take root that at least such a calamity must never occur again. The phrase (first used, I believe, by Mr. H. G. Wells) 'a war to end war' passed into general currency. This was not, I believe, commonly understood to

mean that the actual war itself, or the terms of peace that followed from it, would be such as to establish a political system in which war would be effectually prevented. That something in this direction would be accomplished was indeed hoped. But what was chiefly believed was that the horrors of a world war would be such as to lead the mass of mankind to form a firm determination to cultivate the spirit of peace with an ardour previously unknown. To some extent such hopes have, no doubt, been fulfilled. But it is probable that those who most confidently entertained them did not sufficiently take account of the shortness of the memory of the race and the weakness of large and vague resolutions; nor perhaps did they bear in mind that there is a certain joy and glamour in the recollection of even the greatest calamities. Tennyson, following Dante, has told us that 'sorrow's crown of sorrow is remembering happier things.' It is hardly less true to say that joy is enhanced by the recollection of the troubles of the past. *Haec meminisse juvabit.* It is already clear that the Great War has not immediately led to a cessation of international conflicts; and it is pretty certain that it will not lead to any such result without incessant vigilance. Still, we may at least affirm that there is now a pretty general conviction that it is necessary, in the common phrase, to 'think internationally'; and the institution of the League of Nations, even in its present imperfect form, has gone a considerable way to enable such thinking to have some practical effect. There has been a renewed interest in such schemes as those of Rousseau and Kant for the establishment of a lasting peace and a reawakening of the desire to understand the modes of life and feeling in the leading nations of the earth. Other circumstances also have tended to make this easier than it has ever been before. Some of these circumstances it may be well now to notice.

There is a quite real sense in which our world may be said to have become gradually smaller. This, no doubt, increases the possibilities of conflict.[1] as well as the possibilities of mutual understanding. It was one of Aristotle's contentions[2]

[1] Many writers have emphasized this, *e.g.* Mr. Homer Lea in his book on *The Day of the Saxon.*

[2] *Politics*, Book IV, chap. iv.

that a state must not be so large that a herald cannot reach all the citizens with his voice. The newspapers have for a long time been a pretty effective substitute for the voice of the herald; but it has now become possible to address almost the whole world by word of mouth. The difficulty at least is not due to size, but to diversity of speech and of ways of thinking. In movement also distances have been greatly reduced by the employment of steam and electricity. It is hardly too much to say that for most of the purposes of communal interest countries are now hardly larger than cities were in ancient times, and that the whole world is hardly as large as some countries were a few generations ago. This reduction of size is, no doubt, subject to some qualification. A small neighbourhood is still needed for the more intensive forms of human intercourse. It is still possible to meet those of one's own home and of one's own district in a more intimate way than is readily possible in a wider circle; and the Tower of Babel, or whatever circumstances have given rise to the great diversities of human speech, must still be reckoned among the most serious obstacles in the way of international unity. It is still true, as it has been said,[1] that there are 'two facts in our nature: that we owe a duty to our fellow-men, and that we cannot adequately perform it to the race at large.'

Nor is it altogether fanciful to say that our general attitude to the world has been sensibly affected by the newer discoveries in astronomy and other sciences. For most of the ancients, and even for most of the moderns, our earth was to all intents the whole universe; and its living inhabitants were almost the only beings who had any effective existence for them. We now think of the living inhabitants of our globe as but a small portion even of the people with whom through books we may come, without any very special training, into quite vital contact. We have to some extent learned to regard the lower animals, rather than any of the races of mankind, as our poor relations; and we have quite recently been led to believe that there are possibly many worlds besides our own in which some living forms may exist. Indeed, the discoveries of Einstein have led to the conviction that the whole spatio-temporal system within

[1] Pearson, *National Life and Character*, p. 188.

which our world and the entire stellar universe are included, though almost inconceivably vast, is confined within quite definite limits. We can thus more easily think of the present inhabitants of our globe as a comparatively little band, and a band whose fundamental interests are largely the same. At least we are no longer as ready as some previous generations have been to suppose that any country of our world is peopled by inhuman monsters,

> anthropophagi and men whose heads
> Do grow beneath their shoulders.

It is known rather that there are almost everywhere to be found people who are, on the whole, very like ourselves, made of the same clay, a little coarser or finer, and capable in some degree of similar intellectual and spiritual developments.

Yet all this does not make it cease to be true that there is a real and important distinction between an international and a cosmopolitan outlook. Just as the good father or son is naturally prior to the good neighbour, the good neighbour to the good citizen, and the good citizen to the patriotic worker; so, perhaps even more emphatically, it is still essential that one should be a good patriot before he can be a 'good European' and a good European before he can hope to be, in any effective sense, a good citizen of the world. The great majority of people are still somewhat rigidly confined at least within some particular country, many within some particular neighbourhood, a few almost exclusively within some particular home; and they may live very satisfactory lives under such limitations. There is surely a sense in which

> One place fulfils, like any other place,
> The proper service every place on earth
> Was framed to furnish man with.

At any rate, one can hardly be the brother of everybody until one has learned in some degree what it means to be a brother, how one brother differs from another brother, how far real unity in social intercourse can be made consistent with real difference, and how far it is legitimate to sacrifice individuality for the welfare of a group. It is difficult to learn all this even

within a very limited circle; still more difficult to apply it to the world as a whole. The pure cosmopolitan, who has not advanced through the family, the neighbourhood, and the country, is too apt to be an individualist in disguise, a 'wretch concentred all in self,' who owns no genuine loyalties at all.

Among the causes that have prevented the growth of a genuine internationalism, besides the inevitable difficulties of distance, diversities of speech and national customs, it is probable that theories of diversity of race have played a more disastrous part than any single cause. Every people has a certain tendency to think of itself as being, in some sense or other, a 'peculiar people.' It is not a bad supposition, in so far as it leads to the maintenance of fine traditions. The Jews, who were perhaps the worst offenders, had certainly some grounds for national pride; and, in the end, it was largely from them that the idea of a universal community of mankind was derived—chiefly, no doubt, through Christianity, but partly also through the influence of some of their earlier prophets. The leading races of India also have a special right to pride themselves on the immemorial antiquity of their particular type of civilization and of the long persistence of the ideas on which it is based. But the Greeks, the Romans, and in recent times some of the Germans, have also tended to lay claim to a special racial superiority; and, among ourselves also, even Shakespeare, and more emphatically Milton, have used expressions that seemed to suggest that the English people were in some peculiar sense the favourites of Heaven. It is still possible, no doubt, to maintain that certain races are, on the whole, on a higher level than others; but modern investigations have tended to convince us that the population of most of the leading nations, at least in Europe, consists of a mixture of races not differing very greatly in their fundamental characteristics, and owing such differences as they appear to have mainly to geographical and historical causes, which hardly justify us in putting forward a confident claim to decisive superiority in any people. There is no great harm, however, in the attempt on the part of different nationalities to prove by their deeds that they possess peculiar virtues; but it is well to remember that such virtues carry with them their corresponding defects.

Even the quick-wittedness of the ancient Greeks seems to have been combined with a certain unreliability; and the fervour of the Jews, which produced the sublime utterances of the greater prophets, produced also the abominations that they denounced and the ferocity of the rabble that stoned them. In more modern times we may justly admire the sharp lucidity of the French; but we should not forget that it bears some relation to the light-hearted cruelty of the *noblesse* and to the horrors of the Reign of Terror. The graceful dignity of the Italian temper may, in like manner,[1] yield a beauty which is that of the tempest or the abyss. So too the patient elaboration of the Germans may pass easily into deliberate frightfulness; and the steadfast adaptability in practical affairs on which we are apt to pride ourselves may show itself to others as thoughtless obstinacy and hypocrisy or lack of imagination. It is noteworthy that those who have tried to establish the claim to unique superiority in any people have often been of alien extraction. The finest representatives of any people have generally been sufficiently conscious of their defects. Dante was none too flattering to his countrymen nor Goethe to his. Spain is best known through the satirist of its chivalry and Scotland by the author of *The Holy Fair*. Shakespeare also delighted to have a gibe at the English[2] and Voltaire at the French. Yet it would be absurd to call any of these great men unpatriotic. What is true is that their patriotism was tempered by their love of humanity. Most of them at least could not properly be called cosmopolitan; but they were not merely nationalists. Even Mazzini was far from being that.

Love of one's country has become so nearly an instinct with many people—perhaps we might even say with all healthy-minded people—that it seems almost superfluous to inquire into its theoretical foundations; but, when it comes to be a question of the justification of particular modes of national life, the case is different; and, when we raise the question of

[1] Professor Orestano has recently emphasized the genial balance of the Italian spirit; but it is not always immediately obvious, though it appears to be prominent in Professor Orestano himself.

[2] The remarks of Mr. J. M. Robertson about Shakespeare's attitude towards his fellow-countrymen (*The Evolution of States*, pp. 170–80) seem to me to show his usual good judgment.

international unity, we are still more definitely beset by problems with which it is not altogether easy to deal. In what sense and in what degree, we ask, can it be described as a unity? To what extent can we be said to be under any obligation to promote that unity? And, if there is any such obligation, in what way can most of us have any valid hope of doing something to fulfil it? The answer, no doubt, must be that most of us, taken singly, can do little or nothing to promote even the unity of our country or our town; but, in co-operation with others, we may help to cultivate an international spirit, just as we may help to cultivate a national spirit; and, like the latter, it may become almost an instinct. In the more purely cultural aspects of life, as we have already to some extent noted, it has with many people long become almost an instinct. Nobody who has much appreciation of literature or art feels that the literature and art of other nations are, in any real sense, foreign to him; nor is there much sense of estrangement among those who are interested in science or philosophy. Social customs and modes of behaviour are more apt to present difficulties; but these are often felt in the relations between different classes within the same nation as well as in international relations. A cultivated English gentleman may sometimes feel more at one with a cultivated Chinaman than with an untaught countryman of his own. Religious affinities tend even more powerfully to overleap the barriers of nationality. On the other hand, differences in religious convictions estrange even members of the same community. It is chiefly on the economic side of life that conflicts tend to arise; but these arise within a single nation often more acutely than between different nations. On the whole, it is true that the chief bond of unity within a nation, apart from a common language, is the community of laws and of customs that have almost the force of laws. As regards language, it has already been noted that this is not a decisive factor. An Englishman may find it easier to have intercourse with an American than with a Welshman or even with another Englishman who has a special dialect; and we have already had occasion to notice the possibility of an international language. Hence it is, on the whole, clear that the chief desideratum for a genuine international unity is a common

system of international law; and it is on the possibility of this that we must now concentrate our attention. It is the problem with which the League of Nations is concerned; and it can hardly be doubted that it is the most important problem with which the world is confronted at the present time. Happily a good deal has already been accomplished both in the organization of the League itself and in the treatment of particular problems by its agency. But much remains to be done before it can be regarded as providing an instrument that can be confidently relied upon to maintain the peace of the world. Indeed, war is still recognized as one of the instruments for the settlement of some ultimate difficulties. Some suggestions have, however, been put forward for improved methods that might be adopted in future which would at least gradually eliminate war and bring about a more perfect unity. The recent book by Professor McDougall on *Ethics and some Modern World Problems* contains some of the most striking of these suggestions; and it may be convenient to take it here as the main text for such comments as I have to make.

Professor McDougall begins by drawing a distinction between National and Universal Ethics. I am somewhat doubtful whether a distinction quite of this kind ought to be drawn. Any system of Universal Ethics worthy of the name must recognize that the human race is divided up, not merely into separate nations, but also into distinguishable neighbourhoods, families, and other modes of grouping, which carry with them the demand for special loyalties, though always in subordination to the larger loyalty to humanity. It is true, however, that nations are the largest and the most exacting of the subordinate groups, and that it is specially important to emphasize the fact, which has been already noted in an earlier chapter, that our right attitude towards the larger unity is best described as international rather than cosmopolitan; and this, I believe, is all that is really involved in the distinction that Professor McDougall draws. What he wishes to see developed is the attitude that has been characterized as that of the 'international mind.'

I think it is one of the advantages of the conception of Co-operative Creation that it enables us to speak of inter-

national unity in the same general terms as those in which we have to speak of national unity. Even in the case of national unity, the unity is arrived at, not by the creation of a Group Mind or a General Will in any special or mystical sense, but by devising methods by which co-operative activity can be brought about among representatives of the main problems in the life of a nation. Exactly the same has to be aimed at in dealing with international relations; and it has already been found by experience that it is quite possible to bring about such an attitude of co-operative creation. The international mind is already a reality in this sense.[1]

One of the difficulties to which Professor McDougall draws special attention is that of recognizing the different degrees of importance that have to be attached to different nations in an international grouping. Up to the present the tendency has been to assign special weight to those nations that can be regarded as Great Powers. The eminence thus conferred evidently rests mainly upon the presumed capacity of these nations for enforcing their decisions, though it may also imply a recognition that such power is generally accompanied by better organization and larger cultural and economic interests. This means that the unity of the world is regarded as resting ultimately on possible warfare; and this would, in all probability, result in the end in a renewal of actual warfare. It may thus be described as an attempt to use Satan to cast out Satan. If this is to be obviated, the degree of weight that is to be attached to different nations must be based upon some other test than that of their ability to wage war; and it is not easy to find one that could be regarded as altogether satisfactory. Professor McDougall has suggested that it might be made to depend rather on the amount of their expenditure on education. This would at least be one good test. Perhaps some

[1] In this connection, it may be worth while to quote two sentences from Mr. H. J. Laski's Foreword to the book by Mr. Behrens on *The International Labour Office*. 'What is, I should urge, above all impressive is the way in which men like M. Albert Thomas, Mr. H. B. Butler and their colleagues, by administering an international body, have grown into the possession of an international mind. They are not the less good Frenchmen and good Englishmen because they have learned to adjust that particularism to a richer perspective.'

others might be found that would be worth taking into account along with it. But this is a detail that need not at present be determined. It would need very careful consideration. It is enough in the meantime to know that it would not be impossible to find better ways of deciding upon the relative importance of the nations than by reference to the degree of their preparation for war. What is more important at present is to find some method, other than that of actual warfare, by which the decisions of an international authority could be made effective. Without some carefully devised machinery for this purpose, it is evident that the decisions arrived at would be little better than pious opinions, and might even lead to more bitter conflicts than those that they were designed to avert. The solution proposed by Professor McDougall is a comparatively simple one. It is to confine the right of aerial navigation exclusively to the representatives of the international authority. So far as the present state of scientific knowledge enables us to judge, it certainly seems that this device would place an irresistible power, like the thunderbolt of Zeus, in the hands of those responsible for the establishment and enforcement of international law; and, just because the power would be thus recognized as irresistible, it would probably never need to be used. I think it is true that the danger that it might be used for sinister ends is comparatively slight, especially if it could be regarded as only a temporary device to tide over a period of special difficulty. It might not put an end to war altogether—Professor McDougall does not appear to think that it would—but it would at least ensure that war would be carried on in accordance with the requirements of international law. On the possibility of abolishing war altogether, it may be well to add some further considerations at this point. People have become so accustomed to international strife that the idea of its possible abolition is apt to be received with some degree of derision. It is well, therefore, that we should be reminded, as we have been by Mr. W. J. Perry,[1] that it is a relatively late product of civilization.

[1] *The Growth of Civilization*, p. 133. In his smaller book on *War and Civilization* he even defines War as 'the means whereby the members of a parasitic ruling class of alien origin endeavour, while exploiting their own subjects, to dominate those surrounding peoples who produce wealth

I should be disposed to take a somewhat more hopeful view than that which appears to be taken by Professor McDougall with regard to the possibility of abolishing war altogether, at least in any sense at all similar to that in which it is at present conducted or in which it may soon be conducted when the use of poison gases has become more universal. I believe that the development of the international mind, supported for a time by such an irresistible force as that which has been suggested, would, within a comparatively short period, generate a new attitude (which has, indeed, already to some extent grown up) towards the whole conception of warfare.[1] It would gradually, or perhaps even speedily, come to be regarded as most people in this country regard duelling, or possibly even as all people in civilized countries regard cannibalism. Some, however, may at present be inclined to think that such a prospect is not only Utopian but even undesirable. Hence the suggestion of it calls for some explanation and defence.

The saying that is ascribed to the great von Moltke, that the idea of perpetual peace is a dream that is not even beautiful, is perhaps not as cynical as it is sometimes supposed to be.[2] Peace, merely as peace, is certainly not necessarily an ideal condition. In the sense of idle acquiescence in things as they are, it is clearly not a condition that is adapted to human nature, at least in its present state of development. Life means—and it is difficult to believe that it can ever cease to mean—a struggle towards better conditions of existence. We do not aim at the peace of death, stagnation or despair. It is life, not death, for which we pant. This was felt so strongly by William James that he set himself to try to find a 'moral equivalent of war.' I believe that the effort to find some such equivalent would become particularly necessary if peace were enforced by an international authority, such as Professor McDougall

in a tangible and desired form.' This is probably too large a generalization; but at least the conditions that lead to war can hardly be said to be inseparable conditions of the life of the human race.

[1] Since this was written, there have been many indications—notably in the United States—of the growth of the conviction that it would soon be possible, without any such drastic methods as those suggested by Dr. McDougall, to secure the final abolition of internationsl strife.

[2] For further emphasis on the value of War, reference may be made to Treitschke's *Politics*, Book I, chap. ii.

has asked us to conceive, dominating the nations like a thunderbolt. If we do not wage war against one another, it is at least necessary that we should fight somewhat strenuously against the blind forces of nature and against human ignorance, sin and degradation. This is, of course, a warfare in which mankind has long been engaged; but the time has probably come when it will have to be pursued with a more deliberate purpose. It may even be necessary, as Nietzsche in his wild way urged, that we should set ourselves deliberately to 'live dangerously.' The Age of Chivalry, as Burke complained, is long past, with its cruelties, its valours and its devotions. The new age is that of creative justice; but it is very essential that it should be no less strenuous and courageous than that older time.

It has already been noted that, in the constitution of the ultimate international authority, it would seem essential that there should be some definite and easily applicable means of determining the relative importance of the different nations that are represented in its composition, which must mean eventually all the nations in the world; and, as it is clear that they must cease to be graded on the basis of their preparations for war, there must evidently be some other competitive tests.[1] We have seen that the test of educational efficiency has been suggested; but it is doubtful whether the amount of money expended on it would yield a wholly satisfactory measure of its efficiency. It has to be judged rather by its results. The actual productivity of different nations in science, art, literature and invention would give a more convincing basis for judgment; and the fact that nations were being judged on this basis would supply a powerful stimulus to their efforts. But would it be possible to arrive at an impartial estimate about this? It seems to me that international boards of experts in different departments would be quite competent to arrive at decisions that would be approximately just. Presumably the grading would not be very steep. Several nations would, as hitherto, be regarded as standing on a footing of equality; and changes would only be made at intervals of considerable duration. Perhaps physical fitness should also be taken into account. I

[1] On the possibility of applying such tests, reference may be made to the book by Mr. L. S. Woolf on *International Government*, pp. 78–9.

would suggest that something akin to the old Olympic Games of the Greeks might be brought into being, as, indeed, to some extent it has been; and that the results of these should be included in the estimates by which the grading of the nations was determined. Something of the nature of warfare would thus be preserved, without the evil passions and wanton destruction by which it is now accompanied. But here, as in other matters, it is not my object to try to determine details. It would be contrary to the idea of co-operative creation to suppose that it is the business of any one person to decide what are the best arrangements. *Securus judicabit orbis terrarum.* The one thing needful is to cultivate the international mind and to have a sufficiency of courts and committees to register its decisions.

It certainly seems possible, in view of what has now been noted, that we may be on the verge of a new age, in which atomistic nationalism will have ceased to exist,[1] and all countries will be living freely under the beneficent control of an international organization. It is certainly hard to see how otherwise the peace of the world is to be preserved; and, if it is not preserved, the increasing destructiveness of the instruments of war must, in any case, bring purely national organizations to ruin. The choice lies between a willing organization supported by adequate power, with due recognition of 'degree, priority, and place,' and an enforced organization with mere power as master. Perhaps it may seem to some to be only a choice between two evils. There may be a lurking suspicion that, in any case, the new world would be a world dominated by machinery. It must be admitted that this is a kind of domination that has been steadily growing upon us. Even in the early part of last century Carlyle had begun to lament it; and Heine had somewhat cynically noted that in England the machines had almost the perfection of human beings, and the men had become little better than machines. Samuel Butler afterwards put forward

[1] It is against *such* nationalism that Tagore and others have uttered their protest. With its abolition it might be possible to restore many of the amenities of the older village communities. More direct and intensive forms of co-operative activity might then become possible. But different climates call for somewhat different modes of life. Different types of community, each good in its own way, might be expected to develop.

his amusing fantasy of men falling under the domination of the machinery that they had made. The conception of Frankenstein was another anticipation of the same kind of subjection. That something of the kind has actually come to pass is, in a certain degree, true. The progress that has been taking place in the Western world, and that is now being passed on to the East, was not inaptly described by Tennyson as a running down 'ringing grooves of change'; and in a world dominated by courts and committees the description might conceivably become still more appropriate. But at least the remedy is in our own hands. It lies in co-operative creation. Machinery has, of course, its rightful place in life. Its value consists in harnessing the lower forces of nature for everything that is of the nature of drudgery and leaving humanity free for the joy of creation. It is in this way, as Aristotle partly foresaw, that slavery can be practically, and not merely nominally, abolished. The declaration of J. S. Mill that it was doubtful whether the use of machinery had lightened the toil of a single human being, may have been an exaggeration; but it can hardly be denied that we have not yet entirely succeeded in reducing it to its proper function. The upward path in this respect was partly indicated by Ruskin and more practically enforced by William Morris and others; and its general nature has been pointed out in earlier chapters of this book. It may be taken as pretty certain that the Eastern countries that are now adopting some features of our Western civilization will not long be content to follow us in the over-emphasis on those mechanical methods that have been forced upon us by the rougher conditions with which we have had to contend. There are already signs of protest, and it can hardly be doubted that men will succeed in conquering the machines. The growing tendencies of our time point in the direction of freedom. In science it is, on the whole, true that the age of the physicists is giving place to that of the biologists. Life is displacing mechanism; and, if the conception of co-operative creation in social life can be accepted, that also is the substitution of a living process of growth for the more mechanical idea of contract or of a General Will acting mainly through mass organization. On the whole, we may believe that the new age can be trusted not to allow itself

to be offered up as a sacrifice to Moloch. I am afraid it is not true, as Rousseau thought, that man is 'born free'; but he is born with the power to make himself free by co-operation with others; and there can be no security for such freedom until he has learned, in some degree, to co-operate with *all* others. 'As long,' to use the words of Professor C. H. Herford,[1] 'as national greatness is conceived in terms of power, or of territory, or even of wealth, the very conception of a community of nations can hardly emerge: other nations are rivals to be beaten, are material to be made use of, are territory to be annexed, or at best, are allies to rally to our help. . . . But . . . in proportion as the aims of a nation cease to be fundamentally material, as soon as it seeks a well-being founded upon the spiritual enlightenment, the mental and moral health of its population, the similar aims of other nations become contributory, instead of rival forces, their advance an element in its own progress . . . and the love of each man for his country, as Mazzini said, only the most definite expression of his love for all the nations of the world.'

A good account of the work that has been done by the League of Nations has been given by Mr. H. J. Laski in his *Grammar of Politics*. Mr. H. G. Wells has sought to expose the defects of the League in his *Year of Prophesying*, and has urged the need for a more thorough cosmopolitanism, as distinguished from internationalism. Perhaps he has been rather too impatient of the defects that are almost inevitable in the working of a novel organization. But he is probably right in thinking that a more perfect form of unity has to be aimed at. Most of us would be glad to see a real Cosmopolis, a genuine World Capital, in Switzerland, or perhaps in Rome, and not merely a League. Such a World Capital would probably not be the seat of a universal source of laws, like ancient Rome, nor yet a universal spiritual organization, like mediaeval Rome, but rather a centre of enlightenment on all the aspects of human life—cultural, economic and legal—leaving the various nations, as far as possible, free to manage their own internal affairs, subject to control only in cases in which any of their activities were liable to give rise to serious difficulties or conflict. It

[1] *European Studies*, p. 247.

would seem that this is what the League of Nations may be expected, more and more fully, to develop into. Its recent publication, *The Problems of Peace*, points very decidedly in this direction.[1] In the meantime, we must have patience.

[1] See especially the very admirable addresses by Mr. H. J. Laski and Dr. J. C. Maxwell-Garnett.

CHAPTER X

THE UPWARD PATH

In considering the various aspects of human life, we have necessarily been led to notice a variety of details which may have tended in some degree to obscure the essential aims that it has been the object of this book to emphasize. What I have been seeking to make clear throughout is that human life has to be interpreted as a pursuit of the supreme values through the judicious employment of those that are properly to be regarded as instrumental. Like most distinctions, this is not one that can be quite rigidly drawn. Even the higher values may be regarded as instrumental to one another; and even the more purely instrumental values—such as eating and drinking —may acquire a symbolic significance that may be regarded as intrinsic. It would seem that the great object of human life is to realize beauty and joy through the understanding of the conditions under which that life has to be carried on and the strenuous effort to employ those conditions co-operatively in the way that is most effective for the attainment of the ultimate ends. The definite pursuit of the ultimate ends is the province of what has been referred to as the cultural aspect of life. The economic aspect is concerned mainly with the instrumental values, and what is chiefly important in it is that these values should be pursued in such a way as to be a help, and not a hindrance, to the realization of the intrinsic values. When so pursued, they may almost acquire an intrinsic value in themselves as part of the beneficent effort which constitutes the supreme worth of humanity. The general principle that it is important to recognize in this aspect of life—and indeed in all aspects—is that the instruments should be under the control of those who best understand their use and are most zealous for their employment in the furtherance of the chief ends of life. Subject to this qualification, what is to be aimed at is that everyone should contribute according to his powers and should

be furnished with what he needs for the proper exercise of those powers. The political aspect of life has for its special function the general organization of the communal life, so as to enable the cultural and economic aspects to work harmoniously together, free from external interference. To do this efficiently needs the co-operation of all parts of the world and of every individual in those parts; and hence it must ultimately involve the recognition of a single Commonwealth of humanity. There are difficulties in the way of this; and indeed it is hardly conceivable that human life on earth could have any real significance without this element of difficulty, since it is only under conditions of difficulty that the supreme creative worth of life can be realized. If all the difficulties of life on earth were removed, we should be ready for other worlds to conquer. It is probable—though far from certain—that this Earth is not the only planet on which life exists; and we certainly do not know that the life of human beings on earth is the only life for which they are destined. But it is the only life with which, in our present study, we have any direct concern.

I need hardly state that it has not been my object to plan a Utopia. It is comparatively easy to draw a picture of an idyllic life by leaving out of account the difficulties by which human life is beset; and it might not be very difficult for a small community of like-minded individuals to realize such an idyllic life; but the better world for which we are in search must have its centre in 'Rome or London, not Fools' Paradise.' We cannot shatter the world to bits, even if we wanted to do so; but by taking account of the difficulties that are involved in its complicated structure, we may hope, by strenuous co-operative effort, to be able in some degree to 'reshape it nearer to the heart's desire.' It was a prominent conception in ancient Greek philosophy that in all existence there is an upward and a downward path, which might even, according to Heraclitus, be regarded as aspects of a single process. The particular way in which this conception was emphasized is not now very enlightening; but it remains true that in human life at least there are nearly always two possible directions in which we may go, and that what is most essential is that we should choose the way that leads upward. Often we may have to 'fall

to rise,' but on the whole we may move upward. What I have been seeking to urge throughout is that the upward path in human life is the path of co-operative creation. It is not a novel contention. It is the view, as I have endeavoured to bring out, to which the constructive efforts of those who have dealt with the fundamental problems of human life have been gradually leading us. It is not a view that entitles us to look for any immediate finality in the organization of social life. Those who have tried to provide us with such a final vision have never carried any complete conviction. I suppose Plato's *Republic* may be taken as the most interesting of such attempts; but the picture that he drew is not one that can commend itself to any modern reader even as the ideal for an isolated community. Still less has it any relevance for human life as a whole. What a modern writer has to try to do is to give some account of the complex conditions that are involved in the communal life, and to indicate how it may be possible gradually to remove the difficulties that are involved in them. This is what I have been trying, in a very general way, to do.

The chief conceptions with which we have been engaged throughout are three: (1) the general idea of Co-operative Creation, (2) the three main aspects of national and international life, (3) the idea of a comprehensive Commonwealth. On each of these it may be well to add a few words at this point.

(1) *The Idea of Co-operative Creation.*—This idea is by no means new. It is little more than a modification of the doctrine that has been variously stated as that of a Common Good, a General Will and a Group Mind; but the essentially creative aspect of social life is hardly sufficiently brought out by any of these expressions. On the other hand, the idea of Creation has been forcibly emphasized by writers who do not adopt any of these conceptions of social unity. Among these, Mr. Bertrand Russell is specially noteworthy. With him, however, the idea of co-operation is not prominent; though, of course, it cannot be said to be entirely absent. Though he appears to be willing to be classed as a socialist, his general view of human life must in the main be characterized as individualistic—a not altogether

unusual combination.[1] Again, he contrasts creation with possession in a way that seems to me extreme and misleading. He tends to regard them as based upon two opposite impulses in human nature; whereas it appears to me that the desire to possess is largely dependent upon the desire to use. Creation, in general, does not work *in vacuo*. It works with a given material, and presupposes some effective control of that material. No doubt, the desire to control sometimes becomes perverted, as it does with the miser and sometimes with the book-collector, into the mere desire to have.[2] The impulse to create may also be perverted into the mere desire for novelty. But normally the two tendencies go hand in hand. Reference has already been made to the striking use that Mill makes of the conception of possession, and in particular his emphasis on the idea that is expressed in the famous phrase that 'the magic of property turns sand into gold.' The property, no doubt, need not be purely individual; but, for its effective use, it is in general necessary at least that it should be held by some definitely co-operative group—a family, a guild, or some other organization of friendly and like-minded people. It is only possessions that cannot be effectively used—*e.g.* by being too extensive—that tend to deaden the creative impulse.

The writer who appears to me to have dealt most adequately with the idea of co-operative creation is, as I have already indicated, Miss M. P. Follett. The views that she puts forward, however, at least in their more purely political aspect, are, as she fully recognizes, traceable back to the philosophy of Hegel. But it is probably true that Hegel thought of the creative activity of human life in too purely intellectual a fashion.

[1] Mr. Russell's general view of society is based upon an atomistic philosophy. His position is stated very clearly and simply in his little book, *What I Believe* (Kegan Paul). Some criticisms on his general attitude will be found in Professor J. W. Scott's book on *Syndicalism and Philosophical Realism*, especially pp. 185 *sqq*. Reference may be made also to *Problems of a New World*, by Mr. J. A. Hobson. The great conflict in science and philosophy at the present time is that between Atomism and Cosmism. Unfortunately the latter cannot be explained quite as simply as the former; but the recent developments of physical science seem to give more support to the conception of a unified system than to that of disconnected atoms.

[2] This tendency is well brought out in Mr. Tawney's book on *An Acquisitive Society*, and in Professor Veblen's *Theory of a Leisure Class*.

Throughout his philosophical construction, it seems not unfair to say that he did not sufficiently recognize the importance of the ideas of creative imagination and value. Bergson, on the other hand, who has laid great stress on creative activity in the general process of evolution, has somewhat unduly depreciated the part played in human life both by intellectual construction and by the conception of value. It is the great merit of Miss Follett that she has shown, with a great wealth of illustration, how all these elements can be combined. The way had been, no doubt, to some extent pointed out by others. Some of the followers of Hegel had implicitly, if not explicitly, gone beyond their master by interpreting Spirit in a more comprehensive sense than can readily be recognized in the work of Hegel himself. In particular, Edward Caird and Sir Henry Jones did this persistently throughout their references to social problems. Dr. McTaggart, in an even more explicit way, took Spirit in its most comprehensive sense as the interpretative principle in dealing with the philosophy of Hegel.[1] But, if Hegel meant it to be thus interpreted, it can hardly be maintained that he himself succeeded in making his meaning clear.[2] Some recent representatives of the Hegelian tendency in philosophy, notably the late Dr. Bosanquet, have sought to make its meaning more readily apparent by connecting it somewhat more explicitly with Rousseau's doctrine of the General Will; but, unless this is interpreted as meaning Co-operative Creation, it either tends to become very vague in its practical application or else throws us back upon the decision of the majority or on the existing institutions as the expression of the General Will in its operation throughout the past. The idea of Co-operative Creation enables us more definitely to recognize what is valuable in the work of the past and in the activities of the present, but gives us also a more definite conception of what has to be aimed at for the future, *viz.* to make the World more and more into a 'fellowship,' 'a

[1] I think, however, he emphasized the idea of Substance too much, and did not sufficiently recognize the value of the time process. His views are very fully expounded in his book on *The Nature of Existence.*

[2] He was at least hampered by the apparent conviction that the process of spiritual development had been completed in the early years of the nineteenth century.

fellowship where free men and women help each other to achieve what beauty and purpose they can in their lives.'[1]

(2) *The Three Main Aspects of Communal Life.*—In distinguishing the three main aspects of the social unity, it is again true that I have not been stating anything essentially new. The general fact, as we have seen, has been recognized in the Indian caste system, in the work of Plato and Aristotle, and has recently been emphasized, in an instructive, though somewhat bewildering, way by Dr. Rudolf Steiner. What I have specially been seeking to bring out is that it is not to be conceived as involving a caste system or even any sharp division of classes. It is a distinction between functions, not necessarily between persons. The unity of the social system has to be as fully recognized as its triplicity; and everyone is concerned with the life of the whole, even if his special work may be confined to one of its particular aspects. It was one of the wise remarks of Edward Caird that the prophet in modern times must be a man of the world as well. It is not enough that he should have a vision of the new Jerusalem. He must be something of an economist and something of a politician as well. Hence it is important that the general organization of society should contain some explicit recognition both of the unity of the whole and of the separate functions through which that unity expresses itself. What I have ventured to suggest is that the separate functions seem to demand the guidance of advisory councils of some sort, while the unity of the whole is represented by authorities that accept the advice of the three separate departments and combine the results in their practical policies and programmes.

(3) *The Idea of a Commonwealth.*—In distinguishing a Commonwealth from all the smaller modes of association, I have taken the unity of the English-speaking peoples as the model, and have sought to urge that the more comprehensive unity of the world might be brought about by an extension of the general principle that is here involved. I thus recognize this particular conception as a specially British contribution to the solution of the problem of World Citizenship. In taking this view, I trust that I have not been unduly influenced by a

[1] J. L. and B. Hammond, *The Rise of Modern Industry*, p. 246.

patriotic bias. The British people, like others, has certainly the defects of its qualities. They have been brought home to us by foreign criticisms, and these criticisms have, on the whole, been received among ourselves with a certain degree of meekness. Perhaps it may be said that we take them with a smile, and go on as before. The charge that is most persistently made, and that has been most generally admitted, is that of hypocrisy —not deliberate hypocrisy, but rather unconscious. It is due, I believe, in the main to an imperfect co-ordination of the three main aspects of national life. The spiritual, the industrial and the more purely political aspects have all been strongly emphasized in our country; but the two latter have not been very satisfactorily harmonized with the first. Wealth has been pursued without sufficient care for the welfare of those who have been employed in its production; and politics have been guided rather in the spirit of compromise and opportunism than in that of clearly conceived principles. These defects are largely due to lack of thoroughness in the application of religious and moral ideas; and the emphasis that has been laid on these ideas has consequently seemed to be somewhat hypocritical, and has probably in many cases actually been so. The most characteristic attitude of the English people is that which is expressed by the phrase 'playing the game,' which certainly contains the idea of loyal co-operation among the members of a group and a sense of honour between competitive groups, but not the suggestion of creative activity and still less that of co-operation with the whole of mankind. Still, it seems at least true to say that the more purely legal and political aspects of life have suffered less in our country than the others.[1] Our methods of government expose defects to immediate criticism, and improvements are gradually introduced. The machinery becomes modified without revolutionary changes. Hence it is in the main true that our political methods have become

[1] Bagehot's book on *The English Constitution* contains still, I think, the best statement of the chief grounds for the special excellence of British methods of Government. Of course, there have been great changes since that book was written; but readiness to change is one of the chief excellences to which Bagehot calls attention. For some of the more recent developments reference should be made to the writings of Bryce, A. L. Lowell and others.

models for the rest of the world; and, in particular, the relations between the mother country and the daughter nations have furnished a unique object-lesson in the possibilities of international amity. It is true that the conditions have been exceptionally favourable; and it is by no means obvious that any similar co-ordination would be possible on a larger scale. It presupposes a certain likeness of mind; and it remains doubtful how far this can reasonably be expected in the world as a whole. Probably it would at least necessitate the use of a common language for the purpose of international intercourse; and, in any case, it can only be expected to be brought about very slowly. It will need a long process of evolution; and on this it may be well now to add a little to what has been already stated.

It is evident that the idea of co-operative creation implies a doctrine of social evolution; and this has perhaps already been sufficiently emphasized. We have had occasion to note that the modern conception of evolution is no longer based exclusively on the recognition of a struggle for existence among chance variations, but is thought of rather as more or less consciously involving an upward movement which, in its higher phases at least, implies some degree of purpose and consciousness of value. The conception of emergent evolution, which was briefly referred to in the first part of this book, enables us to think of life, not as a blind struggle for existence, but as a more or less consciously directed effort to achieve the higher values. Among animals this may be blind struggle against negative values, like that of a bird beating against the bars of its cage; but in human life it involves a more or less clear consciousness of the beauty and joy that may be achieved by benevolent efforts, guided by intellectual insight. For the achievement of this great end, the control of material goods is to some extent essential—not, of course, for the mere sake of possession or ostentation, but for the sake of those supreme values for which they are the necessary conditions. What is important for this purpose is that these instruments should be in the hands of those who are most able and eager so to employ them. With a community thus organized there are no definite limits to the perfection that might gradually be made

possible. But it is perhaps somewhat futile at present to try to predict the exact form that it would take. The celestial city is evidently still somewhat remote.

Some hesitation has, however, been felt in the application of the idea of evolution to human societies, mainly on account of the constantly recurring spectacle of the decay of older civilizations. This is specially conspicuous in such a country as India, in which the idea of decadence, rather than that of evolution, is the one that most readily occurs to us. Certainly the study of the history of the world seems to show a pretty steady tendency of the forces of civilization to move from East to West; and it may not be altogether fanciful to suggest that this process is being continued at the present time by the revival that is taking place in Japan and China largely through influences that have come to them from America. It may, on the whole, be maintained that all the great cultural influences have come to us from the meditative lands in the East. They are critically applied in the more cautious and practical West and made more easily available in life by the control of natural forces, and are then returned to the East as a means of giving new life to their older and more spiritual ideals. In all this, it may be urged, there is little real progress, but rather an alternation of growth and decay. But a careful study of what takes place does not, I think, confirm this view. Certainly the fact of decadence cannot be altogether denied; but it can be reconciled with the idea of an increasing purpose. The decay of older civilizations is not due to anything that can properly be described as senility; though it does bear a certain analogy to the decay of power in individuals. It is partly due to the difficulties that result from the overcrowding and mixing of a variety of races. Primitive cultures are too thin to be spread over a large surface. It is the inventiveness and the capacity for detailed application among Western peoples that have made this achievement more possible; though it may have to be admitted that the culture has been somewhat vulgarized in the process. But it is to a considerable extent true that the movement westward has arisen from the effort to escape from the madding crowd or from intolerable political conditions. This was conspicuously the case with the movement to America;

and, though it may sometimes be wise to urge that 'Here or nowhere is your America,' the seekers for Utopia are always eager to be alone with a few like-minded people. Hence evolution among men is somewhat like that in nature at large. It is in new organisms that the higher forms of life appear. But they carry over a great part of the vitality of the old; and the older organisms may still be capable of being revitalized. They do not altogether die, and they may even now be capable of renewing their youth. There appear to be good grounds for thinking that there are the beginnings of such a transformation in Japan and China; and there are considerable signs of a similar revival in India. Still, it remains true that new wine cannot be put into old bottles. A nation that seeks to renew its youth has to be content to allow a considerable proportion of its old ideas to die out. No one can expect the City States to be revived in Greece in anything like their old form; and it is perhaps not much wiser to expect that India can find a wisdom suited to the present time by going back to the Upanishads and the code of Manu. The dead past must be allowed to bury its dead. But there does not appear to be any real ground for supposing that races die out and that others take their place. To some extent at least it may be true that races can gain fresh life by intermixture. Probably fresh discoveries may yet be made in the science of race culture. In the meantime, it must be confessed that much remains obscure. One thing that seems clear is that wars at least must, on the whole, be unfavourable to race progress by killing off the most vigorous people. But it may be urged that hygiene may also be prejudicial by keeping alive the least vigorous stocks. The difficulties that have been urged by J. B. Haycraft[1] and others cannot be altogether ignored. Some degree of birth-control may perhaps be a necessity. But this is a difficult problem, and we must now devote a certain amount of attention to it.

There is here another cloud that hangs over all our visions of a brighter world. No doubt, it will have been present to the minds of some readers all along. They will object that, without war and with increasingly favourable conditions of life in all countries, the growth of population would be rapid and

[1] In his little book on *Darwinism and Race Progress*.

unchecked, and the curse of Malthus would hang heavy on the earth. Certainly, the population problem is one that calls for serious attention, which indeed it has received. It is connected with the whole question of the control of the Family by the national and international authorities and by the force of educated public opinion. Clearly, if the Nation has to be in some respects subject to a more comprehensive mode of unity, it is still more obviously essential that the Family should be subject to the Nation. Hence it seems necessary to add some considerations here bearing upon the life of the Family in its relations to the general well-being of the human race.

In the foregoing chapters we have been regarding social life mainly from the point of view of the larger modes of unity that have been developed in it—nations, states, empires, commonwealths, and the possible future development of a World Commonwealth. Within these larger organizations the more primitive unity of the family continues to subsist; and it would seem that, in some form or other, it must continue to subsist. Human beings are not born as citizens; but, in civilized communities, they are generally born as members of a family; and their earliest initiation into the claims of social life is made within that group. Afterwards it is transferred to schools, colleges, and other modes of initiation. Now, the existence of the family as a separate mode of community or association presents difficulties which, as we have already noted, were strongly felt by Plato in ancient times, and that have also in more recent times been emphasized by socialistic writers, such as Bebel and Mr. and Mrs. Havelock Ellis and, in a more qualified way, by such reformers as Mr. and Mrs. Bertrand Russell. It seems desirable, therefore, to add a little more here about the Family in its relation to the larger organization within which it is contained; though our treatment of this must be very brief. The difficulties connected with it have been brought rather prominently before our minds in recent years; and it is not possible here to do more than refer to some of the most general considerations that bear upon it.

In its simplest form the family may be regarded as a mode of community that is prior to the existence of cities, nations or commonwealths, and that is more closely connected with the

conditions of animal life. The chief difficulties that are presented by it are due to the fact that, in human life, the growth of the citizen is a long and complex process, and that the primitive conditions of family life have to be adapted to the multifarious demands of a civilized community. Within such a community it becomes subject, in particular, to the three main determinants that have been noted as belonging to such communities. It has a cultural aspect, an economic aspect, and a legal aspect. Usually the family has to be regarded as being, to a large extent, a self-supporting community; and in this way it rests upon an economic basis. It is normally founded, however, upon personal affection, which, like friendship and various forms of fraternal intercourse, belongs to the more purely cultural or spiritual aspect of life; and it is concerned with the early education of children, including the development of their civic, moral and religious attitudes. In view of its importance in the production of citizens, it is necessarily regarded as subject also to legal control. This complexity gives rise to a considerable amount of difficulty; and many of the problems with which men's minds are agitated at the present time are directly or indirectly concerned with it. The formation of the family usually rests largely upon the choice of two individuals; yet that choice is necessarily governed to some extent by social regulations, though these regulations must be such as to allow considerable scope for individual freedom.

Marriage is the first step in the formation of the family group; and, in most modern communities, this rests upon a monogamic basis, and is normally regarded as governed mainly by the free choice of the individuals concerned and as constituting a lifelong relationship. The production of children is generally left to the free choice of the two members of the partnership, who are also held responsible for the maintenance and early education of the children, subject to such general regulations as the community may think it right to impose. On all these conditions problems may be, and often are, raised; and it is now our business to consider what appear to be the most important of them.

The following appear to be the chief questions that have to be dealt with: (1) Is it right that the relationship should

always be a purely monogamic one? (2) Should it be left exclusively to the choice of the two persons concerned? (3) Should it be regarded as permanent or subject to dissolution? and, if the latter, on what grounds? (4) Should the production of children be left entirely to the free choice of the members of the partnership? (5) How far should they be held responsible for maintenance and education? To some of these questions it may be possible to give a direct answer. With regard to others it may hardly be possible to offer more than some general suggestions. It may be convenient to arrange these suggestions under the following general headings: (1) Biological Aspects of the Family, (2) Cultural Aspects, (3) Economic Aspects, (4) Legal Aspects.

It seems best to begin with some considerations that are mainly biological, though the definite treatment of these must be left to experts in that department. Some of them, however, are obvious enough. Human beings are not, like pigeons, born in couples; and, in fact, it is recognized, on the contrary, that consanguineous relations have to be quite definitely barred. It is true, however, that under normal conditions the numbers of men and women in any particular community are approximately equal. Hence, if there are to be permanent relations of marriage at all, and if they are to be available for the whole population, the general basis must be a monogamic one. This may not apply in newly occupied territories, where the majority of immigrants may be men; and it may not apply in a country that has been decimated by war, where the majority may be women; and there may be other exceptional conditions. We may hope that in the future such conditions will become rarer than they have been in the past. At any rate, it seems clear that, if there is to be any general rule of permanent relationships, the rule must be that of monogamy. It remains true, however, that the numbers of the sexes are seldom exactly equal, and that for various reasons, often quite valid, some may not enter into marriage relationships at all. Hence this particular consideration, though it points to a general rule, is not absolutely decisive. But, if there is to be any definite law on the subject, it seems clear that it must be the law of monogamy; and it would be difficult to admit exceptions without some appearance

of partiality. Powerful monarchs and very rich men have sometimes claimed exceptional privileges; and, even where there are definite rules, they may be able to secure them. It is possible also that exceptional circumstances might be held as justifying exceptional treatment. Hence the biological point of view cannot be taken as decisive. Though human beings are animals, they are animals with special cultural and economic needs and with special possibilities of political organization to deal with the problems of life.

The cultural aspect of the Family concerns both the relations between parents and their relations to their children. One of the main grounds for the monogamic basis of the Family lies in its cultural advantages both in the lives of the parents and in their relations to their offspring. There are marked differences, as we have already noted, in the respective characteristics of the two sexes that enable them, under suitable conditions, to supplement one another's deficiencies and to have a permanently beneficial influence on one another. This calls for patience, and often for a considerable length of time. Comte did not much exaggerate in saying that 'between two beings so complex and so diverse as a man and a woman the whole of life is not too long for them to know one another well and to love one another worthily.' But the importance of the family group lies even more in the part that it necessarily plays in the early education of children. Even in some animal groups this is apparent; and in the more complicated life of humanity it is much more conspicuously obvious. It is probably true that the earliest years of childhood are the most important in the general formation of character, as distinguished from the acquisition of particular aptitudes. The consideration of this is, no doubt, a difficult subject for the treatment of which more specialized knowledge is needed than is possessed by the present writer. Psychological investigations are being carried on, especially perhaps in America; and we may hope to know more in the near future. How much of what we become depends definitely on what we inherit from our parents or from ancestors more remote, is a matter on which much light has been thrown by Mendel and others; but it remains in some degree obscure. There are some who still speculate on the possibility of the

reincarnation of elements from more remote sources; but for this there does not appear to be much evidence—if, indeed, there can be said to be any. What seems certain is that most of our characteristics are derived pretty directly, though in varying degrees, from our immediate ancestors. Goethe may have exaggerated about this in his own case; but the general fact of such heredity can hardly be denied. Even those who maintain the doctrine of reincarnation usually admit that it only accounts for part of the content—perhaps about half—of the child's mind. At any rate, the early impressions that determine the child's attitude towards life must be taken to a large extent from the influence of the mother and usually to some extent from that of the father also, though of course other influences soon begin to enter in. Hence it is important that the parents should have some understanding of the nature and needs of the child's mind and some opportunities of discussing them with one another. No doubt, its earliest experiences must be of a comparatively simple kind; and, by degrees, it may become more largely dependent on other educational influences. Probably it is in most cases desirable that, at a pretty early stage, it should be brought under the influence of others who have given more attention to the development of the child's mind than most parents can be expected to give. But it is clear that, in the majority of cases, the influence of the family group continues for a considerable time to be one of the main factors in education. This is indeed so obvious that it hardly calls for further emphasis.

It is on account of these cultural aspects of the family that marriage is commonly treated as a more or less definitely religious institution; and it is liable to various forms of shipwreck when there is lack of unity either in the specific religious creeds of the parents or in their general attitude towards the more important cultural problems of life. Such differences sometimes emerge or become conspicuous after marriage, and will have to be more definitely referred to later. In the meantime I pass to the more definitely economic aspects of the subject. Men were until recently commonly thought of as being normally the only bread-winners for a family; and but little regard was paid to the fact that they have to win bread for a

very variable number of individuals. It is now more fully recognized that women may be bread-winners as well. But the conception of the family as a united group from the point of view of economic study has been very imperfectly dealt with. Miss Rathbone has recently written an interesting book on *The Disinherited Family*,[1] and the whole subject has now begun to attract serious attention. There are great difficulties involved in it. One reason that has prevented any definite attempt to deal with it has been the contention of Malthus that the increase of population is a source of danger and ought to be checked rather than encouraged.[2] Any elaborate discussion of the views of Malthus would be out of place here, even if I had more competence than I have for the thorough treatment of them. I believe it is generally admitted, however, that there was some exaggeration in his statement about the tendency of population to grow in a geometrical ratio, while the means of subsistence grew only in an arithmetical one. At the same time, it seems to be true that there are dangers in an increasing population as well as in a diminishing one. The quality of the population is the most important consideration. Marshall considered[3] that the celibacy of the clergy and of others specially devoted to culture had led, particularly in the Middle Ages, to a deterioration of the population in many European countries. Many of those who have exerted the finest influence on social life in Protestant countries have been sons or daughters 'of the manse.' The importance of this consideration has been very forcibly urged by Dean Inge[4] and others; and the problem of eugenics is now recognized as being one of considerable urgency.

At any rate, the fact that the Family is now recognized, in Professor MacIver's phrase, as being an Association within the community, raises the question how far it should be regarded

[1] What is urged in this connection relates only to the families of wage-earners with very inadequate means for the support of a family. It is pretty obvious that it could hardly be applied in a more universal way. For further discussion of it reference may be made to the book by E. M. Burns on *Wages and the State*, p. 24.

[2] It has recently been contended, however, that a limited form of family endowment does not tend to increase the birth-rate. See the paper by J. S. Blackmore and F. C. Mellone in the *Economic Journal*, January 1928.

[3] *Principles of Economics*, p. 28.

[4] *Outspoken Essays*.

as subject to State control. That it is to some extent subject to such control is now generally recognized. Monogamy is insisted upon in most civilized countries; and the education of children is not left entirely to the discretion of parents. There is also, in general, some insistence, though of a less definite kind, on adequate conditions of housing and on some matters of sanitation. It may be that it is now time to give more attention to the whole question of eugenics, though any attempts to deal with it completely would be a good deal resented by many, and would, no doubt, involve a considerable amount of disagreeable interference with the freedom of the marriage relationship. How far it may be necessary or desirable to carry such interference, it is not for me to determine; but it seems to be incumbent on me to indicate the kind of interference that appears to be implied.

Unfortunately, the science of eugenics—if there can be said to be such a science at all—is one that is still in its infancy; and any useful application of its results in practice must be somewhat tentative and probably indirect. Mr. Chesterton, in his book on *Eugenics and other Evils*, may have exaggerated its evils, but he has certainly brought out some of its difficulties with his usual brilliance of statement and illustration. But I think most of those who advocate some regard for eugenic considerations have not in mind anything quite as drastic as appears to be contemplated in that book.[1] It is dealt with in a more satisfactory way by Professor Urwick in his very admirable book on *The Social Good* (chap. ix.), where he raises the rather fundamental question as to what constitutes fitness, and contrasts Plato's conception of it with that which tends to prevail in modern considerations of the subject. The subject is one of very great difficulty; but it seems clear, at least, that the consideration of the subject, taken in conjunction with the

[1] I think he is wrong, for instance, in believing that there would have been any objections on eugenic grounds to the birth of R. L. Stevenson. There might have been objections to Stevenson himself becoming a parent; but the question did not arise. It seems to be true, however, that a strict application of eugenic principles would have prevented the birth of Keats. All that can be reasonably advocated is some degree of encouragement on the one hand and discouragement on the other. Some of those who are interested in eugenics (such as Dean Inge) are rather more interested in encouraging the birth of the fit than in preventing that of the unfit.

work of Malthus, throws considerable doubt on the desirability of giving such an unqualified encouragement to the increase of population as would be involved in any indiscriminate endowment of the Family. If it should ever seem desirable to give any positive encouragement of this kind, it ought probably to be accompanied by some eugenic tests, *i.e.* it ought only to be granted in cases in which the parents have been certified as eugenically fit. Conversely, if such a proposal as a tax on bachelors should ever be carried into effect, there might be an exemption in the case of those who were similarly certified as unfit. Whether it would be possible or desirable to adopt either of these proposals, is a question that involves too many difficulties to be decided by any general considerations. It could only be dealt with satisfactorily by a thorough investigation of the ways in which it could be applied in practice. And it seems doubtful whether any other methods could be mentioned that would be likely to prove effective. It may be worth while, however, to refer to a proposal that has been made by Professor Carver. He urges[1] that 'if the labouring classes would develop a higher standard of comfort, and refuse to marry until they had attained it, and if the employing classes would develop a lower standard of comfort, and be willing to marry when they had attained it, we should have a better balanced population and a better distribution of human talent. This would reduce the incomes of the employing classes and raise those of the labouring classes.' So far as I can judge, the economic arguments on which this recommendation is based are sound; but, of course, it could not be enforced; and the part relating to the labouring classes might involve some difficulty. I suppose early marriages are largely due to the desire to have someone to care for the household. But, no doubt, this difficulty might be to some extent met by communal arrangements. It arises largely from the overcrowding of our population in large cities, a condition for which some modes of escape may be provided. The scheme of 'home-crofting,' which has been so ably advocated by Professor J. W. Scott,[2] might be of considerable service in this connection; and so might the

[1] *Essays in Social Justice*, p. 271.
[2] *Unemployment: a Suggested Policy.*

development of Garden Cities. But these are schemes that cannot here be discussed in detail. At any rate, it would be much better to try to meet the general difficulties about population by methods of this kind rather than by any attempt to enforce elaborate eugenic regulations or to resort to the kind of 'social surgery' that appears to be suggested by F. H. Bradley in an article in the *International Journal of Ethics*.[1] It can hardly be doubted, however, that even the degree of interference that is thus suggested would be resented by many lovers of freedom; but it is not easy to see how, without some degree of interference, the problem of population could be adequately dealt with by State regulation, or how the Family could cease to be 'disinherited.' The interference would not, I think, be at all comparable to that which was contemplated by Plato; but he wrote at a time when individual liberty was not much valued and when human life was not thought of as being quite as definitely marked off from that of animals as it is now generally regarded as being. I have thought it well, however, to indicate as explicitly as I can what seems the only possible way in which this matter could be effectively dealt with by State regulations.

It would probably be better to try to deal with it by methods of a more purely cultural kind. The cultural value of the Family is certainly not confined to the relations between husband and wife, to which reference has already been made. Wordsworth has told us that

> a child, more than all other gifts
> That earth can offer to declining man,
> Brings hope with it and forward-looking thoughts.

Certainly the association between the old and the young is generally a pleasure as well as a duty; and often it becomes in the end a help rather than a burden, both culturally and economically. Hence it would be a mistake to regard it purely as a matter for compensation and endowment. What is wanted is rather care and understanding. It certainly seems desirable that knowledge about sex problems should be, more fully than at present, a part of general education. They can be

[1] April 1894.

dealt with, as previously suggested, in connection with elementary biological studies without any harmful suggestions. Religious teaching may also be used for this purpose. Dean Inge has shown a noble example in this respect. And this leads me to refer, a little more explicitly, to the place of religion in relation to the Family.

Marriage has generally been regarded as an institution with which religion is more or less definitely concerned. This is due mainly to the cultural aspects that are involved in it, but also to the more general fact that, being a little world within itself, it is concerned with the whole outlook upon life and with its fundamental values; and, as we have already noticed, this appears to be the province of religion. Some of the difficulties that are apt to arise within the family are due to differences in this cosmic outlook. Such differences, indeed, are not necessarily fatal to the kind of harmony upon which the marriage relationship rests. On the contrary, if what has already been stated with regard to the cultural value of marriage is correct, some differences in this respect may even have a positive value. It is probably true that women in general tend to have a somewhat different cosmic outlook from that which commonly commends itself to men. They are perhaps apt to cling rather more to old traditions; but, if the view suggested by Comte is sound, such differences may be to some extent part of the cultural value of the institution of marriage. What is wanted is a more general recognition that it is possible to differ about religion, as well as about other questions that are less fundamental, without loss of affection or of the sense of civic obligation. The recognition of such difficulties, however, makes it necessary for us to refer explicitly at this point to the rather unpleasant problem of divorce.

That the monogamic relation is the only one that is generally satisfactory seems perfectly clear; and, if it is to be satisfactory, it must be permanent even in the face of considerable difficulties. The sanctions both of law and of religion are rightly invoked to ensure that this is normally the case. But it does sometimes happen that it has been, through some ignorance or inadvertence, or through some catastrophic change in the relations between those primarily concerned, formed in a way

that is felt to be extremely unsatisfactory, and that becomes more and more unsatisfactory the longer it lasts. To try to maintain it, even under extreme difficulties, may sometimes be a valuable discipline that ought to be undergone. But there are cases in which the difficulties are felt to be too great for patient endurance. This has been recognized even by peoples in whom the sense both of law and of religion was peculiarly strong. The Jews, for instance, had somewhat strict rules on family life; and it is generally recognized that family life was and is exceptionally well regulated in Jewish communities. Even such a Jew as Shylock is rightly represented as faithful and happy in his domestic relations. But divorce was, from an early period, recognized in the Jewish law as legitimate under certain conditions. Christianity was from the outset stricter in its insistence on permanence; but it also recognized one circumstance—adultery—in which it was justifiable. It is doubtful, however, whether in Christian communities the life of the family has been, on the whole, as happily maintained as it has been among the Jews; and, as is well known, so earnest and devout a Christian as Milton urged—even against what appeared to be the explicit declaration of the Founder of his religion—that there were other circumstances in which it not only could be justified, but was imperatively demanded; and he had, to the full, the courage of his convictions. But, of course, such a view involves great difficulties—cultural, economic and more purely legal. In order to deal with it as satisfactorily as possible in such painful conditions, it would be necessary to bring together the best wisdom that can be procured on all those leading aspects; and this is hardly possible without considering them in very close relation to one another. If there were a more generally recognized tradition of consultations between trained representatives of the three aspects of the commonwealth—such as has been previously urged as desirable on more general grounds—it would be more easy than it usually is at present to bring together the various relevant considerations, such as the care of children, the making of satisfactory financial arrangements, and the assurance that the breach had really become inevitable. Such a breach could hardly fail, in any case, to be somewhat deplorable and even tragic; but by these means it

might at least be possible to regard it as fully justifiable in all its essential aspects. It may be hoped, however, that improved methods of education may make such difficulties very rare. It has been suggested by some that the kind of education that is specially needed for this purpose is one that might with advantage be partly acquired in the period that generally elapses between the formation of an engagement and the marriage ceremony. In some countries—*e.g.* in Germany—it is more definitely recognized than it commonly is in our own that this is, to some extent, a period of probation, not necessarily involving any complete finality. It might be treated as a period in which some elements of adult education could be imparted. No doubt, some instruction about the relations between the sexes and the general problem of eugenics might be given more fully in school than has commonly been the case in the past; but perhaps some further emphasis on this might fittingly be made by clergymen or other cultural guides during the period of probation, at least in the case of prospective marriages at an early age. The seriousness of the undertaking would thus be impressed on the minds of those about to enter upon it; and reflection on this might help to prevent some grave mistakes. Perhaps even Milton might have profited by the advice of some spiritual guide older than himself. But, of course, it cannot be supposed that such advice would always prove effective. The suggestion of a 'Novitiate for Marriage,' as explained by Mrs. Havelock Ellis in her book on *The New Horizon in Love and Life*, goes farther than this and seems to me much more open to doubt. But it could not be adequately discussed in such a general survey as the present. But at least it seems clear that Professor W. E. Hocking is right in declaring[1] that 'those who, like Mr. Bertrand Russell, call for a type of marriage in which neither partner breathes upon the liberty of the other, call in effect for the abolition of marriage.' Much of the value of marriage is educational; and in all education there is an element of discipline. But human life is complicated. The importance of permanence has to be weighed against the importance of congruity.

It must have become apparent that the consideration of the

[1] *Man and the State*, p. 102.

various aspects of the problem of citizenship with which we have been occupied in the preceding chapters does not furnish us with any 'royal road' to their solution. They can only be solved by the gradual and often somewhat painful education of the human race. Hence it seems best to conclude our discussion of them by some more definite reference to the place and function of education in human life. That we should be led to this is no new feature in the treatment of social problems. Plato's *Republic*, which is still in many ways the great source of wisdom in dealing with such problems, may be said to be little else than a treatise on education; and it is not difficult to see that most of the greater problems of social life are at bottom educational. The reason for this also is not far to seek.

The general ground for the importance of education in human life lies, as we have already noted, in the fact that a human being is not born, as bees and ants and some other animal beings appear to be, with a definitely formed co-operative instinct. He has to learn to co-operate; and it might almost be said that it is at bottom the one thing that he has to learn, or at least the thing to which all others are subordinate. The many ways in which it is necessary for human beings to co-operate with one another could hardly be embodied in such definite instincts as those by which many of the simpler forms of life are guided. But even in purely animal life education often plays some part. Some species of birds may be seen teaching their young to fly. Even cats appear sometimes to give elementary lessons in the art of dealing with mice. But the art of flying is the one that most readily presents itself as an analogue of the arts that human beings have to acquire. It is often referred to in connection with poetry. Shakespeare's works were referred to by Ben Jonson as 'flights upon the banks of Thames'; and Milton, as we have already noticed, used the phrase '*πτεροφυέω*, I am letting my wings grow.' The whole of human life might very well be pictured as the growth of wings and learning how to use them. At birth we are little else than a bundle of potentialities, which become gradually actualized by co-operative activity. Thus, in the widest sense, all life is a process of education, though only some parts of it are carried on under definite and organized

modes of guidance. Such guidance may best be described as a process of initiation. It begins in the earliest years of childhood; and perhaps those may be said to be somewhat unfortunate with whom it ever ends so long as life lasts. All that it is possible to do here is to call attention to some of its most important phases.[1]

Some of the earliest phases have been well described by psychologists. Reference may be made, for instance, to Professor Stout's *Groundwork of Psychology*. They are characterized as 'learning by imitation'; and so far they are not much above the purely animal level. But gradually a selective process takes the place of simple imitation. The child begins to display individual preferences and capabilities, due apparently in the main to hereditary dispositions; and the chief object of education then becomes that of turning these to the best account with a view to his own individual development and for fitting him for the place in society in which he can be of most service in the general development of human life. The great imperative then becomes, in Carlyle's phrase, 'know what thou canst work at, and work at it like a Titan.' Few are Titans, but, except in very sad conditions of imbecility, it is generally possible to find some mode of activity in which one can accomplish something in co-operation with others—a qualification that perhaps Carlyle did not always sufficiently emphasize. The earliest phases of this development are generally carried on within the family, the cultural functions of which have already been referred to. In the early life of Carlyle, for instance, they were very conspicuously present, and continued to have a dominating influence throughout almost the whole of his life. But it is usually true that some of the main directing influences come from institutions of a more definitely educational character. The place and function of these can only be very slightly dealt with here.

[1] It is well (indeed, brilliantly) dealt with by Professor Urwick (*The Social Good*, chap. x.). But I think he exaggerates the evil that is contained in human nature. No doubt most of us inherit some impulses that tend to lead us away from what is best; and the imitative impulse, which is generally strong in childhood, is not always directed to the best models; but I believe most children are ready enough to 'love the highest when they see it.' What is important is that their attention should be drawn to it at an early stage.

What it is most important for us to emphasize is the general fact that education is concerned with all the main aspects of communal life, and that they have all to be considered in close connection with one another. There have been times when this was much less obviously the case than it is now. Even Plato, comprehensive and inspiring as his outlook was, took but little account of the economic aspect. He provided no definite education for the class that is most directly concerned with it; and probably—though he does not say so—he conceived that a good deal of it would be carried out by slaves, or at least by people under the direct control of the more cultural classes. In Mediaeval times, again, the three sides of the commonwealth tended to be somewhat sharply distinguished. The 'clerk of Oxenford' cared for little else than the cultural aspect of life—his books and his spiritual ideals. The Knight was a leader in the political life, which meant, to a large extent, the life of war. The member of a Guild—as skilled workers usually were—was educated for his work by apprenticeship and sometimes by travel. Women were educated, mainly within the family circle and by religious institutions, for domestic duties, moral obligations and the decencies and some of the refinements of life. In modern times such differentiations have to a large extent disappeared or are in process of disappearing. The work of life has become more highly specialized than ever; but there has, at the same time, been a growing recognition that the three main aspects of life are, in some degree, the concern of everyone. No doubt, there are many different views as to the extent to which this participation should be carried. Some think that everyone should, at a certain stage of his life, take part in the more mechanical activities by which the economic side is sustained, and be set free afterwards for the more purely cultural and political activities; that everyone should have a voice in the work of government, and that everyone—men and women alike—should have a considerable degree of understanding and appreciation of science, art, philosophy, and the general problems of morals and religion. At any rate, it is pretty widely believed that it is desirable for everyone to have some more or less adequate initiation into all the aspects of human activity. Such a view makes very large demands; and

it would not be easy to fulfil them at all fully. We have to endeavour in some degree to be all 'clerks,' all craftsmen, and all—in Heine's phrase—'knights of the Holy Ghost.' These claims are now made, and it is probable that to some extent they will have to be fulfilled. If so, we must be prepared for them by educational methods. How in detail this is to be accomplished is a problem for educational experts. In an old civilization like our own there are difficult questions of the adjustment of a somewhat antiquated machinery to the new demands that are made upon it. But, even in a comparatively new country like the United States, the problem of adjustment is felt to be by no means an easy one. The exact stages at which specialization can properly begin, the exact degree in which it is desirable that the education of people destined for different vocations should be separately carried on, the exact extent to which it is right that the education of boys and girls, men and women, should be substantially the same and carried on in the same institutions—all these are problems on which it is still possible for thoughtful people to take different views; and it would be futile to attempt to discuss them in such a general survey as the present. It is very obvious that they have to be dealt with by co-operative thought and tentative effort. It is obvious also that the general principle that must underlie such efforts is the conception of the supreme values that have to be realized in human life, and the way in which the subsidiary values may best be utilized for the realization of those that are most fundamental. William Morris was one of the best examples in recent times of the way in which the three main aspects of value might be harmoniously combined; but few can hope to emulate such an example, which also, as we have had occasion to notice, was not without its accompanying limitations.

In different countries different needs are naturally felt in education. Durkheim, in the last of his many interesting writings (*L'Éducation morale*), noted that in France the two great centres of social interest are the Family and the State. He contrasted his own country in this respect with England and Germany, in both of which there is a greater variety of modes of co-operative life; and he urged that what is chiefly needed in French education is to wean the young from the family interest

in which they are primarily centred, and to lead them by carefully devised methods of discipline to a fuller realization of their social obligations. In other countries different methods may be found efficacious. In England it is commonly thought that much can be done by co-operative games. 'Playing the game' has become a recognized phrase for fulfilment of the obligations involved in any particular situation. In Germany some reflective theory might be thought more efficacious. But it is somewhat rash to pronounce judgments, either favourable or unfavourable, on the practices of different countries. Demolins wrote a very interesting book on *Anglo-Saxon Superiority*; and apparently what chiefly impressed him was the superiority of the methods of Professor Geddes, who is not an Anglo-Saxon, and whose ideas were mainly derived from Comte, Le Play, and other French writers. People in all civilized countries are feeling about for better ways of developing the sense of social obligation. Mr. F. J. Gould has contributed greatly to the recognition of how much may be done by moral lessons of a formal kind. But the study of history and of the best literature may also contribute much. It is one of the chief arguments for the study of Greek and Latin that so much social and political wisdom is contained in them in a form that can be readily assimilated and that is often expressed with inimitable directness and literary grace. But there are many roads to wisdom, and I do not wish unduly to emphasize any one of them. What is wanted is a combination of the scholar's ideal of thoroughness in knowledge and insight, the craftsman's ideal of practical soundness in workmanship and the knight's ideal of courage and enterprise. Perhaps we should add the saint's ideal of absolute devotion to what is best.

Perhaps one of the dangers of modern life lies in the fact that so much can be got without very strenuous effort. William James's book on the 'moral equivalent of war' called attention to this possible source of weakness in modern life. It was what Nietzsche also seems to have had in mind in his injunction to 'live dangerously.' It may be that 'the unlit lamp and the ungirt loin' is what we have most to dread. Beyond such generalities as this, it would be difficult to lay down any definite directions for advance in education. It would be very rash to determine

what is the best education for any country or for any individual. It has often been thought that Shakespeare's education was defective. Ben Jonson said that he had 'small Latin and less Greek.' There has probably been some exaggeration about this; but it is not unlikely that the best of his education—and it was evidently a very good one—was that which he got by co-operation with his fellow-artists.

Probably in this, as in most other important aspects of life, what has chiefly to be guarded against is the two opposite tendencies to preserve outworn traditions and too hastily to set them aside. It is well, as Bacon urged, to stand on the old ways and constantly be on the watch for those that are better. There are always temptations on both sides. The Founder of Christianity, in his metaphorical fashion, represented them as the temptations of the Devil. It is vain to seek to 'turn stones into bread.' The traditions of the past that have clearly become useless or hurtful have to be ruthlessly set aside. It is no less futile to fall down and worship the devil—*i.e.*, as I understand it, the powers that are at present dominant. On the other hand, it is no less fatal to throw ourselves rashly down from any position on which we stand more or less securely. What we have to recognize is that, at every point in our social and individual existence, there is an upward and a downward path, and to try always to choose the upward one. But it is seldom easy to be sure that we have found it. There are no signposts on the way. All that we can say, as I have sought to urge throughout, is that it is the path that is seen to lead most directly to the gradual realization of all the supreme values of life. The fact that moral value or worth appears to be supreme among these must reconcile us to the view that we cannot look for a complete realization of them upon earth, but must be satisfied with the strenuous, and even sometimes the disheartening, pursuit. The Upward Path is not a 'primrose path.' It is the path of strenuous endeavour and well-founded hope. Any full account, however, of the grounds on which our hopes are ultimately based would involve a more complete philosophy of life, which would necessarily also be a philosophy of religion and of the Cosmos, than it would have been possible to give in such a sketch as the present.

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